

Ms. B.  
1.1  
1781




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1934



Land	200.00
Horse	125.00
wagon.	60.00
Wagon	60.00
ox, wagon	30.00
3 old wagon.	65.00
Yoke oxen.	40.00
2 cows.	45.00
3 tons english hay	40.00
1000 shabboards.	50.00
other lumber	5.00
1 slat	720.00
100 bushels potatoes.	30.00
2. Pigs	10.00
1 Barrel Beef.	10.00
Phrean Collins furniture	20.00
Life estate	100.00
	200.00

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Could, James,

Gift of  
Edward G. Fletcher



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# Municipal Law

3.

The word Law in its most comprehensive sense, signifies a rule of action, prescribed by some superior: and is predicable of all kinds of action.

By the Law of Nations is meant, that Law, wh<sup>ch</sup> Nature prescribes to Nations or Sovereign States - Quod natural ratio inter homines constituit -

But Municipal Law, of wh<sup>ch</sup> tis my present purpose to treat, has been defined. "A Rule of civil conduct prescribed by the Supreme Power of a State commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong.

This last part is Superfluous: and tis different from what is called Natural Law, wh<sup>ch</sup> is a Rule of Moral conduct and is binding upon the whole human family. Whereas Municipal Law regards its subjects as members of a Society or Community, regarding only those rights which arise in Society. "Pne Civile est, quod quique Populus sibi constituit - (or better) quod quique sibi Populus constituit and hence the difference is. Municipal Law is a Rule of Civil conduct - Natural Law, the rule of Moral conduct.

This Rule to correspond with the Definition before laid down, must be Permanent, Uniform and Universal 2  
By Permanent isn't meant Perpetual and Immutable - but that it is a constant Rule and not an occasional one i.e. continuing either indefinitely or for a certain period of time.

By Uniform is meant that tis General in its operation as far as it extends -

By "Uniform" is merely meant, that it shall be General in its operation as far as it extends.

By Universal is merely meant, that it shall be General

4. within its own limits, for local usages or Laws which prevail only within one part of the Kingdom, may constitute a part of the Municipal Law. 1. BL. 44.

Retroactive The Definition requires, that this Rule be promulgated, and yet it shall not be retroactive, by which is meant, a Law which affects transactions which took place before the Law itself was enacted. But there is a material difference between a Retroactive Law <sup>or</sup> a Retropositive Law, and those Laws which are deemed "Ex post Facto"

- 3 Dall 348. A Retrospective Law is any, which relates to Civil or Criminal cases, 385. 391. which has a retroactive operation. Whereas an "Ex post Facto" Law is applicable only to Penal Laws. Retroactive is a Genus of which "Ex post Facto" is a Species. The latter are always Penal Laws, and former are either Penal or remedial. It often happens, that both have a retroactive operation, this definition of Municipal Law virtually prohibits it.

Constitution of the U. S. This prohibits the Legislatures of several States passing any "Ex post Facto" Laws. by Art 1. Sec. 10. This subject is well explained in 3. Dall 386. 391. This Rule must be prescribed by the Supreme Power of a State, by which is meant the Legislature, or a Lawmaking power, and as power necessarily involves the right of repealing. 1. BL. 46. 90. BL. has laid down Rules as to the interpretation of Laws. 1. BL. 49. 61.

Construction of Laws. First words are to be understood generally kata their most popular signification Terms of Art kata to the interpretation of them by the learned in the Art. or in C. L. Technics, "Quilibet in sua Arte Credendum est" 1. BL. 59. 61. 4. Bac ab. St. S. 4.

Second. When words are ambiguous, it is proper to consult the Context and thus establish their meaning by their connection and also to compare the Law to other Laws relating to the



to y same. By y mode words "in se" dubious, are often rendered clear and intelligible.

Third. Words are always to be understood with reference to y subjectmatter. Fourth y effects and consequences of different constructions are to be regarded.

Fifth. The last, and that wh is "Instar omnium" and to wh the foregoing are subordinate, is. That y reason and spirit of y Law is y Law itself. "exante ratione legis cepit lex, is a maxim of C. Law, and (with y exception to y Penal Laws) when discovered conclusive in all questions of Construction. The reason and Spirit of the Penal Laws may be consulted to take a Party out of ym, but when he is without the letter, he can never be brought within the Spirit.

From y great Cardinal Rule, arises what is called y Equity of y Law and by apparent yt no other Construction can comply with y intention of y Lawgiver, for "tis sufficient, that y Reason and Spirit constitute y essence of the Law and not the moral Equity in its common acceptation. Co Litt 24. Ed. 1. Ed. 2. 3. Ed. 43.

Municipal Law is divided into Lex Scripta and Lex Scripta. The Unwritten Law includes not only General customs, properly so called 18. C Law, but also particular Customs of certain parts of the Realm and likewise these particular Laws yt are by Custom observed only in certain Courts and Jurisdiction 1. Ed. 63. 67.

The C Law is sometimes used as synonymous with y Unwritten Law, but improperly for such is only a branch of the Unwritten Law. wh includes three branches. The C Law. Local Custom - Particular Customs or Laws.

The Unwritten Law is a Genus of wh y C Law is a Species. The Unwritten Law is so called, because its original

o. institution is not set down in writing, like an Act or Statute. it don't derive its force, from an authoritative written record or Roll, but from immemorial usage, "whereof y<sup>e</sup> memory of man runneth not to y<sup>e</sup> contrary". 1. Bl. 64. 57.

The first and most important branch of y<sup>e</sup> Unwritten Law is the C<sup>o</sup> Law, "wh<sup>ch</sup> is defined to be "Rule of Civil conduct" founded on General Custom, and extending throughout the whole Realm or Community: as contradistinguished from Local Custom, or it is called Calus either to distinguish from other Laws as Statute, Canon, Civil Law, or because ty common to the whole Realm; ty mentioned by Edward the Elder after y<sup>e</sup> abolition of Provincial Customs and ty Alpled.


Customs. wh<sup>ch</sup> are y<sup>e</sup> foundation of y<sup>e</sup> C<sup>o</sup> Law must be immemorial. A custom to be immemorial must extend back beyond y<sup>e</sup> time of Legal memory. wh<sup>ch</sup> in Eng is dated from y<sup>e</sup> accession of Richard 1<sup>st</sup> (1189) So yt no Custom has y<sup>e</sup> effect of Law, ni it has existed without interruption from yt time. but y<sup>e</sup> positive rule regulating y<sup>e</sup> extent of legal memory cannot apply to us.


1 Bl. 68.  
2. Do 31.  
2. Role 267.  
5-

But if y<sup>e</sup> C<sup>o</sup> Law be unwritten where is it, or any branch of y<sup>e</sup> unwritten Law to be found. Bl answers y<sup>e</sup> inquiry "yt it is to be sought for in the Records of Ct of Justice in books of Reports and Judicial decision and in the Treatises of y<sup>e</sup> learned Sages of y<sup>e</sup> Profession. 1. Bl. 68. 2. Do 31. 2 Role 267.

These don't "per se" constitute y<sup>e</sup> body of y<sup>e</sup> "Lex non Scripta" or C<sup>o</sup> Law, as y<sup>e</sup> Roles of Parliament do or are, y<sup>e</sup> Statute Law. for if they were y<sup>e</sup> Law. it wd then be written Law and a Judicial Decision could no more be overuled, or questioned on a Statute. But y<sup>e</sup> is contradicted by daily experience and there is no impossibility in overuling them, but they are "Prima Facie" Evi of what y<sup>e</sup> Law is, and always have been so considered. 1 Bl 63. 70. 71.







These laws were expounded or ascertained by y<sup>e</sup> Judges of y<sup>e</sup> C<sup>t</sup> of Justice, y<sup>e</sup> depositories and Oracles of y<sup>e</sup> Law?

By y<sup>e</sup> term "Precedent" is meant a former Judicial Decision, on y<sup>e</sup> point in question and is, only Evi of what y<sup>e</sup> Law is - It is a Gen Rule, however, yt a Precedent must be followed, 1.306. 697. ni plainly absurd, or flatly unjust, and not to be overruled, merely quia y<sup>e</sup> reasons of it are discovered - It is authoritative and binding, ni shown to be absurd and unjust, and he who objects to y<sup>e</sup> Precedent or law of it, takes y<sup>e</sup>onus probandi on himself and must show its fallacy, absurdity or Injustice - In y<sup>e</sup> country we have a right to overrule all determinations in y<sup>e</sup> Eng Law - yt are clearly unjust - but farther y<sup>e</sup> n<sup>o</sup> overthrow y<sup>e</sup> whole System of Jurisprudence - This is indispensable to y<sup>e</sup> preservation of uniformity in y<sup>e</sup> System, yt L<sup>d</sup> Bull says "stare decisis" et non quæta moveri is y<sup>e</sup> most important maxim of y<sup>e</sup> Law -

But how did y<sup>e</sup> Law come into existence? In point of fact, it was built up by y<sup>e</sup> successive Judges of Westminster Hall. They were in fact y<sup>e</sup> Lawgivers - This theory may seem not to answer y<sup>e</sup> objection naturally arising out of y<sup>e</sup> definition. "yt y<sup>e</sup> Sovereign Power is wanting", but y<sup>e</sup> answer to y<sup>e</sup> is, Gen Usage sanctioned by adoption, for no number of J<sup>s</sup> however able they may be, can administer Justice without y<sup>e</sup> aid of y<sup>e</sup> unwritten Laws

of Rec

There are many decisions of y<sup>e</sup> Law, wh<sup>ch</sup> <sup>in</sup> <sup>the</sup> Court have originated, since y<sup>e</sup> accession of Richard II - 1180 - as y<sup>e</sup> doctrine of Escheator devised - wh<sup>ch</sup> was introduced in y<sup>e</sup> Reign of Edw, and indeed y<sup>e</sup> Mercantile Law was never fully understood, till y<sup>e</sup> time of L<sup>d</sup> Mansfield

These decisions, in new cases, then, do not create Law - but merely promulgate it. They are only regarded as Evi of what y<sup>e</sup> Law immemorially was, and wd have been declared y<sup>e</sup> same had y<sup>e</sup> question originated before y<sup>e</sup> time of Richard -

First -

The Unwritten Law by itself merely, never can furnish a complete remedy in y most simple Statutory business, and y Ct yd shd thus be called upon to carry y Law into effect, and <sup>must</sup> make an unwritten Law "pro re nata" or adopt one. I will Illustrate y by one Example -

Suppose y unwritten Law unknown, and a St made giving a Person remedy for an Assault and Battery, now a proceeding must be devised to carry it into effect, seeing there is no knowing how y remedy is to be recovered -

Suppose y it provides for a recovery by action, The question then presents itself, what is an action? It says Trespass, What is Trespass? It defines it - How is it to be framed - By Writ? What is a Writ - It then says any things more provided by St, what are they - as Pleadings, Issues, and how are they to be tried? Indeed from y commencement of Motion to y return of Final process, without an unwritten Law made or established, as they proceed, y Ct cd never regularly administer Justice -

Conformable to y view has y fact been; y entire branches of y Ct Law have been bnt into existence, long since Richard 1<sup>st</sup> and are immemorial, because they are Evi of what y immemorial rights of perfect obligation now are, and what they have always been.

Particular Customs are another y second branch of unwritten Law, are local usages, not common throughout y whole realm or State, but confined to local Limits - These in Eng are probably y remains of those provincial Customs, out of w<sup>ch</sup> C L was first collected by Alfred. On these are any particular Customs in y U. S. is doubtful -

Particular customs are not regularly recognized on Cts of Justice, as they are not presumed judicially to know yon - not being Public or Gen Rules -



When such is to be made a ground of claim or defence,  
it must be Specialy pleaded - i.e. it must be cited in y<sup>e</sup> Co Lib<sup>l</sup>  
roll or Plea, and its existence must be proved, as a <sup>175-</sup>  
matter of fact to y<sup>e</sup> Jury, like other matters of fact, <sup>Little Sec. 2. 65.</sup>  
y<sup>e</sup> same has been before determined in y<sup>e</sup> same Court. ( <sup>1. Bl. 76.</sup>  
& recorded) in wh<sup>ch</sup> question again arises, in wh<sup>ch</sup> case Doug 36.  
any further enquiry is precluded, Doug 360. <sup>176. 76.</sup>

But y<sup>e</sup> Customs of Gavelkind and Borough Eng are Exceptions  
to y<sup>e</sup> last rule & they need not be proved, being notorious & <sup>Little Sec. 2. 65.</sup>  
known to y<sup>e</sup> whole realm - They ~~must~~ be Specialy pleaded - <sup>176. 76.</sup>  
~~need it~~

That Sir Mr Blackstone shd have asserted y<sup>t</sup> y<sup>e</sup> Law Merchant  
is a particular custom (he in his first Book, he does  
so call it) seems very remarkable -

But y<sup>e</sup> proposition is certainly incorrect, as it is not in  
any one sense, nor has it a single trait of y<sup>e</sup> class of Customs -  
or Laws. It is indeed confined to particular subjects, but  
y<sup>t</sup> no more constitutes it a particular custom, y<sup>e</sup> n<sup>o</sup> y<sup>e</sup> law of <sup>1. Bl. 75.</sup>  
descent, wh<sup>ch</sup> is confined to particular subjects, and relates <sup>2. Bl. 453-454.</sup>  
only to heirs. The bulk of y<sup>e</sup> Law Merchant, th<sup>o</sup> governing  
particular transactions, is a Customary Law, extending throughout  
y<sup>e</sup> whole realm, wh<sup>ch</sup> of itself shows y<sup>t</sup> it is a branch <sup>Chit. 13.</sup>  
of y<sup>e</sup> Gen Common Law of y<sup>e</sup> Land and need not be <sup>Palk 135.</sup>  
Specialy pleaded - <sup>1 Bl. R. 198.</sup> <sup>2. Burn. 1216. 18. 22. Chit 28. 109-</sup>

Moreover y<sup>e</sup> Law Merchant ant<sup>ly</sup> attended with y<sup>e</sup> incidents  
of particular customs; for it need not be Specialy pleaded -  
nor tried by a Jury or proved by witnesses.

It is however said y<sup>t</sup> if new cases arise in wh<sup>ch</sup> it is doubtful,  
it may be proved by witnesses - But y<sup>e</sup> ant<sup>ly</sup> Q<sup>ue</sup>st<sup>io</sup>n to be offered  
to a Jury, to prove a matter of fact th<sup>o</sup> it has been so said,  
and I think contrary to principle - but y<sup>e</sup> it may take  
y<sup>e</sup> Q<sup>ue</sup>st<sup>io</sup>n of skillful merchants, as to what y<sup>e</sup> usage of merchants  
is - when they themselves are in doubt, as they wd consult  
a dictionary for y<sup>e</sup> meaning of ambiguous words -

And I suppose  
the lower lines of  
authority.

These customs must be new cases in wh<sup>y</sup> Law is doubtful.

Be says to make a particular custom good, y<sup>e</sup> following  
Co Litt 113 are necessary requisites - 1. Immemorial - 2. It must  
Litt L. 212. have been continued, 3<sup>d</sup> It must have been peaceable -  
J. Co 58. Fourth They must be reasonable or not unreasonable -  
36. 77. 78. Fifth Certain - Sixth Compulsory when established -  
and Seventh and lastly They must be consistent with each  
other -

1. Bl 78. 78 Particular Customs in derogation of y<sup>e</sup> Law, must be construed  
strictly. 18. They can't be extended by construction -

Certain particular Laws adopted by custom and used only  
in particular jurisdictions & Co, constitute y<sup>e</sup> third branch  
of y<sup>e</sup> unwritten Law 18. y<sup>e</sup> civil and ecclesiastical Law -

Particular customs are confined to Local Limits, but particular  
laws are not - It is in material where y<sup>e</sup> cause or  
action arose, provided it is bro't in one of those Co, in wh<sup>ch</sup>  
those laws are adopted 18. y<sup>e</sup> Military, Maritime, ecclesiastical,  
and academical in Eng, wh<sup>ch</sup> have adopted y<sup>e</sup> civil and  
Canon Laws, 18. y<sup>e</sup> civil and ecclesiastical Laws of y<sup>e</sup> Empire -

12 Bl 67. 79. 80. 82. 83.

In y<sup>e</sup> country there are no ecclesiastical Co, the Maritime  
Laws is adopted in our Prize Co, not only in its decisions,  
but its rules of Ev<sup>id</sup> -

I presume to say, y<sup>e</sup> civil and Canon Laws possess one  
original force in Eng - but they have become a part of y<sup>e</sup>  
C Law by adoption - wh<sup>ch</sup> may be either by immemorial usage,  
where they form a part of y<sup>e</sup> constitution Law or y<sup>e</sup> above Co -  
or by a legislative act, when they become a part of y<sup>e</sup>  
written Law of y<sup>e</sup> Land -

1 Bl 79. 80. See also Bl 411. 29.

The C Law of Eng and y<sup>e</sup> ancient Sto are "Norma Facie,"  
y<sup>e</sup> Law of y<sup>e</sup> country, but they derive their force by a similar  
sanction 18. by adoption or legal provision, for Papist



yt y Civil or Canon Laws as such, are unknown in ~~any~~  
our country, tho as far as they are incorporated with y Public  
Law or Laws of Nations, they may be here known; but  
as y Laws of England they have no more inherent force,  
in y<sup>s</sup> country, y<sup>n</sup> a Roman Code wd have in England—  
They are binding in no other sense; y<sup>n</sup> y Com and H<sup>t</sup>  
of Eng are binding— viz by Adoption—

Various <sup>States</sup> in y Union have adopted particular branches  
of y written Law of Eng, and whenever y<sup>s</sup> is y case, they are  
binding by force of y<sup>s</sup> Legislative proceeding and not by  
any innate authority they possessed,

They are thus made a part of y written Law" by Land,  
y<sup>n</sup> y Adoption by usage, and custom of the makes y<sup>m</sup> a part  
of y unwritten Law— But still as y<sup>s</sup> country was originally  
settled by y English, they brot with y<sup>m</sup> so much of these  
Laws as then existed, as their birthright, wh laws formed  
y basis on wh y superstructure of our code of Laws has  
been built—

So yt now y Law of Eng, is "bona fide facie"  
y Law of Every State in y Union, both quia it was their  
inheritance and sanctioned by adoption and immemorial usage—  
and hence our Cts can't reject it as plainly unjust, or  
inapplicable to y circumstances of our Country, in either of wh  
cases, it is clear. Cts of America wd not consider it binding—

Thus then an entire branch of y Law, wh from y different  
form of our government, can't apply to us, as Bishops and  
their Services wh only exist in Monarchical countries, and  
so of those precedents, y binding force of wh, has been much  
lamented by y Eng Judges, on account of their Injustice—

Every Country must have an unwritten Law, witht wh  
there wd be a failure of Justice—

A Ct of Justice can't administer Justice in one single case,

wilnt it, wh they must either adopt or reject "pro re nata".

A question formerly arose, in it was possible consistently with y Union, yt any State ed have a Co Law of its own: distinct from yt of England? This question has been so long and in so many of y State affirmatively settled, yt it is now mere speculative theory.

I have no doubt, but yt each St & might have a Com Law distinct in some respects, and y only plausible objection to y demonstrable proposition, yt they even cant have a custom old enough - to be legally a Custom and if we live to y end of Time, we cant have had y Eng arbitrary Rule - But that a Custom must go back to Richard's. 1.<sup>o</sup> is a rule entirely inapplicable to our circumstances, as we have then, not in existence -

The truth is, y objection lies in "a circle" for a question is, can we have a Co Law in any respect different? Objection says No - quia if we ed it wd be different from y Co Law as it wd not be sanctioned by age - I shant is no more, ym saying - We cant, <sup>quia</sup> we cant. But y question is settled by every State, having some sanction or rule on y subject from y Co Law of England -

II. The second branch of y Municipal Law, is y "written Law, or Lex Scripta" consisting of Sts. & acts of Legislature -

1. Bl 88. It has been made a question, how far y Eng Sts are binding in y country -

1. Co 20. This is pretty generally agreed yt y ancient Eng Sts are binding here on y same principle of y Co Law - of England - i.e. perma facit - and y reason assigned in y Eng Books, why any of these Sts are binding on us, is, yt our ancestors list

How 2. 52. over with ym, on y colonization of y country, as much of y

1. Tuck Bl parent Law as was in existence at yt time - They consider 38 1. 84 ym as their birthright, as did y Eng Jurists with respect to all their colonies -

666  
2. P. Mm.

75. In analogy to y distinction, professional men have

determined, at that time, before our revolution or at least before our colonization, are binding, but passed since our colonization, are not "Prima Facie" obligatory on us, the same of decision is used in "Regin & Her Eds", latter & the Regn are not even "Prima Facie", Law in yo country - The whole Law & Entails is derived from y<sup>e</sup> "De Donis" - All actions wh<sup>ch</sup> sound in Case are derived from Weston 2<sup>d</sup> - The St De Donis giving an action to Executors & Administrators, in y<sup>e</sup> case of a Tort, is adopted in most of y<sup>e</sup> States -

With respect to C Law, a distinction between Ancient and Modern wd be a Solecism - A Modern decision in derogation of y<sup>e</sup> Ancient rules of y<sup>e</sup> supposed C Law, don't make a new law - but only declares, what y<sup>e</sup> C Law originally was -

If y<sup>e</sup> year books are prima facie Evi of y<sup>e</sup> C Law of y<sup>e</sup> country, y<sup>e</sup> reports of y<sup>e</sup> decisions of Le Mansfield and others are equally so, for they have only declared what y<sup>e</sup> C Law immemorially has been, or in other words made y<sup>e</sup> application of an old principle to a new sets of facts - But y<sup>e</sup> distinction between Ancient and Modern Ls are perfectly intelligible -

When I speak of Ancient Ls being binding, I don't mean y<sup>t</sup> y<sup>e</sup> are binding upon our Legislatures, they doubtless can alter and retrench ym as they please, but I mean, y<sup>t</sup> our Ls are Prima Facie bound by ym - Where to sum up y<sup>e</sup> whole, y<sup>e</sup> Ancient St Law, in so far as our Legislatures have altered it, is Prima Facie our Law - But those Ls wh<sup>ch</sup> have been enacted since our "colonization", and unquestionably since our "revolution" are not so even Prima Facie -

In some of the States y<sup>e</sup> today, y<sup>e</sup> ing to, have been adopted down to certain periods by y<sup>e</sup> Legislatures, as in N<sup>Y</sup> and Indiana,



Different Kinds of Statutes

1. BL 85.62 All Sts are either Public or Private. 1. General or Special -  
A Public St is one wh regards y whole community at large -  
A Private St is one wh regards particular persons, and  
private customs. The application of y's distinction ant always  
obvious - And apparently plain - Most Public Sts regards  
y concerns of y whole State literally, as y St of limitation  
of Brands and of Usury -

82  
32  
sure!

So when a Statute enacts no person shall do or so, it  
is public - So Sts prohibiting certain acts and inflicting certain  
penalties upon whomsoever offends so ym., are plainly  
Public - In these cases, y distinction is vats obvious, y St  
being unlimited - But there are cases of Sts regarding only  
a particular class of men only, are Public, tho' y relation of  
be immediate - The rule of distinction laid down by Lord Coke,  
is, if y class of Persons to whom y St relate, amount to  
a Genus, y St is then Public, but if y Class be only a  
Species y St is Private - "Generale dicitur a genere, et  
Speciale a specie"

If y class to whom, y St immediately relates, be divisible into  
Species, or other classes, it is a Public Stat, but if y class  
is divisible only into individuals, it is Private. If then a St  
be divisible into parts, one of wh applies to a class, and y  
other to a Species, one part is Private, and y other Public -

Acts are deemed to be Public acts, wh y Judges will  
take notice of, witht being pleaded, those wh y Judges  
will not take notice of witht pleading, are Private Sts -  
A St wh relates to all y Subj<sup>ts</sup> in y Realm, is a public one,  
And y words of it are particular. Yet if y intent is  
General, y St is a public one and vice versa -

A St relating to all mechanics is Public, because they constitute a Genus, but relating to all Blacksmiths, is private because they are one of y Species, not constituting a Genus of Mechanics.

So a St relating to all officers capable of serving on juries, <sup>serving Legal Process</sup> is Public, but one relating to all Sheriffs, is private, for in all these cases, y species are composed of subordinate classes, but only resolvable into Individuals, and a St relating to an Individual or any number of Individuals, by whatever name they may be called, is a Private Statute. But a St authorizing all Guardians to sell y hand of all Minors, wd be Public.

Every St w<sup>ch</sup> regards y King, is a Public St, for every subject has an interest in y thing, for y same reason every St relating to y President of y U.S. or y State Government, is a Public St, tho relating to one man, because it relates to him in his official capacity. Robert 27.

Hence a St giving a forfeiture or Penalty to y thing or State is Public, because of y forfeiture & all Sts concerning y Revenue are Public, for y concerns y Public. Bac Ab Stat St. 12. Mod 249. 613.

10. Co 57. Plow. 65.

A St may be partly Private and Partly Public. Bac. Stat St.

It is not unusual for y Legislature to declare a St public, in its nature private and by y principles of y Law private. They doubtless have y power, and for y sake of y convenience, often exercise it, as it prevents y necessity of counting upon and receding y St, whenever action is brot upon it.

For a private St must be specially pleaded and proved as matter of fact, whereas y St is bound "ex officio" to take notice of a public St, without its being pleaded.

2. another division of Sts is, yt all Sts are either declaratory of y Law or remedial of defects therein. 1. Bl 85. <sup>Declaratory</sup>  
A declaratory act merely declares, what y Law is, and always has been - and makes no. new Law. Post 22.

Remedial. But a remedial St introduces a new Law, either by adding  
y superfluities or by supplanting y disused of C Law  
y St of Limitations and Bonds -

Explanatory. So may be added a distinct class of Sts, not taken notice  
of by any of y Books, being distinct from both of y former,  
and are called explanatory Sts, as 34<sup>th</sup> Hen 8<sup>th</sup> -  
and wh explain a former Stat, and wh are neither declaratory  
of C Law nor remedial of such, but form a distinct class -  
There are however but few such, most Stat with y exception  
of Penal Sts, being Remedial - Rac Ab. St. P. 6.

1. Pow. D.  
142. 140 -  
Falk 254.  
Cuth 396 -

Third

Third - Another coordinate division is of Penal and  
beneficial Sts. or Penal and not Penal - This last is also  
sometimes called remedial - Beneficial is here used by Ed  
Coke, as contradistinguished from Penal, and I think properly  
as there will then be no confusion, "Remedial, being ante  
used as opposed to "Declaratory"

Rac. Ab. A Stat inflicting a penalty or a punishment, of any kind, is  
St. P. 6 - a Penal St - a St not inflicting such, a remedial Stat -  
Cuth 414. 415 -

I wd here observe y word penalty in its most comprehensive sense,  
Cuth 414. is synonymous with punishment, but in its narrower sense,  
or in common parlance, it means a forfeiture or pecuniary  
penalty -

- 15 -  
A Stat then giving higher damages yn are required by y  
Falk. 212. rules of Natural Justice, wd seem to be penal, but they  
Cuth 414. are not so treated in y books, but as Remedial -  
1. Wils 125. as Comm D.A. 1. action on Stat. 1. Mils 126. 7. R.R. 239. Rac Ab St. P. 6.

All Sts giving costs, are considered as Penal and so construed -  
Falk 200. for they are unknown to y C Law and y St wh created  
Cuth 119. 22. yn (y first of wh was Gloucester C. Can. 1) so considered  
Conberback yn. Moreover they are given as a substitute for y old C Law -  
100 - amercement, wh tho nominally used in Judgmts, is  
4. Mod. 7. substantially abolished -  
Falk 205.

Rac Ab St. P. 6 -

Rac. Ab. Title Costs. St. P. 511 -



When y Plff pays costs, it proceeds on supposition, yt he made a false claim and where y Def pays, yt he withholds fromy 16-  
Plff his right - The old amercement was a Penalty -

An action brot by an individual in his own right to recover a Penalty, is a civil action, tho' y it on wh it is brot, be a Penal one - Thus y Ct of Eliz gives £10- to y Prosecutor for Pezuzg - an action to recover y sum, is civil, so y it is now, and Qui Tam actins upon it. Post 48-  
Comp 382.  
1. Mils 125.  
7 Pl. 257.  
4 do. 753.

What determine y character of y action, is y form of y Process. If it commence by writ or declaration, it is civil - but if by indictment or information, by wh y process is a Capital, it is Criminal and ys of great practical importance, as it regards y rule of Evi and amendments.

Civil actions are Transitory, but Criminal Local -

Fourth - All Acts are "affirmative or negative" y must be determined by y phraseology, and practically is of no importance, any more y to say, all Acts, all Acts are in red ink or black ink - Fourth

Doc Ab Stat G. 1 Pl. 89.

All actions between party and party are civil, tho' for y recovery of a Penalty, it is as much so, as an action for money had and received. Ibid -

In Eng every Act commences its operation from y commencement. 15. foot day of y Session of y Legislature, in wh it is enacted, ni come other time is prescribed for its commencement by y act itself - This arises out of y Legal Fiction, y Session continues but one day - as a Ct of Justice

La Ray 37, 1 Pl 316 Doc Ab Pl 3. Pl 349. 222 -

But y Act most often operates retrospectively -

It has been holden, yt Two Acts, enacted in y same session, and inconsistent with each other, will both be repealed with respect to y repugnancy, but there is no later decision, wh by y Act y latter in point of time, will repeal y former "pro tanto" and y stake is in y better opinion -

Doc Ab St B. C.

6. Mod 287

But

This last rule is generally adopted in y<sup>e</sup> country, and it is customary for Congress, to fix a time, when a new Stat<sup>e</sup> begins its operation -

Before entering upon y<sup>e</sup> construction of Stat<sup>e</sup>, y<sup>e</sup> 2<sup>d</sup> observe, with regard to y<sup>e</sup> character of y<sup>e</sup> Two Grand <sup>divisions</sup> of Municipal Law - y<sup>e</sup> 1<sup>st</sup> y<sup>e</sup> Stat<sup>e</sup> Law is a mere methodical collection of Positive Laws, too limited to meet y<sup>e</sup> vast variety of Cases of Municipal Law - On y<sup>e</sup> Contrary, y<sup>e</sup> 2<sup>d</sup> Law is a consolidation of Principles founded in Justice, and so extensive as to embrace all y<sup>e</sup> rights of perfect obligation -

It may be said to be a system of ethics, embracing all y<sup>e</sup> duties, wh<sup>ch</sup> are y<sup>e</sup> rights of perfect obligation -

There arises y<sup>e</sup> vast variety superiority of y<sup>e</sup> 2<sup>d</sup> Law, so highly deserving and surpassing all y<sup>e</sup> Paragone, it has been, or can be pronounced in its favour -

The Construction of Statutes - is y<sup>e</sup> process by wh<sup>ch</sup> we discover y<sup>e</sup> will or intention of y<sup>e</sup> Legislature - In y<sup>e</sup> construction of Stat<sup>e</sup> (especially remedial ones) there are three points principally to be considered. First, what y<sup>e</sup> old Law was at y<sup>e</sup> Enactment - Second. The mischief or evil 1<sup>st</sup> what y<sup>e</sup> old Law didn't provide for - Third, y<sup>e</sup> remedy applied to prevent y<sup>e</sup> mischief, hence y<sup>e</sup> "construction must always suppress y<sup>e</sup> mischief and advance y<sup>e</sup> remedy -

3 Co. 7. B.  
1. Re. 87.

The object of y<sup>e</sup> rule is, then, to ascertain from y<sup>e</sup> old Law y<sup>e</sup> mischief for wh<sup>ch</sup> y<sup>e</sup> remedy is intended to provide -

Thus by 26. 13 of Eliz., Leases made by bishops, for more y<sup>e</sup> 21. yrs are void - To find out y<sup>e</sup> meaning of y<sup>e</sup> 1<sup>st</sup> or index of any other, it is doubtful, a logical mind is led spontaneously to enquire, what was y<sup>e</sup> old Law - It enabled Bishops to make leases for an indefinite period of time - Then what was y<sup>e</sup> mischief in y<sup>e</sup> - The impoverishment of their Successors - (such leases have been adjudged good, during y<sup>e</sup> continuance of y<sup>e</sup> bishops in his See) and merely voidable on his death or removal, The Remedy is intended to prevent y<sup>e</sup> impoverishment by long Leases - Post 22 - 22 -

The two first are merely important as means of construction, for if a remedy is ascertained, y Law is ascertained - Stat. Law is y will of y Legislature in Writing - Com Law. is Stat worn out by time -

The rules of minute interpretation laid down in Pl. apply as well to St as to C Law - 1. Pl. 59. 61 - Bac Abr. P. 4 -

## Penal Statutes

must be construed strictly and <sup>19-</sup> <sup>8 mod 65.</sup> <sup>y intention</sup> their literal import, and so rigidly has y rule ~~for~~ prohibiting y construction of Penal Sts. been observed, yt it has sometimes been carried to a ridiculous extent - The St 1. Edw. 6. takes away y benefit of Clergy, from a man convicted of stealing horses. Stealing a "horse" was adjudged not within y St. So stealing a "Beeh" <sup>Leach C La</sup> was adjudged not within y St making dogstealing felony - <sup>107-</sup> <sup>Bac Abr. P. 9.</sup> This is merely from y benignity of y Law - not prevents y accused, from being punished when not within y Letter - The true meaning of y Rule then is, yt vs y Party accused, Penal Sts. <sup>4. Pl. 133-</sup> are to be construed strictly, but when for him equitably and liberally. E.g. y person accused is not to be adjudged guilty of y Penalty, when within y reason and spirit of y Law - <sup>4. Pl. 3-</sup> <sup>Leach Brown Law. 170 - 295-</sup> also clearly within y Letter -

Bac St. P. 6. P. 9. Row. 17. <sup>Do 233. 318. 87. 4. Pl. 133-</sup> <sup>Rawkins P. 61. 53 - 131. 138. 9-</sup> But tho' the is strictly within y letter, he is not to be adjudged within y reason and y spirit - Hence, y one may be punished like a hang out on y St, who is within y letter, but not being within y Penalty, a person who ant within y letter - If he ant within y letter, he ant within y Penalty,

Rawkins. 61. 53 - 131. 138. 39

Hence if a St enacts, yt whoever does "so and so" shall be guilty of felony, and it is clear, yt Infants, Idiots and Lunatics, and not be convicted, for tho' within y letter, they ant within y spirit -

The gen. and universality of y passion, in a Penal St, need include those (one they are specially named) who, by reason of any legal incapacity at y Law are exempt from punishment, for any act, not before forbidden by y C Law,

1. Rawkins  
Ch. 64-  
63-



for when it provides a Corporal punishment, it don't extend to Infants, nor expressly named, as whoever erects a nuisance, on a highway &c, shall be whipped - Infants are within it, nor named in words expressly.

Contra. Ld Kenyon who thinks it an arbitrary distinction.

It can't however be understood, yet y intention of y Legislature is to be disregarded in y construction of Penal Sts, as <sup>the</sup> Party accused: to make any distinction seems not y nature of Punish. The truth is, y intention of y Legislature when apparent, ought always to govern, and yet not be a sanguinary construction, as some have stated, but a just and legal interpretation. 4 T.R. 3 - where Ld Kenyon strongly animadverted on y practice - and Plow. 5. 6 - 86 -

21. This rule of strict construction has not however been uniformly acquiesced in - for there are as in wh y Eng Cts have gone so far, as to bring a person (not within y letter) within y spirit, as in y case of a servant who was made guilty of Petit treason, for killing y Master's wife, when y St only made it Petit treason for killing y Master and in y ground, yet y will of y Legislature, wh is y Law, not seems be evaded - (Gould Contra)

In conformity to y rule of strict construction, it has been settled, yet if y repetition of an offence, incurs augmented punishment, for y <sup>first</sup> offence, <sup>and guilty</sup> in he has before y commissioners of y second offence, been tried legally and convicted of y first - for there is no legal process, i.e. no record of Judgment vs him, wh is y only proof in y case.

Deac Ab St L. 9. 2. Paulstrade 349 -

1. Root 52. Note In y case, y accused must be convicted of y first even before y second is committed, or he will not be subjected to y increased punishment. This is a strong instance of y benign construction of Penal Sts - The first punishment, says y Judge, was intended as a

salutary discipline, and y offender ought not to incur y augmented punishment, till he has reaped y benefit of y first Lesson -

One may be indicted for several offences in y same indictment or presentment -

It has been holden in y Ct of Penn<sup>t</sup>, yt when y same person has been repeatedly indicted, by a continuance of y fines - as for a Surety, neglect he owes a rule £30, only one person can be sued for and recovered at y same time, The Ct<sup>s</sup> proceeding upon y ground, yt y punishment for y first offence being a warning to abstain from a repetition, he shd have suffered y whole of it, yt, before he cd be presented or prosecuted for y others -

Judge Gould Contra and it is extremely opposed to y Eng Rule -

There are some cases, in wh Penal L<sup>s</sup> have been extended by construction, but they are clearly departures from Law -

The Penal Laws of every Sovereign State, are strictly Local, whereas "Remedial Laws" are transitory - so yt y Penal Laws of one country, can never be enforced or noticed in another, so as to affect y rights of citizens in y latter, "A nation can't burnish faults committed out of its territories" - y<sup>e</sup> is a principle of Public Law, for there is no such thing as a community of Criminal Jurisdiction in Separate States -

The Penal Laws of every country extend to all aliens, while within yt country, and if they commit crimes there, they must be tried by y Laws, for they owe a temporary allegiance to them, as long as they reside within their Jurisdiction -

Reming 38-

Rattel P. 1, Ch 18. Sec 232.

As a man can't be punished corporally for one offence, attended with yt punishment in one State) ~~as another~~ in a different State, from yt wherein y offence was committed, so neither can he be punished for any other offence -

1.20 P. 123-  
3.72.733-

But one may enforce any right, <sup>black</sup> civil and not in its native local, as well in one State as another, regardless where y cause of action may have arisen, Thus if y give B a bond in Conn<sup>t</sup>, it may be recovered <sup>well</sup> in Pennsylvania, or London as in Conn<sup>t</sup>, and so of Slander and even Battery, as far as regards y civil remedy and indeed any other <sup>cause</sup> ~~kind~~ action, wh is in its nature, transitory.

It has however been determined in Conn<sup>t</sup>, and Massachusetts, yt if goods be stolen in one State, and transported by y Thief into another, he may be tried and punished in y latter upon y principle, yt he repeats y theft in every stage of his progress. This decision is in 1. Mass. R. 116. is to say y least a very extraordinary one -

2. John R. 477 79- This point however has been settled y other way in N. Y. and by Judge Patterson in y R. R. Ct, in y case of y U. S. vs Page. in 2 John 477 9- It was decided, yt a person apprehended in y State of N. Y. in possession of a Lease horse wh he had stolen in Vermont, sh<sup>d</sup> not be convicted in N. York. This was y case of y People vs Gardner - and these authorities I conceive, to be demonstrable of y Law - This I conceive right.

It has been <sup>suggested</sup> ~~suggested~~ on y principle in y Eng practice, yt where a felony has been committed into different Counties, it may be tried and punished in either. But y analogy can't. be extended to 2 different or separate Governments, governed by different Laws, and under different heads, like any two of y U. S. For in y different Counties of Eng - y same punishment are inflicted under y same Supreme Jurisdiction -

Further it is impossible for a Ct to know precisely - an in what we call a Theft is an offence at all in a neighbouring State - The man might have come honestly by y goods - and bringing ym into a State, is certainly no offence of itself. Turn over 10 leaves. at N<sup>o</sup> 2.



Moreover what we call Larceny, might in some places, as it was in Sparta, under certain circumstances, be no offence - and what is still worse, a trial, and acquittal, or Conviction in one State is no bar to an Indictment in another

Remedial or Beneficial Acts are to be construed liberally or equitably to effect the intention of a Legislature. No Acts not within the letter have been adjudged within the spirit and vice versa - For the rule operates both ways - as the 9th Edw 3d gives a remedy to prosecutors in certain cases, but says not a word of examiners, here it has enlarged, by stat, and decided in *Att. Gen. v. ...* - are valid, when the Act would be - So on the other hand the Spirit may restrain the letter - thus the 32. Hen 8th enacts, "that all persons, my service done," & the have decided on the words "all persons," didn't include Idiots, Feme Coverts, Infants &c, and the explanatory Act 34. Hen 8th sanctioned their decision

3. Co. 7.  
1. Do 123-  
11. Do - 71.  
3. Co. 430-31-  
Pov. 2. 140. 21.  
Roc. 16. 16.  
P. 6. 7.  
Syn. 334.  
1. Bed 300  
For Jan.  
141.  
Roc. 16.  
St. 4. 8.

Under the Gen Rule, clauses, sentences, single words" and even a legal Technical, are sometimes construed by Acts, when used in a Act in a sense different, from what they usually express. This may be illustrated by a whole class of Acts, arising under the words "void & voidable" a distinction of Primary Importance, as no two words of the Law have caused a greater latitude of discussion - Ante 10. 14 -

"void" is a mere nullity, can't be ratified, and is, as if it never had been, and 3<sup>d</sup> persons may take advantage of it - "voidable" stands good till avoided, and no one can take advantage of it, ni y Parties or their representatives - The true distinction is, if an act or transaction is declared "void" by stat, it is holden to be wholly void, if y mischief intended to be prevented was let in by construing y act as only "voidable" but on the contrary if y 'mischief wd. be let in by construing y word "void" as voidable, it may be and often is so construed - To exemplify y distinction, y St 27. Eliz. 1 to wit there is a similar one in most of y State provides "all conveyances by debtors to

1. B. 8. 87.  
3. Co. 58. 3.  
60-  
Can Eliz  
141. 207.  
10. Co 53-  
2. PR 606.  
7. Do 310-  
2. PR 413-

in fraud bona fide creditors, shall be absolutely "void"  
These y construction must be literally and strictly so, or y  
Stat is a dead or y Stat is a dead letter, or y only possible  
way in wh y end of y Stat, can be answered, is, to treat y  
conveyance as if it had never been - Here it construed as  
only voidable, y mischief wd be let in, and farther, as  
moreover third persons cd never take advantage of it,  
(I speak of Eas Creditors) Page 18.

2. St. 1131 -

5 St. 538 -

2. St. 1131 -

260 -

Boe. Abr.

21 -

Terms merely permissive in Stat Law - often construed as  
imperative, and it is a Gen Rule, when y it enables a Ct to  
do a matter of Justice between p. Parties, they are bound to do it  
in all cases falling within y Stat, and y enabling words have  
an imperative effect, thus y 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> Bill and Mary  
enacts, yt Ct may award costs, to y Def in certain criminal  
cases, in such case y Cts are bound to do so - and "may" means  
"must"

Where a St directs y doing of a thing, for y sake of Justice,  
or y Public good, y word "may" is positive - But y Cts  
don't extend to executive officers generally - in relation to y  
official acts, wh a St enables ym to do -

Gov Tho Hane of Pennsylvania made y correct distinction -  
the constitution of yt St enacts, yt y Governor, on y Representation  
of both houses of y Legislature, <sup>requesting</sup> May remove y whole bench of  
Judges, or any one of ym - When thus addressed, he refused,  
the legislature endeavored to constrain him, yt y word "May"  
in y act, meant "must" but his answer was, yt it  
meant "want" when addressed to a Governor -

10. Mod

202 -

Boe Abr

St. 1131 -

However a St tho "beneficial" taking away a Ct Law remedy  
is construed strictly, for such abridges y Ct Law - right  
of Citizens or subjects, Thus it has been holden at Ct Law,  
yt y action of Governor when concurrent with Treasurers  
is not barred by y St -



There is however one class of Sts, falling within y last distinction, wh are construed liberally, viz y Sts of Limitation, wh, tho' they take away y C Law remedy, are not so much for taking away y right of one party, as for quieting y long disturbed possession of another, and ergo properly called Acts of Repose -

Exclmt 58-

Path 421-  
4 Pl. 508-  
Runninton  
56.

Words of an explanatory St can never be extended by construction, they must be taken in their strict sense, for y office of an explanatory St is, to give y meaning of y Rule, and is in itself an act of construction, secus y terms might be indefinitely extended.

Coth  
3867  
Lath 534  
Bac at  
9646

In Sts yt are partly Penal and partly remedial, y two rules of construction have their & respective applications. Thus in y St of Fraudulent Conveyances, wh has a double aspect, one part is, to set aside y fraudulent act, and thus far "remedial" wh wd require a liberal construction, but y part wh inflicts y penalty, is Penal and must be construed strictly as must all Sts acting vs y offender -

1. Bl. 58  
Plow 57.  
Bac Ab  
St 4. 6.  
3. Co 82.

The different parts of a St are always to be construed, yt y whole may, if possible, take some effect, (same in Contracts) Hence it is always objectionable, yt any part is rendered nugatory to wh it is possible to give an effect, as if one word <sup>construction</sup> ~~word~~ wd make a word nugatory, and another give effect to it -

But where words are synonymous, either construction may be made, as repugnant to y body of y Stat - For repugnances are, if possible, to be reconciled and if irreconcilable, y latter part reveals y former, "instantly" and a Saving yt annihilates y whole body of y Stat, is utterly void, as Ct will never suffer a part to destroy y whole, or charge y Legislature with such an absurdity, but y power of a St may be qualified or restrained by a Saving -

1. Co 47.  
1. Pl. 63

But if a Preamble in y St, is contrary to y purview of y St.  
y Preamble is good and not y purview, quia such speaks y  
Latter intention- of y Legislature-

- The rules of construction of Sts are y same in Equity as at  
Law- 'Tis a very erroneous idea, yt Equity will give a.  
1. Foubt 22.  
3 Pl. 431.  
438- construction contrary to a Ct of Law- or rather different-  
True they may differ in construction as well as two Cts of  
Law, Two Cts of Law may, but y principles may, and must  
be y same in both- for y legislative can't mean different  
in Equity and in Law- The remedy may differ, y proceedings  
always differ but y construction of Sts and Contracts, is y  
same in Both-

A St contrary to Natural Equity is void- "Pura natura  
sunt immortalia" "immutabilia"

### Repeal of Laws

All Law on Com or Stat is repealable- and ys must necessarily  
be y case, for y power of making a Law, necessarily involves yt of  
repealing it - But y Legislatures of y Several States, can't repeal  
any constitutional provision- Whenever y Comon and Stat Law  
differ, y Comon Law is abrogated or repealed by such, wh  
is y later intention of y legislature, and upon y ground of its being  
of higher authority, as erroneously supposed, and a St is of course  
always considered of later date, yn y unwritten Law-

2. Litt 111. 115- So if 2. Stats differ, y elder is repealed, and still further  
Bac. 2d. 87. if two parts of y same St. are repugnant, y latter part, shall  
6. mod 287. stand alone, and repeal y former- or other "pro tanto"  
1. Pl. 33-

11. Co 63. Bac Abr St D.

And as every St is repealable, a clause in any St, yt it  
shall not be repealed, is void So an act making yt  
Bac Abr St D. it shall be repealed only by a majority of Two Thirds-  
1. Pl. 90- or Two Fifts- is void, for a majority can always repeal  
a former Statute. Moreover such clauses are in derogation

of y authority of a future Parliament - and a prior Legislature  
can't bind a subsequent one, nor by compacts wh are not  
properly Legislative acts, but conventional. Hence it is, a  
General rule, yt all acts in derogation of y power of a  
subsequent Legislature, are void - This principle may be b't  
to bear on some of y constitutions of these States, wh a majority  
have at all times, a right to alter. indeed y est statement  
of y proposition carries with it correction, and is self-rendent;  
for they can alter any legislative proposition by a bare  
majority of one vote -

But y constitution of y U S is a compact between distinct  
Sovereign States, and is a matter of convention attainable  
only in y manner prescribed

The Law never favours y repeal of a former Law by implication,  
Where 2 Acts are apparently at variance, Cts of Justice 11. Co 63.  
are so to construe ym, yt both may stand, if possible. Bac Ab  
and y repugnancy must be clear, to repeal a former Stat. St 2.  
for it is to be presumed, yt if y Legislature intended to  
repeal y former. yy wd have expressed yt intention -

It is laid down in y books, yt an affirmative Stat does not  
repeal y C Law - Bac Ab. Sc. G. C. Litt 11. 15. 24

This is not satisfactory by any means and perfectly  
unmeaning, for a Stat couched in affirmative terms, may Com. 2. Sc. E  
or may not repeal y C Law; if it is inconsistent  
with it, it repeals it, secus et don't This opinion  
is corroborated by many Cts, in wh it is confessedly  
repealed - The same may be said of negative Acts, 1. 206. 183-

The above has arisen out of yt division of the abovementioned,  
n't to say y least of it, is senseless

When <sup>it</sup> gives a remedy in any case, so in wh there  
was a subsisting remedy at C Law, and don't abrogate y C Law -



2. Burr expressly or impliedly, there will be two concurrent remedies,  
903.05  
Con D. ag. by It being called "cumulative"

4. Burr 2060- yn is inflicted by an Elder Stat, y elder is of course repealed,  
decree 68  
252- for it aint to be presumed yt y Legislature cd provide  
Bu ab Ld. two distinct Stat punishment<sup>s</sup> for y same offence-

10. Mod 33% If a Penal Stat inflicts a lower ~~It~~, yn is inflicted by  
y C Law - for a given offence, y C Law is repealed by y  
Buc Ab. H. Stat, and y lower punishment<sup>s</sup> can only be inflicted,  
4. Burr 2026- for clearly where y legislature lessen a penalty, they  
4. Ab. 178- mean to repeal a higher one -

But if a Stat inflict a higher punishment yn y C Law,  
for y same offence, y C Law aint abrogated, y St punishment  
being only accumulative, and y offence may be punished  
under either - The St of Elvi furnishes an Example of  
y, wh furnishes punyng more severely yn y C Law,  
and yet y prosecution may affect either - But it has  
been asked, is there not as high Evi to repeal y old  
Law in y last case as in y other? I confess I think  
there is, and y distinction is founded altogether on  
y benignity with wh Penal Sts are construed -

But then, observe Then, y marked difference between a  
St inflicting a higher and a lower penalty, yn was  
done by a former Stat, or by y C Law -  
An higher or lower, y former Stat is repealed, but at  
C Law, there is a difference, so yt if y Stat penalty  
is lower yn yt at C Law - it repeals it, if higher, it  
aint repealed -

It is laid down in some of y books yt an affirmative Stat

don't <sup>repeal</sup> ~~appeal~~ a Prior affirmative Stat, This is inevitable,  
and to me appears, an arbitrary and unmeaning 1. At 58  
distinction, wh I have never seen satisfactorily explained.  
An explanation is attempted in 2 Thow 30, wh only  
confounds confusion

. . . . .

The true criterion an one repeals y other, or not, is, an  
y latter is inconsistent with y former, for if it be inconsistent  
with it, y latter repeals y former, tho both are affirmative

But these rules, relating to <sup>re</sup>appeals, founded in repugnancy,  
apply only to constructive appeals, and not to express  
clauses, for where there is an Express repealing clause 1. 2 Bl. 30  
there can be no question. When y repealing St is itself <sup>repealed</sup> Bac. at 9. 2.  
repealed, y <sup>original</sup> ~~criminal~~ Stat is "ipso facto" revived.  
On y other hand, if y St, wh has been repealed, is <sup>revived</sup>  
y repealing is void, so far as is repugnant to y first-  
pro tanto!

The repealing Stat becomes void by y reestablishment of y  
repealed Stat, by implication, for in ~~the~~ either case y intention  
of y Legislature is evinced.

2. 6.

If one Stat is grafted on another, for y better execution of y  
former, y repeal of y former, virtually repeals y others -  
So, if a St be revived, y explanatory acts attendant upon  
it - are revived with it, and all its "para materia"  
are to be taken together, as if founded on one Law -

So where an action founded on a former Stat,  
is given in a new case, every thing annexed to y  
action is also given -

When one St is expressly repealed by another, it makes a  
different provision on y same subject, and a provision for  
its own continuation for a limited time, y former St don't  
revive after y lapse of y time, in it was specially  
provided for, by y latter, 3. East 205. for y express clause



shows, yt y repeal was not intended to be limited to  
y duration of y other provisions.

Bac. Ab. 9.2. Where a St has been repealed by 3. or any number of  
repealing Stats, and only 2. of y repealing Stats are repealed  
y 3<sup>d</sup> continues in force, and repeals y original Stat.

Ibid. If a Stat, yt has been repealed, is revived, y repealing act,  
if merely a repealing one, becomes void "in toto" but if more,  
it is only void, "pro tanto" for it is impossible, yt y repealing  
clause shd remain in force. When a Stat is repealed,  
all acts done under it, before y repeal, are good and lawful,  
for y repealing of Laws only makes ym cease from y  
Banker 233. time of y Repeal. But it is laid down in some of y  
Eng Books, yt if a Stat is declared to be void, all acts  
made under it, are absolutely void and null.

This ant<sup>o</sup> admissible, and won't bear a moment's scrutiny.  
It is too destructive of peace and policy of y State,  
to be tolerated, Indeed it wd be punishing our obedience  
to y Laws.

Is a general rule, yt a Stat can't, nor ought not  
to have a retrospective "operation" and indeed such is  
forbidden by y rules of y Municipal Law, for y rule  
wh forms a Law, is to be prescribed.

1. AC. 22. Hence, if a penal Stat after having been violated, and before  
451. judgment is given vs y offender, is repealed, and a new Stat  
1. H. 1. 1. 1. made on y same subject, y offender ant punishable under  
Bac. at 166. either, ni y former is expressly repealed continued in force,  
92. 23. as to all acts and offences committed before it was repealed  
by an express clause to yt purpose, For y offender cant  
be sentenced under y first, for by y supposition, there is no  
such Law in Essex, nor can y latter Stat affect him, for  
if it did, not being in existence at y time y offence was  
committed, it wd operate "Ex post facto" wh is forbidden  
by y Constitution of y State.

There was a case in N York, where a Clerk, in y Post Office,  
was indicted for repeatedly <sup>obstructing</sup> stopping y mail, but post y indictment  
and before y Trial, there was a Law passed, altering it, as it  
stood at y time y offence was committed, and he ergo escaped  
punishment entirely - M G vs Treadwell.

This rule is founded on y broad principles of Criminal Law -  
Thence it has become common to insert in repealing Stat, yt  
y repealed Stat shall continue in force, as to all acts, committed  
before y new one was enacted.

But a Stat thd not essentially retrospective, in its provision,  
may become so indirectly and its retrospect can't be prevented,  
as if a contract is made to do an act, lawful at y time,  
but wh before y time of performance becomes unlawful by 1. Stat.  
Stat y contract is annulled, for y Covenant <sup>or</sup> can never  
be compelled, to do an unlawful act, and, or is perfectly  
consistent with y retrospective prohibition. Thus if a contract  
shd be made to import certain commodities, and before y  
time of importation arrives, an embargo, or a non importation  
act, or a declaration of war, shd render y performance  
unlawful, y contract wd be annulled, it wd be to y same  
as an inevitable accident - (Contract 50-51-140)

But here it is to be observed, yt y Stat in terms is prospective, as to  
a future illegal act, for y rule is not, yt y Parties shall  
not be bound by y performance, when y act was lawful,  
but yt performance can't be compelled,  
if one contract

On y other hand, not to do a certain, wh a subsequent Stat  
makes it his duty to do, y contract is annulled -  
as if one shd contract to serve another, and not depart  
without his permission, and he is ordered into y Army -  
here y Law annuls y contract, and every contract must  
be made subject to ys latent conditions -

If however one covenants to do an unlawful act, a subsequent  
to making y act lawful, don't annul y contract, for  
there is no inconsistency in obeying both. Ibid.

If a contract illegal by Stat, is made while y Stat is  
in force, a subsequent repeal of y Stat, can't give validity  
to such former contracts, nor can it be made good.

28.

Instances of y kind occur under y "Stamp act" making  
all contracts without Stamps void, tho' y act was repealed  
1810, yet all made without Stamps, while y act was in force,  
were as much void after y repeal, as before, for we are  
to look at y State of y circumstance, when y contract is  
or was made - 1. H. B. 65-

If complete performance of a lawful agreement be made illegal,  
by a subsequent Stat, yet if it can be performed in part

Plow 284 legally - a performance of y part will be enforced in Equity -

2. H. B. 581- and I trust in a Ct of Law - if y Ct adapt a remedy

163- to y case, - Thus where a Dean and Chapter covenanted

1. Lord 249- to make a lease for 99 yrs, and before y lease was

3. P. 353- made, leases by Stat were made void for a longer term,

2. P. 31- ym 40 yrs - These y Contract obliged ym to make a

1. D. 446- lease for 40 yrs -

Little Contracts 52-

Princ of Chy 51-51.

This is sometimes called performance by sales "Cy. sales"  
"as near as may be"

So also if a complete or literal performance is prevented  
by act of God, y rule is y same, and performance may be compelled  
by law, Thus if a man covenants to convey a house and lot,  
and y house is burned by lightning, he may be compelled to  
convey y lot but y other party isn't bound to accept it -

Art. 1. of W. Const of U. S. forbids y States legislatures  
making any law, impairing y obligations of contracts, 15.  
"ex post facto Laws" now it has been a question, on a



a Stat making a contract void, conflicts with y<sup>e</sup> Section  
of y<sup>e</sup> constitution - I apprehend, y<sup>e</sup> article has no bearing on  
Such, so if a contract to do an act, afterwards made  
unlawful, were not annulled, y<sup>e</sup> consequence wd be y<sup>t</sup>  
individuals by contracting with foreigners, might curtail  
y<sup>e</sup> powers of y<sup>e</sup> Legislature, - However, I conceive, y<sup>e</sup> Section  
applies to those acts, wh directly make void contracts between  
individuals, and not those whose annulling prohibitory effect,  
is merely consequential, and y<sup>t</sup> an act of y<sup>e</sup> nature, whose object  
is y<sup>e</sup> public good, is to be void merely, quia an individual  
may suffer, is absurd -

That part of y<sup>e</sup> constitution relative to "ex post facto" laws, has  
no concern with y<sup>e</sup>, for they are Penal retroactive laws under  
y<sup>e</sup> head. it may be observed, y<sup>t</sup> Insolvent laws under our State  
Legislatures, may be made so far as to discharge y<sup>e</sup> person of  
y<sup>e</sup> Debtor, but any process discharging his future acquisitions,  
or property, is void - This was determined in y<sup>e</sup> Supreme Ct of  
the States -

L. Wharton  
122.203.  
S. Do 131.

It is laid down y<sup>t</sup> a Stat requiring y<sup>t</sup> to be done, wh is  
impossible, is void - 1. Bl. 91 - So also it has been said by  
Ed Coke, Holt and even Bl, y<sup>t</sup> a St contrary to reason or  
divine Law is void - But y<sup>e</sup> I apprehend, is indefensible,  
as there is nothing about wh men more widely differ, y<sup>e</sup>  
in these opinions of y<sup>e</sup> divine Law - y<sup>e</sup> is now exploded.

- 29 -  
87-9-  
S. C. 118-

If a legislature choose to make an unreasonable Law, no Judge  
can set up his judgment and overrule such - But I wd  
lay down y<sup>e</sup> rule. Thus, "If y<sup>e</sup> collateral consequences are  
demonstrably unjust, y<sup>e</sup> Ct may avoid y<sup>e</sup>, if they can, by  
giving a reasonable construction to y<sup>e</sup> Rule, but if y<sup>e</sup> intention  
is plain, they must so administer or leave y<sup>e</sup> bench -

1. Bl. 41.  
1. Bl. 11  
23-

An a St opposed to y<sup>e</sup> Const. of y<sup>e</sup> Land was void, or ed be  
so declared by Cts of Justice, has questioned for some times,  
(wh is a matter suspensing) is <sup>not</sup> a difficult Question -

There is no doubt, but yet laws are void - and Cts. of Justice must so decide, for if a Judge whose duty it is, to enforce and uphold a Law, can't decide as to their constitutionality, a constitution is a dead letter -

The constitution is a part of a Municipal Law of a land, and paramount to all legislative provisions, and as Cts. may declare a later Lt to repeal a former one, repugnant, or void, so they may declare a Stat void wh is repugnant to a constitution - There is no more difficulty in one case, or in another. Even a King may decide upon it, under a feudal system, & Cts. This question has been repeatedly argued and decided in the Supreme Ct of a State - & wh all constitutional questions may be carried - 2. Federalist 78 - Cts can decide on a legality of Laws - No. 78 -

It has been questioned, how far a Lt authorizing a Ct of Jurisdiction, in a particular case, or cases, vests a

1. Particular Jurisdiction of an anciently established Ct of General Jurisdiction - 8. B. 114.
9. Co 118. The answer is, if a Stat make a new Law, concerning an old offence, and appoints particular Cts to execute it, & Talk. 364
10. 1042 C Jurisdiction of a Ct of general criminal Jurisdiction is not
1. Moily 7 descended by it - but there is a concurrent Jurisdiction for a Jurisdiction of a Ct of Gen Jurisdiction can't be ousted by implication - The same may be said of our State Ct in a county - if a Lt enacts, that all partic. ancient crimes of a particular nature shall be tried by a newly established Ct - This wd not exclude a Jurisdiction of a Corresponding higher Ct in a County -

The Stat in these cases says, that they shall be tried by a particular <sup>Ct</sup> and don't say, that no other Ct shall try them -

### X

- Coro 524. But if a Stat creates a new offence, and establishes a new Jurisdiction for its trial, it wd perfectly settled upon, & Jurisdiction of a Ct of Gen Jurisdiction is excluded by it -
1. Salvi 186 or not. The latter opinion seems to be, that it is excluded in a last case, for here there is no ancient Jurisdiction to be ousted by implication - This is confirmed by all Books -
- End. 630.



If a Special authority is given <sup>by Stat</sup> to certain Persons, affecting  
y property or rights of individuals, yt authority must be strictly  
pursued, and must appear on y face of y proceeding, or  
proceedings must be void, and y Party acting under it  
a Trespasser. - Cowper 26

If a Stat enables a certain body of men not incorporated,  
to do certain acts by a Majority, and constitutes a certain  
number of ym, a Quorum, a majority of y Quorum, not  
amounting to a majority of y whole, will not bind ym  
The principle seems to be, yt as those bodies are men  
creations of y Stat, they have no other power yn those  
expressly given ym - or necessarily incident to ym -

The rule is now yt a majority of a quorum ant satis -  
This ant applicable to Corporations - ~~recesses~~

Authority of a Private nature conferred by Stat on two 2.  
individuals, is Joint, and not Several merely, <sup>ni otherwise</sup>  
expressed, and upon y death of one it don't survive to y  
other. 1. Root 67. But if y authority be of a public nature,  
it is Joint and Several, so yt on y death of one, y authority  
will survive to y other. This contemplates ministerial  
acts only - and not Judicial, ni expressly named

If a Power of a Public nature is given to Several, y act of  
a Majority of y whole number, (all being Present) in y y  
execution of y Power, is y act of all, y Majority, however,  
have no power to act secretly, but if y others are notified,  
their act will be binding, <sup>seems y wilful absence of one</sup>  
might defeat any measure -

Secus if y authority were private -

These rules don't apply to Bodies Politic, of Corporations, ni  
wh a majority of all present, will bind y whole, provided  
there be nothing in y charter of incorporation - y  
meeting being legal, all being duly summoned, y number present

constitute ~~for~~ "pro re nata" y Corporation - Due if y meeting is regularly convened, is it SUFF -

"Vote" y word "void" is often construed "voidable" - and often taken in its third sense -

It has been said, yt "void" might mean, might be construed voidable - Secus if y words "to all intents" were added - as unit y Criterion, for void to all intents, has been construed "voidable"

Rule, If y Stat or y object of y Stat wd be defeated by adjudging y act "voidable" it must be adjudged void - Secus it may be adjudged "voidable"

Several Acts relating to y same Subject, are all to be considered in construing w one - Plow. 266 - 1d Ray. 1028 -

Rules of y construction of Stats, are y same in Equity, as in Law - y mode of enforcing y Law, is different -

Of Pleading Acts or y mode of prosecuting on y m -

<sup>Phrase</sup> instead of Plurals The books on y s Subject, are more confused, yn on any other branch of Pleadings, In some cs. they are irreconcilable - arising in a great degree from looseness, or inaccuracy of Language - and from a promiscuous use of y "<sup>Plurals</sup> Plurals" "Pleading" "counting upon" and "reciting a Stat" - which are specifically different and totally distinct -

Merely Pleading a Stat, consists in nothing more, yn alleging y facts, wh bring y Case within it, and for y s purpose y Stat need not be named or referred to, thus to plead y Stat of Limitation, in affirmis - "Def merely says, "non affirmis" infra Sex annos" So to plead y Stat of frauds, &c. y Def don't refer to y Stat, but merely says, there is no note or memorandum in writing, Signed by him - or not his act in writing, for forms. 3 1d Rayma 11. 221 - for use. - 2. Ch. Plds.

- Counting upon a Stat, consists in an express reference to it by y words, in virtue of y Stat. or <sup>in</sup> y form and effect of y Stat in such case &c, and he who pleads a Stat, also sometimes counts upon it without being required - for they are distinct acts -

Reciting a Statute, differs from both y former, and consists (as y name imports) in quoting y Statute, or its Contents, True a St is sometimes pleaded by reciting it, together in connection with y statement of facts, wh bring ym within it, but pleading a Stat don't necessarily imply a reference to it, or recital of it -

It is a General Rule - yt Judges are bound *ex officio* to take notice of a Public Stat, ~~but~~ they are not set out <sup>in</sup> ~~in~~ y pleading, for if y facts are satis stated, y Cts taking Judicial notice of y Stat, will ap'ly it to ym - if they come within ym it, and if a public Statute be denied, it need not be proved, for y Judges are to know it Judicially. But if a private Stat, y Judges are not bound to take notice of it "ex officio" and can know nothing of ym Judicially, ni pleaded and recited, for it is a mere matter of fact, a private muniment of right, of wh y Judges are no (more) presumed to know Judicially, ym of y existence of a deed note or any Specialty, and of course, no advantage can be taken of it - ni specially pleaded. and such may be denied by y Plea - "Nul Fil Record" in wh case y party must prove it -

4. Co 7b-  
Cra Eliz  
23b-

1. Bao. 38-

11. Co 57-

2. Mod 57-  
2. Role 450-

over 2 or 3

To take advantage of a Private Stat, it is necessary at C Law - to plead and recite it and if an action is brot on such, it must be set out in y declaration, It must end upon as a Specialty, i. for if it aint set out, no cause of action appears in y declaration -

4. Co 7b- Bao. St L 2-

10. Co 57. 2. East 351-



But a public Stat when required, <sup>to be pleaded.</sup> as it sometime is, when  
 Cro. Elr 236- used by way of defence need never be recited, tho' they are  
 1. Stat. in. Ch. 2. s. 100 sometimes counted upon - Doug. 30. La Ray. 382.  
 + Co 70-  
 Duc. W. Sc. 62. 2. 1. 12. C. 57. 2. East 347. 341-

The pleading, containing a recital of a Public Stat, is so  
 unnecessary, yt Ld Mansfield said yt he wd be a Reader  
 down to half a letter in such a case, It unnecessarily increases  
 cost, and lengthens y Record, as y Judges officiously notice  
 its provisions - It is also said yt a Public Stat may be given  
 in Evi, under y General Plea - But y language is incorrect -  
 and a legal dogmatism -

36- The misrecital of a public Stat (in some of y books) is said  
 to be fatal in many cases, and even after verdict, tho' it need  
 not be recited - Cro. E 245. 236. Comp. 474. Bac L. 5. 10.

By some it is said yt a misrecital in an immaterial part,  
 is cured by verdict - Cro. Ch 136. 372. Bac L. 5.

Ld Raymond The True Rule in y above case as laid down by Holt is,  
 382. Cro. Elr 236- at a misrecital of a Public Stat is not fatal, in y party  
 245. "lies himself up to it" (i.e. y Stat) as recited, as by y words  
 Cro. Ch. 232. according to "or as y Stat recited, & agreed" But if he  
 2. McNally merely concludes with y words, "as recited" or similar terms -  
 En 516 it aint fatal, for y Judges will treat y misrecited one,  
 Doug. 90. 82. as surplusage, and "ex officio" notice y true Stat -

37 The misrecital of a Private Stat is never fatal after verdict,  
 nor upon Demurer in Common Form, for in both these Cs,  
 y Ct having no knowledge of y Private Stat, "ex officio"  
 can't know, an it is misrecited or not - Indeed it is,  
 Due to Ld exactly y same w a note of hand - or a bond wh must  
 be produced to make a Compansor - P. 658. La Ray 382  
 2 McNally 517 2 Mod 241. 1. Pelum 356 -

1. 7 9 07. 88 7 07 9 9 / ✓ 2 07 12 2 07 9

of argo here is a misrecital, advantage must be taken of it,  
in either of y following three ways, First By "nul Tel Record",  
when y Stat wd not support y declaration. Second, by claiming  
y Error and Pleading - y Stat in abatement. Third - by craving  
y Error, reciting it, and then demurring to it, pleading Specialty  
y variance,  
quere Banance!

When a Public Stat is to be used by way of defence, it need not be pleaded specially - but when it is relied on to defeat Universally  
a Specialty, it must at Law be specially pleaded, - Thus  
a debt on bond, were must be specially pleaded to 5 Co 58 B  
take advantage of it - Ed Roll says, y Law deems us  
highly of a Specialty, & it must be pleaded specially - but 3 Salk 381  
if there <sup>is taken</sup> reason, y Gen Issue, never ed in a Specialty - Robert  
The true reason, is, yt issuery is inconsistent with y plea 5 Bac  
"non est factum" and whenever y defence furnished by y Stat 4 B  
is inconsistent with y Gen Issue, it must be specially  
pleaded - as y Stat of Limitation - Bac issuery 4 B  
Chy on Bills 198 - 1. Saunders 283. n. 2. Ed Ray 153. Exp D 147 -

I have above stated yt in declaring upon a private Stat, it is  
it must always be recited, but y recital need not be  
literal, tis satis, if it be substantially declared upon, not always  
as Lawyerlike - 4 Co 76 - 2. Mod 37. 2. Pole 468.  
as recited -

In no case, is it necessary to recite y Title or Preamble, 3 Co 63  
of a Stat. Such being no part of y Stat, but merely Bac  
y name and reasons on wch it is founded - L. 3. 5

It was once held yt a misrecital of y Title of a Public Stat, Ed Rayns  
was not fatal on demurres, but more suspicious, & has  
since been determined Sever, not latter decision, I think, is  
correct, for y Party two himself up to y title Stat pleaded - Bac  
6 Mod 62 - 324 -

they shd both be qualified in y manner Ed Roll prescribes  
ante 30 -



38. When a Stat is partly Public, and partly Private, it must be recited.

10. Co. 57. 1 Col. 227. A variance in y description of a Stat or record, is fatal.

3 Co. 63- Corp. 471. There y recital of Stat is necessary, & plea must contain y date of y Stat and y place where enacted. or it will be ill on Demurrer - L. 8. 1. 2

Co. 211. Co. Ch. 232. Bac. St. L. 5. 2. Hawkins 240- Corp. 474-

"Null Tiel Record" can never be pleaded to a Public Stat,

4. Co. 76- 2. Mod. 57- as its existence can never be made a matter of fact but if a private Stat is misrecited, "Null Tiel Record" may be pleaded, and must prevail, for its existence is a matter of fact - Co. Elri 355.

Bac. St. L. 3. 8. Co. 28-

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Carth. 382. It is a Gen Rule in pleading on a Public Stat, y Pleader need not count upon it, he need do no more y state those facts, wh bring y case within it - 1. Bac. action Qui Tam B. 38-

There are Three exceptions to y above Rule -

1. Com. D. First if there are no concurrent remedies, ne at Co Law, action on St. G. and one by Stat, y y pleader declare upon it - 1. Co. y Stat, he must also count upon it - Secus y Co didn't know what remedy what remedy he intended to pursue, and wd supposed. he claimed y Co Law Remedy -

4. Bac. 18.

or - 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

2. Hawkins Second in an action on a Penal Stat, y Pldg must always count upon y Statute, that a public one, and y extends not only to indictments y informations, but also to Civil actions,

Plowden 200-

7. R. 521- 1. R. 521- 2. East 333. 341. 342. It is to recover penalties by Stat - The reason of y Rule, I know, not, ni it is founded on y benignity wh. to show to Criminals - for there seems to be no ground of distinction between yd and a Civil action on a Public

1. bent 103- Statute - 2. Bac. Str. Qui Tam R. - Heeling 32.

Bac. St. Third If a Public Stat gives a new action unknown L. 3- 4- to y Co Law, he who sues upon it, 1. Co. y Stat, must count upon it, as well as plead it - Some of y books say,

2. East 339 341-

jury must reach it, but a new action is then used as 2. East  
synonymous "with counting upon" and it runs, Ad Elia v. ord 334-  
to look it-

Thus in a mixed action of traverse upon a Stat of Gloucester,  
to recover a share held, it was unknown at C Law, for y  
Plff must count upon Stat to show on what his action is  
founded - such being unknown to y C Law -

But where a Stat merely extends an old action to a new case,  
y old Rem Rem obtains, y it ant necessary "to count upon  
y Stat" Thus Stat 4th Edw. 3 "de bonis Testibus" <sup>100</sup> Exec. 11. Duc. 10  
in certain cases, an action of Trespass or goods of y Testator  
taken away during his lifetime, was unknown to y C Law  
y it has been determined y C Law need not count  
upon y Stat, as it merely extends y old action of Trespass. 41-  
to y new case - Post 27 -

Yor 83. B. 85. a. R. Comyns 2. action on 30 B.  
N. v. N. of v. N. 74 9. 7- 2. Duc. 433 - Ex -

In an action on a public Statute, not Penal, it ant necessary  
for y Plff to count upon y Stat, in there is a concurrent  
remedy - at C Law - or in y St gives a new form or sort  
of action - Statute of a Public Stat, not Penal, creates a  
right or duty, and gives damages for y violation of one, or  
neglect of y other - he who sues, upon y Stat, need not  
count upon it, for y C Law furnishes y action -

So of a Stat not Penal, merely creates a right or duty, Carth  
with giving a remedy or damages, there is no need of counting <sup>382.</sup>  
upon y Stat, for y C Law supplies y action as in y case <sup>212.</sup>  
above and y mode of declaring ass -

If one St prohibits an offence, and another inflicts a penalty,  
he who prosecutes on ym, must count on both, for y remedy is  
contained in neither by itself - How. 206. B. 400. 10. L. 4.

It is in y Stat, it follows, y if one Stat prescribes a penalty

for a given offence, and a subsequent trial gives a right of a Penalty, to any one prosecuting for it, then he who prosecutes, must count on both trials, & even if misdeem will not be added even by verdict.

Leases  
Ex. Co.  
235.

An offence may be laid in a single indictment, as an offence is both at Law and Stat, but it must be in distinct counts; to claim two penalties in one Count would be duplicity which ought to quash a Indictment.

If a prosecutor is doubtful to avoid failure, he may insert two Counts, one "contra Formam Statuti" & other as a Misdeemeanour - \$ Duplison at Law

If part of a Trespass consisting of repealed acts, is at Law, and part of it is at Stat, it is necessary to count upon a Stat in a prosecution for a same, and the words "contra Formam Statuti" will refer to that part of the offence prohibited by Stat, reddendo "Singula Singulis".

40.  
Stat. 212. Thus entering by force on one's land, is an offence at Law  
Carr. 382. and hunting on it, an offence by Stat. Both of which may be sued for in one action -

La Holt says, yet saying yet I have hunted on Wille's close, is satis, withit contra Formam Statuti.

42. If a Temporary public Stat having expired, is revived by a subsequent Stat, extending on a same, it is satis and proper to count upon a first only - and if a Complaint conclude "contra formam Statuti" it will be referred to a first, for a first contains a Law, and a latter merely <sup>inures</sup> ~~contains~~ duration, or removes a limitation annexed to a first -

If the words, "contra Formam Statuti" are inserted in an indictment for an offence, known only at Law, they will be rejected as Surplusage, The rule is thus laid down withit any qualification in books, but it will be found in books, yet the question has always arisen post verdict Com. D. action in Stat. C. Comyn Re. 26.



Such on demurres, I conceive, must be fatal, for there is an informality, which is always a good ground for Demur-  
Post 44-

Any Plea, namely, is ill on Special Demurres, however unimportant - But note, there never need be, a Special Demur- on an Indictment -

Where a Stat gives a penalty for a new offence created by it and directs, how it shall be recovered, offences can't be punished in any other way, yn yt directed by y Stat.

A defendant relief<sup>yn</sup> upon y Stat of another State, must set it forth in his plea, a general allegation isn't satis- in such cases. 1. Mass Pl. 104. 1. East 6. and where a Stat directs, what must be pleaded, y plea must be in y words of y Statute. 10. Mod 217- or 2170-

Exceptions In y enacting clause of a Stat must always be negatived in y declaration, complaint, or indictment founded upon it. The omission of yo requisite, is so absolutely fatal, as not to be aided by verdict. But exceptions qualifications or Provisos in subsequent substantive clauses, of a Stat, are not required to be negatived and no notice need be taken of ym -

1. Burr  
153-  
3 Pl. 542.  
7. 20. 27-  
6. Do. 550.  
5. Do. 83-  
1. Do. 141-  
2. M<sup>o</sup>ally  
544-  
1. East 646  
Bray. 331-

This distinction may seem arbitrary upon y first impression - but it isn't so in reality - The ground of it, is, y when in y former case, y exception is in y enacting clause, it enters into y description of y right created, or y offence prohibited - and to properly describe yo, it is indispensable to negative y exception; whereas when y qualification is in a subsequent clause, or rather substantive clause, it forms a matter of defence, and don't constitute a part of y offence, wh may be described without mentioning it -



analogy - Thus there is a Count Stat enacting, yt whoever shall  
 Exception in y body of a Count - it must be negative - merely state, yt such a person did secular business on y sabbath,  
 but in separate clause. <sup>Secus.</sup> without negating y exception, it cd not be supported, y exception is so interwoven with y nature of y offence yt it can't be described without y negative -

But suppose y first section of c. 10, merely provided, "whoever did secular business & and y exception shd be within a subsequent section & y that it wd not be part of y description, and y no notice wd be taken - this same Stat contains, substantive clause, yt all prosecutions under it, must be within one month, y constituting no part of y description, of y offence and may be used as a defence, if y Def uses 'cause - See Pleading. 11. or 126.

- It has been before observed, yt there were two subsisting
2. Rankin remedies, one at C Law and one by Stat, y latter of which is 302. N. (called cumulative) either may be resorted - But further, Burr 799. 802. 5. ante 24. v. Plf or Prosecutor elects to pursue C Stat remedy and can't Dist 45. ante 42. support his case under y Stat, by reason of noncompliance with Coun 648. none of y requisites, he may in y same suit, resort to his C Law Stat. 45. remedy - and recover as at C Law, if he can make out his case at C Law - and y words "Contra Formam Statuti" will be rejected as Surplusage, for there is a good declaration
  1. Perkins at C Law without it. and a C Law right of action - 211. 280. 302. 5. and it is now settled, yt y applies as well to Criminal
  2. Heb. 138. as well as Civil cases, (tho' formerly thought Secus - Falk 212 -
  2. Hales Pls of Crown 191. 2. McMill 303. 95. 3. IR. 169 - 5. Co 39. Cro Elvi 231 - 307. 2. Hale 71. 170. 171. 607.

As There is a Stat in Count, yt give double damage, for Trespass, in y right Season, whereas y C Law only gives single damages, here if y Plf fail on y Stat, he may recover at C Law - This was so decided in Count, but it supposes y Plaintiff satis at C Law, to warrant it - So in y case of a Libel, wh is punishable at C Law,

dec<sup>n</sup>

If by Stat, yet a party may be punished at Law, tho' y Stat permits out another, and y<sup>e</sup> is satisfied with y Off<sup>r</sup> or Prosecutor -

If y<sup>e</sup> w<sup>h</sup> has no offence at Law, is made illegal by Stat, 6 Mod 86  
and a particular mode prescribed by Stat to prosecute 4. S. R. 2  
for it, y<sup>e</sup> mode it is usually said, must be pursued to  
y exclusion of all others. Thus if a Stat creates a new  
offence, and provides y<sup>e</sup> it is to be prosecuted for by  
information, it is said y<sup>e</sup> no prosecution of any other kind  
will lie -

Bac. Abr. St. G. R. 11. Mod 174. ord. 123 - 654 -  
and in 11. Mod 174 in w<sup>h</sup> a prosecution for Usury is  
cited as an example, of y<sup>e</sup> rule, w<sup>h</sup> is inapplicable, for  
usury was indictable at Law - I wd observe, y<sup>e</sup>  
neither y 10. or 11 of Mod. are good authorities -

The above rule as a general one, must be qualified and 45 -  
there only 2. class of cases, to w<sup>h</sup> it can apply, tho' these  
may comprehend a majority of those w<sup>h</sup> occur under it. 1. Burr  
They are first, where y particular mode of prosecuting is  
prescribed under y prohibitory or inacting clause - 544. 5  
2. Burr  
202. 102  
803. to 51

only

That mode can be followed secondly, where there is no  
prohibitory clause, properly so called, but y Stat merely  
enacts y<sup>e</sup> doing of an act. not before punishable shall be  
punishable for the future in such and particular manner.  
then tis necessary to pursue such particular ~~manner~~  
remedy -

The rule holds in these two classes only -

But y reason of y above is. y<sup>e</sup> offence and remedy are  
created together, and so blended in y act, y<sup>e</sup> they can't  
be separated in y prosecution, for y mode of prosecution being  
prescribed in and forming a part of y very clause,  
in w<sup>h</sup> it must be founded, it is presumed to be y intention  
of y Legislature, y<sup>e</sup> y<sup>e</sup> mode only shd be pursued -

But on the other hand, if a particular mode of prosecuting is provided  
2. *Hankins* in a separate, subordinate paragraph, or clause, any *C Law*,  
302. prosecution, which is adapted to a case, may be pursued, for such  
4 *TR*. 205. a distinct substantive clause does not exist of *C Law*, by mere  
implication. As a Stat enacts, that it shall be lawful to erect  
a private nuisance, and any person who does so, shall be  
prosecuted by information, here there being no distinct substantive  
clause, they can't be separated in a discretionary but if it be  
"further enacted" &c, a offender may be prosecuted in any way.

And if it was an offence, at *C Law*, before, is prohibited  
by Stat, either of *C Law*, or Stat proceedings may be pursued,  
to punish a offender, This is implied in a very supposition,  
that a Stat remedy is cumulative. ante 24. 43-

Here then is a remedy independent of a Stat, which a Stat don't  
oust by supposition. This rule, it is to be observed, relates  
to a different class of offences, from a former, it applied to  
new offences, yet on a contrary prescribes a new remedy  
for an old offence.

46- If a Stat creates a right or an offence, and prescribes no  
remedy or punishment, a *C Law* will lend its aid to enforce a  
right or punish a offence as a Misdemeanour - ante 41. Post 50-

Thus if a Stat merely provides, that no person shall do such an  
1. *Burn* an act, and no more, he who violates it, is, is guilty of  
54. a Misdemeanour at *C Law*, for violating a wholesome regulation  
3 *Lev*. 290- of Society, and hence it is neither then necessary or proper,  
2 *Long*. 425. in a case to court upon a Stat, for a *C Law* will afford  
3 *Co* *Eliz* 655. a proper proceeding -  
10. *Co* 75- *Rue* 116. It a proper proceeding -  
2 *Ch*. 6 mod. 26-

To obstruct a execution of Powers granted by Stat, is an offence  
at *C Law*, and a indictment for such obstruction must not be  
founded on a Stat. The Indictment need not, and ought not  
to conclude "Contra Formam Statuti" as a Stat enables.



commissioners to lay out highways, & an individual Long 240.  
residing such is guilty of an offence, at C Law, and must  
be so prosecuted, for it is y province of y C Law, to  
punish disorderance

If a civil remedy in such case, is sought, it is said to be  
by action on y Stat. 14. y right to be enforced given by Stat.  
but y recovery is furnished by C Law, ante 41. Post 51-

If an offence thus created, is to be punished, y offender  
is to be prosecuted as for a misdemeanor or violating  
wholesome regulations of y State-

### Who may prosecute on Penal Statutes?

Is an elementary principle of y Law, that a person  
cant be prosecuted by an individual in his own individual, private  
right or capacity, originating in y own principle of municipal  
Law, for a party injured by y offence, is ever entitled to y remedy  
and to prosecute for it- 2. Hankin 265:

4/-  
4. 20s. 2.5s.  
6.7

Where as y party injured is a Public offence, is y Public,  
y right of prosecuting belongs to y -

Tamen y Gen rule of Equity or Eng. Practice, private persons  
do prosecute offences, of y highest nature, even felonies, when 2. PR. 47-  
no part of y penalty given to y Prosecutor, and even by  
indictment. They prosecute thus in most cases, (it seems) for y costs, but y is in y King's name, and for y King who  
party, is injured by crimes in all monarchical Governments- 71. 242.  
The individual is here considered as merely a "informant", 233  
his name not ever appearing - 257  
223  
229-

The prosecution runs thus. "The King on information of A. B.  
vs C. d. &c". This rule depends altogether on Examples  
there being no law authorizing it - This is unknown in  
y a State -



Then it is said, y<sup>e</sup> a substantive action is not to be prosecuted by an individual, it is not meant, y<sup>e</sup> an action will lie vs y<sup>e</sup> offender for y<sup>e</sup> private injury suffered - so only means y<sup>e</sup> an individual has no right in his own name to prosecute for an offence vs y<sup>e</sup> Public - but unquestionably y<sup>e</sup> party injured may sue for y<sup>e</sup> civil injury -

-48-

- But there is a mixed species of prosecutions, partly public, and partly private - called Lui Tam, which began and carried on by individuals in their own names, both in y<sup>e</sup> U.S. and in Eng. It is a prosecution both partly in behalf of y<sup>e</sup> State, and partly in behalf of y<sup>e</sup> Prosecutor - and derives its name from y<sup>e</sup> original words, of complaint viz Lui Tam pro domino quam possessoris A.D. informed E.C.,  
1. Bae. 37. Lui Tam  
3 Pol. 162. Lui Tam pro domino quam possessoris scilicet  
Com D. ac. St. 3.1.

It is inconsistent to say, as is generally said, y<sup>e</sup> y<sup>e</sup> State is a party to y<sup>e</sup> prosecution, for it is not in any sense, directly a party to y<sup>e</sup> prosecution, tho' it may reap y<sup>e</sup> benefit of it - the individual prosecutes alone and is y<sup>e</sup> only party, tho' he does it in behalf of y<sup>e</sup> State, as well as himself. This is practically important, tho' not generally attended to -

Lui Tam Prosecutions are either by action or information. This is another distinction not duly attended to, in most of y<sup>e</sup> books, and certainly not in Don Parlane - At Lui Tam Action is carried on, by civil process, but a Lui Tam Information by Criminal Process - This is distinguishing Orderon, i.e. a Lui Tam, commenced by Information or Capias - or forthwith (to speak it - a vulgarly) is a Criminal Proceeding - or Lui Tam Information - and y<sup>e</sup> Proceedings are, as in all criminal cases. Whereas a Lui Tam complaint commenced by original writ - is a civil proceeding - It is then y<sup>e</sup> Garb of y<sup>e</sup> action y<sup>e</sup> determine its character. -

(P. 16)

An action then bro't by an individual in his own right, Com 6382. on a Penal Stat., is a civil action - The action itself  
7. T.R. 257. 4 Do 956.58 - 3 Do. 448 - 1. Mils 125.

does not decide its character, but y form of it. Thus  
an action brōt to recover y st Penally for bribery, is  
a civil and a mere action of Debt.

This distinction is merely nominal, but of a great practical  
importance, y incidents of a Qui Tam action and a Qui Tam  
<sup>information</sup> ~~prosecution~~ being very different.

For in civil cases, y Def is entitled to 15 days notice, a  
criminal prosecution is formidit: In y former he bleads by Atty,  
in y latter, in Propria Persona. In civil cases, y record is  
amendable by y Stat & Amendments, but not so in Criminal Co,  
In civil as in Eng. y affirmation of a Quaker is admissibly  
not so in criminal cases.

From y County Cts, no criminal cases are appealable, the  
many civil are -

48 -

Qui Tam of both kinds are generally brōt upon Penal Stats,  
to recover a penally or forfeiture of some kind, and more often  
on Penal Stats. Indeed as understood at present, they are treated  
and understood as excluders of Penal Stats. Qui Tam strictly  
speaking are unknown at C Law.

2. Hawks 377. 1. Roll 1. Cro Eliz 877. Cro S. 360-61. 532.3

There was a proceeding of a similar nature, if we judge  
from y words used in it, Quam pro Commis pro rege quomin &c. &c.  
but so rare, y its nature at present is hardy known.

When y Stat gives a penalty to him who will sue for 2. P. 487.  
same, his called a popular action, and a causa publica 3. P. 160.  
it is given indiscriminately to y people at large - In some cases, <sup>See L. Sec.</sup> <sup>2. P. 487.</sup>  
y whole penalty is given to him, who prosecutes for it - but  
more generally half goes to y prosecutor and half to y King  
or State - Com. D. action. L. 3. 1. 3. Roll 2. 2. Hawks 265.  
C. 1.

If an individual is civilly injured by an offence prohibited Com Dig. ac  
by Stat, he may have his private remedy by a civil action. A. 1. 50  
on y Stat - The Stat implicitly gives a remedy - Bar. At. 10. 10.

50.

A popular action ant necessarily a Qui tam action, tho' treated as synonymous in y books, in wh they are much confounded. A popular action may or may not be a popular action, as y case is for where y whole penalty is given to Qui tam prosecutor, it certainly is not, as he sues in his own name - but a popular action. The form it appears in some of y books particularly Bac and Hawk - it wd seem, yt even here, y Qui tam forms might be followed, but I apprehend, they are incorrect - Part 52.

Com. Dig. Pt.

B. F.

3 Bb 161-

Bac. 37.

But when y penalty is to be divided, it is a Qui tam action - On y other hand, a Qui tam ant necessarily a popular action for y remedy or right to recover may be limited to y party aggrieved by y offence, in wh case it ant a popular action, and here y Prosecutor or y party must sue, Qui tam as y penalty is divided.

Having known thus far, by way of explanation of y nature of these two actions, I shall proceed to enquire, in what cases an individual may sue, upon a penal Stat in his own name, and in any form -

Bac. Ab

Pt. K.

Com. Dig.

ac. 27

It

6 Mod. 267

2 Hawk

377-

It is a general rule, yt whenever a Stat prohibits or commands any thing for y advantage of Individuals, or y protection of private rights, an individual may have an action on y Stat, for injury done him by its violation, and y rule holds, tho y Stat is penal only and so (to speak negatively) expressly gives y individual no ~~remedy~~ remedy - The example of a nuisance (supra) will illustrate y Rule -

51.

2 Lev 230.

Co Lit. R.

50-

Com. Dig. ac. 27

It

Also if an individual is civilly injured by an offence prohibited by Stat, he may have his private remedy by civil action, (as above) Where a Stat inflicts a penalty on any one for depriving another of his right or interest with making an appropriation or for y penalty, he who is injured by y violation of y Stat, is entitled to y penalty, and may recover it by action - and not y King as y Public - , for as y legislature inflicts



a penalty without appropriating it, it is presumed it  
it was for him, who should be injured by the transgression. Thus  
an Eng Stat prescribes a penalty for not setting out tithes - tithes  
and y penalty goes to y person entitled to y tithes - who  
was injured by their not being set out. It has been said,  
in y case, and others of y same nature, y an action lies  
upon y Stat, at & Law to enforce a right afforded by Stat  
and thus understood, it is true -

ante 46

The next question y presents itself, in what <sup>cases</sup> ~~cases~~, an  
individual may prosecute qui Tam action on a Penal Stat  
and not merely where there is an remedy and who may have  
it?

'Tis a Gen Rule, y if for an offence immediately injurious  
even to y public only, and a Stat gives a penalty or part 2. Hawks  
done to him, who will prosecute for it, any individual may 37/10 or 73.  
have a qui Tam action on y Stat, who will prosecute 4. C. 13.  
vs y offender for y penalty. Is Stat vs smuggling giving 3. per 65.  
a penalty to him, who will prosecute - ante 50. Post 53 - Comm. Di.  
act 32. &  
C. 1.

The rule as laid down in y books is, when y whole penalty  
is given to y individual pe, but in y case, I apprehend,  
it wd be at least unnecessary on principle; if not  
improper to prosecute qui Tam action, as y individual dont  
sue for himself, "as well as" pe, he may however with-  
doubt prosecute on y Stat -

If is an offence, a Stat inflicts a Penalty in favor of pe,  
and allows a sum certain to him who ~~not~~ will prosecute  
with effect, any individual may prosecute qui Tam esse"  
for it makes no difference between a gross sum, and a  
part of y penalty, and in both cases, he who first commences  
his action, has an interest in y sum or penalty to be paid -



2. *Stimpkins*  
371, or 265  
1. *Bac.* 37.

But where a Stat forbids an act immediately injurious to y Public, only, in a penalty &c is given to y prosecutor, no individual can have an action upon it, nor an information in his own name, for he has no interest in y Penalty, and no right of any kind under y Stat. As Penalty for smuggling, not given in whole or part, to any private prosecutor - and no forfeiture given him -

4. *Co.* 13. a.  
12. *Co.* 134.  
*Cre.* 8. 134.  
3 *Bl.* 161.  
2. *Hamkins*  
577.  
2. *Ch.* 187.

But if a Stat prohibits an offense immediately injurious to an individual, as well as to y Public, and expressly gives y party injured a penalty, or part, or damages for y injury here y Party may and (better) ought to sue *Qui Tam* <sup>action</sup> ~~esse~~, for y penalty, especially if y Public is entitled to a fine and it seems so, tho' no fine is given to y King or Public -

Quere. however if y whole penalty is given to y party injured - where is y propriety of his suing *Qui Tam* ~~Esse~~. for he may undoubtedly sue in his ~~own~~ own name, without joining y Public or declaring "a *Qui Tam* Toron"

And generally wherever there is a fine or penalty of any sort, given to y public, and a suit may be made, a fine is of course inflicted upon conviction in y civil suit. tho' y Prosecutor suet *Qui Tam*. There is no such a suit action of *Indignitas* at Law - when y judgment was "*Capitatus*" -

3 *Bl.* 160.1  
*Polsham* 175.  
*Bac.* ~~dir.~~  
N. R.

54. When no form of action is prescribed by Stat for y recovery of Stat Penalties, there is y most common and proper action - <sup>another</sup> but yet not y only action - There is a species of action - in Stat, wh lies in y case - (however it seems, & seems it would lie at Law - he recovers a fine, tho' it will for an amercement) y theory is y, where y Stat prescribes, y y Transgressor shall pay a certain sum to y person prosecuting - y commencing y action he recovers it, makes y offender his debtor -

It was holden in one case, *vt Indebitatus assumpsit* *vid-*  
But *vt actum* is never *habe* in England - and *Plural* *vid*  
not *li* -

But how can debt *li*? for before *vt* prosecution commences  
no *personalty* is due - The *ct* declares, *vt* *penalty* shall  
be forfeited to him, who *vide* sue for it, and *vt* positive  
provision of Law virtually enacts *vt* *offender* shall be  
indebted to *vt* prosecuting party for *vt* same, nor is *vt* doctrine  
so fanciful as *vt* assigned by some. *vt* *vt* such offence  
is a breach of *vt* social compact - *Cutney* 32. 2 *Dev.* 250. *Cap* 3, 7.

An action of *Indebitatus assumpsit*, was once supported to  
recover a *penalty* in *vt* case of *many* *usage*, but *vt* *ct* not  
be supported at present, at least *vt* be a hazardous  
experiment to *vt* Pleader - *partly*

Where *vt* Penalty is given by State, *vt* *vt* State or King, and 3 *Bl.* 102.  
*partly* to *vt* Prosecutor, *vt* State may prosecute and recover *vt* *2. Stark*  
whole - For *vt* penalty is given *partly* to *vt* prosecutor, *partly* *392-268*  
as an inducement for him to prosecute, and not for any claim *2. Stark*  
he has on account of *vt* Public offence. Moreover where *vt* *11 Co. 105. 11*  
State prosecutes, it may be said to take *vt* penalty by  
*halves* *as* State and Prosecutor - *7. Bl. 556.*

A bona fide conviction on a *Qui Tam* Complaint, either  
by action or by information, is a bar to any subsequent  
prosecution, suit, or even Indictment for *vt* same offence, quia  
*vt* end of *vt* Law is obtained and punishment inflicted.

So on *vt* other hand, when *vt* State prosecutes, no individual  
can maintain *vt* action and *vt* bar is mutual, for if it were  
seems *vt* offender might be twice tried, convicted and punished  
for *vt* same offence.

55. So *vt* pendency of a *Qui Tam* action or information, may be *3. Burr*  
pleaded in abatement to *vt* subsequent information or Indictment. *1423.*  
(if commenced) for *vt* same offence - *2. Stark*  
*391. 275.*





yt no regulation in y<sup>e</sup> common - ed do it - without repealing  
y<sup>e</sup> Stat - so to defeat y<sup>e</sup> vested right, tho' in whole, not  
be equally as extravagant, as to release recovery on a Private  
note of hand - They can't release a right vested in an  
individual -

But on y<sup>e</sup> other hand, where y<sup>e</sup> penalty or part of it is given 5/-  
to y<sup>e</sup> party injured by y<sup>e</sup> offence<sup>ence</sup>, yt party has a vested right  
in his allotment before action not, as a mere matter of Justice -  
tis a debt on y<sup>e</sup> commission of y<sup>e</sup> offence, wh y<sup>e</sup> State or King can't  
release even before action brought - tis in y<sup>e</sup> nature of a remedial  
action, wh nothing but a repeal of y<sup>e</sup> Stat, will set aside -  
more inductive

Even if y<sup>e</sup> Penalty is inductive in its amount, tis still considered  
as remedial - so far at least as to preclude y<sup>e</sup> interference of  
y<sup>e</sup> King -

2. R. R. 311.

2. Hawkins 382. Nov. 180-

It seems at C Law, y<sup>e</sup> prosecutor in a popular action on 2. Hawkins  
a penal Stat - might release his part of y<sup>e</sup> Penalty, but y<sup>e</sup> 382.  
conviction, wh not be a bar to a subsequent prosecution by y<sup>e</sup> 2. R. R. 33.  
same or any other party - or Jtys. Tho' before such a conviction,  
such a release wd be of no avail - even at C Law, as to  
securing immunity for y<sup>e</sup> King - For y<sup>e</sup> Prosecutor's right to y<sup>e</sup>  
penalty is not consummated till after conviction, and y<sup>e</sup> same  
Prosecutor may sue again -

But y<sup>e</sup> right to release in a popular action by reason  
of y<sup>e</sup> collusion practised, mentioned y<sup>e</sup> 4. Hen 8<sup>th</sup>, wh 2. R. R. 382. 2<sup>d</sup>.  
so enacts yt no Covinous recovery in a popular action, shall 3 R. R. 162.  
be a bar to a subsequent action, or prosecution, brought by  
an individual for y<sup>e</sup> same offence, and also yt no release  
pending y<sup>e</sup> action by prosecution to Jtys, shall become  
to defraud public Justice - This was to provide as Chanc  
prosecutions, and is one of those ancient Statutes, wh is promi-  
sued y<sup>e</sup> Law of y<sup>e</sup> U. S. - Indeed, I'm of opinion, yt y<sup>e</sup>  
above Stat is only an affirmation of y<sup>e</sup> C Law. as respects  
Covinous or fraud, for & trust, there is no reasonable doubt,  
yt a covinous recovery, if ascertained, wd have been



1. Burr 395 void at Ct Law. Dr. Mansfield says, there is no  
1. Co 77 transaction, however solemn. - yt fraud will not vacate,  
y. times abundant. Moreover y<sup>e</sup> question involves y<sup>e</sup> authority of Records.

58. It's further provided, by Stat 16. Eliz., yt y<sup>e</sup> Prosecutor  
2. Plunket can't compound y<sup>e</sup> action, in any manner, till plea  
397. pleaded - nor then without leave of y<sup>e</sup> Ct, on pain of <sup>leave</sup> felony -  
1. Pet B. 18. and other punishment, and it is discretionary with y<sup>e</sup> Court  
5 J.R. 88. for 167. to grant or refuse leave - and when to compound, is  
1. Bac. 43. thus given, yt part of y<sup>e</sup> Penalty belonging to y<sup>e</sup> Public,  
Com. D. act 16. must always be paid into Court -

It's a rule of Practice, yt after verdict, y<sup>e</sup> Ct will not give  
Com. D. leave to compound, ni on proof of y<sup>e</sup> poverty of Def.  
act 16. E. 2. Even a bona fide release of y<sup>e</sup> Prosecutor ed not at Ct Law -  
for 167.  
4. Burr. 192 Bar y<sup>e</sup> right of y<sup>e</sup> Public, to y<sup>e</sup> public part of y<sup>e</sup> Penalty, pending  
1329. y<sup>e</sup> prosecution. But a bona fide release, even with leave of y<sup>e</sup>  
11. Co 55. 6. Court, after conviction, wd bar any action for y<sup>e</sup> same offence.  
2. Plunket  
275. 392. by any other Individual, and even after prosecution commenced  
3. 167. but y<sup>e</sup> is now abrogated by 4<sup>th</sup> Hen 8<sup>th</sup>.

Suppose y<sup>e</sup> Prosecutor practices fraud to defeat a public  
prosecution, as to delay, as yt y<sup>e</sup> Ct of Limitations, may bar it,  
and then withdraws, wd he not be punishable as for a  
misdemeanor? I think he wd.

59. But when y<sup>e</sup> action is given to y<sup>e</sup> Party injured by y<sup>e</sup> offences,  
2. Plunket and he dies and releases, pending y<sup>e</sup> Suite, or suffers or desists -  
11. Co 55. y<sup>e</sup> State can't proceed on y<sup>e</sup> prosecution, for y<sup>e</sup> Pl<sup>y</sup>'s part can't  
2. 167. go to y<sup>e</sup> State - nor can it plead for its representatives -  
3. 167. The State can't become Executor to y<sup>e</sup> Prosecutor -

110. 2. Plunket 262. 3.

If several persons are convicted on one prosecution, on a Bill  
for a Dr offence, &c, in some cases several penalties are inflicted, and  
in others, only one penalty can be recovered vs ym -  
This distinction is perplexing and has confused y<sup>e</sup> Cts, counsel,  
and every body else -

Rule. as punishments are in their nature several, each First  
of several offenders convicted in one prosecution, civil or  
Criminal, it to be a several <sup>punished</sup> penalty, and where a sum is  
prescribed, it prescribes sum is to be inflicted, on each. however  
numerous of convicts - Exception. First when a penalty <sup>pro Elvi</sup>  
is given by way of satisfaction to a party aggrieved, by a <sup>480-</sup>  
offence, in such there shall be but one satisfaction - There <sup>Lark. 182.</sup>  
is a contrary in y books on y subject - <sup>4 Burr</sup>  
Con R. 303. <sup>2026-</sup> Cowh 610

Que. To R.

it is apparent -

Exception Second - When from y paralogy of y Stat, y one <sup>2. East 573-</sup>  
joint penalty alone was contemplated, as thus, if a St enacts <sup>4. FR. 843</sup>  
any persons or person committing such an act, they shall <sup>Lark. 182.</sup>  
suffer." but here if y language had been, he or they shall  
suffer, y case wd have been different"

And further, a rule requires an exception, the argument  
for St shall seem only to contemplate a joint Penalty,  
yet if a offence was punishable at C Law - y is satis Evi  
that a several penalty was contemplated by y Legislature -  
namely y contrary proceedings - for all penalties are several  
at C Law - and y St Remedy is cumulative and as far  
as offences are severally punished at C Law - y same must  
be y case vis a Stat. But in all W, an within y General  
Rule, or either of y exceptions, ~~to it~~, tis y intention of y Legislature,  
y governs -

If debt is bro't for y recovery of a Penalty vs joint offenders  
there can be but one penalty recovered, at any rate,  
in consequence of y form of y action. There is but one entire  
debt and so y Court must consider it. - Ergo. but one  
recovery, and but one entire Judgment -

where y St requires but one penalty, debt is y most  
common and proper action, and as debt lies only for y  
recovery of one Penalty, so where y Penalties are several,  
debt must lie, as decided quia in y action of debt, only  
one entire sum can be recovered - 1. BR. 245. 2. East 588 -

\* Naps. 187

And as two or more persons may join in committing one offence, so on the other hand, there are cases, in which any number of continued acts, may go to constitute one entire <sup>indivisible</sup> individual offence. and if y offence is prohibited by a Penal Stat, there will be but one penalty recovered, for all these conjoined acts taken together, constitute but one offence - I will illustrate y, by a former example of y Stat, enforcing y observance of a Sabbath. If a man Cow. 640. Labour y<sup>e</sup> day, he shall not incur a penalty for distinct parts of y<sup>e</sup> day, but only one penalty, y acts being in continuity. So it is y continuity of acts y<sup>e</sup> constitute battery -

60. In a popular action, y Plt<sup>f</sup> by y Pro Law are entitled to no costs, ni expressly given by y Stat or by some General Statute  
2. Plt 781, giving Plt<sup>f</sup> costs in such cases. But when a penalty is  
1. Rule 5<sup>th</sup>, given to y Party injured by y offence - he is as much  
Salkr, 206 entitled to costs in y<sup>e</sup> as in a civil action, for y Penalty  
1. Plt 781 is given as a compensation for y injury sustained, and y  
2. Plt 781 costs shall go to satisfy y Party for y default of y debtor.  
10-  
2<sup>nd</sup> Plt 781  
Collock in not satisfying y<sup>e</sup> damage without action bro't, as  
17. 13. 201. he shd have done -

In Court y Prosecutor always recovers costs, where judgment is vs Def and pays costs, if Judgment is vs himself -

Finis of Municipal Law.



## Husband and Wife

Husbands right to wife's Property 3.  
Wife's personal property in possession  
3. Choses in action 4. Wife's Chattels  
Real. 8. Wife's Real Estate of Inheritance  
9.

Wife's right to the Husband's Estate  
13. Husband's Liability on wife's  
account 21. I<sup>st</sup> for her debts. 21.  
II<sup>d</sup> for her Tort 21. III. For her crimes  
24.

Wife's power to bind the Husband  
by contracts during Coverture 26.

Wife's power to bind herself &  
property by her own contracts 32.

Her power to devise 39. Agreement  
between Husband & wife 44.


Contracts of Husband and Wife  
during Coverture. 45. Also before  
Coverture 47. Requisites of Jointure  
to bar Dower. 49. Husband's right  
and power over the person of his  
wife 50. Evidence pro & con 53.


In what cases she must join 58.


When he may sue alone or not  
at his Election 60. When he  
must sue alone. 64. In what cases  
the Husband must sue with &  
in what with his wife as defs.  
68.

Celebration of Marriage 70  
Valid and voidable marriages. 70.  
- Divorce 76-









# Of the Rights of Persons

The subject matter of Municipal Law, is divided under two <sup>5</sup>  
General heads. Viz Rights and Wrongs - 1. Bk. 122. 3 Do 1 -  
Its object is to guard and enforce y. wrongs, and to prevent  
or redress y. latter. 3 Bk. 1. Do. 122.

It is necessary y<sup>t</sup> rights be first understood, wrongs being  
but Privations or violations of Rights and right - 3 Bk 2 -

Rights are of two kinds - 1.<sup>o</sup> of Persons, 2.<sup>o</sup> of Things -

Wrongs are also of two kinds, Private and Public - 1. Bk 122 -  
Persons as contemplated by Municipal Law are of two  
kinds - 1. Natural. 2. artificial - or Civil.

Natural or human beings <sup>are</sup> considered in their natural capacities -  
artificial <sup>are</sup> such as are created by y. Law, and are  
called corporations, or Bodies Politic - as Cities. Corporate  
Towns, Societies - and other incorporated compounds - 1. Bk 123 -  
467 -

These derive their existence from y. act or charter of incorporation, &c.  
created to maintain a perpetual succession for y. protection &  
maintaining certain particular rights and to perpetuate these  
rights -

The rights of Persons considered in their natural capacities  
are of two kinds. Absolute and Relative -

First. Absolute rights, are such as belong to Individuals, consid<sup>ed</sup>  
as Individuals - Such as belong to you even in a state of  
nature - 1. Bk. 123 - These constitute what is called natural  
Liberty. 1. Bk. 125.

These rights, (so far as their enjoyment is consistent with  
preservation and welfare of Civil Society) are enforced by  
Municipal Law. 1. Bk 123, 25.

It is obvious then y<sup>t</sup> absolute rights can't appertain to artificial  
persons, since they derive their existence, and of course



have no right from y constitution of civil society

The absolute rights of persons comprehends 1. y right of Personal Security - 2. Personal Liberty and 3. Private Property. l. 1. 120. The absolute rights of Persons and y principles of Law wh relate to ym, being few and simple l. 1. 124. 5 I shall treat of ym briefly, giving my an outline of y Law on y subject and referring to 126. and 127. to y "things" as a more particular description of ym -

First. The right of Personal Security, consists in y right of enjoying ones life, limbs, body, health, and reputation -

Second. Personal Liberty, as here used, consists in y power of "free motion" without restraint in y due course of Law -

3- The right of Private property is y right of having, enjoying y ones acquisitions without control, in y Laws of y Land. l. 1. 133. The right of private property is grounded in natural Law - its modification, as y tenure by wh it is holden and y method of possessing it and transferring, are derived from Society -

4- Second. As to Relative rights of Persons. they are those wh grow out of y relations of civil society, or such as belong to Individuals considered as members of civil Society. l. 1. 123-140 - The civil relations, from wh these relative rights result, are either Public or Private -

First as to those relative rights, wh arise out of public relations, see l. 1. 146 - as y of Governors and Governed - Magistrates and People -

Second - The private relations, from wh relative rights and duties result are y four following - viz. 1. Husband and Wife - Parents and Child - Guardian and Ward - Master and Servant. These are called Domestic relations -

## Husband and Wife -

### Husband's right to y wife's Property -

In Roman Catholic countries, marriage is regarded as a religious ceremony - By y Law and by our Law, it is considered as a civil contract - 1. Pl. 433 -

Husband and Wife are for many purposes regarded as one Person in Law - 1. Pl. 422 -

The forms and requisites of y contract, will be considered in connection with y mode of dissolving it, or y Law of Divorce - 1. Pl. 422 -

ably close -

y Legal effects, of marriage contracts, and first of y consequences of marriage contracts, as it respects y husband's right to y wife's estate - The general principle, by our Law as to y branch of y subject is regulated, is founded on y husband's duty to maintain and protect y wife and her estate as far as only his, as is supposed necessary is unable him to perform y leading duty -

### First. If a Wife's Personal Chattels in Possession -

These in general are absolutely vested in y husband by marriage - For y exception in y case of "Paraphernalia" (y kind see Post - 2 Pl. 455) he may dispose of ym at pleasure - and may even bequeath ym - Co Litt 351. 1. Bac. 287. C. 1. Burm. Jere -

If she die Intestate, before y wife, they go to his administrator - 72

But he has no beneficial interest in Personal property, wth y wife has "in altera dicit" is what she holds as Executrix - yet he may control, but is liable or responsible for it - And - So also y husband is entitled to y Personal chattels of y wife, acquired by her during Coverture - as a Legacy - The avails of her labour -

See P. 33.

Bac. Bar. Tem. D. Talk 115. 114 - E. 1. 2. 127.

as to legacies and notes payable by estate of deceased person  
to her during her lifetime. See P. 2. 62.3.

II Chose The wife's Personal Property in action, as noted in action.  
The husband may dispose of ym at pleasure during their  
Joint Lives - as debts due her as bond, note, Court Bill -

Co Litt 351. Ch Bills 110. Sir 515. 3. Will 55. Dec. 6.

Com. D. B. Term. But reducing ym into possession or some act of ownership's equivalent

2. 3- it, is necessary during their Joint Lives, to give y husband absolute

De Chy 209. title, so that it survives to her, on his death. Pool 82, and vol

1 Bl. 575- 1. Role. 842. 30, it is said to her representatives on her death, he surviving

Bar. B. Term but for St 29. Ch. Sec. infra (but secus if an adequate

2. 36. 435. settlement be made on her. ym line belongs above)

The uses, tis said, all title, as husband in y case - 2. Bl.

434. 5. sed see - see Chy 2. 21. Toller 83. 4- 5/3- 1. Bl. Wm 44-

Sal 36- Post 73- 1. Role 310-

These with show also, y by St 31. Law. 3. and 29- Ch. Sec  
we may take it as admin<sup>tr</sup>-

Sir St 31. Law. adm<sup>tr</sup> in case of intestacy, was given,  
(in ym) as y next and most lawful friend, who (in case  
of y wife's dying) was by some construed to be her husband-

The St of 21. Hen 8<sup>th</sup>, directs adm<sup>tr</sup> to be given to y next  
kin or widow. 1. Toller. 84. 38-

Stier 84. Others hold, y he has y right to administer "Sine mari" <sup>Com. D. adm</sup>  
3. 6- at O Law- and not under any Stat. Idem. 2 Bl 515. <sup>22</sup> 4 Co. 51-  
at any rate he has y right by y express provisions of y  
St of Bonds- and Meritt

For by y last Stat, y husband as administrator isn't bound to  
2. Bl. 515. 51 account with her representatives, i.e. not liable to distribute  
Toller 3/3. here effects, and thus he may hold ym as administrator,  
Bac Term. not liable to account -  
C.



no such Stat in Court, no such right in husband -  
in Court administration goes to Stat of Hen in y first instances  
St Court 4<sup>th</sup> 165 and there is no special provision for  
Intestacy of y wife here and none at Law - and our St  
compels distribution with exception in husband's favour -

74. He can't however, either here or in Eng bequeath wife's  
chooses, in action, for a bequest ant a disposition w<sup>ch</sup> takes  
effect in his life time - Co Litt 351- Jac. Bar. Term. C-F  
and even if another on husband's neglect is appointed  
Administrator, y husband consid<sup>ed</sup> as next of Hen, is in Eng  
entitled to her personal property, post payment of debts - 3. alms 526 -  
Toller 3/3 3. Wils 168 -

There is y<sup>d</sup> correct on principle -  
And y right it has been held is transferable to his  
representatives, so yt if he die before taking administration, his  
representatives will take y Residues - 1. P. Wms 381. 2. alms 526 -  
1. P. Wms 382. 1. Wils 163. Toller. 116. 217 -

75. But it is now held, yt her representatives are by Stat  
31. Edw. 3<sup>d</sup> entitled to administration and yet they are Trustees  
for his representatives in Equity.

75. A settlement by y husband on y wife, is said to be an  
absolute purchase of her choses in action, so yt he must  
not only have ym. if he survive, but if he die first,  
will transmit ym to his representatives - Pow Chy 63-312. 412.  
2. Vern 301. He being considered as purchaser of ym -  
by y settlement.

1E. in  
Equity -  
and in Equity  
only

But y rule don't hold, it seems, ni there is an express  
or implied agrant to yt effect, w<sup>ch</sup> if y settlement is said  
to be in consideration of her choses. under 692 3 P. Wms 190. n

Pre Chy 209. 2. Vern. 64 -

But if y settlement is made post marriage, it must  
be adequate. Secus it ant a purchase - even tho so 2. alms. 408  
expressed, at least not of y whole - In y<sup>d</sup> case, y wife Rob. W. C.  
being in y power of y husband, her agrant won't bind, her - 285 n.  
ni Justice is done her -



Means of rent due to y wife while we, become divorced

2. 36. 34.5 y husband's by marriage - But y is by et 32. Ten 5<sup>th</sup>  
1. Ch Ps 21.  
2. 36. 34.5  
3. 36. 34.5  
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100. 36. 34.5

If a debt to y wife be sued, and judgment be obtained vs him.

by husband and wife - They are tenants of y judgment. The claim  
is viewed as a debt jointly in husband and wife -  
1. 36. 34.5

- 3 Mod. 89  
82  
1. 36. 34.5  
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2. 11th 208- Husband may assign her choses in action for a valuable consid<sup>n</sup>  
but not without consid<sup>n</sup> For an assignment carries only an  
equitable interest and a voluntary assignment being inalienable  
as to wife, a Ct of Chy won't support it and a Ct of  
Law can't - y interest not being assignable at Law -

Assigner has no interest or equity vs y wife -  
But a voluntary assignment, the word for y purpose of a transfer,  
has been holden as an act of ownership to change y property,  
by vesting it in y husband - Rob. & Com. 95. 1. P. 11. 380 - But  
not at Law - Rob. 295. 2. 11th 208 - 1. Br Chy 44 - (Post 43)  
Rob. & Com. -

He may however release her choses in action without consid<sup>n</sup>  
For as he has a legal power over ym. y release must operate  
at Law - and Equity can't set it aside -

If y husband is obliged to resort to Equity to obtain y wife's  
choses, in action, y Ct won't in gen interfere in his favour -

ni he will make a reasonable provision for y wife - *Equitation*  
interposition being discretionary 4 Br Chy 356. 1. P. Wms 251. 382.  
3 Ves 15. 580. Ab. 280. 58- 458-

If husb. assign ym for value, y assignee is liable in Equity to  
y same obligations, as husband, to make provision for y wife -

Ab. 291. 34 3 Ves. 15. 586- 1. P. Wms 251. 382. 458- 4 Br Chy 326-

For a Ct of Equity won't interpose on any other terms in favor  
of y assignee - They are liable to husband's debts after his death -  
leaving y wife, ni purchased by a settlement (see *Supra*) . 77.

1. Bac. 289- Co Litt 351- 351- Bac Ab Per. Horn. &

nor to be taken in Execution by his creditors during his  
life - For they are his effects, besides a chose in action and  
liable to execution - Post Ct. 2. p. 58- *Ibid* -

Goods of a feme sole in possession of another by bailment or  
finding, are on her marriage, absolutely y husband's, and he  
may sue alone - for ym -

\* For they are regarded as choses in action - They are 1. Ben. 261-  
outrages y bailor specific chattels and in her constructive possession - 1. Reb. 641.

1 mo 1. Bac. M. R. Pen. C. 4 T R. 489- Esp. 2. 576- 1. Selw. 172-

hold it her share - After if converted before marriage, she must then join  
in y action, for her right at y time of y marriage, for y  
injury done, is in action only - Post N° 2. 52-

3 T R. 631-

indeed, it has been questioned in y first case, and if goods  
bailed or found, y husband alone can maintain trover - 5

1. Lev. 107. 1. Ben. 261. 1. Selw. 172. 3 T R. 631-

What can be y objection on principle, none. For y possession  
of y Bailee or finder, before conversion, is constructively y  
wifes possession - So y her right is not reduced to a chose  
in action at y time of y marriage -

trust  
A constitution by wh one is bound by y husband to pay money  
to y wife, is subject to his control and not to hers. She 3. East 331-  
may receive y money as it becomes payable, but can't  
discharge y contract, For y contract giving y wife nothing  
more y n a right or authority to receive y money as it becomes payable

That she may do, as paymt to her, is performance -  
There are ~~three~~ different opinions on y<sup>e</sup> point in y<sup>e</sup>  
books.

### III. The Wife's Chattels Real -

Chattels real are such personal property as survivors of y<sup>e</sup> Realty  
is less for y<sup>e</sup>rs. mortgaged - 2. 36 386

Over these when vested in y<sup>e</sup> wife, y<sup>e</sup> husband has a more extensive  
right, y<sup>e</sup>n over her choses in action -

Roll 344 - The chattels real of y<sup>e</sup> wife are liable during y<sup>e</sup>r t<sup>e</sup> Devise,  
for paymt of his debts and to be taken in execution -  
Other choses in action are not so - Co Litt 46. 351. 4. Pl. 638. 9.

A husband has a right to dispose of y<sup>e</sup>n absolutely during their  
t<sup>e</sup> Devise. ~~For~~ paymt of his debts if he does not, they go y<sup>e</sup>  
Survivor - "Et Tenant &c" Co Litt 46 - B. Pre Chy 418. For 514. Co Litt 351 -

70. But it has been resolved in Court, yt on y<sup>e</sup> wife's death, living  
y<sup>e</sup> husband, they go to her representatives - The law accordingly being  
unknown here - 2 Day 238. The interest ant assignable -  
338.

On Eng nec husb nor wife can devise y<sup>e</sup>n, for y<sup>e</sup> right of  
Survivor is prior and paramount - to yt of Devisee -

Pre. Chy 418. 2. term 270. Co Litt 351. 2. Pl. 434.

But by act executed during their t<sup>e</sup> Devise, y<sup>e</sup> husb. may dispose  
of y<sup>e</sup>n, to vest in devisee even after his death - For here  
a right of future interest passes instantly. On this 207. 1. Roll 344 -

So yt if y<sup>e</sup> transfer comes within y<sup>e</sup> description of a disposition -  
during y<sup>e</sup> coverture - whereas a devise vests no interest till  
testator's death - Will Sec. 2. 86. Co 184. 5 - 3. Bac. 209. 10.

They are liable for husband's debts after his death, if y<sup>e</sup> wife  
survives - So a converso as to y<sup>e</sup> wife -



For y wifes right of survivorship intervenes and as y husband Co 184-  
 universally ed not by will make ym suggest to his debts, just Lat. Rec.  
 of his creditors after his death can't suggest in- for in Eng 2. 86-  
 are they are liable for y wifes debts, if she die first-  
 (St Tenants Page 8)

The husbands right by survivorship, include his exors, but  
 according to y doctrine holden in 2 Jay 338, y rule in Court  
 must be different-

If a feme sole, St Tenant of a chattel real, marries and  
 dies, y whole goes to y other Tenant, for his title is prior  
 to y husband- Plow. 418 Co Litt 185. Bac. Ab. B. Rem 62

But y husband has during coverture y some power to sever  
 her Tenancy by an actual disposition of her moiety, as she had  
 while sole- Ibid-

She may, in Equity, assign ym what consid<sup>d</sup> during coverture 80  
 1E. Eqy can't set aside y assignment- 2. Vern. 270. Rep. 289-  
 For y legal title is at his disposal, and Ety can't control 301-  
 his right to dispose of it- ante 75- 1. Vern 718. 3 P. Wms 39-

of The wifes Real estate of Inheritance-

For y wifes real estate, y husband has y sole usufruct during  
 Coverture. But he can't at C Law alien it alone- This power  
 not being necessary to regulate their concerns and provide for  
 y support of y family- 1. Selwini 11. 1. Roll. 347.  
 Bac. Bar. Gene. C. 1. II 10. Co 42-

Nor can husband and wife by yor St acts alien her 1. Bl. 444  
 inheritance in by fine or recovery - on y Ground of Estoppel- Lat. Rec. 6-  
 669. 70-  
 Bac. Abr. 3-  
 . 3-

In Court it may be done by their St deed-

By St 32. Hen 8<sup>th</sup>, y husband and wife are enabled  
 to make a lease for her reasonable interest, for their lives  
 or 21 yrs- R. 4<sup>th</sup>. Cro. P. 378. 22. 5 Co 3- 2. Saund. 180. n. 9-  
 22. 378-



Such leases are ergo valid during y term, tho y husband  
or wife shall die before y expiration of it.

81. If husband during coverture grant a longer estate in his  
 2. A. 25- wife in y. wife's land, there is no forfeiture, as in other cases,  
 534  
 2. A. 25- of tenants for life 9 Co. 140- Co. Litt 326- Bac. Ab. H. 2

For y<sup>e</sup> coverture disables her to claim & estate during his life,  
and if forfeited to her, y<sup>e</sup> marital right is immediately re-attach-  
ed. But it will endure only as a grant during his life  
at most and probably for less, as y<sup>e</sup> wife may die and he  
not be entitled to Custody

Suppose she dies under circumstances, not such as entitle a husband to custody, can her heir on her death, claim a pecuniary interest? Suppose not, & grant being originally a pecuniary

On his death during her lifetime, her real estate vests solely in her. On her death y fee vests solely in her heirs, but y husband in case of a child born alive of her, and capable of inheriting y estate, has an estate for life in y whole of wh she died seized of, by y courtesy of eng-

1. atts 603- He is entitled to custody, in y wife's equity, of redemption, in fee,  
Pow. M- 112. 115. And it is only an equitable interest, of wh there can't be  
an actual Trust. (Mortgages 32)

On Gavett's kind Genesee & husband has custody with having  
issue - Extra -

Our tenure of lands by a charter of Ex.<sup>ty</sup> is according to pt of  
Co. Lib. 30-  
Lavekuna, but entirely under such circumstances, has never been  
allowed here - 2. Bb. 128-

There can be no curley in a remainder or reversion, for if these y will dont die seized - see Estates by Curley -

To entitle y husband to entree, y Jersin of y wife must be actual. Except in case of some Personal Heredam, and Entry o redemption. Co Lm 29. 2 Pl. 127.

Co Lm 29- 2 Pl. 127.

But it has been determined in Court, yt actual seisin  
 not necessary and yt a right of possession is satis-  
 4. Day 298- To entitle y husband to curtesy, y marriage  
 must be legal, and issue must be born during y life of y  
 Mother- 8 Co 35. Co Litt 29. 30. 2. BB 127.

By y birth Cut Subra y husband is tenant by y curtesy  
 initiate, y title is consummated by y wife's death- 2. BB. 28. Co Litt 30-

At C Law, arrears of rent, due to y wife while sole, not not  
 enowise to y husband on y wife's death 2. Bae. 17

They not go to y Executors, being in y nature of Choses  
 of action belonging to her while sole and not reduced by  
 to possession by y husband- 1. Roll. 350 Co Litt 152. B- 4 Co 57- Co Litt  
357. a  
Ambs. 692.

But by St 32. Hen 8<sup>th</sup> they are given to y husband, they  
 vest in him on wife's death, and go to his executors &c on his  
 death

But arrears acconing out of wifes property during coverture,  
 go to y Survivor at C Law- this not being withint. y above  
 St 32. Hen 8<sup>th</sup>.

The wife can have no sole and separate property at C Law  
 1. Atks 270- 1. Tonlt. 87. 98 1. Pow. 103. Contae. 2. P. Wms 70- 85.

Now a gift to her sole and separate use is protected in Chy  
 as y claims of y husband- 2. Bes. 191. 665. 1. Tonlt. 87. 98. 2. P. Wms 316-  
 1 Atks 270- 70-

Sole property thus vested in y wife, y husband has no right to,  
 by curtesy or otherwise- Over such property she may exercise  
 as absolute a power in Chy- as if sole, ni yt she cant  
 directly devise it if real, by St 32. 34. Hen 8<sup>th</sup> 2. T. R. 695.

Pow. 165. 6- 2. Bes 663. Pow. 2. 50. 1. Bes. 303- 2. Do. 191- 3 Atks 393. 1. Do 270- 1. Pow. C. 444-

How far she make a disposition by way of Trust or power-  
 see Post No 2. p. 40. 1-

84- The husband cannot by his dissent defeat a gift to a wife and separate use of a wife, tho he may her common purchases.

Co Litt 304. Co Litt 356. Doe. Bar. and H-B.

For a descent in her of Real Property-

For as y can cast it upon her no act is necessary to its vesting and y husband cant prevent it-

Co Litt 3-356- But y wife post coverture determined, may dissent <sup>from</sup> or ratify her purchases- tho y husband actually assented, for her acts during coverture dont bind her-

2. Pl. 292. 3. Co Litt 3. a. 356. Doug. 435. Com. D. B. F. C.

After y wife was first allowed to hold separate property, trustees were thought necessary to stand seized to her use,

not so now-

But property real or personal, may now be given to herself separate use directly before marriage or after: even by y husband as well as others- In such cases y estate has been holden to be a Trust in y husband-

These representatives have y same right, if after coverture ended she didnt make her election- Co Litt 3. a-

If y husband neither assents nor dissents, purchases are good during coverture- Ibid. Com. D. B. F. P. 2-

For she cant bind herself by her assent, till after coverture determined-

18. an equitable interest in a term for yrs- It has been holden, yt if a feme sole possessed of a Trust term to her separate use, marries, her interest in it vests in y husband "Pure Mariti" - I cant tell why- 1. Vern. 718. 2. D. 270-

(Contra 2. Bos Chy 345)

2. Alth 421- 4. Co 29- Co Litt 3. a. 2. 1- 112-

2. Vern 17. Voluntary conveyances by a woman before marriage, are sometimes 355. adjudged fraudulent and void in Equity as w y husband.

2. Bos 264. As on y Eve of marriage, she makes a conveyance, without her

1. Lomb 99. 209. intended husband's knowledge, to a stranger see Trust Conveyance



Secus if made to provide for her children by a former marriage  
of the wife's right to y husband's estate.

I In Eng and Court under To of distributions <sup>22</sup> 2d. Ch. 2<sup>e</sup>  
St 165.6) if y husband die intestate leaving issue,  
y wife has 1/3. of y personal property absolutely. If no issue -  
1/2. debts of y husband being first paid - Pol 515. 2. Bac 427. 8.

II Dower At C Law. y wife is entitled on y husband's  
death, to a life estate in 1/3 of all y husband's inheritable  
property, of wh he was seised at any time during coverture -  
and wh, any issue wh she might have had, cd have  
inherited (Estates for Life, Dower) 2. Bl. 129. 131. Litt Sec. 30.

The husband at C Law, can't by alienation bar her of y  
right To bar herself. she must join in a judicial conveyance.  
In wh cases, y husband being concerned to procure y wife  
to join in a fine of his lands, is compellable in Ch to 10. Co 48 -  
perform y contract specially, - as by Fine or recovery. 2. Bac. 133 -  
140 -

In N York and Mass. she may bar her right by joining  
in a deed with her husband. For y rule in Court vide  
post N<sup>o</sup> 2. p. 12. She is entitled, (not having barred herself  
as before) if any issue, wh she might have had, cd  
inherit - Secus if any issue if any issue wh she might have had,  
cd not inherit it - Litt Sec. 53. 2. Bl 131.  
as Dower in Special Tail.

For y following rules on y page see Estate in Dower -

But she must have been y actual wife at y time of his  
death, Hence at C Law, a divorce "a vinculo" takes  
away y right. 5 Co 38. 1. Roll 681. 2. Bac. 130.

Divorce amensæ et thoro, don't, for y marriage ant at an end -

Bac. Dower. C. Nov 108. 3 Co Ch. 463. 9. Co 19. Co Litt 32 -  
33. B.



If y husband dies before y age of consent, y wife is still to be endowed Co Litt 33. a 40. a -

But she must be above y age of hine at y husband's decease.  
Litt G. 35. Co Litt 33. 3 & 131-

The wife has dower, however old she may be at y marriage -

1. Roll 77. Co Litt 40. a -

### Husband and Wife (Book 2)

Rule 14. 136. Was formerly holden, yt y wife of an idiot might be endowed  
Litt 31. And y husband of an idiot cd not be Tenant by Curtesy -

2. Pl. 136. His now settled, she can't be -

1. Litt 41. For to entitle y wife to Dower, y marriage must have been legal -

Co D. 125. The wife's right of dower is paramount to y claim of devisees -  
creditors and even mortgages, where y mortgage is made post  
marriage - <sup>postmarriage</sup>

Co Litt 3135. The right to y Personal property of y husband, is <sup>postmarriage</sup> deferred to such  
2. Pl. 482. claim. - Co. l. P. 85. and -

4. Co 64. 66.  
10. Do 43 -

The ground of her preference to creditors &c as to dower, is yt, her title has relation to y marriage, if y husband was then seized, and y commencement of such dower as he obtains post.

Whereas her claim to y Personal property relates only to his death -

Survivor in law by y husband, is sated to entitle y wife to Dower - Co Litt 31- And such dower by y wife ant sated to entitle y husband to Curtesy -

2. Pl. 131. For she has no dower to restore him to possession, when he is wrongfully disseised; but he has power to restore her in a similar case -

1. Root 59. In Court y wife is entitled to right of Dower, only in y imitable property of wh y husband died seized, or rather wh he owned at his death -

2. The words of y<sup>e</sup> Stat limit her dower to y<sup>e</sup> inheritance of wh<sup>ch</sup> her husband died possessed - It Co<sup>nt</sup> 146. But y<sup>e</sup> word "possessed" is in y<sup>e</sup> case construed as synonymous with y<sup>e</sup> word "owned" so y<sup>e</sup> actual possession or seisin by y<sup>e</sup> husband, is not necessary under y<sup>e</sup> Stat - She is entitled in Co<sup>nt</sup> to 1/3<sup>d</sup> of what inheritable property he owned at his death. Tho<sup>ugh</sup> he died disseised -

In Co<sup>nt</sup> y<sup>e</sup> husb. may defeat her right by alienation in his lifetime - but not by alienation in contemplation of death, and as a provision for his family, for y<sup>e</sup> Stat any thing but a Testamentary disposition -

By our L<sup>aw</sup>, if a man die without issue and leaving a widow unable to support herself, and who has no relation bound to support her, his property in y<sup>e</sup> hands of his heirs, and Legacies is charged with her support during her widowhood - This is peculiar to our State - Little Dower.

In Eng y<sup>e</sup> wife isn't entitled to Dower in y<sup>e</sup> Equity of Redemption, of a mortgage made by y<sup>e</sup> husband in fee, before marriage -

Because tis a mere Equity, and yet y<sup>e</sup> husband in parallel cases, is entitled to Curtesy. (No. 1. P. 9. 81) But in case of mortgage term, she is entitled to Dower, if y<sup>e</sup> reversion is in estate of Inheritance 3 PMm 229. 2. PMm 700.

1. Por. Chy 326.

In Co<sup>nt</sup> and N. Y. - Tho<sup>ugh</sup> y<sup>e</sup> mortgage is in fee, she may have dower in y<sup>e</sup> Equity of Redemption - ~~It~~ Et of Errors June 1815 - Co<sup>nt</sup> R. 559 - 6. P. 290. 7. 20 278 - Her right in Co<sup>nt</sup> as in England is paramount to y<sup>e</sup> of y<sup>e</sup> husband's devisees and creditors -

2.

The right of Dower may be barred in various ways - as by divorce - (Supra) so also o<sup>f</sup> alienage, as if a citizen of N. Y. marry a foreigner. The Court hold any interest in his real Estate, whence it is usual to obtain from y<sup>e</sup> Legislature a special act entitling y<sup>e</sup> wife to hold

to hold real property.

When a *foreign* woman becomes naturalized, y disability ceases.

The wife is barred by *coverture* with an adulterer by *St. Rest.* 21. Co. Litt 32. 3 P/nn 276. 1. Roll 680. 2. Pl. 136-7.

3- So by *Divorcé à vinculo matrimonii*

So by *allegiance*, except in case of y Queen-consort.

2. Pl. 131. 136.

2. Pl. 130. 36- So by Treason of y Husband -

but not by his felony since *Stat 1. Edw 4<sup>th</sup>*, for in consequence of y attainder, his issue ed not inherit y estate - No such rule in *Covent* - nor can there be any by y Laws of *H. L.*  
Art 3. 2. in 33- 2. Pl. 136. 30.  
Art 3. Sec. 3-

Here neither y heir nor widow can be barred of their rights -  
by y husband's Treason

Plow. 85. By detaining y title deed from y heir at Law - her right Lower is suspended, till she restore ym - and if she deny y Detainer and it is found vs her, she is barred forever -

3. Co 17. 13.

2. Pl. 136. 1/2 So if she alien in fee or Life of any other ym herself -

3. Pl. 130. 230. she forfeits it by *Stat of Gloucester 5. Edw. 1.*

Litt Sec. 4. 15. Co Litt 221- 2. Pl. 274. 5.

It is not y work a forfeiture, like any other Tenant in life -

2. Pl. 137. 3. By accepting a *Porture* before marriage. *West* 44. 5.

1. Pl. 136. 170. *Eyes* 358. 2. Pl. 140- *Dower* - *H.*

4. So by *Forcing* y husband in buying a fine, or suffering a recovery of his inheritance during *coverture* - ante No. 1-  
P. 85- She is preventing from averting her *coverture* -

These are y only modes, in wch she can alien her property

10 Pl. 48- or inheritance during *coverture* -

*Bac. Dower* In theory of Law, y principle on wch she thus alien

*H.*



alien her estate, is not yet she can any way during way during coverture, alien her real estate, but merely by matter of Estoppel, wh prevents her from averring her coverture - for if yet fact ed appear to y Ct, neither a fine or recovery wd bar her right of Dower -

Divorce a vinculo ge dont work a forfeiture of Dower in Court, ni y wife is y faulty person. - If she is y faulty person, dower is barred -

But our Ct seems to imply, yt a woman being absent from her husband without his consent, and without just cause, ant entitled to Dower -

### Paraphenalia; Sole 229-

The wife is entitled also to certain articles of property, called Paraphenalia - i.e something over and above Dower - as her Apparel. Bedding. Trunkets (Post 6)

Its sometimes difficult to distinguish between y description of property and yet wh a wife may hold to her sole and separate use - a difficulty arising from y minuteness of many facts into wh an examiner wd tend to run to perfection

As to property holden by y wife to her sole and separate use, y husband is a stranger - She holds it to y utter exclusion of any right in him - not so as to her paraphenalia - especially of y 2<sup>d</sup> class. Post 8 - Property to vest exclusively in a feme covert, must be given to her sole and separate use

But no particular form is necessary. y intent being apparent - is satis - 3 atts 393 -

In some cases, y intention is infered, not from y terms of y Gift or Transfer, but from y nature of y property and y circumstances under wh it is given. Term 23 - 98. as Diamonds, Plate - given by y husband's father



3. Atk.  
393-

to y wife on marriage day, has been helden as her separate property; and a similar gift of a stranger, may be so. Trinkets given by y husband himself in his lifetime, are also in some cases, y wife's separate property, and they are or not, must depend upon y intention with wh y gift is made -

This distinction is important, and when it is obscure - as in y case of Covenants above y title inclines in favour of y wife. Aliter if bequeathed to her by y husband, she have no other title - Then she takes, as Legatee, wh presupposes yt y Property was y husband's - It may ergo be subject to his debts - Post 8-

And property given to y wife by y husband, even in his lifetime, for y purpose of being worn as ornaments of her Person, is not her separate property in y above absolute sense - as vis her creditors, (3. Atk 394) but is liable under certain qualifications for his debts, Pl. ergo comes under y head of Paraphernalia -

- 0- The wife's property called Paraphernalia, is of 2 kinds -  
First necessary apparel and Bedding - 2<sup>d</sup> Ornaments as Trinkets. Jewels - &c in gen - 1. Roll 911. 2. Roll 535. 6 -  
Comyn D. R. de Fem. l. 3

1. PM<sup>m</sup> 730. The power of y husband over these 2 classes, is essentially  
2. Atk 77. different - During his life, Paraphernalia of y second class.  
3 Do. 338. 96<sup>t</sup> are at his disposal, but accord<sup>g</sup> to Mod<sup>o</sup> authorities, he  
Exh 2. 570. can't bequeath ym -  
2. Roll 436 -  
Contra Co Ch. 250. or 335. 1. Roll 911. reversed

Those of y first kind can't be taken by creditors, nor can husband sell ym -

Husband <sup>exors</sup> can't take y ~~second~~ class in execution, He surely can't sell all of ym - indeed twd be a smothering

She is entitled at least to one bed and apparel suited to her quality - Com D. R. de F. & S. Part 2. Sec. 500. 2. Roll 436 -

1. Roll 911 -

Paraphernalia of 2<sup>d</sup> class, are assets in y hands of T. husband's executor, and to pay debt post y other personal property is exhausted, but not before. 3 Atk 395. 1. P. Wm 730-  
The wife's claims are paramount to his representatives but likewise of his legatees.

Land being at E Law. liable in y hands of y heir, for specialty debts, if y specialty creditors take y wife's paraphernalia of y 2. class, she will be considered as creditor in Chy in y heir, for so much in amt as those creditors have taken of y Paraphernalia -

Here right to ym being preferred to y heir at Law - 1. P. Wm 730- to y inheritance. 2. Atk 422. 3 Atk 369. 2. Atk 171 104-

Aliter if taken by Simple contract creditors, since they ed not have taken y real Estate. She has a lien on y land, only when her paraphernalia are taken, when y land in y hands of y heir might have been subjected in stead - 2. Atk 104. 5.

Here y land is liable to both class of Creditors -

But if y Husband create a Trust Estate in Lands for y payment of debts, they are liable for debts on simple contract - The personal property is first liable however -

If men in such a case, her paraphernalia are taken (y personal fund being deficient) for even simple contract debts, y wife will be considered as a Creditor in Equity - vs y heir.

Aliter if there is no such Trust: for in y case y simple contract creditors ed not have taken y Real Estate. †

Ibid. Of y second class, for those of y ~~1<sup>st</sup>~~ first ed not be taken by y husband's creditors -

Things wh y husband keeps in his own possession but demands y wife to wear as ornaments - are Paraphernalia -

A settlement or Jointure on y wife, before marriage expressed to be in bar of all demands vs husband's estate, (or after

marriage, but in pursuance of articles made before marriage) stipulating yt y settlement sh<sup>d</sup> be in pursuance bar of all demands, takes away her right of Paraphernalia of y second class -

These settlements y acceptance of y settlement, being a waiver to or of her claim to ym. Secus if y articles are made post marriage and not in pursuance of those <sup>to</sup> before marriage - (at Putra) for she was not Tui Paris" at y time of making settlement.

9. It has been holden yt she has y same right as y Devisee of Land as vs y heir at Law: for her claim is preferable to yt of Legates or Devisees - 3 Atk 221. 432. 3 -

But as to Devisees, y<sup>e</sup> is said to be doubtful, and may now be considered as questionable. Toller 231. 422. 23.

Ambl's c. 2 P<sup>l</sup> 544. n. 1. 2 Rep 7.

y second kind of y husband pledges "Paraphernalia, y wife, not y executor of y husband, has y right of Redemption, and if there is a surplus of y Personal Property after payment of debts, she is entitled to it, to redeem y Paraphernalia, even to y exclusion of Legates - 3. Atk. 335.

Paraphernalia of y second kind

2. am  
2. 46. 7. The wife's right to redeem property vs y disposition of y husband, is strictly personal, and of course <sup>not</sup> transferable or transmissible. So yt if she dont claim ym as Paraphernalia her representatives cannot. In husband bequeathes Paraphernalia of 2. Class to wife for life, remainder to another, so y wife holds ym during life, as under y will. not claiming ym as Paraphernalia. - On her death, they go to y remainderman not to her executor: for as she made no claim to ym as Paraphernalia, y Ex or adm<sup>or</sup> cannot.

Sh<sup>d</sup> have been secus, had she claimed ym as Paraphernalia.



No<sup>2</sup>

In Count real as well as Personal property is liable for all debts, and as y Executor, if he shd take y Paraphernalia for payment of debts, wd himself be immediately be immediately liable to reimburse y widow, if there were other assets.

Quere can he take ym at all, ni both funds are exhausted! If he can y widow will be creditor to y amt of ym - vs all y Estate of deceased - real and Personal -

In addition to y widows usual share under y It of distribution, necessary household goods, are to be allotted her by Test in Count, where y Estate is insolvent. It Count 275.6.280

This rule is extended in practice to other articles, to money - Quere ant it also extended to Solvent Estates -

## Husbands Liability on Wifes Account.

11. The husband and wife are jointly liable. 1. For her debts - 1. Roll 351.  
 2. For her torts - 3. For her crimes, in some cases - 1. 2. Co. 11.  
 They are jointly liable during coverture for her debts - 7. J.B. 348  
 contracted while sole - But y liability ceases on her death - 1. Roll 443 -  
 ni judgment has been recovered vs ym before - 1. Selw. 337. 2. Co. 3. 122.  
 - Cont. 30 - 3. Mod 180.

For as his liability as it grows out of y relation in wch he stands to her, ceases with it -

So secus if Judgment has been had vs ym, for y Judgment there y debt, by converting y original duty of y wife into a It duty of y husband and wife - Ibid. Post 68 -

If then she die first, no Judgment having been recovered (ant It) 1. B.C. 1. 3. m.  
 y creditor loses his debt, ni she leave assets - or chise in action -  
 Co. Lit. 357. 3. P. W. 100. 1. Do. 408. 4. 122

If he dies first, y debt survives vs her 3. P.W. 40. 7. J.B. 343. 02.

Tho her executor ant liable -

Co. 3. 22.

12.

12. The principle of y husband's liability is yt y wife by marriage - loses part of her property and y command of y rest, as well



as y avails of her labour - and thus is deprived of means of  
 securing herself from arrest and confinement -  
 The ought not to be personally liable to a suit by her  
 husband

This applies to y principle of her liability both for her debts  
and torts -

214 110. And hence she can't in any evil action be taken and  
15 R 486. holden alone on mere process for her debts or torts. She  
500 40. 445 must be discharged in y<sup>e</sup> case on com mo-18. nominal bail -  
2. 100 2  
-720-  
quia she can't procure bail, quia she can't room in niamity -  
1. 100 140-  
3 30. 124. Com F. B. B. 6.

Except when action is brought against her, when she is bound to answer with the  
 minor. She then continues liable to be held in answer, for she can't  
 by her own act, defeat a proceeding against her, which was originally  
 regular, for she was originally regularly held to bail on the  
 said debt of Lion & Co. Creditors

2 of 8. In y<sup>r</sup> case execution goes w<sup>th</sup> her alone, and she is liable to be  
328.  
3 of 11/ taken upon it alone

1.62.1944 for such case. y visitor (Pth) may by a vein fused stain  
of East 5th. execution vs y husband & herself, nitrit a best ideas, y whole  
proceeding wd appear erroneous, and not conform to y trend -  
1 Schov 3/0- 2sch. 30- 3 mod 140-

13. If both are taken on same Process, she is discharged on Corn Bail and he remains in Custody till he puts in Bail for both -  
See 1272. 1. Mem. 4R- 2. B.P.R. 720. p. Lev 210.

Contra rent 48- w<sup>h</sup> no one it is supposed, will become bail  
n<sup>y</sup> responsibility of a persons having no property at common-  
law legal capacity to act.

If she is held under arrest in violation of these rules, not  
summit. She may in General obtain a discharge in a summary  
way by a motion to a Ct ~~Presiding~~ ~~at~~ ~~Presiding~~ & ~~Doct.~~  
If necessary by habeas corpus, as when a Ct is not sitting

But she will not be discharged in a summary way (i.e. on motion) when ended alone, as Time Taken, viz y coverture is notorious

Will less if he has imposed on, Plff by pretending to be a  
 Joint Solr: She is left in such case to plead her coverture -  
 2. R.R. 903. 720. For y application by motion is to y discretion of y Ct -  
 hon of her husband be an alien - 2. Bl R. 380 - Talk 64. 96 - 1.  
 and out of y reach of y Process - 2 R.R. 340 -  
 11 R. 51 - 2. Bat P 233 -) For in such case, as y husband can't  
 be sued, y Ct will not upon application in their discretion, discharge  
 her. The above Rules all apply to Domestic Process -

But if taken alone on final Process as both, she ant  
 discharged, viz there is a collusion between Plff and husband  
 to keep her in Prison - This exception is founded in  
 humanity

For upon a final process bail ant allowed, and ergo y  
 body of y wife as well as yt or y husband is eventually  
 liable for y debts - she must in y case remain in Custody -  
 1. Lev. 50 - The reason, wth she ant discharged on final  
 Process, is, yt y object is to obtain satisfaction for y debt - 2. 116. 12  
 327.  
 1237. 116  
 327.  
 2. 116. 12  
 720 -  
 1. 116. 12  
 124 -  
 Tis a compulsory Process, and on it, bail ant allowed -  
 Contra Lev. 51. not Law - 1st Law - Contra 1. Lev. 51.

At perdon. if y husband and herself are both taken on  
 final Process there can be no ground on wth she can  
 be discharged.

## II. Husbands liability for y Wife's Torts -

The husband is liable Jointly with y Wife during Coverture, for  
 her torts committed while Solr - The law is y same -  
 if she alone, and with y direction, approbation, or consent  
 of y husband, commit a Tort during coverture -

On Pl.  
 301.  
 3. Bl. 114.  
 1237.  
 1. 116. 140 -  
 Cro Jac 87.  
 1. 116. 151.

The wife in these cases is y only guilty person. They are  
 jointly liable for her Torts only Men, in those cases, in wth  
 y wife both in fact and in Judgment of Law, is y only guilty  
 person and he is made liable with her, quia she cant  
 be sued alone -

1. *Stalkie* But for torts committed during coverture by his command  
 4 *R.C.* 3. 4. (tho' in his absence) or by her jointly with him, or in his  
 28. company, he only is liable -  
 1. *R.C.* 348. Cro Ch. 184. Or 355. 254. or 481.

It is then deemed his sole act, or in these cases, she is supposed to act by his coercion. But yet this presumption can't be rebutted. Where husband and wife are jointly liable for her torts during coverture, she continues so post his death. *Palm 313 - Cro C 366 519* For in all such cases, y wrong is done both in fact and legal contemplation, by her alone - and his liability during coverture is founded on her privilege not to be sued alone. But when they are so liable during y coverture, his liability ceases with y coverture. For in such cases, he isn't y guilty person. tho' liable with her to be sued for y wrong. *Cro Ch. 371. 4.*

When he is liable alone during y coverture, y action doubtless survives vs him, y tort being considered in such cases as his sole act -

### III Husbands liability for Wifes Crimes -

The husband in some cases, is liable alone for y wifes crimes - as in cases of bare theft committed by her thro' his coercion - or in his presence, he is liable alone, y act being considered as his -

1. *San Rins* For y coercion actual or presumed, excuses her (So not y rule found ed in part at least on law relating to  
 1. *Plates* Benefit of Clergy - & men being entitled to it and women not?  
*P. R. 65.* 4. *R.C. 29. Ch. m.* The rule is said to be y same as to  
 2. *R.C. 40.* Burglary - *Heeling 31. 4 R.C. 28. 1. R.C. 40.*

*Heeling 31.* But y wife is liable as sole, if she commit y offence voluntarily, as in y husbands absence, and even by his force & free command. Such command falls short of Coercion.  
 4. *R.C. 29.* For mere misdemeanors committed by both, she is liable  
 4.



with y husband, y husband's presence, coercion, or command  
dont excuse her - 10. Mod 63. 335. 4 Bb. 28.

Why ant she excused in a more modest manner, as a simple  
theft wth is a higher offence? Here y doctrine of clergy, (nt Sub)  
seems to clear y difficulty and seems to intimate or indicate  
yt her exemption in y former case, arises out of y doctrine -

and Itake y general Theory of y Law to be, yt y coercion  
of y husband dont excuse y wife - For y above distinction  
4. Bb. 19. n Ch -

If y doctrine of y Clergy is assumed as y reason of her exemption  
it wd clear away many difficulties, and reconcile many con-  
tradictions -

And For higher crimes, as for Treason, Murder, robbery 1. Hawkins  
committed by both, both are liable, though husbands used 4. Bb. 28.  
coercion - For by reason of y enormity of y offence, y supposed 2. for 1120.  
coercion ant allowed as an excuse - Because these offences 3. Bb. 2. 75.  
are ousted of Clergy and if committed by her alone, she  
alone is liable - 316.

10. If a wife incur y penalty of a Penal St, he is bound  
to pay it, tho' she commit y act alone, and witht his  
sanction - The Penalty is in y nature of a debt - See  
Municipal Law 59-64

2. Bac. 284. 1. Hankin.  
2. 5.

In y case he is liable with her and <sup>maybe</sup> made with her a  
party to an action or information

She ant guilty as accessory in felony in receiving and  
assisting her husband after y fact - This rule is founded  
on indulgence shown by Law, to y relation, in wth they  
stand to each other, not to any supposed coercion -

1. Hawkins  
4.  
1. Bb. 38, 39.  
2. Hawkins  
45.  
1. Bb. 44.  
44.

In all es to wth y above exceptions dont stand, y wife  
is liable for crimes as if sole -

1. Co. 52. Hobbs 13. Cro. 482.  
3. Bb. 20. 1. Bb. 44.



# If the wife power to bind the husband by contracts during coverture.

Her power to bind a husband during coverture by her contracts, is said to be founded on his assent, Express or Implied—

1. Roll 351. 1. Bb Com 480. 1. Selw 287, 288.

17. But a husband is often bound by her contracts, when he expressly refuses to be bound (i.e. his consent) is if he refuses to provide her necessaries, she can bind him—  
 1. <sup>342</sup> Bb. C. 442. 1. Selw 120. 1. Bp Dig 122. 1. Roll 351.

His assent in fact is not necessary then in all cases, to his liability on her contracts, and his dissent won't in all cases exonerate him. Perhaps a more simple and obvious statement of a Principle, on wh he is bound by her contracts for necessaries, with his actual consent—  
 1. <sup>182</sup> P. M. M. 122. 124. 6 Mo. 289. 1. Bb. C. 118. is, y<sup>t</sup> he is under obligations as husband to provide her with necessaries i.e. food, raiment, medicine, and such as are suitable to her rank, and from his duty, y<sup>e</sup> law implies his assent and y<sup>e</sup> implication can't rebuttal—

18. The husband, tho an infant is bound for y<sup>e</sup> wife's necessaries, as he wd be for his own. (1. Bb. 1. Roll 351) For by being bound by the promise contract (i.e. of marriage) he must be so by those wh are incident to it—

19. Cases in wh y<sup>e</sup> wife may bind y<sup>e</sup> husband, chiefly on y<sup>e</sup> ground of assent. First where there is a coverture assent by y<sup>e</sup> husband before y<sup>e</sup> contract 1. Bb 423—

Second. Where assent by y<sup>e</sup> husband is expressly given. 1. Selw 120 1. Roll 350.

Third where y<sup>e</sup> wife usually provides necessaries for y<sup>e</sup> family and husband pays for em— i.e. has a General Authority where y<sup>e</sup> husb. has, som allowed her to contract. 1. Selw 128.

27.

Where there is implied consent antecedent to contracts of same kind, wh she post makes-

Fourth Where necessaries provided by y wife, come to his use or y<sup>t</sup> of y family- In yo case there is an implied assent subseq<sup>t</sup>.  
1. Bb 429. 3 East 383. 1. Selw 120-

In these cases, the wife acts in strictness as servant and y contracts she makes, are y contracts of y husband considered as Master or Employer-  
1. Lalk 118. 2. Ven 155. 2. Wils 1214-

1. Selw 109. 206. 1. Role 351-

A general credit given to y wife, (as in 3<sup>d</sup> classes of Cases) can't be determined by any private prohibition, so as to defeat y claims of those who post trust her on y account, of y husband.

For credit given by one to another, can be withdrawn only by notice, coextensive with it- Secus wd be defrauded-

1. Show. 35. 2. Vern. 643-

If y wife not having a General credit, purchases clothes without husband's knowledge and hawes ym with having worn ym. y husband ant liable, for here is no Express assent antecedent or subseq<sup>t</sup>. Secus had she worn ym and post hawed ym, for then having come to his use wd imply an assent subseq<sup>t</sup>-  
118.  
2. Le Ray 1606.  
Exh. 8. 123.  
2cc. 125.  
70-

Upon y same ground of distinction, if (with husband's privity) she haw her clothes before or post wearing and borrow money to redeem ym, he ant liable for y money- Besides borrowing money, ant a contract for necessaries- Semble, of any other article. The Rule thus far laid down, presupposes y<sup>t</sup> y husband has been guilty of no neglect in furnishing necessaries - for her.  
1. P Wm 183. 1. Role 352. Exh 125

21. If a husband turn away his wife, he is liable at all events for her necessaries, ni she commit adultery. 21.

1. Contract B 16"

1. Selw. 230. 6. T B. 605. 4. Burr. 2178.

1. Dou. C. 138. 6. 2008, 27 875.

1. L. 16. 348.

Palk. 118 - 1. L. 1. 339.

226, ..

Adultery is a satis cause, and (y only one wh will exonerate him from supplying necessities) for turning her away - and if y husband does it, he can't liable

But in y first case, 12 (when she ant guilty of Adultery) no prohibition general or special will avail him -

1. Talk 118.

For 1214.

Est D. 124.

The husband consents to her contracts for necessities, kata Talk 118 - For 1214 - or rather his duty to support her, gives her a General credit for necessities. (Est 124) and y Law raises a promise to him to pay for yon -

If a man cohabit with a woman, and allow her to use his name, as his wife and appearing so to y Public, he is liable for her necessities, tho' not married - Ergo "not lawfully married is a bad plea in an action for a debt contracted by her - 'he holds her out as his wife'

1. Selin 13. Co. Lev. 41 Bull n. P. 136. Est D. 124. Talk 434.

Bac. D. P. 4.

To in a suit for a debt due to her, y rule is y same To in action for Torts by or w<sup>th</sup> husb and wife -

Comb. 131. Bac. D. P. 4.

Let Quere on what principle? can they join as H<sup>us</sup> & W (Pleads 39) or no principle. If y rule be true, law gives no right to a man by a breach of policy and good morals ~~###~~

1 Levin 41 Such a plea is good in an action for Torts, and on appeal, so it is a good defence in an action for criminal conversation - Lord Mansfield says, y marriage must be lawful to support y action, because y charge is of a Criminal nature - See Page. 40 of y Title

Bull N. P. 146.

Est D. 125.

and pays y alimony

If y husband and wife part by agreement, or y husband allows her a separate maintenance, he ant bound for her necessities post y separation is generally known in y place in w<sup>ch</sup> he lives. (Post 28)



22. Whether known or not to y person trusting in y place where 23.  
 trust is given, it aint material, the enough if know personally  
 where he resides - Talk. 116. 12. Mod 244. 1. Ld Ray 444. 1006.  
 6. 2d 147. Esp S. 126 See Page 27.

Such a separation is a revocation of y credit wh marriage  
 gives her on y husband's account, and Ld Holt says, y  
 y credit must be presumed to be given to y wife on her  
 own account - But whether so presumed or not, y husband  
 is not liable - Ibid

If y wife living separte, has no separte maintenance, y  
 husband aint discharged - 4. Burr 2078. 6. T.R. 604 -  
 Esp S. 126.

If y wife depes and lives with an adulteror, he aint liable,  
 after y elopement is notorious - Talk. 110. 6 mod 171. Esp 125 -  
 1. Bb. 442. 3. - Sir 647. 1. Lev. 8 - and kata y current of authority,  
 he aint liable at all, even if her elopement is not notorious -  
 Esp S. 125. 1. H. R. 348. See Supra -

For by such an act, her rights as a wife are forever  
 forfeited - Hence husband is discharged forever - 1. B. et P. 338 -  
 339 - and y husband aint bound to receive her again, 6. T.R. 603.  
 6. T.R. 603 - Nor is he liable for her necessities, after refusing  
 to receive her - 1. Hen R. 349. 12 mod 244. 6. T.R. 603. Ld Ray 444 - 23 -  
 Sed Quere. as he has given her a credit with y Public,  
 wh aint in any way revoked, so far as regards y knowledge  
 of y Public - This is rather too much in favour of y  
 husband, it seems hard, yt he shd be exonerated, till  
 he shd have given notice -

But it seems to make no difference an y elopement is 2. Sir  
 notorious, an tis adulterous or not, he aint liable - 875  
 Talk 118.  
 The rule seems to be, yt y husband aint liable, tho' Esp S.  
 125.  
 y Elopement aint adulterous - 1. Pow. 36.  
 1. Lev. 107



if a wife ~~married~~ with an adulterer, and post hoc to return and y husband refuses to admit her, he must support her and of course is bound for her necessaries.

Co. L. 125. St. 875. 1. Bac. 290. 300 -

For a mere elopement is not a perpetual forfeiture of her rights; it's but a Temporary Infraction of ym, i.e. as long as Elopement continues -

Contra. Falk 119. 118.

25. In y case, i.e. post hoc he offers to return, a general prohibition vs troubling her, is not good. A Special one however is good. For tho he is bound to support her, yet post such misconduct, she can't arbitrarily select creditors for him vs his wife and prohibition -

St. R. 603. 4 Burr 2177. 1. Lev 4. 1. No. 124. Bac. H. B. Feme 1. Lelovii 103.

If however he leaves her, at his own house with children,

1. Bac. H. 226. having made no provision for ym, tho' she live in a State of adultery, he is liable for her necessaries, provided y Pitt didn't know of y adultery - For by leaving her in such situation, he gives her *Domus Proci* credit with y Public.

1. Falk 119. 6 Mod. 171.

But tho y husband ant liable for her necessaries during

2. Bac 1179. elopement, not adulterous, neither is y wife, for she is still a *Feme Covert* and y marital rights are entire - i.e. can't be violated. The creditor must credit her at his Peril - violated. St. 875. n. Co. L. 125. Bac. B. Feme. 4 +

1. Pow. C. 36. 8. J. R. 547.

It has been holden seems, if she lives in adultery during y Elopement. For as she may forfeit her own rights as wife, how can she impair his? This I conceive ant Law - for in y case she wd obtain rights by an adulterous Elopement - Vis an obiter opinio. See Page 32.

1. Bac H. 338.

24. Where husband and wife live separate, and husband is liable for necessaries furnished her (ante 22) y goods, it is said, shd not be charged in y declaration generally as

St. 27.

furnished to him, but y special matter shd be shown -  
 Secus y cause of action wd not be identified, so as to  
 be a bar. (Star 137) There ant y former mode of declaring  
 according to legal effect. (So Gould thinks) It  
 ant agreeable to analogy and I sd never see y necessity  
 of it - Provision. If y husband provides necessaries, 1 Ex. 5.  
 for y wife at home he has a right to prohibit y Public 1. Ex. 5.  
 as well as any individual to visit her at all and may 1. Ex. 5.  
 discharge himself - for y end of y Law, is attained

And he may thus terminate any credit, he may have given  
 her, with y Public or individuals. Salk 118. 2d Raym 444 -  
 1006. But he cant deprive her of necessaries. Esp. 122. 1. Bt  
 442. Salk 118. 2d Raym 1006. She may deprive herself  
 by misconduct. If he refuses to provide ym - she may get  
 ym on his credit - (Hnt 17) 1. Bt 442. Esp. 122.

25. If y husband turn her away witht satis cause, he is liable  
 for her necessaries, and I presume, y rule is y same. if she 2. Bt  
 leaves his house by reason of bad treatmt, wh wd render 12. 14.  
 her residence intolerable - no analogous case in y Eng Books 12. mod  
 244.  
 but in y State. (Conn) there are (Post) a father 3. Bt  
 abused his son and his representatives were holden liable 37. 2. 38.  
 as a Gen or Special prohibitor -  
 For here y husband is y aggressor -

For money lent to y wife, y husband ant liable under  
 any circumstances, unless it is actually expended in y purchase Salk 297  
 of necessaries, and then only in Equity, because there is danger 38.  
 of Misapprehension, y Law wont favour y Lender. and as Pre Chy  
 y contract at Law is good or bad at y times of lending 453.  
 and ant affected by Matter 'ea post facto', it must be Same of an  
 enforced at Law without reference to y application of y Infant.  
 money. or not at all - Hence y husband cant be subjected  
 at Law but in Chy - y lender stands in place of lender,  
 and recovers only y amt of necessaries - Tho less y y own lent -

A woman in y County of Fairfield. Cont. brt a bill for divorce for "culpable absence" and supported it by proving yt she deserted him for y intolerable brutality of his conduct. Sup Ct. Case not reported.

27.

If a husband and wife separate by deed, y husband stipulating an allowance for her maintenance, and y allowance isn't duly paid, he is liable on her contract<sup>condition</sup> for necessities - 2. N.B. 148. Contra. Mansfield -). For here y <sup>condition</sup> of his exemption from liability is broken. Post 31. Justice Mansfield didn't concur in y decision 2. N.B. 148 - but I think, y others Judges fairly demonstrated it.

Of the Wife's power to bind herself and Property  
by her own Contract.

many cases

By y Gen Rule of y C Law - <sup>she</sup> can't make herself liable or or subject her property by her contract: tho' she may in many bind her husband. The reason generally assigned is, yt her existence is merged in y husband's, yet she has no will distinct from his. 10. Co 42. 1 Roll 347. 1. Bb 442)

It don't seem necessary to resort to so technical a reason, for y true principle of y Rule is, as y Law has in favour of y husband deprived her of her property or disabled her to dispose of it, hence she is privileged as all Personality liability

2<sup>d</sup> The husband has a right to her person, and if she wd bind herself, y<sup>s</sup> right might also be infringed

3<sup>d</sup> If she wd affect or subject her property, <sup>her</sup> right to y<sup>s</sup> might be defeated - ante 12.

The presumption yt she acts in all cases under y coercion of her husband, seems to form in gen part of y true reason of y rule - For if she <sup>she</sup> wd enter



into a contract confessedly vs his will, it certainly  
wd not bind him or her

Her contracts at C Law are not regularly voidable  
merely. but void.

1. Pow. 90. 97. 1. Falk 7.

2. P W 144. 2. Bb C. 233.

But a redelivery of her deed or bond after her husband's  
death, or what is equivalent to it, will bind her.

Cow. 201.

4. Lewis 8  
20.

This being a reacceptation virtually, so y<sup>t</sup> in Law, it is  
a new deed - For every deed takes effect from delivery  
i.e. from y<sup>e</sup> date of y<sup>e</sup> last delivery (not valid "ab  
initio" but from y<sup>e</sup> redelivery -

25-

Her leases, however are only voidable. This exceptor to  
y<sup>e</sup> Gen Rule is allowed for y<sup>e</sup> advancemt of agriculture

And if she joins y<sup>e</sup> husband in a lease of her lands, for  
life or more yn 21. yrs. and accepts rent after his death,  
she is bound by y<sup>e</sup> Lease, for she thus affirms it - For  
husband can avoid y<sup>e</sup> Lease, tho' she can't during  
coverture, for y<sup>e</sup> avoidance wd be of no greater authority  
yn y<sup>e</sup> Lease itself -

2. Tanna

180. et. 3

on Ch

563

15266

1. Chit P. 43- 225

In y<sup>e</sup> case however after she becomes discreet, she may  
ratify or annul it, as where she leases alone -

1. Polle 349.

1. Leon 132. Com. D. B. T. G. J. R. I. L. H. 225.

It being as to her voidable -

1. Leon 132.

If she ratifies it, she becomes bound by y<sup>e</sup> contract -  
for she ratifies it "ab initio" -

Ch 4. 43.

1. Mod. 231. Cro. E. 563. 4. 2. Tanna 180.

1713.

If a lease be made to husband and wife, and she agrees  
to it after his death, she is liable on such y<sup>e</sup> contract  
as are running with y<sup>e</sup> land, tho' not upon such as are

1. Note 349.

2. Tanna 180.

180. m. 9.



as are collateral, no charge y Person - 1. Ch. Recd. 43.

1. Roll  
349.  
Com. &.  
18. H. 30.

If an obligation be given to Barron and Some, she may refuse y benefit of it after husband's death, and after such waiver it enures to his representatives, as an obligation to him alone - "Deed" 81-

If a husband and wife are made Tenants in Common, she may disagree to y purchase or gift after his death - 1. Roll 349- 3 Co 26- and when waived, it will enure as an Estate originally conveyed to husband - for by y waiver, it is waived as to her "ab initio" or by relation. 3 Co 27.8.

In D Bar Den. R.

3 Co 26: But if y Estate is a Freehold, a waiver by Parol, isn't effectual - she must disagree in a de of Record. This is necessary by reason of y Law's deeming so highly of a Freehold,

On y other hand, she may assent to it by Parol, or by her acts, as entry and taking y profits -

2. Roll 31.  
3 Co 327.  
357.8. If an estate is limited to husband and wife, and a stranger, y husband and wife take but a moiety - here y husband and wife are regarded as one Grantee - This is in consequence of their legal unity -

2. Den 120- If real estate is conveyed to husband and wife by words, wh between strangers wd create a St Tenancy - they will take by entireties and not by moieties -

Estates in St Tenancy - P. 8. 5- They are "Quasi St Tenancy,"  
C. 140- 55 R 654. 2 L. 38. Co Litt 187. a. b.

Ergo y husband can't by his own act, alien even a moiety or sever y St Interest - He can't thus deprive her of y chance



- If husband is banished or has acquired y<sup>e</sup> Realm, & (Esp. R. 554) or is transported or is in alien enemy, he is "Civiliter mortuus" and y<sup>e</sup> wife is considered as a  feme sole, for in such cases, there is no satis rason for treating her as a feme covert, or as co-actor of her own privileges or y<sup>e</sup> husband's right - Besides a capacity to act for herself is deemed necessary to preserve <sup>her</sup> from suffering - In these cases therefore she may contract at C. Law, and is liable to be sued and arrested - For y<sup>e</sup> same reason, she may also sue alone -
1. B. & L. 357.  
1. R. & M. 346.  
2. B. & L. 104.  
Salk 116.  
646.  
2. R. & L. 231.  
1. Pol. & 290. 300. 1. Pow. C. 76. 97. 1. Pow. 66.

30- The rule has been holden to be y<sup>e</sup> same, if y<sup>e</sup> husband were a foreigner, and has remained abroad for yrs without returning.

11. East 304 n.  
2. Ros. L. 233  
1. N. R. 80 For in such a case deserting y<sup>e</sup> realm (it is said,) for yo purpose, is equivalent to allying it and y<sup>e</sup> wife, as in y<sup>e</sup> former case, is regarded as a feme sole - So in a case of a divorce "a mensa et thoro" and for y<sup>e</sup> same reason, If husband and wife are separated under articles of agreement, and y<sup>e</sup> wife has a separate maintenance, she has been liable even at C. Law to y<sup>e</sup> extent of her contract.
1. T. R. 5. Salk 116. 5. T. R. 682. &

But, y<sup>e</sup> doctrine is now overruled 8. T. R. 545.  
Esp. R. 6. 6. B. & L. 607. 4. B. & L. 766. 1. R. & M. 377. 2. B. & L. 1076. 1195.

2. N. R. 148. 163.

12. matter any embas The case of Corbett vs Palmer, went further in any other. In Bennett vs Brooke, y<sup>e</sup> wife alone was holden liable at Law for necessities, And the husband was within y<sup>e</sup> realm in y<sup>e</sup> case she was holden liable - she had a separate maintenance - lived separate and y<sup>e</sup> contract was for necessities - 1. Pow. C. 79. 80. 100. Cooks Bankr. Law 24. 28.

In Lady <sup>on</sup> Savoy's case, y<sup>e</sup> husband lived in Ireland y<sup>e</sup> wife in England. A separation by deed had taken place



and a separate maintenance was secured. She was held liable on y ground, yt her husband lived abroad and yt she traded as a feme sole - 2 Br Chy 385-87. 1. Pow C. 78. 2b d 125.

Indeed y *Case* Lady L. and Darnell vs Brook. 1. 3 et P. 357. Corbet vs ~~Dr~~ we have all been denied to be law and must be considered as overruled - The whole current of Eng authority is vs ym - 8. T R. 545. Marshall vs 1. Feb 297. Ralstone - 11. East 381. 2 Br. F. 225. 9 East 471.

(not Law Lanesborough, Darnell and Brooks. Corbett Polnet)

1- Nor is her separate real property liable in Equity, ni by virtue of an agreement to yt effect on her part, *Temble* 15. an agreänt respecting y property itself. not for her debts or Personal ~~representative~~ <sup>personal</sup> engagements - 1. Br. 517. 1. Br Chy 16-20-21 2. 11 R. 163- But her separate <sup>personal</sup> property and y rents and profits of her separate real estate, may be applied by a Ct of Equity in discharge of her ~~for~~ Personal ~~engagements~~ <sup>engagements</sup>. as in discharge of a hand note &c. 1. Br. Chy. 20-21- and y decree is never personal vs her, it never acts in personam, but vs her property only - 1. Br Chy 21-

In these cases of separation and separate maintenance, if a 29- remedy is to be sought vs y wife, a Ct of Equity (as before said P. 20) 29- is y proper Forum, for as it can give a remedy vs her separate property wtht infringing her privileges or y husband's right - 8. T R. 547. 1. Pow C. 183

2. A Feme Covert, being separate, wtht separate property, 4. T R. 766. was never holden liable on her contracts either in Law 6. D. 604. or Equity The husband is bound to support her, and to 5. D. 682- admit yt y wife is bound, is to exonerate y Husband -

It has once been held <sup>liter</sup> ~~aliter~~ yt y wife living separate



from y husband, in a state of adultery, is liable on her own contracts. 1. Bat & P 338) ved Quere ante 23-

For tho she may thus forfeit her own rights as between y husband and herself, she can't impair <sup>her husband's</sup> In Judge Gould's opinion, y<sup>e</sup> ant Law-

2. Br Chy  
356.

10. Co

1. Ten H 300

7. Co 8

1. Dow. C

22.

If a Feme Covert alone levies a fine or suffers a recovery she is bound by it, tho y husband may defeat it during <sup>his</sup> life or afterwards, if Tenant by y Curtesy by entry -

1. Hen BL 341.

She is estopped by y recovery, tho some have doubted, an she can bind herself by a recovery - 1. Ten H 300. Co Litt 326 - C. B

16. Co 43

1. Hen BL 341 - and after husband's death, she is bound by y Warranty in y fine, he not having defeated it. If she is bound during coverture, y marital rights wd be infringed.

1. Ch. R

466.

43.

2. Roll

395.

In matter of Record, and can't be avowed against.

If y husband joins in a fine or recovery, tis binding on both "ab initio"

She is bound by way of Estoppel -

2. BR.

695.

1. Ten H 341

2. Dow 150.

2. Dow 150.

616.

6. Br. C.

150.

There were regularly y only (2.) conveyances by wh a Feme Covert wd alien her inheritance at C Law. But it seems now, st she may do it. First By executing a power over a use at Law (2. Ten H 695) wh operates at Law as well as in Equity. 2<sup>d</sup> In Equity she clearly may, as st by a declaration of Trust, tho there is only an agreemt made before marriage, for selling y Estate upon Trustees. subject to her appointment or declaration. The second mode can be enforced in Equity only - Dow. 2. 150. 150. 2. Br. C. 150.

1. Dow 181.

Dow 2. In y former case it where there is an actual settlement made

150. 150.

2. Dow 180.

2. Br. C.

690.

150. 150.

in Trust y Trustees or persons, to whom y estate was first conveyed, are compelled in Chy to carry her appointment into effect, by joining in y necessary conveyance

150. 150. 4. 150.

for its purpose-

32.

In y latter case other necessary parties, as y husband. or y wife. heir at Law (as y case may require) are compelled to y same thing

If y wife having separte estates, permits y husband to receive and use y rents and profits, if it is real, or 1 Ab's  
Personal, it is Personal, she is bound in Equity to 2. Pow. 422.  
have abandoned y rents and to him - 2. P. 778 82. 423

As to devising Personal property see 2. Ab. 498 - n Pow. D. 167. C.  
2. Sec 191.

35. A Chancery Court can't devise real estate under y General words "all and every persons or person" in y 32. Hen 8th Dyer 354. B  
This was y Rule before y explanatory Statute 34. Hen 8th Pow. D. 140. 48.  
(Bed) and by yt Decree, she is solemnly disqualified, 1. Bes. 300.  
This rule does indeed seem to be founded on y Presumption 4. Co. 61. b  
yt she acts by coercion of her husband - For she has no 2. Kel. 225.  
interest in her inheritance, and y power of devising it, 2. Mils 2.  
not subject her person, and of course cd not violate 2. Est 556.  
y marital right -

### The Wife's Power to Devise

By our St of Court, all persons of full age and right understanding & not otherwise legally incapacitated, shall have full power to make their wills - Testaments, and other alienations of their lands and other Estates - Its of Court.

As to y meaning of y words "legally capable" note y construction given to y words "all persons" in y 32. Hen 8th Pow. D. 141 - i.e. persons capable of disposing of real property by other modes of conveyance -

It was once decided in y Ct of Errors, in Comt, yt she might devise Real Estate under y Gen Law authority  
 \* Kirby devises - but since determined Contra \* 2 Bl. 105. 438. 2 Jay 162. Under our new St, she is expressly empowered to devise (St Comt 15) And in General, she can't make a will or bequeath Personal Property -  
 For it wd violate his rights - *offic. lxxc. 106. Mentworth*

2. Bl. 498. Secus of Goods, wh she holds as Executrix, in "ante Jroit"  
 2. East 552. 12. she may make an <sup>executory</sup> ~~executory~~ of ym witht husband's  
 Godolphin's consent, but she can't even witht his consent bequeath  
 110. 11. 301. ym - making an execution of ym, is no more ym executing  
 a power over ym -

In Equity, she may bequeath her Personal Property, holden  
 \* 2. Bl. 488. to her sole and separate use - She is a Teme Sole in Equity  
 4 Co 51. "Teme ad hoc" She can't do yd at C Law, for y C Law, knows  
 2. East 552. nothing of Property holden to her Sole and separate use -  
 Jar 831. For 831. Not being disabled as to yt by St 34 T Con 8<sup>th</sup>. ante 41. 35  
 Cro Pr. 376. 1. Mod 211.

It has been said, yt she may bequeath her Paraphernalia -  
 4. Reeves History Eng Law 72. 3. 4.

1. 2. Bl. 347. But she may bequeath any kind of Personal Property held  
 1. Mod 211. in her own right, in wh she has y beneficial interest -  
 3. 2. Bl. 695. witht his consent, but an y goods were originally his or hers,  
 2. P. (Hm) 82. 316. tis his conduct yt gives y conduct, his conduct is y  
 1. Vern 245. operating, bequeathing act -  
 2. 2. Bl. 253. 1. Reeves His Eng Law 101. 111. 307. 4 & 78.

That y husband's consent gives validity to y Instrument -  
 2. Bl. 488 - 1. Mod. 211 -

2. East 552. But his assent of a bequest <sup>to</sup> her of Personal Property,  
 wh may accrue to her after his death, will be of no avail,  
 tho she survives him, for he has no power over it,  
 The bequest is ergo void 2. East 552. This proves, yt it is  
 y assent of y husband makes her will of Personal Property valid -



3.  
103.

If a feme sole makes a will and then marries and dies before y husband, it is revoked. For it is essentially incident to a will to be revocable by y act of y Party or Testator, But her power to do so, being suspended by marriage, ("for y revocation during coverture wd be void") y Law revokes it for her, for y Law won't allow y ambulatory Instrument to remain in force.

2. Pymms  
624.  
4 Co 60-  
2. SR  
685  
2 Ab. 499.

But if The survive y husband, how is y rule? The opinions are contradictory - The weight seems to be in favour of y Reversal - I think it wd be revoked -

2d Henr. Co. 2 JR. 530. (Note 381- (2 SR 605.)  
2. Ab. 480 - n - Dow. 2. 173. "Devise" 135-

And a will made by a feme covert is not by y English Law. validated by y husband's death, for if not good in its inception, it can never become so - Same rule as to all contracts - 2. East 552. Collateral events can never give validity to yt wh was originally invalid - 1. Eg. Co 176.  
11. Mod. 123. Fath 238.

172.3.  
2. East  
552.  
Lilt 246.  
Plew. 343.

one not coupled with an interest 35.

35. She may execute a naked authority, for here no interest of her's can be affected - as a bare power to sell another's property Com D. Bar. Seme Co Lilt 112. a. & n. 6. 4. Cruise & 21. 2357.  
P. 3.

So also tho' an interest passes to her with y power, provided y authority is collateral to y interest and don't flow from it - They are then unconnected, as if granted to different persons -

As devise to her, of an interest, in trust to convey to another, or on consideration of her conveying - Here she is bound to convey and by conveying parts with no interest wh she has a right to hold -  
Pb. 40. 41. of y title. "Devise 40"

12. a. n. o.  
each 133-  
1. 300 L.  
182.  
4 Cruise  
235.  
21.

Aliter if y Power arises out of her Interest - as devise to her in fee with power to convey - 1. Bat P. 192 - In



10. bes.  
246.

yo case, if she cd execute y power, she cd dispose of her own beneficial interest - Post 40. 44- ante p. 83-

But I conclude, she may convey it in Equity, as separate property, independently of y power. (ut supra)  
Post 38-

40. she may however execute a power or authority retained by herself to convey, or even virtually to devise her own estate of y estate is settled on her by way of Trust or uses -

in y former case, she may effect y obligation by declaration of Trust, in y latter by executing a power over y Use -

If y Trust or Power is to be created during coverture, it must be by fine; if before marriage it may be by deed -

in an estate of a woman conveyed to y Use of herself for life, remainder to y Use of such persons, as she by any writing in y nature of a will shd appoint -

Here a limitation by her of y Uses, in remainder, is valid in Chy - 1. Pow. Dev. 150- 2. bes. 101- and Even at Law. Uses being now executed by y H of Uses -

41- So by way of Trust, she can dispose of her Real Property in a similar way. As an estate of a woman conveyed to Trustes in Trust for her separate Use, coverture, and afterwards in Trust for such Person - In such or y case an appointment by her in pursuance of y Trust will be supported in Equity, as a declaration of y Trust. 12. y Trustes will be compelled to convey or carry it into effect -

And it seems, she can't devise or execute a power by devise over her Real Property, in any of these ways

For y rights of her <sup>at Law</sup> ~~hus~~ are concerned -

She may in Equity bequeath her Personal property under a bare agreement of her husband before marriage, & she may retain it. for it is absolutely in his power

But y rule holds only in Equity, for they only <sup>can</sup> enforce y agreement.

At Law she can't hold y property as separate. ante No 1. P. 80. The agreement in y case makes it her separate property.

But a power to convey by Deed, y property of another, she may execute with a Use - Pow D. 31.2. Voy. 80 - Lahti 11. 35.2. (Walk 239-) Tho she can't execute a power over her own interest. 1. 3 et P. 192. For in y first case she is a mere agent for passing y others interest -

And y appointer in y above cases, is considered as taking by virtue of y Instrument giving power, tho' y Person executing it. See Devises

First. She may dispose of her Real Property by executing a power over a use. Suppose a woman before marriage conveys T. her real estate to H. B. to y use of herself, for life, remainder to y use of any person or persons she shall by any ~~means~~ writing in y form of y deed, or will, be appoint - Here all she has to do, is to make a will in form, appointing her children or any persons, y remaindermen - She reserves, while Sole. a power to convey to whom she pleases -

When she makes y appointment, y appointer is in entire devises, but she don't in form convey y estate, for it is taken out of her, - nominally having reserved to herself only a life estate - and a power to appoint any person or persons to take y use in remainder - She exercises a power over a Fee simple wh she conveyed away her Fine Cole -

These appointees in y<sup>e</sup> case, take under y<sup>e</sup> original settlement and not by y<sup>e</sup> appointment, for y<sup>t</sup> is nothing more or less than naming those who shall take it -  
The appointment is valid at Law -

Second. Declaration of Trust. The main difference between y<sup>e</sup> and y<sup>e</sup> former mode of conveyance, is, y<sup>t</sup>, y<sup>e</sup> word "Trust" is substituted for "Use" "Tis then man, a woman before marriage conveys her Real Estate to Trustees in Trust for herself and separate use during life, and y<sup>e</sup> remainder in Trust to such persons, as she shall in y<sup>e</sup> form of a will appoint. Now she may declare by writing in form of a will, who shall take, and these appointees as in y<sup>e</sup> former case, take under y<sup>e</sup> original Deed, not she made when "Sui Juris" ante 30-

### Agreements between husband and wife -

Tis a General Rule of Law. y<sup>t</sup> all contracts of husband and wife are void, and those made between y<sup>em</sup> before coverture dissolved by intermarriage - Co. Litt 112.264. Cro. El. 551.  
1. 36. C. 442. "Donors of Chy 5"

The reason assigned is, y<sup>t</sup> y<sup>e</sup> legal existence of y<sup>e</sup> wife is merged § 136.444.2. The true reason seems to be generally - First y<sup>t</sup> by their legal union, y<sup>e</sup> right and obligation meet in y<sup>e</sup> same person. Butk 326 - So y<sup>t</sup> an action can't lie. 2<sup>d</sup> That a recovery if attained, wd in most cases be nugatory by reason of y<sup>e</sup> rights of y<sup>e</sup> husband to wife's property - Thus. If he cd have a recovery wd her, it wd in general be out of wh<sup>ch</sup> is evidently his own, or what he might make his own, by his own acts. If he cd recover wd her, what she might recover, wd ipso facto, become either his absolutely or partially -

Besides Thirdly - The policy of y<sup>e</sup> Law won't allow



suits between ym - Since if y wife of a defendant becomes Executrix or administrator to y Plff y action is destroyed -  
8. J.R. 407-

If y Def in y case, had been taken in execution 8 J.R. 407  
by y original Plff. he must be discharged. Ibid. For  
his wife as Executor has now become y Creditor. but she  
cant hold him in execution, and besides y Trust during  
coverture devolves upon him; so y<sup>t</sup> he himself has y  
legal right of creditor, at his control - But there  
are some Exceptions to y General Rule - Post -

### 37. Contracts of Husband and Wife during Coverture

At C Law no contract between Husb. and Wife respecting Personal  
Property is valid, for y reason before assigned and indeed y Law  
dont recognize a right in y Wife to hold Personal property  
independently of y husband  
1. J.R. 9. 1. R. Rb. 336. 345. 6.  
Cooks Bank. 85 1. Pow. 84. C.

And a deed of Land from y husband to y wife directly, wd  
at C Law and according to y ancient Rule of Equity, be void -  
by reason not only of y husband's right to her property of Co Litt  
w<sup>th</sup> y control and "management" wd still be in him, but 3. a. n. l.  
by reason also of y impossibility of any overruling remedy 112.  
between ym. For y Law knows of no right without 1. Pow.  
a remedy - Besides y C Law dont recognize separation 84.  
of rights and interests between ym, w<sup>th</sup> a contract respecting 4 Co 23.  
property implies -

38. But tis now settled in Chy (ut ante. 101 P. 9. 84)  
y<sup>t</sup> husband may settle property to y Wife and separate use  
of his wife during coverture, even without Trustees -  
1. Fealb. 3476 1. Atk. 250 - 2. P. M. 300 - and her  
agreements respecting y<sup>t</sup> property, even w<sup>th</sup> y husband, are binding -



For Equity can act upon and control y property without invading y Personal relative rights of either party -

2. Wis. 669. For Chy - 44 - 2 Bern 64 - 1. atks 270 - 1. P. 122  
126 - Brown's Chy 16 - 1. Tombl. 90. 1 - 102 - 2. Map. 159 -  
6. Bro P. C. 156 - 2. Wis. 131 note 1. re 163 - 577.

For D. 810 - 1. Day 221 - 35. (alter) yt she cant hold Personal property to her separate use -

But it has since been decided secus by Ct of Errors -  
Pow. Chy 8 -

2. Ben 305. Formerly holden yt Trusts were necessary -

3 atks 72. Pow Ch. 9. Title <sup>line</sup> 57.

A Conveyance of Real property by Husband to 3<sup>d</sup> persons

2. Bb. 337 to y use of his wife, is good at Law. For & Law regards

332.3. 4. Co 29. only y legal title and Equity wd carry y uses into effect -

Co Lts 3. - Alter since y use of legal title is not because y legal title is not

112. in y "Cestui Que Use" so yt a conveyance for y use of

1. Bost. 1367. y Wife, wd be a conveyance to y wife, wh at Law, cant be -

30- So if Husband to encourage y industry of y wife, engages to allow her a part of y avails of it, y agreement is good in Chy - 3 P. Wm 337. 1. Tombl 92. Contra: Day 291. overruled.

She may sue y husband in those cases by her next friend in Chy -

1. Atks 270. "Donatio causa mortis" from husband to wife is good at Law - (semble) For it is testamentary - 1. Co Lts 3. a. n. a. 496. 2. 274 Co 50. 2. 1. Co 163. 168. 1. Tombl. 87. 99 -

1. 1. Ben 305. If husband covenants with y wife not to intermeddle with her estate, he is estopped from doing it and she is left to her contract. 12. She may obtain an injunction as here in Equity

40- Articles of agreement between husb. and wife to use separate 8. Mod 22. are enforced both in Chy and at Law - 2. Ben 386. 671. 3. Cor. 674. 2. 2. 377. 1. Burr. 452. 1. 1. Ben 386. 334. 351. 1. Tombl. 357

If then in violation of y agreeamt, he compels her to live with him again, she may be discharged by a writ of Habeas Corpus - Com. D. Bar. Term 0. St. 478. 1. Burr 542.

Neither y person or property of y husband, is injured by a "Habeas Corpus" nor does it interfere with any marital right, wh he has not relinquished, and if post repeats y attempt, he is guilty of a contempt -

He is bound however only to y extent of y agreeamt, ergo any property post coming to y wife, will be as much at his disposal, as if there had been no separation - nry contrary is expressly stipulated Dac. 338.  
1. Term. 261.

41. A voluntary Settlement by husband on wife post coverture is <sup>not</sup> good vs even subsequent purchasers. knowing y fact. as being fraudulent by Gc 27. Eliz -

Sure. is y correct on marriage & knowing y fact and being voluntary purchasers, now ca they be defrauded by y settlement, if established. see F Conveyances -

Contracts between husb. and wife. before Coverture -

42. It is regularly true, yt if y husband is indebted to y wife, 1. Rb. 442. fore coverture, or vice versa, intermarriage extinguishes y obligation <sup>cro Ch.</sup> 551. see P. 36 -

If y husband being indebted to y wife by bond executed before marriage, dies, and leaves y bond uncanceled, y debt, it seems, will not revive, for a personal contract, once suspended, is forever extinguished - 2. Bow. 254 2. H Rb. 10. Rb. 10.

cro Ch. 551. 1. Rb. C. 542.  
4

If y obligee in a bond, being a woman, marries any of Cro Ch. 551. 1. Term. 33. Com. D. 35. 1. Rb. 442.

The principle of 30 Rule is, y<sup>t</sup> a marriage is a discharge of all y<sup>e</sup> debts, y<sup>t</sup> might have been due from y<sup>e</sup> obligor, & he marries. But y<sup>e</sup> whole debt might have been due from him, ergo y<sup>e</sup> whole debt is discharged.

Under y<sup>e</sup> Gen Rule, a distinction is taken between a contract y<sup>t</sup> creates a duty during coverture, and one creating a duty after it had ceased. A Contract or Promise by y<sup>e</sup> husband before marriage, to leave y<sup>e</sup> intended wife of a sum of money, after his death, is allowed to be good at Law, as well as in Equity. Because there is no debt during coverture, for y<sup>e</sup> contract is made before coverture and don't create an oblig<sup>con</sup> till after. Here there is no difficulty about a remedy, or invasion of y<sup>e</sup> Marital rights.

Ld Holt was opposed to y<sup>e</sup> rule, but he was overruled by y<sup>e</sup> other Judges and his view well established.

42. As to a bond executed by a man before coverture, conditioned to leave his intended wife a sum of money after his death, there has been much difference of opinion, as it isn't discharged at Law by their subsequent intermarriage. The Penalty being a present debt.

That such a bond is good in Chy, as well as at Law, there has been no doubt. 2. B.M. 243. 2. Vern. 280. 490. 2. Ben. 343. 2. Atk. 87. Pre Chy 287.

And such a bond was holden valid in Ld Holt's time, Holt himself contra, but overruled by y<sup>e</sup> other Judges.

Carth 571. Com. Ro. 67. or 57.

The great great doubt might y<sup>e</sup> Ld Holt's opinion rendered 30 Rule extremely uncertain, till Ld Kenyon's time. 5 T.R. 382. When it was unanimously settled by all y<sup>e</sup> Judges, it's now good at Law. Carth 571.

5 T.R. 382.  
2. P.M. 243

4. A wife may by accepting a Jointure before marriage



Bar her right of Dower is at Law. Such an agreement was never considered as extinguished by subsequent intermarriage. Co Litt 36. 4 Co 12. 2. Bl. 137. 8.

1. Rule. 173.

For y estate don't take effect, 'till after y <sup>coverture</sup> ~~coverture~~ is determined. And to enforce y contract either in Law or Equity, requires no Suit between husband and wife -

The Eng. Law. as to Darning Dower by Jointure, is regulated by y St of Uses - 27 Hen 8<sup>th</sup>

## Requisites of Jointure to Bar Dower

These are Four.

First. It must take effect immediately on husband's death -

Second. It must be for y life of y Wife - at least and not per annu. &c -

Third. It must be settled expressly on y wife to herself - and not in Trust for - Fourth. It must be expressed

to be in satisfaction of her whole Dower - On y subject there is a contrariety of opinion - but I think y weight of authority is in favour of y Rule and have laid down and y fact may be averred Co Litt 36. B. 2. Bl. 138 Contra 4. Co 3. a. 2 Bl. 138. n. Owen 33 -

Unless these requisites are complied with, in settling y Jointure y right of y Wife to Dower isn't barred - tho' still y Jointure is not void, but notwithstanding, it will not bar Dower -

45. It has been doubted, can a Jointure in Comnt, may not consist of Personal Property (ante 3) there. "Some other estate" must mean (in our St) a larger estate y n for life - St Comnt 147. 2. That it can't, see Taurfein. Co 1800 - Sellick vs Sellick -



1. Ves 55. But an executory agreement by wife before marriage, to accept  
 1. Pow. 53. personal property or money in lieu of dower, may be enforced  
 5 Br PC 570. in Equity - tho' they can decree when its advantageous and reasonable  
 2. Eq 99 so as to guard her w<sup>th</sup> loss or injury, and won't interfere  
 101.2. w<sup>th</sup> her intention - Parent and Child 41-

If a Dower be settled after y<sup>e</sup> marriage, she may on husband's death, accept or refuse it and take Dower Joy<sup>t</sup> settlement being made during coverture, doth bind her. But she can't have both 2. Br. 133. 2. H. 140. 1. Buls. 137. Eyer 308-

And by bringing a Bill of Dower she renounces Dower -

3 Co 27. a 4 So. 5. B.

### a Devise of Real Property.

46. ~~A~~ Parol Will or Testator's intention y<sup>t</sup> ~~to~~ sh<sup>d</sup> be instead  
 4. Co. 4. 5. of Dower, is inadmissible - Once decided Contra by La  
 Cro Elvi 128. Jones - but his decree was reversed by Wright and North  
 Co Litt 36. B. decree was affirmed

For in devise, y<sup>e</sup> testator's intention must be collected from face of Instrument -

But tho' y<sup>e</sup> devise ant. expresses to be in D<sup>ty</sup> of Dower, yet y<sup>e</sup> wife can't take both - If y<sup>e</sup> husband has devised away all his other property. (Vente) This being proof upon face of Instrument, of his intending y<sup>e</sup> devise as a substitute for Dower -

La Ray 438. Cro Elvi 128.

- It is now a General Rule, y<sup>t</sup> marriage settlements, agreements made between husband and wife before marriage, are binding in Chy - 12 on husband and wife, both of them -  
 1. Pow 444  
 2. Do 255.  
 2 Vern 480. 93. 1 Smell 87. 93. 95. 2. Atk 37.

Husbands right and power over y<sup>e</sup> Person of his Wife -

4. If y<sup>e</sup> wife is injured in her person, and y<sup>e</sup> husband sustains a consequential damage, he has <sup>a</sup> sole right of action w<sup>th</sup> Salk 206 y<sup>e</sup> wrong does - as by Battery. False Imprisonment. Slander - 1 Lev 160 The action must be laid in y<sup>e</sup> case, with a "Per Quod Servitium Com. De Ra Tona M. or Consortium amittit" Ibid 2. Chy. Pl 374. 1. Salis 345. Cro 501. Co Ch 89.

To for "Crim Con" with y wife, y husband has his action - 4 Burr  
Doug 162. Bull & R 27.3. 2057.

The precedents of y action are laid in Tresspass. 2 Chy R 265 -  
Is however in effect an action on y Case - Ibid - 2 Ch. Plaw  
6 East 387.9 - This is clearly a departure from principle, 374.265  
a wage arising from inadvertence

Proof of Lawful and actual marriage is necessary in y action -  
A marriage "de facto" gives y party no right of action -  
for there is no legal injury -

If y husband consents to y act, he cant maintain y action,  
"Potenti non fit Injuria" - 4 T.R. 651. 1. Selw. 13. 1. 15

To if he himself lives in a state of open concubinage -  
1 Selw. 15. 4. Es. 16 - Fac. Law L. Bar. Term 50 - (Contra  
and yt it only mitigates damages - 1. Selw. 15. m  
This is now y settled rule and I think y true one -  
1. Es. 57. 1 Phil. Eri 33. n

It has been holden, yt y husband cannot maintain an . 50  
action for adultery, committed with his wife post seheration -  
by agnamt - 5 T.R. 357. But y case seems to be doubled -  
for any Post seheration, is prima facie legitimate, and  
y vinculum matrimonii ant dissolved - and it is no  
policy to establish any Rule yt wd bar their reconciliations -  
6 East 244. 1. Selw. 16.

If y wife is allowed by y husband to live as a prostitute,  
he cant recover -

If y husband is not sorry to it, it generally goes  
in mitigation of damages - Rule NP 27. Park 28. 1. Selw. 15. Term and n

But husbands mere neglect or inattention as to wife's  
conduct, goes only in mitigation of damages - for yd don't  
amount to consent - 4 T.R. 651. 1. Selw. 15.

breach  
of hospitality

In aggravation, Plt may prove her rank, & her character was before good - that they lived together harmoniously, & any peculiar turkitude in Def's conduct - <sup>1</sup> 1. Selwyn 300 - Bac. 27 - Es 343 - In mitigation, Def may prove Plt's unkindness, his having turned her away - having refused to maintain her - her bad character before & act - her previous elopement, her wanton manors, her having made a first advances - her prior incontinency, even before marriage - <sup>2</sup> quia in these sort of actions, & damages are presumptive - While Ec 140. 65% Bull. 25. 1. Selwyn 30. 31. 4. Es 15. 2. Do. 562.

But he can't give evi of her misconduct after & act -

According to ancient & Law - the husband might give y. wife moderate correction. <sup>1</sup> Bac. 185. 1. Ter 113 - 6 - 1. Hawkes 130 - 1. Bb. 444 - 471 - This was allowed on y ground of his liability for her misbehaviour - But according even to y <sup>be</sup> old Law. <sup>as</sup> as well as y present rule, if he beat her violently or even threatened to do it - she could bind him to y peace by writ of "Supplicavit" in Chy - or might obtain a divorce in y Spiritual Ct proper, proper excommunication - <sup>articles of peace are now exhibited at Lane</sup> 5 Mod 22. more 874 1. Bac. 285  
no violence allowed now (verbal) If y husband beat y wife, she may bind him to y peace and vice versa - 1. Bb. C. 445. 1. For Chy 445. 1. Selwyn 113. 3. Re 433. 2. Ter. 128.

It seems to be agreed y<sup>t</sup> he may restrain her of her liberty for gross misdemeanors, as keeping bad company -

The husband's power over y wife was first impaired in y reign of Ch. 2<sup>d</sup>

That he may restrain her for keeping bad company and destroying his property. see Ter. 478 - Com. Bat Home. 0 -

Dig

1. Bb. 624  
For 478.

But in case of unreasonable confinement, she may be released by "Habeas Corpus" - by her next friend or any one who will volunteer in y character.



He may Justify battery in defence of his wife and vice versa -

Exp G. 314.18.

No. 239.

Ld Ray 62. Bull  
18.

Each may thus justify as in self defence

\* If he reconfines her unreasonably, he will be guilty of a contempt -

It was held. (aliter) by a late Eng Judge, yt y husband might correct y wife with a stick as large as y Thumb - Hence he obtained y name of y Thumb Judge -

Erden e

52. The Mutual inability of husband and Wife to testify  
for or against each other - see 141 - Co. Litch 6. B.

Ex 141 - Ex Lib 6. B.

1. Pl. 443.

2. Hawkins 31. 4 PB. 678.

It is a general rule, yt y husband and wife can't testify for or agt each ther. the reason assigned is, yt y husband and wife are one person and no one is allowed to testify agt himself - or for himself - more properly -

The union of Interest and y policy of y Law, seems to be  
y true foundation of y Rule—

Their common interest prevents you from testifying for, and  
y policy of y Law, vs each other 1. Mc Hally 162. 158. 170. De

1. M<sup>o</sup> Kelly 162. 168. 170. Pea. Evi 173

Es/ D. 720. 1. Phil Ev. 63. 64. Rule 286. 1. Bl 448. n.

The husband can't testify when y wife is concerned even w.  
his own interest - <sup>personal</sup> As property settled to wife's sole and separate  
use, was taken for y husband's debts - action vs y husband,  
and husband excluded to prove, yt it was to her sole and  
separate use - Phil Ev 54.

4 P.R.  
678  
2. N.R.  
331.  
E. N. D.  
720.

Phil Evi 64.

'If an action is brou't by or vs y husband, or by and vs y  
 husband and wife jointly, y declarations of y wife ant Evi  
 vs heri- is sufficient by husband for wages earned by y  
 wife- her acknowledgement of y debt is no Evi. Phil Evi 64 -  
 Wis 577. 1. T.R. 680- (Bul 28) So in Trespass vs husband  
 and wife, her confessions of y trespass committed by herself-  
 can't be given in Evi- In 1034. 1. Phil 64. 7. T.R. 112.

Gr 1094. - Phil 64.7. PB. 12.



in action of adultery with P's wife, her letters to def  
we not Evi vs y husband, nor her confessions of y act for  
her, being declarations made in his presence -

53- Neither of you is allowed in any case, even between y Parties,  
Pea Evi to give Evi tending to exonerate y other. as when in Settlement  
174. 75.  
1. Phil cases, or others, if y marriage of y husband is disputed on y  
66.  
4 Rb. 163. ground of a former subsisting marriage of y husband, y lawful  
2. J.R. 263. wife, i.e. y first one, is not allowed to testify to y former  
L La Ray marriage, tho' y husband ant a party to y Suit - for they  
752.  
Esp 720. wd charge y husband with Pegury - here policy governs -

2. J.R. It has also been laid down yt if a witness has been examined  
263.  
1. J.R. L as a fact, wh in its nature must have been known to him,  
67. as his own marriage, his wife can't be called in y same  
party to contradict him, as it might subject him to a  
charge of Pegury - (Tho' y other party may)

Thus. Gould. don't regard as Law, it don't follow, y to  
contradicting evi charges y other with pegury. and he don't  
believe yt ys is regarded as Law in Eng -

Pea Evi And a woman divorced 'a vinculo matrimonii' can't be  
174  
approx 44 a witness vs her former husband to prove any fact - wh  
6. East has happened during y coverture - For it might tend to impair  
192  
1. Phil y confidence of husband and wife during coverture -  
66

But she is a competent witness as to facts wh took place  
if one, subsequent to y divorce. - ibid -  
testify in chief  
he may be  
examined. For a Gen Rule of Evi y- a person may testify vs himself -

and with consent of y opposite party for himself - But ys  
ant so in case of husband and wife, even if P's who allow  
3 L.R. 6. B. it. Def's wife<sup>n</sup> to testify for her husband, for she might  
Pea. Evi 175. Raym. 12. Harwood Es 264.

testify to facts, without intending it, and not tend to criminate him -

And if a Married woman brings an action as  feme sole - her husband can't testify for Def to prove her a feme Phil 64.  
Covert, as a proof of it fact and defeat her Suit - 2. Ark 265.3.  
Poa Evi 176.

§9. I doubt it -  
Exceptions to the First General Rule.

First In a case of Treason, it is said, yt a wife may testify as  
a husband, a duty of allegiance being paramount to every private  
obligation - Bull N.R. 285.82. Ray ma. 1. Gill 113. 1. Hale's Pl Cr. 48.  
2 Keb 403. Contra 1. Hale 301. 2. Hankini 608.

But ye has been doubted and I think properly - Peak 173.  
1. Phil 68. 69.

54. Second. When wife exhibits complaints vs a husband to bind him to peace, for illustration of herself, she may testify vs him Ray 1.  
and Converso - 1. Bl. 443. Pea Evi 173. 2. Hankini 432. Bull N.R. 287.  
She is allowed from supposed necessity - Esp D. 721. 1. Burr 542.  
1. Phil 68.

Third, When husband is prosecuted by public for abusing  
a wife reasonably - E. by Indictment -

This rule is denied or doubted - Ray ma. 1. 1. Nally 161 - Gill  
20 - Recognized. 1. vs 633 - Bull 116 - Bull 287 - 2. Hankini 388 - 388.  
Esp. 721 - Peak 173 - 1. Bl. 443 - n - 1. Hale P.C. 301 - 1. Phil 38. 68.  
308.

It seems very proper, to be well established kata 1. East, 1. Cr.  
454. and agreeable to reason - It seems a necessary Rule -

The weight of authority is in favour of it. Contra Ray 1. Gill 120. 1. Hankini  
57.

He can't testify vs husband in case of Con. Felony or Treason.  
murder. But she can in an action vs a husband, for attempt  
to take away a wife by force after articles of Separation -  
Bull 287. 1. Burr 543. 1. Phil 68.

1 Phil  
673.

Fourth. A woman forcibly carried away and married -  
 by Jt 3. Hen<sup>th</sup> is a witness by husband to prove  
 fact - En Ch. 488. Ex D. 721. Bull 286. Peak Evi 174. 2 Hawk 602.  
 Here however, there is no marriage in law - such a transaction  
 is illegal and made Felony by Jt - 1. Bb. 443. 470.

The case is not therefore strictly in exception to J Gen Rule  
 and y woman } it has been resolved may testify for him -  
 12. to show yt y elopment and marriage was voluntary -  
 on here Part. 1 Phil Evi 68. n. 1. 1<sup>st</sup> Mally 181-2 - 179  
 supposes her his lawful wife and if so, y wife testifies  
 for y husband 12. in case she testifies yt y marriage was  
voluntary necessary - This rule prevents a strange Subterfuge -

Fifth - If a man marries having a former wife living -  
 y second may testify against him, tho y first cast - This  
 (y second) is no legal marriage Bull A. P. 287. Ex 721 -  
 Peak 74 - 1 Phil 68 - 1. 1<sup>st</sup> Mally n. 181 - as An indictment  
 for bigamy, y first marriage being admitted and proved,  
 by others, y second wife may testify to her marriage -

Sixth - In actions between <sup>their</sup> Parties, y wife has been  
 admitted to give such Evi, as not indirectly charge y  
 husband in "civiliter" not "Criminaliter" - As In an action  
 for wedding cloaths - a man, his wife mother was  
 allowed to swear, yt they were procured on credit of her  
 own husband - 1. Str 504 - Bull chis. 287 - Ex 721 - for  
 her testimony is not Evi by husband -

Sevens, when y Evi not bind even collaterally to criminal  
 husband -

Thus in an Indictment as 23. y wife of A. 1<sup>st</sup> cant testify  
 yt A her husband committed a offence -

1. M<sup>o</sup> Mally 162. 1. 2. TBo. 268. 1. M<sup>o</sup> Mally 168-9.

7 La Ray 162. 1. 1<sup>st</sup> 443. n.



No can she testify where y Evi and operate indirectly, in his favour - As an Indictment for conspiracy, y wife of y Def cant testify for y others - Her in Conspiracy - y others are all acquitted, one cant be subjected

2. Ltr 1095. Pea Evi 173. 5. Esp. 157. While Evi 65. 5. 1. Mc Nally 152. 3.

1. Mc Nally 172. 3

57. Seventh - Declarations of y wife as to transactions immediately before her marriage, have been allowed to be proved, & charge of husband "civiliter" w. Declarations, yt She had agreed to pay a certain sum for nursing a child -

1. Phillips 71.

1. Per 504. 2p. Esp D. 721. Rule N.P. 28;

This is somewhat anomalous - Her declarations appear to have been considered, as those of an agent, but y Rule goes beyond yt in y case of common agents - Where y wife acts as agent for y husband, her representations are Evi as much as those of any other agent - Evi 21 -

Dug Gould, thinks y Rule clearly a departure from principle 1. Esp B. 142 he had also observe, yt y declarations of y Agent are no Evi 2. 20 511. n in they are made at y time of y act done - any more, post 1. Camb 33+ are not admitted - This Rule admitting y wife's declarations, he considers 69. as a departure from y principles applicable to y general laws of Evi - respecting agents - and y principles as well as y particular rules of Evi, which obtains between husband and wife -

Eight The dying declarations of y wife are good Evi vs y husband in an action tort - She is supposed to be under 18. obligations equally solemn as those of an oath - 15. on indictment vs husband, are good Evi vs him - 2. Leon 563 1. East Pl Cr 57. In what Cases, husband and wife shd join in bringing actions and in what Cases, husb. may or must sue alone -

In some cases, where y cause of action relates to y wife or her rights, y husband must join with her as Pltff - In others, he may or may not, as he pleases, and in others he cannot -



It is difficult to reconcile all y cases either to principle or to each other. 1. Nils 423-4. 3

First Gen Rule - The wife must join as Pltff where y right of action wd survive to herself on husband's death - 3 D R 631. 1 Rule 247. 1. Nils 424. R & 354. 1. Toul 309.

Because if y husband might sue alone, he wd by commencing y action, attach a sole right of recovery\* but also because he can't constitute an attorney - Besides a judgment might go vs her, y marital right be violated -

The following right to be attached to y rule marked\* in himself and thus (as y case may be) onst y wife of her legal privileges i.e. her right of Survivorship - &c

In actions Real for wife's land, they must join, or y right of action wd survive to her - She can't sue alone, not only because of y husband's right to y avails of recovery - but &c. as above\* 1. Rule 21. 1. Rule 347.

To in Judgment to recover wife's lands. (let come)  
For her terms survive to her - 1. Rule 21. Cro Evi 33. Est D. 444.

To in suits <sup>for</sup> y wife's choses in action, wh she had before marriage - 1. Rule 347. 53 - Cro E. 557 - 3 T R 621 -  
2. alth 208 - Mod 422 - 2. Nils 423 - 1. Tolv. m. P. 3. 3 -  
1. Tolv 347. R. 2. ves. 758\* - Com. R et F. 6. B et F. 6.

Contra. and\* y husband may sue alone or join y wife - (but y seems not Law) Cro E. 138 - W. 214 - 3 Lev. 403 - 7. T R. 348 - arguments - Contra 1. Bern 396 - 10. ves in 578 - These do y authorities Contra regard a suit by husband alone - as a reducing ym the possession or an appropriation of ym to his own use & if not, they surely ought to be joined - The principle being admitted, as it undoubtedly is, yt y wife's right of action for

Choses in action; will survive to her - I think, y principle  
clear. y they must join - This question is now considered  
doubtful in Westminster Hall -

To to recover rent due to y wife while sole -

Com D. B. S. R. Co Ld 55. B. 1 Roll 372. Cro Elr 400. 1 Selw 25.  
Quere. since y To 32. Ten 5<sup>th</sup> as y To makes it y husband's  
absolutely 7 R. Com D. Bar Sem D or B.

8- To upon <sup>an</sup> promise made to y wife while sole -

For Torts done to y wife while sole, she must be made  
a Co D. 1. Selw. 204. 305. 2. Le Ray 1208. 1 Selw. 387. Cro S. 501. 30. 600.  
Com. D. Bar Sem D or B or L.

To for injuries to y wife during coverture - w Flander -  
Art and Battery - (Right survives - 1 T. R. 62)  
Com D. B Sem D. 1 Selw 301.

To for waste committed on y wife's land and for y same - Real or.

To in Trespass for cutting wife's trees during Coverture -  
Trees are a part of y Inheritance and y right of action  
survives to her -

Contra - y husband may join y wife or sue alone -  
Quere. his authorities don't support y position The case  
in Cro Elr is now for com and y in ventis may have  
been of y same kind - Note Com. D. B Sem. L.

1. Role  
347. B.  
2. Wils  
424  
Cro Elr  
30.

Action for destroying emblements on y wife's land - (as  
corn, garden vegetables) don't survive to y wife, but  
y husband (it is said) may sue alone or join y wife -  
Cro Elr 33- 2. Vent 198- Quere on what principle  
can she be joined - S. P. G. - think, they can't join -  
Emblements <sup>are</sup> y fruits of annual labour - Bimbury.

S.P.  
or Cliv  
96

So they may join in Trover or destroying trees & grass or injuring it, or her inheritance during coverture -  
Are they not bound to join, as in action we survive to her? 2. Wils 424. Com. D. T. Fem. Do. R. B. Buntury 277

in Trover for wife's property, if conversion was before coverture, she must be joined. 3 T.R. 681 - For her rights at y time of marriage on y action ante No. 2. 77 - Shall y rule be bear upon y question an or no y wife must join in action or Chose in action and to decide affirmatively

So in General for injuries done to her person or property while sole - 1. Bac. 306

- If y property of y wife is bailed or found before coverture -  
1. No. 77. and converted afterwards, the Husband and wife (decided)  
3. R. 631. may join in Trover - or they may sue alone - 1. Bac 289 -  
Palk 114 - Com. D. 474 - 1. Vent 261 - 1. Lev 107. 1. R. 102)  
Court divided - by two Judges, y wife ought to be joined -  
What propriety can there be in joining y wife -  
Her right at y time of marriage is not a right in action - She is constructively in possession -

50. In Trover by husband and wife, y conversion shd be said to husband's damage only -

In the 2. clasp of C. he may sue alone or join y wife - at his election -

In Cui 443. If y husband distrain for rent due to y wife, while sole,  
Com. D. B. F. and a rescue is made, he may sue alone for y Rescue -  
Murre 304. or join y wife - He may consider y Rescue as a tort  
Bac. 304 to himself only - as y goods distrained, were in his possession -  
or he may treat & proceed as throughout, as y means of enforcing her right of action - ante No. 1. P. 83 -



N<sup>o</sup> 4-

To in debt or covenant for rent accruing out of  
 y wifes land during coverture - Palm 207- Com. B. et al.  
 & The rent is said to survive to her - 10000 350.  
 Com. D. B. Fem. 1. Amb 692. 4 Co 51. Co Litt 162. B.

51- The reason probably is, yt as y claim accrues during Coverture -  
 he is considered as having a right to assent to her interest  
 in it - and to dissent and treat it as his own - Ied there -  
 is y<sup>e</sup> correct on principle? P. J. - thinks she ought to  
 be joined -

If a bond is given to husband and wife during coverture -  
 he may sue alone or join y wife - 2 Mod 217 - 1 Str 230 -  
 4 T. R. 616 - 1. Selw 309 - 1. Bac. 205 - Esb 296 - 2 Wes 678 -  
 7. Com. B. et al. F. J. & 1. East 296 - 432. 3 - Esb 207 -  
 On y<sup>e</sup> case y above reason appears to be properly applied -  
 Ie. yt he may consider it absolutely his, or may assent  
 to her interest - If he shd not disagree to her interest -  
 it wd on his death, survive to her - But if he <sup>shd</sup> not assent  
 to her interest, y whole wd rest in him and no right  
 wd survive to her (Seemle)

Suppose y husband makes no election either way -  
 y right don't survive to her - She takes no right in  
 it any way - 1. East 432. 3 Co 267.

The modern opinions are, yt when a bond is thus  
 given to husband and wife, it is given Prima Facie -  
 to y husband alone - and if after his death, she claims  
 any right as Coobligee - "y thus probandi lies upon her"

So if a bond is given to husband and wife in her right -  
 as Coobligee. 4. T. R. 616 - he may sue alone or join y wife -  
 and yet y<sup>e</sup> bond wd survive to y wife - I conclude -  
 Here we must search for an additional reason, wh I take



to be y<sup>e</sup> husband has a free control of y<sup>e</sup> effects - he is liable for y<sup>e</sup> execution of his wife's right of Executorship - he is liable for his wife's trust and he may declare as on a bond to himself only - *Id*

quest action for an estate

62-

To an action concerning to y<sup>e</sup> wife in reversion in all during coverture, husband may sue alone or join y<sup>e</sup> wife - But in y<sup>e</sup> case, he must declare on a Plea in Fee - in himself and wife, in right of his wife - Pleas lie on Special Demurrer -

2. mod 217.

So if a bond or other obligation be given to a wife alone during coverture, husband may sue alone or join y<sup>e</sup> wife -

2. Ves 676. 1. Roll 20. 32. Com. D. Barren 41. & 3 Lev 403. 1. Vern. 386.

There y<sup>e</sup> principle is, y<sup>e</sup> husband has a right to treat y<sup>e</sup> bond y<sup>e</sup> same as any other personal chattel given to y<sup>e</sup> wife during coverture - As if a carriage be given her, it becomes absolutely his, by operation of Law. Yet y<sup>e</sup> husband may give his assent to y<sup>e</sup> wife's interest in y<sup>e</sup> bond, or treat it absolutely as his own -

Had y<sup>e</sup> bond survive to her, if he had not disagree to her interest in it? So *Id* Hardwick expressly says -

2. Ves. 676. 7. Semble Contra. 1 East 432. 1<sup>st</sup> Esp 266 -

and yet it vests originally in y<sup>e</sup> husband alone, in he manifests an assent to her taking an interest in it -

Don't y<sup>e</sup> fact y<sup>e</sup> he may sue alone? prove y<sup>e</sup> assension?

*Id* thinks - *Id* Hardwick wrong, in y<sup>e</sup> husband assents to y<sup>e</sup> wife taking an interest - When a chose in action do survive to y<sup>e</sup> wife, she regularly must join - I think, y<sup>e</sup> Criticism in *West* and *East* - correct -

2. mod 403.

If a legacy is given to wife during coverture, husband may sue alone for it - Com. D. 3. F. 2. 1. Mod 173. 2. Roll 136.



64 - Husband and wife can't join in assumpsit with stating  
 B. N. King wife's interest. 2. B. R. 1236 as in last cases, viz -  
 2 R. R. 405 y<sup>53</sup> & service was done by and promise was made to her -  
 Cro. J. 644. Acus not correct - Post 68 - For no reason appears

When <sup>for joining with</sup> husband must sue alone. or Cannot join -

Third. Where <sup>for</sup> wife is y suffering cause of action, and y  
 husband sues, consequential damages, she can't be joined  
 Part 206. in y action, as in case of slander of y wife with special  
 Cro. Ch. 80. damages laid to y husband - For no interest of y wife  
 1. Cro. 140. is involved in y suit - The declaration must always  
 1. Feb 791. be laid with a "Per quod consortium amittit"  
 2. Do. 387.  
 Cro. J. 501. 38.

So in y case of assault and Battery of y wife per quod &c -

65. The latter has been gen called Trespass vi et armis  
 2. Do. J. d. Exp. 545. But it is strictly case on principle - 2. J. d. 16.  
 4. C. 6. East 387. 5. Do. 361.  
 2. m. 136.  
 3. 9. 1. 13.  
 5. 11. 13.

It seems however yt y action of Trespass is y approved  
 remedy Post P. 476 - This is in consequence of Precedents  
 at variance with principle -

If battery is committed on Husband and Wife, they can't  
 join for y whole injury - for y wife's battery they can  
 and must - for y husband's they can't.

For y battery to y husband is an injury to him only -  
 Cro. L. 30. Cro. J. 355. 501. 538. Pelton 88. Com. n. L. 100. Ten. 10. 4 -

But if in y case, separate damages are given for y battery  
 & each, y husband may release as to his battery, and then,  
 it being after Judgment, he may have judgment with y  
 wife for her battery. 2. Com. 20. Com. D. R. Ten. 10.  
 L. 100. Cro. J. 500







But if y wife sue alone, when she ought to be joined with y husband, Def can plead in abatement only - 32 E. 2. 3 Com 100- 2. 11. 1841- For y action is not <sup>to the</sup> action, but to her disability, and it don't appear in y declaration - 1 of 2 on p. 1. 2.

1. Dec 397. But if her coverture is not so pleaded, and Judgment goes as y wife, y husband may reverse it by writ of Error in y name of both - <sup>W. 11. 1841</sup> -

1. Dec 397. 4 20 22- For his right might be affected by it -

2. If husband and wife join in an action, and y declaration shows no interest in y wife, tis ill on Special Demurrer - and (it seems) on Gen Demurrer - 2. H. C. 205. ante 64- But it is aided by verdict - 1. 11. 1841. 31. 12. 2. 11. 1841. 2. 11. 1841. 8. n. For as y interest may be joint, y Ct where y Contrary does not appear, will after verdict presume so - 1. 11. 1841. 664- 644- overruled -

In what Cases, the Husband must be sued with y wife - as Defs.

1. Ch. B. First. Gen Rule - The wife must be joined with y husband, 443. 3 Mod 186. as Def, when y action wd survive to her - Since y husband's representative might be injured - This rule is y converse of y Gen Rule, as to their joining as Plffs. 1. 11. 1841. 351. 1. 11. 1841. 348. 1. 11. 1841. 281. 440. Co Ch. 355. Co Litt 351.

If y Plff cd rightfully commence an action as y husband, alone, and he shd die, y liability of y husband's representatives wd continue and thus y husband wd be suggested contrary to rule of Law -

For in actions Real, to recover lands holden as husband,

and so in all Real actions. Co. Dig. B. 7. 1/2.

67.

To for Tort committed before Coverture unto 11. 14. Co. Litt. 333. 37. B. Com. D. B.  
2

To for Rent due from her before Coverture. Co. Litt. 337. B. Com. D. B. 7. 1/2.

To in general in all actions in which y wife was liable before  
Coverture. 1. Bac. 307. Fidd. Supra.

To of Tort committed by her alone without y husband's privity  
during Coverture. She is y only guilty Person and y Cause  
of action will survive to her. Cro. Ch. 301. 1 Mil 149.

If a Lease is made to Husband and wife during Coverture. Com. D.  
she must be joined in an action for rents accruing B. 7. 1/2.  
during coverture, because y Rent follows y interest and y  
interest will survive to her: for it should be recollected, 1 Bac 307  
yt where a chattel Real is given to y Husband and y  
wife, they are Joint Tenants and y chattel goes to y  
Survivor. The Lease is not voidable, till Coverture ceases.  
for her purchases are only voidable, and yt only  
after Coverture B. Ps. 28. 47. Com. D. B. 7. 1/2. 2 To 1337. 1 Rolle 6.

Second: But regularly when y cause of action would not Ray 6.  
survive to y wife, she cannot be joined. as if a Tenement Com. D.  
sole being a Leases manner, y husband must be sued B. 7. 1/2.  
alone, for rent incurred during Coverture. For it survives  
as y Husband and not as y wife. See Ray. 6. Com. D. B.  
7. 1/2. Raym 6. For she cannot dispose of y Lease after  
marriage and y husband takes y whole benefit of during  
coverture. "Pursu Mante"

This Rule might seem to contradict y Rule on y last  
page, but y lease in yt case was made to y wife  
during Coverture and yt engagement of y wife y  
binding on her during Coverture, tho' she may avoid it  
after Coverture has ceased. but in this respect this

Rule is very different, for here she enters on no contract during Coverture.

72

Agreement on a promise of a husband and wife i.e. It promises is bad. in this case a husband must be sued alone.

If a battery or other Tort is committed by Husband and wife jointly or by her alone, thro his Coercion, or by her alone in his company, they cannot be joined in an action, but a husband must be sued alone, for in all these Cases, a Tort must be considered as his sole act. "Page 14." 1 Rolle 348. Palmer 348. Com. D. B. J. & Pleader. 2. a. 2. Cro. Ch. 355. or 401. 184. or 255. 4.

If a dect<sup>r</sup> then alleges, yt a Tort was committed by Husband and wife, a dect<sup>r</sup> is bad - incurably ill. even if a husband is found not Guilty. For the Plt<sup>f</sup> relies as for a Tort. wh is in Law a sole act of a Husband. Whenever they are sued together for a Tort if it don't appear on a Dect<sup>r</sup>, yt it was committed by her alone<sup>\*</sup>, it is incurably bad. They are Plt<sup>f</sup> liable for Torts committed by her alone without Coercion.

And if both are sued for a Tort and a Jury find yt a Husband ant guilty and yt a wife w, a verdict don't aid a Dect<sup>r</sup> (at Sup<sup>r</sup>) This verdict shows yt they ought be joined, but in a different way. by charging the Tort to have been done by a wife alone

Chief Baron has adopted a Rule as laid down This depends upon judicial learning and perhaps would be as well if a verdict were allowed to cure a Dect<sup>r</sup> were a Precedents that way.



In *Tower vs Husband and Wife*, conversion must be laid in y Deed to y husband's use only. *Pecus Indigent* may be arrested on Error but. For y Conversion cannot in Judgment of Law be to y use of y wife, as she can't at Law hold personal Chattels - and if there could be a conversion to her use, 'twere ensure immediately to y husband. Co. L. 507. & Rot. 6. 1 Edw

According to these authorities a verdict for Plt<sup>f</sup> will not cure y Deed. J. B. thinks (as a governing Rule). For y Husband and wife should be joined and y mere allegation, yt y Conversion was to y use of y wife, shd not. he thinks, render y Deed incurable - for y Court must know, yt if y Conversion were truly laid, it passes immediately into y Husband. yels 106.

If y wife is joined with y husband, when she ought not to be, y action may be abated. So here *Bena* and even if y mistake is not pleaded in Abatement, by Error and motion to arrest <sup>judgment</sup> is good. If action is husband and wife for words charged to have been spoken by husband only, or by y husband alone for a debt of y wife while Sol<sup>d</sup>. 7. J. R. 748. 1. Selw. 313. Com. D. Barn Teme 7. J. Cro J. 208. Selw. 106. 8. 2 Wils 227. 1 Vent 93. 1 Selw. 315. 13

If a *Teme Covert* being sued alone, pleads Coverture and verily, she may have Costs for Costs in her own name (for she is y only Def on Record) or by Plea Tacing her husband and she may have Costs together. Doug. 614.

The wife when sued with y husband, cannot plead alone nor can she appoint an Atty, for y Law won't allow her (a *Teme Covert*) to appoint an Atty, y husband must join 1 J. B. 318. Cro J. 239. The reason a *Teme Covert* cannot appoint an Atty, is y same wh disables her to make any other Contract. J. B. 318.

- subpoena her sued alone? then it is *Quia Semble*. Song 614.  
70. For y Plt<sup>f</sup> having sued her as Plt<sup>f</sup>, cannot deny her  
right to plead as Def<sup>d</sup>.

### Of the Celebration of Marriage.

Marriage is a civil contract at C Law. Secs in Catholic  
countries. Salk 120. 437. 1 BL 433. as to y mode of solemnizing  
marriage see 1 BL 437. 44. Et Co<sup>nt</sup> 477. 8. By our St  
publication is necessary either in some meeting on Sunday  
where y Par<sup>ty</sup> or either of ym reside, or by a written  
notification posted up about the church during Mass.  
during eight days.

- In case of Minors, publication and consent of Guardian  
or Guardian is necessary - in y old St publication or  
76. consent. Et Co<sup>nt</sup> 476. 1. Lev 137

If Clergiman do celebrate marriage contrary to y provision  
of y St, y marriage is good and y penalty is incurred  
by y Magistrate or Clergiman *Id.*

- Is a marriage solemnized by a private person or y Par<sup>ty</sup>  
themselves, good. 1 BL 439. 5. n. 3. Tj gen. deemed bad.  
Bar. 400. Bae. a. If good, why does y St authorize 3<sup>d</sup> persons to solemnize it?

Before y St 26. Geo 2<sup>d</sup>, if persons not authorized solemnized  
marriage, y R. B. wd prohibit y Ecclesiastical Ct from  
treating y marriage as void. Yet y Ct wd not grant adm<sup>tr</sup>  
of Wifes estate to y husband. Now by St 4<sup>th</sup> Geo. 4<sup>th</sup>  
regulating all marriages in Engl<sup>d</sup>, declares all marriages contrary to it  
void absolutely.

### Void and Voidable Marriages

77.

Impediments to Marriages in Engl<sup>nd</sup> are of 2. kinds.  
I Canonical and II Civil.

I Canonical impediments viz consanguinity. affinity

and Imbecility are derived from y Divine Law 1<sup>o</sup>. y  
three last mentioned Impediments are cognizable in Eng by y  
Spiritual Ct. 1 Bl 434. v. Penous Contracts seems to be abolished  
see 32 Hen 8<sup>th</sup> and 3<sup>d</sup> Edw. 6<sup>th</sup> and 26 Geo 3<sup>d</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup>  
Geo 4<sup>th</sup>. 1 Bl 434. v. The three first being derived from the  
Divine Law are hence incorporated into y Ecclesiastical Law  
of y R Empire. They have been sanctioned by 32 Hen 8<sup>th</sup> and  
a part of y written Law. It is declared in y<sup>t</sup> St,  
y<sup>t</sup> nothing (Gods Laws except) shall prohibit marriage  
without y Levitical degrees.

The Levitical degrees are y Standard as to consanguinity  
and affinity.

nothing. Gods Law excepted, shall prohibit  
marriage the Levitical degrees. y<sup>o</sup> Exception probably included  
"imbecility" it being an impediment in y Divine Law. *Ibid.*

Canonical Impediments render y marriage only voidable  
and y<sup>o</sup> only during y lives of both Parties, y Separation being  
only <sup>inter</sup> *salute animarum*

For y real object of y proceeding was Spiritual Discipline.  
and y spiritual proceeding being a divorce, it must be *laid*  
had, if at all, while both parties are alive. Co Litt 33.  
1 Bl 441. 34. Afterwards B R will forbid y Ecclesiastical  
Ct to decree y marriage void Salk 548. 1 Bl 434.

Rule. All Penous collaterally related by consanguinity  
or affinity in the fourth or any higher degree by  
the Civil Law Computation are allowed to  
intermarry, as first Cousins (y<sup>o</sup> ant<sup>o</sup> allowed  
in Catholic Countries) Among Collaterals, the  
most distant prohibited degree, is that of  
Uncle and Niece and Aunt and Nephew—  
It makes no difference whether this third  
degree is by Affinity or Consanguinity.



Supposed a Contingency, 170. See also to all 235.  
235. 181.

In Court be a late to a man may marry  
a deceased brother's widow. To Court 478. 185. 7. Marrying  
a Sister of one's deceased wife has always been allowed here  
tho' for some deemed to be illegal. The degree of affinity  
is 1<sup>st</sup> & 2<sup>nd</sup>.

But this a marriage is within a prohibited degree, yet  
if no divorce takes place during the lives of a Party,  
a issue is by English Law legitimate. The Divorce  
is in such case "a vinculo matrimonii" - Talk. 121. 1  
38 440. Case 27. Talk 548. Parent & Child Page 77

In Court a marriage is declared "Null and void".  
and a issue illegitimate and a Question of Legitimacy  
may arise after a death of both Parties. It of Court  
479. 3. 5. The parties are also subjected to severe  
punishment for Incest. One of a most highly Penal  
offences known to our Law. except Capital. 4 38 64. 5.  
180 435. On Eng. Incest is punishable only in a  
Spiritual Court.

#### 80. Second. Civil Impediments.

First prior Existing marriage. 2<sup>nd</sup> Want of Age, which  
is 12. or 14. Third. Want of Consent of Guardians or Parents.  
4<sup>th</sup> Want of Reason. 1 38 430. 7. Parent & Child 77  
Page 82.

1838 435. There it is said, render a marriage "void ab initio" so  
that there is no need of divorce to set it aside. This  
Rule is now altered, where a impediment is a want  
of consent of a Parents by St 4. Sec. 3<sup>rd</sup>.

Want of age don't seem to make it void to all  
intent. See Infra.

First. Prior Marriage. Here a second Marriage is not only void, but amounts to Bigamy, wh in England is  
punish'd by the 1<sup>st</sup> James 1<sup>st</sup>, by our Stat it is a high Crime.  
1 Bl 436. 436. 4. Do. 164

Second. Want of Age. In yr case a marriage may be ratified on a Party obtaining a age of Consent without another marriage. So yr intent a marriage seems only voidable. But they may also disagree and rescind it without Divorce. in yr respect it seems void Co Litt 74. 1 Bl 436. In Females a age of Consent is 12. in Males 14. 1 Bl 436.

If one of a Parties is under a age of Legal consent at a time of marriage unless yt Party has attained a necessary age, and yt Party has ratified it expressly or impliedly, either party may disagree. The principle is a Contract to be binding must be Mutual Ibid.

This upon a contract to marry in future, if one of a Parties is of a age of 21. and a other not, a former may be made liable on failure of performance, but a other cannot be. This Rule is a same, as to all Executory Contracts between Adults and Minors. 1 Bl 436. Ch. n.

Third. Want of Consent of Parents and Guardians. is no impediment at C Law. but is made so by Stat 1 Bl 437.8. Where a consent of Mother or Guardian is required see Bl. 438. n. This is now abrogated by a new Stat of 4<sup>th</sup> Geo. 4<sup>th</sup>

Fourth

Want of Opinion.

The marriage of an Priest is void, and he must forever remain incapable of marriage - So of a Lunatic this I conclude. he might ratify a marriage at a licit interval - But I have never known a case of this kind. 1 Roll 357. 1 Bl. 414.

Our Court Law on this subject is very different from  
 y Eng. in many respects. Ex. 1. A Marriage within y  
 prohibited degrees is here void. Hence no Divorce is  
 necessary to vacate it. Hence also the issue before Divorce  
 is illegitimate Int. 79.

Second. Want of Consent of Parents don't render  
 y marriage void here, but subject y Minister to a  
 Penalty. In Eng. it makes y contract void, unless  
 there is a Publication of Banns. 1 Bl 437. 8.

Third. The Impediments of Previous Contract were  
 never known to our Law.

Is a marriage celebrated within another State  
 between Parties belonging to this State, and who leave  
 it (Conn't) for y purpose of evading our Law, good  
 here? The Rule of our Law not being complied  
 with, tho' y marriage is agreeable to y Law of y other  
 State 2. Hen. Bl. 147 412. Bac. 114. Co Litt 79. b. 80. n  
 2 Burr. 1080. This is now settled by y unanimous  
 consent of y profession and Public, in y Affirmative.  
 Tho' I don't think there has been any decision  
 determining this precise point. The frequent Exemption  
 to Gretna Green seem to direct y subject of all<sup>1</sup>  
 doubt with the Eng. Public.



## Divorce

75-

Divorces are of two kinds. First. "a vinculo Matrimonii" Second. a Mensa et Thoro - The first is a Total - & second a Partial Divorce. The first is a complete Dissolution of y Contract. The second does not abolish y Relation of Husband and wife, but merely separate ym.

In Eng. these of y first kind can be obtained only for some of the Canonical Impediments before named and these existing before marriage (as is always the case in Consanguinity) not supervenient as may be y case as to Inbécility and Affinity. 1 Bl 438. b. 40. These Causes of Divorce are cognizable in Eng only in y Spiritual Courts.

But there may be a supervenient Impediment of y description, and in y case there can be no Divorce, as Divorces cannot be obtained, unless the marriage be illegal, here I mean Total Divorce and I refer to y General Law of Eng. and such divorces as are grantable by Cty of Justice. For a Divorce "a vinculo &c" is sometimes granted by Parliament and such Private and Special Acts of Parliament may be founded on other Causes ym y Canonical Cause or Impediment.

1 Roll  
358. b.  
C. Lite  
235  
1 Bl 440.  
Bac. d.  
p.

When a Total Divorce is granted, y issue of y marriage is illegitimate. For y Divorce nullifies y Marriage "ut 1 Bl 440. inito" ante 74. 1 Bl. 434. This originally tway voidable 1 Bac. Postora. a. C. Lite 235. 1 Roll 358.

The Causes of Partial Divorce in Eng. are Adultery, and well grounded fear of bodily hurt. These are granted in the Ecclesiastical Courts Moore 683.

But Parliament of late often grants Total Divorce for Adultery.

Divorces in other cases are in Ecclesiastical Cty.

In case of Partial Divorce, y wife is generally entitled to Alimony to be settled in Eng at y discretion of y Ecclesiastical Judges, and for which if payment is not made, an action lies at C. Law. 1 Bl. 441. 2. 1 Rev. 6. to enforce it, for y ecclesiastical Ct cannot enforce its decrees, for its power don't extend to Person or Property. Its power extends only to Excommunication. But in Case of adulterous Elopement and living in Adultery, Alimony, like Dower, is not allowed.

83. After a Partial Divorce, issue born is presumed to be illegitimate. For y decree of y Separation is presumed to have been obeyed. But this presumption may be rebutted, and if so rebutted, they have all the right of any Issue. Parent & Child. W. 4. 1 Bl 407. 7. Co 42. 4 T.R. 358. Gb D. 480. 4. 5.

In case of voluntary Separation, subsequent issue is presumed to be legitimate. For as y Parties are not required by the Law to live separate, no such presumption as that in y former case, can arise.

By Jo of Comm. Divorces are ordinarily ~~and~~ granted by the Supreme Ct. The Causes are 1<sup>st</sup> Fraudulent Contract. 2<sup>d</sup> Adultery. 3<sup>d</sup> 3 years willful absence or desertion with total neglect, wh means. I suppose his neglecting to administer to her bodily county and driving her away with violent abuse, is equivalent to desertion. Fourth. 7. yrs. absence unheard of. y Sup Ct may declare y Party at home. Single

Fifth 3. yrs absence on a voyage usually performed in three months unheard of or heard of under such circumstances as to render his death very probable, the Supreme Ct may declare the Party Single: St Comm 236. 480. What is meant by Fraudulent Contract? it has been a subject of much speculation. It is generally held to refer to the last of the Canonical Impediments

'Criminal Ambiguity' which is surely a great Fraud.

77

In y two last cases, y distant Party, is presumed dead. The same Rule of presumption (as yet in y fourth case) is established by St 1st Pam. 1<sup>st</sup> relative to Bigamy. 4 Bl. 164. 6 East 80. and by the St 19. Ch. 2. as to Leases depending upon Lives. I conceive, if it shd afterwards appear, y Party were alive, y Lease would not be determined. "Insurance." 153. or 531.

The Decree of y Sup. Ct in strictness is only declaratory of y fact, yet y Party applying is single—

In all the above Cases arising under our St, y Party who obtains y Divorce or is declared Single, is expressly authorized to marry again. The marriage of y other Party is also authorized by Usage.

See the Case of Grisby vs Grisbie when on the return of y former husband, y Legislature gave y wife her choice between the two husbands and she chose the former. But J. Q. Minter. the second marriage lawful as is declared so by Law.

The Divorces authorized by St and granted by the Sup Ct are all Total. But the Legislature may divorce "a vinculo" or "a Menso et Inno" at its election—as to extreme cruelty. intolerable abuse see 1 Swift 193.

Total Divorces in Court don't affect the Legitimacy of y Issue previously born 1 Swift 192. Since they are granted only from supervenient Causes, unless in y Case of Fraudulent Contract, and that either supposes y impossibility of issue, or warrants a Divorce merely by way of Relief, to one Party, as the Fraud.

84. It don't make y marriage Murtherous. In England where there is a Total Divorce granted, y Woman has no Dower or alimony granted, for as such Divorce is never granted, except for such Impediment as existed before Marriage, it renders y Contract void "ab initio" 133.7. 7. Co. 70. 5 Do. 98.

A Partial Divorce don't deprive her of y right of Dower. Ante M. P. 9. 86. Co Litt 32. 33. 9. Co 19. Co Ch 463. Except in y case of Adulterous Elopement by St Weston. 2<sup>d</sup>

Indeed tis her Elopement and not her Divorce which bars her right in y case. Ante 86. N. 1.

In the case of Total Divorce in Court, the wife has dower. if she is not the Faulty Party. also part of her Husbonds estate, not above  $\frac{1}{3}$ . may be assigned her immediately for alimony ante 4.

Personal property may be granted to her as alimony, so adjudged by y Sub. Ct and affirmed by y Ct of Error.

85. So where y marriage is within y Spiritual degrees, y Sub. Ct may assign to y wife a reasonable share of the Husbonds Estate, not above  $\frac{1}{3}$ . (St Court 474) And y marriage is "ab initio" void. This, I think, is peculiar to Court —

Finis.





## Parent and Child 81.

Privileges and Disabilities of Infants 81.  
 I<sup>st</sup> as to Crimes 81. II<sup>d</sup> as to Torts 82. III<sup>d</sup> as to Contracts - 83. As to the Mode by which an Infant may bind himself for necessaries by Writing. 85. What Contracts of an Infant are Void - what Voidable 94. Executory Contracts 99. Exempt Cases in Equity 101. What Powers an Infant may execute 103. What offices an Infant may hold & 104. How an Infant is affected by the Nonperformance of Conditions annexed to his office or Estate 105. In what manner Infants are to Sue and be Sued 106. by Whom to appear - 107. I<sup>st</sup> how and to Sue 107. II. how they are to be sued & 110. How far y Law regards Infants in ventre sa mere 113. Relative Rights and Duties of Parents & Children 114. Of the rights and incapacities of Bastards 120. Duty of Parents to their Bastards. 123. Mode of Proceeding 123. Rights and Duties of Parents in relation to their Legitimate Children and vice versa. 127. I<sup>st</sup> of Maintenance. 127. II<sup>d</sup> of Protection 130. III Education 131. II<sup>d</sup> The Rights and Powers of Parent. 131. How far a Parent is liable for Childrens acts. 136.

## Parent and Child

An Infant or Minor is any Person under y age of 21. yrs. Male or Female.

By the C Law full age is completed on the day preceeding the 21<sup>st</sup> annivrsary of y day of ones birth.

### Priviledges and Disabilities

First as to Crimes. No person under the age of 7. is punishable for any crime whatever.

There are some cases in which Infants above 14. are priviledged with regard to Misdemeanors and offences; not Capital. These however are only offences of omission and in General Infants are not liable for offences of omission: for an Infant is presumed to want prudence and foresight and besides he want the means of performing what he ought to do, as he has neither time or property at his disposal.

But when an Infant is prosecuted, tis a Rule yt he ant to be convicted on confession without great caution and great perseverance on his part in yt confession - Particularly in higher offences.

A General It inflicting corporal punishment, sometimes extendy to Infants - sometimes it dont, in Infants are expressly named - the distinction is, if a St create, such an offence as is punishable at C Law by corporal infliction, Infants. tho not named, are punishable

If a St prohibit an offence or an act under penalty of corporal punishment, but without constituting it such an offence as is corporally punishable at C Law, Infants. is named ant

punishable. This is sometimes called collateral punishment. But when y offence was punishable at C Law, but not corporally, Infants are liable to the C Law punishment Co Litt 247. 357 Plow. 364. Co D. 274. 1 Hawk. 1.

4. II Tort. For Torts committed with force, Infants are generally liable at any age, Civiliter. Not Criminaliter. For Torts committed with Force upon y mere question of Guilty or not Guilty, y concurrence of y will has nothing to do with y case. 1 Tomb. 81.  
1 Hawk. 3. 2 Role 547.

At what age is an Infant liable in Slander?  
3 Bac 132. See 129. It has been determined at p. 17. he is liable. Goulds. thinks, he is liable when "doli capax" Slander requires y concurrence of y will - it necessarily includes malice, when "doli capax" he is capable in Law of committing what in Law constitutes Slander.

5. An Infant is liable to be punished as a Common Cheat, not under 14. for under 14. the question of "doli capax" don't arise. ni in cases of Felony.

1 Lev 169. Is an Infant ant liable to a civil action for Fraud, but y Rule needs qualification. In 1 Kelb 414. to say he is liable only for Torts with some kind of force, but y case of Slander is decided by this decision and Ed Mansfield and Kenyon are opposed to y doctrine in Kelb. 1 Selwini 129. 258.


D. G. says y true Rule is this. viz. An Infant is liable to an action for fraud or deceit. Civiliter if "doli capax" ni subjecting him for y fraud would virtually subject him on a contract. not binding upon him. This Rule is inferable from y following case - A bailed a horse to B.





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
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
















































... horse to B - infant. A bot an action vs B for  
satisfying him. As for a tort, it was held, y action did  
not lie; for y's negligence was mere for a breach of y contract  
of Bailment - 1 Keb 310: 313. 8 T.R. 335. 1 Lev 108. 1 Feltz 123.

Contra D. Grant 220. 10 B.R. 172.

But where y's objection don't exist, he must be subtracted  
after y age of 14.

6 In the Ground, it was once held, y a person who represented  
himself to be y age, when he was not, y he cd not give  
evid of his finances - See how.

There are cases in wh. bty will excuse performance of a  
contract vs an infant to prevent fraud. In cases  
coming within y Rule, y Chancellor acts as Guardian,  
y Infant and won't impose y interest of y infant.

But y cannot be done even in Equity, when y contract  
is absolutely void - for y is making a new contract  
for y Parties. 1 Fomb 70.71. 3. Mod 78. 1. Eq Ct 489. 1. B Ch 353.58.

D. 10. 1. L.R. 46. 75.

7. Contracts. An Infant can bind himself by a contract  
(generally) and then contracts are either in general void  
or voidable - 1. L.R. 46. 75. D. 10. 1. R.R. 465.

An infant and adult join in a contract, y latter being 500  
is bound, in when y undertaking of y Infant is absolutely  
void, in wh case tis no consideration on y part of y Adult  
and neither are bound? 8. Mod 180.

Ant y Adult liable in an action vs both? No y Infant  
prevails in it, there being no variance in y case - Suppose 3 Es & R. 10.  
the one in a single bill or note, wh is only voidable and 75. 5. 20.  
y infant prevails in his plea, y infancy y authority are, 47.  
yt y Pth cant have judgment vs y Adult, but must 1 Ch. 32.  
discontinue and begin "de novo", vs y Adult. 5. John 150.

But there is y rule agreeable to principle? Or there



Infant 23c,

12. But y things contracted about must be necessary, or y infant at y time of contracting the question, in they are necessary is to be left to y Jury. <sup>Ex 3. 560.</sup> as Ex 22. 563. to y distinction between matter of fact, and matter of Law. Earth 116. 11. tis yv, what description of articles are necessary, is a <sup>Ex 162.</sup> question of Law, for y Judges but what of any of these descriptions is necessary, is a question of fact for y Jury. <sup>Str 1101. 8 J.R. 578.</sup>

into when y Inf pleads infancy, y replication of necessities is good - general.

For y matter rep'd, is matter of fact, not of Law. what description of articles are necessary, is y question of Law, but what articles of any of these descriptions are necessary for an Infant in any given case, is a question of fact. (ut supra)

And Infant may bind himself for his wife's necessities as well as his own, for if he is able to bind himself in matrimony he must be able to bind himself to y Incidents of y Contract. <sup>Stur 116. 18.</sup>

So may an infant bind himself for his children's necessities, for being bound by y principal contract, i.e. matrimony, he must incur y obligations incidental to it.

So he is bound for y debts contracted before coverture

But an infant cannot bind himself even for necessities if under y care of a Parent or Guardian, or Master, and duty provided for he is only allowed to contract, yet he may not suffer,

Hence an infant can bind himself for <sup>even</sup> necessities only in these three cases

First. If he has no Parent or Guardian. Second. If out of y reach of their care. Third. If being under their



he isn't duly provided for.

But in the two last cases, y infant's parent, if he has one, it seems, is also liable, for Parents are bound to maintain their children and y infant's power of contracting in these cases, is intended not to discharge y Parent, but to relieve himself. Master and Peret 54.

In strictness however, y infant isn't bound at Q Law, even for necessaries, by his express contract: for he isn't of course liable to y extent of his contracts or agreements, but only to y amount of y true value of y necessities. His obligation seems then to be founded on a contract implied.

As to the mode by which an Infant may bind himself for necessaries by writing.

First. By Penal Bond. he can't - (a single bond is an acknowledgment, made under seal of a debt)

Second. By a Single <sup>bill</sup> bond he may -

3. By a negotiable note. <sup>-note</sup> when actually negotiable, he isn't bound -  
1. Tr 41. 1 Donb 73.
4. By a note not negotiable or it seems by a negotiable note not negotiated, he may be bound - 1 Barad 408. n. Carth 160.  
1. Donb. 72. 1. Pow. 345. Ch Bill 20.
5. By a bill of exchange not negotiated, it seems, he may <sup>Carth 160.</sup> be bound, but not if it be negotiated - 1. Donb 73. Ch Bill 20. & 28.
6. By account stated, he isn't bound - or an Promissory contract. 1. Tr. 40. Co Litt 172. Lach 162. Nov 87.

As to reason of these distinctions.

II. The reason, why an infant isn't bound by a Penal



bond, is, said to be, yet y penalty is to his disadvantage.

1 Tont 73.

Es Litt 172. a. Cro Elv 320

But y true reason appears to be, yet y consideration ant  
examinable: if therefore y Infant were bound at all by it,  
he might be liable for things not necessary, or for things  
beyond their value. 1 Pow 36. Ch Bills 20.21.

And y true principle of discrimination in y and all  
above cases seems to be, "if y consideration is examinable,  
he is bound, i.e. he may be, y contract being for necessities.

Seems if y nature of y contract or security excludes  
an enquiry into y consideration, as in y case of y Penal  
bond. (ut supra)

Second. Single bond, of wh y consideration was formerly  
examinable, th' not now.

Ch. Bill 20.

1 Le 362. 4/8.32

1 Rob 723. 1 Per 86.

Is it not now examinable in y case of Infancy? I  
aprehend, it may be, or why is it not in y case of Penal  
bond? In y case in Le. Plff replied necessities, and y  
it held y def might traverse y replication

In Criminal Cases, y consideration of a Single bond, is  
certainly not examinable.

Third and Fourth.

(Poa 61. 215. 1 Cro R 117. 202)

If a negotiable note, negotiated, y consideration ant  
examinable. Of a note not negotiable, or if negotiable, but  
not negotiated, y consideration is examinable. Aug. 514. 1 Cor 3.  
10. John. 33. 1. Nopes. 403. Ch. B. 20.1.51. 1 Tont 73. 1. Pow. 6. 34.5. Kid 155.  
62.87. 34.

Fifth. Bills. seem to stand upon y same ground as Negotiable  
notes. ut supra

Sixth. Account Stated. When y rule was settled, y items  
of an account were <sup>unexaminable</sup> examinable. This doctrine is now  
relaxed, but y Rule continues - Nov 87. Cro R 602. 1. Pow. 36.

1. Le. 40.42. 1 Tont 73.

He ant (i.e. Infant) to be capable of stating an  
account. Bull.

18. There in y case of a Penal Bond, for necessities, is y

Infant liable on y original <sup>ie Simple</sup> contract? It depends upon  
 the question. Does y bond merge y Simple contract?  
 It seems not merged, if y bond is void. For y doctrine  
 of Merger is founded on y idea, yt y lower obligation  
 or remedy is swallowed up by y higher - But a void bond  
 creates no obligation or remedy. (So in Gray vs Toller  
 1. H. Bl. 452) held yt a contract originally good is not  
 affected by an honourable consideration obligation - analogous  
 to Robertson vs Bland.

Quere when is y bond void? vide Post 29, 33 -

19. But a single bill does merge y original contract, It binds  
 y Infants for necessities - and if not, tis only voidable.

Com D. 164. 3 Burr 1078.

1. Pow 218. 1 Str 12 49.

In Court a note by an Infant, tho' not for necessities  
 is not only voidable. Now. 1843. decided by y Ct of Errors,  
 to be void.

For money lent an Infant is never liable any way either  
 at Law or in Equity, ni it is actually laid out in purchasing  
 necessities. At Law, he ant<sup>e</sup> bound, ni y lender himself  
 lays it out and even tho' y Infant shd do it, for y contract  
 is good or not at y time of Lending -  
 see Infra margin. *See Brown Jan. 1843*

But if y Lender lays it out, he recovers y value of y necessities,  
 only, tho' y ant<sup>e</sup> lent, shd be greater, so yt he recovers as vendor  
 of y necessities and not Lender. In strictness then, y Infant seems  
 liable, at Law, not as for money lent at all, but as for  
 necessities purchased with it.

1. P. 87m 583

(Post Chy 14).

2. Eqty Ct 515. 1. Pow. 37.

20. The Infant is bound, if y money is laid in necessities even  
 by y Infant himself, y lender is then in y place of vendor,

1. Salk  
 279, 386.  
 10 Mod 67.  
 5 D. 369  
 1 Pow 37.

as considered in Equity and recovery of value of necessities.

But at Law, he can be considered only as a Tender in goods and of course cannot recover at Law.

An Infant isn't bound by contract for articles to maintain his trade, they not being deemed necessities.

Pr 1083. Cro P.

1 Polk 271. 1 Pow. B. 35. 494. 1 Roll 729.

So an Infant isn't bound by contract to pay for repairing his buildings. It isn't supposed, that an Infant's trade is to languish, or that his house is to go to decay, but the Law supposes he has a Parent or Guardian whose business it is to attend to these affairs.

3 Polk 105. 1. Pow. 35.

But it is holden, that if an Infant take a Lease of a house, and reside in it, till rent day, (y rent not being above y value) he is liable for y rent in Debt. So also of a Lease of Land. Cro 40.

The lease of a house may under circumstances be as y means of procuring Lodging wh is necessary. But as to y Land, due to yon what definite principles, is y rule founded. Is it Law, If so it seems an exception. Last 37. Cro Lam 320. 2. Rule 69.

1. Pow. C. 35.

an infant isn't bound by a contract to pay for instruction in music, singing, and dancing. It isn't more accountable.

1. Selw 446. 1. Pow. B. 35.

Then at y day, as y case may

At y day, if Persons of y Infants rank nearly, than these Persons, they are as necessities, as in a case before cited, where a Son driven from his father's house by rivalry, obtained collegiate education in another State, here, Father was held liable for his subsistence, as it was proved to be a proper education for y son.



21. Indeed an infant is bound at Law only by contract or receipts - Post 145 - (may be)

But if an Infant does voluntarily, what he <sup>is</sup> ~~can~~ compelled to do either in Law or Equity, he is bound by y act -  
 4 Crui 15. If an Infant makes equal position with Colenant -  
 3 Burr 1704. Post 145. Thus sent on a lease devolving upon him -  
 1. Tomb. 77. So if he inherit an estate subject to a widows dower  
 9 Co. 85. and he apportion or apportion it, y act is valid, ne  
 1. Pol. R. 375. at full age, he can show in these cases, yt he acted  
 to his disadvantage 2 Burr 684. 3 Do. 1301. 2. Co Litt 172. 3. 5. a

So if an Infant ~~the~~ receives or paymt of y debt -  
 Post 144.

In Court, his Guardian may be decreed to make reconveyance  
 y Do. In Court 220. and now y Guardian or next executor  
 or admin<sup>tr</sup> may on recovering y debt, release withal  
 a decree -

(may be)

2 Bern This (when he does, what he <sup>is</sup> compelled to do) is y only  
 342. 429. class of cases, in wh an infant is bound at Law, ne for  
 2 Bern receipts.  
 35. An Infant def. is bound by a decree in Equity, in that  
 1. Bern 295. he is allowed 6 months after full age, to impeach it for  
 9 mod fraud or Error - 2 - y 2. h. v. d. 1 of 1 h. v. 1  
 128. 2 P. M. 401 - 3 Do. 352. 1 Tomb. 75. b.

22. An Infant ~~Plt~~ is as much bound in Equity as an Adult,  
 2 Attk. I has no day, after full age, to set aside y decree  
 1. Tomb. 75. in fraud or gross neglect, appears in "his Prochein Amie"  
 or Guardian <sup>his</sup> whom y Suit must be brt -  
 Any Person may bring in Equity a bill, or a Suit at Law,  
 but he must be admitted by y Ct as competent, or y Suit  
 will fail, there is therefore little danger of fraud or neglect  
 and if Guardian or next friend is guilty of fraud  
 or neglect, he is liable to y Infant, and if y suit fail



he, not an Infant, is liable for costs - and as they come out of y<sup>e</sup> Infants estate at y<sup>e</sup> final settlement, depends upon his conduct in y<sup>e</sup> Suit.

such acts of an Infant as don't affect his own interest, but take effect from an authority, wh<sup>ch</sup> he has a right to exercise, are binding on an Infant Executor duly sworn off Ex. 21<sup>st</sup>. and receives debts or discharges them - or executes an office he may hold  
 3 Burr 1602.  
 21<sup>st</sup>  
 21<sup>st</sup>  
 Com. D. adm. & Tolls. 356.7

There is in Eng. a very recent Act, wh<sup>ch</sup> forbids him to act until 21. such I take to be our law, & occurs however hereafter.

A promise after full age will bind y<sup>e</sup> Promisor to a Contract made before, tho' it want for necessities - Est D. 163 -  
 But not when y<sup>e</sup> original contract was void - but only where y<sup>e</sup> contract originally was voidable - 2. T.R. 755. 1. Str 690.  
 Post 37. 45. Chetty in Bille 21. 1. T.R. 648. 1. Poph. 131.2. 2. Ven. 203.

21. And tho' he sh<sup>d</sup> have given while an Infant a written security, yet if it is not absolutely void, a promise after full age will bind him, y<sup>e</sup> original parol contract being a valid consideration for y<sup>e</sup> new promise, The original Parol Contract isn't considered void altho' y<sup>e</sup> security was - 3 Bac. 134.  
 Post 37. 45. ante. 18 Post 29 - Bull. 155 Est D. 164.  
 Po 18. 22

Secus if y<sup>e</sup> written security was only voidable, for then y<sup>e</sup> Parol contract being merged, don't remain as a consideration, for y<sup>e</sup> last promise, but y<sup>e</sup> new promise ratify y<sup>e</sup> security -  
 Post 24 - Est D. 164. B. M.P. 155. 1. Post 58. 4<sup>th</sup> 2<sup>nd</sup>.

But in y<sup>e</sup> case, y<sup>e</sup> action might be on y<sup>e</sup> writing, and y<sup>e</sup> new promise, repelled by y<sup>e</sup> plea of Infancy. But when y<sup>e</sup> Person Est D. 164. after full age, makes a new promise, in consideration of a contract made during Infancy, he is bound no farther, y<sup>e</sup> n<sup>ew</sup> promise extends as a Man promises to pay 50 per Cent of y<sup>e</sup> debt

24.

But in y<sup>e</sup> last case, y<sup>e</sup> new promise can hardly be considered, as a ratification of y<sup>e</sup> original contract, as it was not it) but rather a new substantial contract of wh<sup>ch</sup> y<sup>e</sup> original one is y<sup>e</sup> consideration. Suppose then a voidable security, (as a single bill) for 100 £ was given during Infancy, and a promise after full age, to pay 50 of it, might not y<sup>e</sup> bill, tho' a Specialty, be y<sup>e</sup> consideration of y<sup>e</sup> subsequent promise, as the 2 agreements stipulate for different things, for y<sup>e</sup> subsequent promise can't be a confirmation of y<sup>e</sup> original security, but a new original undertaking to pay 50 £ in consideration of a Prior voidable security for 100 £.

Ante ¶ 10. and a voidable undertaking or contract, is a good consideration, tho' a void one ant.º

Ante ¶ 10. 18.

Decided in Court of Errors, yt an action on an note given by an Infant, ant supported by proof of a new promise. Did y<sup>e</sup> Ct consider y<sup>e</sup> note void? I guess no.

Decided by same Ct, yt an Infant's grant is void under Court St.

1 Schwin  
138.  
C 260 P  
481. m

Payment of money into Court, does not preclude y<sup>e</sup> Def<sup>nd</sup> from availing himself of his Infancy, for y<sup>e</sup> amt of money so paid, may have been for necessities.

25.

If an Adult jointly interested with an Infant, in y<sup>e</sup> lease, obtains a renewal of it, in his own name only, he shall be decreed to have acted as Trustee only - and y<sup>e</sup> Infant or may claim his share of it, if it prove beneficial - Feans not.

If an infant is arrested and sued on a cause of action in wh<sup>ch</sup> his Infancy is a good defence he ant discharged on motion, as a Tene Covert, but must plead his hurdage, or be held to Bail in short. 1. Bat P. 480 - 408.





is of y age of consent, and y other not, y former may  
defend afterwards, as well as y latter

But on a contract to marry in future, if one of y Parties  
is 21. years old, and y other not, y former may be  
subjected for a breach of contract, tho' y latter can't be.  
This and Hale. 80. No. 2.

The age for disposing of Personal Property at will, in Eng  
is, according to some opinions, 14. in males and 12 in  
females, if proved to be of satis discretion and according  
to others, 15. 17. 18. The former seems y better opinion.  
For they agree with y Rules of ecclesiastical Law -  
wh in Eng governs in such cases -  
2. Vern 104. 469.  
2. Mod 318.  
Proc. Chy 316.  
1. Bb. C. 463. 2. Do. 497.

By Count To 42 y age is 17. in both Sexes -

What Contracts made by Infants are void what voidable.

All contracts for infants not for necessaries are generally  
void or voidable. Ante p. 8. 9.

Its have lately inclined to construe y contracts of Infants  
as voidable only.

This construction is generally advantageous to y infant, as it  
allows him an election, when he attains full age, and y  
other party can't take advantage of its invalidity -  
28.  
See 288.  
1. Burn 560.  
3 Do. 1607.

10 Ch. 502.  
3 Mod 310.  
1. Pons. & 38. 38.  
54. 1. Roll 730. 2. 4 Bb. 511.  
1<sup>st</sup> It is laid down as a General Rule, under y head, yt  
those contracts in wh there is an apparent benefit or semblance  
of benefit to y Infant, are voidable only -

So cas of thos in wh there is no apparent benefit. They  
are held to be void -



Enure as to y<sup>e</sup> latter branch of y<sup>e</sup> Rule - see Post 33.  
 The rule in its nature is vague, for in y<sup>e</sup> many forms,  
 it would be difficult to determine, and it even for y<sup>e</sup> benefit  
 of Infant or not. The first I think, a correct one,  
 but I don't consider y<sup>e</sup> last a true one, a better one  
 may be found, post 31.  
 The purchases of y<sup>e</sup> Infant are only voidable, being  
 supposed for his benefit.

C. Litt 2.3.8. 2. Ven 263. Cro &  
 320.

Is a Power of Atty to accept Pension is only voidable.  
 Is a power by an Infant.

Is an Indenture by an Infant Slave to serve his master, 24 R 511.  
 is voidable only, for it may be for his benefit, by working  
 an emancipation. By his faithfully serving.

But under y<sup>e</sup> last branch of y<sup>e</sup> destination, it has been said  
 y<sup>e</sup> a lease by an Infant not reserved, void.

Hutton 102. 11 Mod 421. 2436. 2 Leon 216. Noe 130. 12 Mod. 162.

10. and 11. are not good authorities.

Is if only a Trifle is reserved 3 Bac. 34. True? First  
 there appears to be no judicial decision to y<sup>e</sup> effect - 3 Bac. 3384.  
 3 Burr 1588. 1826. Second Wrighty swears the other way -

Litt L. 5. 47. C. Litt 308. a. 3. Burr 1805. 1. Lon. 5. 3 Bac  
 3841

28.

5 Bac. 535. Little void, and voidable -

In other Cases, leases by Infants are said to be voidable  
 with any reference to Rent. 5 Bac. 535.

And Ed Mansfield has directly denied y<sup>e</sup> doctrine, and said  
 y<sup>e</sup> it had not been decided so, but that it was a mere  
 axiom and indeed he has disproved it upon principle -

For First, tis well settled, y<sup>e</sup> an Infant may make a  
 lease with rent, to try his title. and Second, y<sup>e</sup> Infants  
 lessee can in no case avoid y<sup>e</sup> lease on account of Lesors  
 Infancy, This last consideration seems to me decisive upon  
 principle.

3 Burr 1794. 1805. 1. Tonk 74. 1. Bb R. 578.

1 Pow. 38. 1. Mod. 26. 2. T R. 161.

Again he cannot plead "non est factum" and y<sup>s</sup> is  
a criterion. *McC.* not universally — *Co. Eli* 857. 10. *Co* 43. 5. *Do*  
119.

If a bill of exchange is endorsed by an Infant, y<sup>e</sup> Indorsee  
may recover of all y<sup>e</sup> Prior Parties, tho' not of y<sup>e</sup> Infant —  
The Indorsee is only voidable and that only by y<sup>e</sup>  
Infant. *Lid.* 172. 3 *Es* 487. *Marshall* *Pr* 675. 5.  
*Park* *Pr* 20. *oth*

23. *Li*, said, y<sup>e</sup> a Penal Bond by an Infant is void, as  
*Es* 2. 164 it can't be for his benefit — ante 18. *Co. Eli* 920. *Stellen* 16. 106.

1. *Pow* 54. 1. *Roll* 729. 5. *Bac.* 334. Void and Voidable  
Quere was y<sup>e</sup> point ever decided? I don't find y<sup>e</sup> it ever  
was, (ante 18) many opinions seem inconsistent with  
y<sup>e</sup> doctrine — *Litt* L. 259. *Co Litt* 172. *Perkins* *Sec.* 12. 154.  
3 *Burr* 1804. 5. 1. *Moreson* 403.

And on principle, for first, he can't plead "non est factum"  
*Pow* 47. *Salk* 279. *Gill* *Eli* 162. 5. *Co.* 119. *La Raym* 315.  
2 *Hen* *RB.* 515.

This indeed is not absolutely decisive, for he can't plead  
"Non est factum" to a Letter of *Atty* *La Ray* 315. 3 *Burr*  
1804.  
1808.

30. If having given a penal bond, he bequeaths property  
for y<sup>e</sup> payment of his debts and obligations, y<sup>e</sup> Ct of Chy will  
order payment of y<sup>e</sup> bond. This however might be considered  
by some as a legacy to y<sup>e</sup> bond creditors. But w<sup>ch</sup> y<sup>e</sup> o  
idea be correct? 1. *Eg* *Co.* 282. 3. 1. *Mod.* 403. 1. *Tomb.* 74.  
1. *Pow.* C. 37.

I doo there. on principle, y<sup>e</sup> bond wd appear to me,  
but voidable, if so y<sup>e</sup> Infant's knowledge is as secure as if  
void. The election it affords him, is beneficial, and y<sup>e</sup>  
weight of authority is balanced —

There also an y<sup>e</sup> last branch of y<sup>e</sup> above Rule, ante 26.  
is Law? does y<sup>e</sup> reason of it extend to any thing but  
leases reserving no rent, and Penal Bonds?

The rule itself seems vague and y infant privilege is guarded with it, and y election of y Infant is generally advantageous to him.

The first general branch relates chiefly to purchases, by Infant 21. and it limited to them in its application seems agreeable to principle 12. it isn't contradictory to any settled principle, or decided case, and there seems no reason opposed to it. The last branch embraces sales, conveyances and leases made an d obligations entered into by Infants.

But as to sales, conveyances, leases and obligations by Infants, the true rule of distinction seems to be this, all gifts, sales, grants, leases and obligations made by Infants and not taken effect by delivery, are void. Those not so taken take effect, are only voidable. Little P. 2. 53. Perkins P. 12. 3 Burr 1804. 5. Look 10. 1. Roll. 1730.

As to fine by an Infant is voidable only. 3 Burr 1805. 3 Boc 136. 1. Poul. 74. 8. Co 42. 6. 247. a. 150. Co 125. a. Perkins. P. 2. 53. Now came y rule and y subsequent rules, be accounted for by y first distinction (rule 26.) or even, reconciled to it?

33 So if an Infant sell a chattel as a lease or horse and deliver him, the sale is only voidable, if not delivered, its void, and y Purchaser liable in the past, for taking him. Perk. 3. 12. 10. 1. Roll 778. 1 Mod 137 Roll. 77. Look 10.

The words, "not take effect by delivery" are an essential part of y Rule, as to deeds and, and make a difference between deeds not convey an interest, and those not delegate a power to convey. The first are only voidable, and y latter void. 3 Burr 1804. 5.

As Infants leases, releases, &c by deed, are in general voidable only. They take effect by delivery, 12 by delivery which convey an interest. Title "Deed 39" Perkins P. 12. 8. Co 42. 4



Hence if an Infant delivers a deed of conveyance, and then he obtains full age, he delivers it again, & second delivery is void (as a delivery) because & first has & same

Twice however ratify & deed. *Pleoneve*, "ab initio"  
"Deed 33" 3 Bac. 135.

33. But a power of atty in Infants is void. & don't take effect by delivery. 3 Bac 135. S. 2. Inf and age.

Now if an infant give a power of atty to another to convey his estate, he may grant & purchase under & power as a minor, & so entering under & conveyance.  
1. Bac 136  
378.  
1. 2<sup>d</sup> 136  
75.  
3 Burr 1804. 8.  
3 Bac. 136. 8. 142. ..

Mr Powl, however denies & distinction between Deeds conveying an interest and those delegating a power.

Powl. 32. 3

Upon & whole, & Law upon & head appears to me to be contained in & first branch of & first rule, (rule 25) which relates chiefly to purchases by Infants and is & second rule which relates to their grants, leases, obligation, &c. rule 31.

It will seem to me, & purchases by Infants are voidable only, & is that & first branch of & first rule, and their conveyances, deeds, &c. are voidable only when they take effect by delivery, but void when they don't then take effect, & is under & second rule.

Truth and Parson  
3 Burr 1807. 8.  
1. Bac. 136  
579.

Perhaps & rule as to contracts taking effect by delivery. This is consistent with a general criterion, ought to be modified by & last branch of & first rule. Thus if an Infant purchase & don't be satisfied, & by concluding & contract voidable, when an interest passes by delivery it will be void by way of exception. - *Pleas* is only voidable. So says La Manoxfield.



As. Case of an Infant agreeing to sell 2 ounces of her hair, in wh case y barber to obtain y 2 ounces, literally shaved y young w's head, in y case she brot an action of assault and battery, wh was allowed to her.

This is y only exception I know. and probably wont occur again -

3 Feb 363.

Executory Contracts by Infants are generally voidable, only - as a promissory note -

Mars En 875. 6. 4 Est R. 487. 122.

1. Mod 25. 137. Est D. 164. 1. Pow C. 38.

That a promise of an Infant is void and yt if an adult and an infant join in y promise, y former may be sued alone - see - 5 John 160. 1. Par En 432.

As to Penal Bonds, see ante -

30. A bond of submission to arbitration by an Infant - is said to be only voidable

In some cases, these distinctions are momentous in practice

Effects of void & voidable contracts -

1.<sup>st</sup> If a contract is void, third persons or y adverse party may take advantage of its invalidity [as creditors may of a fraudulent conveyance]

If voidable only - y party for whose benefit its made and his representatives may take advantage of it -

2. R. 603. 1. mod 25. 1. Pow C 48. 4 Co 124. 8. Do 42. 1. Hall 74.

If a voidable conveyance is made of Real Estate, only y original & 1<sup>st</sup> party and privies in <sup>estate</sup> <sup>387</sup> as remaindermen or reversioners <sup>8 Co 42. 3</sup> can take advantage - (his privies in estate cannot. 1 Roll. 762.)

i.e. his privies in blood may but privies in estate cannot.

3<sup>d</sup>

- 2 Bolls  
28.  
5 Bae 584.  
3 Bae. Infan. 87.  
Co Litt 3. a. it and makes it good and he is liable for rent and  
Crs P. 320. even for gl wh. accrued during his minority, for he  
2. Benbts 203. ratifies "it ab initio" Post 45. ante 20-  
2. Ben 203. Co Litt 3. a. 2 Bolls 60. 1 Toml. 130. 12. 1. Boll 131.

So if he makes a lease and accepts rent, after he  
has attained full age- he thereby ratifies y lease-  
Post 40- see Putro Infra.

So any act evincing an intent to waive y knowledge  
of Infancy or to confirm y contract, has y same effect.  
2 Benbts 203. Co Litt 293. Fo 690. 3 Co 65. Crs P. 320.

38.

- 2 Ro 766. a mere nullity- as a Power of atty by an Infant to convey  
3 Co 64. B  
Coush. 201.  
482.  
7 Pl. 83.  
Borg 58.  
1 E 1075.  
here his act or declarations made after full age, can't  
ratify y lease, (as when an Infant Lessee takes a  
new lease of y same interest, rather increasing y terms or  
diminishing y rent, y second lease is void and  
can't be ratified.

- Co Litt 380.  
12. Co. 122.  
3 Mod. 229.  
12. Do. 197.  
243.  
1 Pow. 21.  
23.  
An Infant having conveyed by Common Recovery in Fee,  
may avoid y conveyance by writ of Error, during his  
minority, but not afterwards, for his age can be tried  
only by Inspection, by y Judges. no averment to be  
tried by y Court, is admitted as y fact.  
Co Litt 247. a. 380. Richerb. 132.

as by W.  
Testmt

It is said that an Infants conveyance by matter in Dis<sup>ty</sup> is  
avoidable either during his minority or afterwards-





whether a male infant can thus bind his real estate  
(i.e. an estate of inheritance) it is said, and yet decided  
4. Cruise 19- That he can't 1. Tonbl. 287b.

42. It has been decided, if a male infant lease, for lives,  
was good, if made with consent of Parents.

3 atk 224. 1. Cow. 2. 52. 2. P. M. 220-

Maccisfield

And it has been holden by Lord Mansfield, if a female infant  
seised in fee, covenants in marriage, (with consent of Guardian  
and in consideration of a competent settlement) to convey her  
inheritance to her husband, Equity will execute y agreement-  
2 P. M. 243. 1. Cow. 6. 48. This says Lord Hardwick, is going  
a great way, yet there are cases, when y Ct will do it,  
viz where y settlement by y husband is an adequate settlement  
or consideration, and y wife leaves issue-

3 atk 213. 1. 4. Cruise 2. 16. 1. Cow. 2. 50-

43. But tis said by Lord Thurlow, her real estate not bound,  
if she has a settlement, and after her husband's death, takes  
possession of it. and y it shd not go into y complicity of y  
settlement.

Lord Thurlow Men, is of opinion, if a subsequent ratification  
after y wife becomes married, is necessary. 4 Port 316.  
510. or 70. 3 Mod. 453. n. 4 Cruise 2 17. 18. These last deny  
y rule laid down by Lord Mansfield, and Hardwick.

Upon y whole, Lord Mansfield's opinion is much shaken,  
if not overruled, and there seems to be a difference upon  
principles, between y case of an agreement to settle an estate  
upon y husband during coverture, or for his life, (wh may  
be deemed necessary by way of family provision) and y  
of an agreement to vest him with y inheritance, wh can  
hardly be supposed necessary for y purpose-

At any rate, it seems agreed, if any contract by a female  
Infant, to vend her real Estate, is not binding, if made  
before marriage-

3 atk 56. 3 Port. 2. 16. 2. 11.

1. 5. 1. 5. 1. 5.





46. But an Infant can't execute a power over his own inheritance, as it would affect his own interest, tho' a Term Covert, (if full age) may. 1. ves 305. Pow. P. 43.

Said in 3. Atk. 412 no precedent in a Co. of Bar. or Countys to a power over a Real Estate may be executed by an Infant, (3 Bac. 108 n) This is too general a proposition - but must mean a General Power. 1. ves. 304. Pow. P. 47.  
3 Bac. 108. n. not 108.

The general rule seems to be, y<sup>t</sup> Infant not interested may execute a power so as to bind his person & the consent of it, if it don't amt to a discretionary power over real Estates. Thirly.

1. ves 308. And he may execute even a general power over Personal estate, (tho' his own interest is affected by it) if old enough to bequeath it by will. Tecus not. as Request of Personal Property to an Infant with power to dispose of part or y whole, to whom he may think proper.

47. An. When an Infant Tenant for life, with power to make a Portion, covenanted in pursuance of y<sup>e</sup> power, to settle part of y<sup>e</sup> land on his wife for life, y<sup>e</sup> Covenant was holden Good in Equity. and here y<sup>e</sup> power was Special.

### What Offices an Infant May hold

The general rule is, y<sup>t</sup> an Infant may hold a ministerial office, wh<sup>ch</sup> requires only skill and diligence. But not a Judicial one. as he may be Sullie. Steward. Bailiff. The Judicial office is supposed to require judgment and discretion -

Co. Litt. 3. A. Co. Litt. 581. 3 Bac. 123. 125. 725. 86.  
in Cro. tis said he can't be Steward of a Manor.  
Where what office involves Judicial power -

11. Co. 4. The reason given, wh<sup>ch</sup> an Infant may a ministerial office, is, y<sup>t</sup> if he is incapable (as before he attains y<sup>e</sup> years of discretion) it may be executed by another - a Deputy.  
253. 508. 4. Mod. 279.

where then can he hold any office, or can't be executed by Deputy.

Where as to y Law of Court, Can he hold any civil office?  
I don't know y<sup>t</sup> he can -

An Infant can't be an Atty,\* for he can't be sworn as y<sup>t</sup> office requires. besides y duties are attended with responsibility.

3. Bac. 126.

This ant<sup>y</sup> case in all y States of y Union, as Georgia Infants are admitted at almost every session of y Legislature, in practice as Atlys and Councillors at Law, provide they can pass an examination in open Ct.

D. Shaffer know a man only 19. practicing in Georgia -

Nor can an Infant be a Juror for y same reason, and because a Juror acts judicially. 3 Hob. 325.

An Infant may be an Executor at any age, but can't act as such till ff. 1/2. Now by St 38. Geo 3. he can't till full age, ante 7.

Regularly, an Infant officer is bound by his official acts, and liable for his neglect of duty. As Infant Gaoler is liable for an escape - and liable in debt, if y escape is upon execution. How 364. B. 5 Co 27. a. b. 3. D. 3 Mod 222.

2. JR. 129.

Now Far an Infant is affected by y nonperformance of conditions annexed to his office or estate Conditions, are of 2 kinds Express and Implied.

First. By Express conditions, infants are bound as well as Adults. ergo If an Infant hold an estate, to which an express condition imposing a forfeiture, is annexed, he forfeits y estate by nonperformance, as A Minor Infant Heir, to whom y Land has descended, Co Litt 246. v. or B.

2 Vern 560. 333. 43.

1. Ven. 139.

1. Lev 21. 8. 30 44. Carth 45.



50.

But there is an exception to y last Rule, where y condition impose a penalty i.e. a forfeiture distinct from y loss of y Estate. In such case, y Infant ant bound to pay y penalty. 1. Vent 200. Cuth. Co Litt 245. B.

+2.

As if a Lease be assigned or bequeathed to an Infant, under wh Lessee was bound under some condition to pay double rent, The Lessee and his representatives may be subjected to y Penalty, but not y Infant.

2.

Implied conditions may be either at C Law or by H Law. Implied conditions at C Law are either founded on skill and confidence or not so founded. 8. Co 44. By y former, Infants are bound, as when a stewardship is granted to an Infant in fee, he forfeits y office by unskillfulness or mismanagement. C. Co 44. B. Co Litt 233. B. 1. Inst. 82. 83.

on Ch.  
555.

51.

By y latter Infants ant bound. 20. If an Infant Lessee for life alien in fee, there is no forfeiture. (So of a Feoff Covert) 8. Co 44. B. 1. Roll. 551. Ci. Litt 233. B.

As to conditions implied by H Law, Rule? Where y Lord gives a recovery vs Tenant for nonperformance, or breach of y condition Infants are bound by y condition. as Lessee for life or yor forfeits his estate by waste, either voluntary or permissive - for y H of Gloucester gives an action to recover y thing wasted.

52.

But where y H Law merely gives a right of entry, and no penalty or recovery, y Infant ant bound, as If an Infant alien in Mortmain 1. Inst. 623. here there ant no forfeiture, for y H gives y Lord only an entry. but no action to recover.

Where as to reason of these distinctions?

Infants are bound by Hs of Limits, ni they are specially.



excepted.

1. Rev. 31. Per Ely 518. 1. Ely 304.  
The Its of Limit are in y nature of conditions annexed to a right.

And if an Ex or adm or Trustee, for an Infant, don't sue within y time prescribed by St (he having power to sue), y Infant is bound by y St, y exception taken  
3 P M 3091. 3 P M 309.

This rule must relate to cases in wh y Executor has a right to sue, in his own name, on a contract in favour of y Infant's Father, deceased, or on an obligation given to an Executor in trust for an Infant and not I presume, to suits wh must be bro't in y infant's name, and in his own right, for it wd repeal y Statute in y Statute, The rule holds in Equity as well as at Law.

In what manner Infants are to Sue - and be Sued -  
12. by Whom to appear -

I have already treated of y rights wh Infants may acquire, and of y duties wh they may incur by their own acts, &c. It are next to enquire of y means of ascertaining those rights and enforcing those duties.

First. How Infants must sue -

An Infant must always sue by his Guardian, or Prochein ami. He can't appear by atty, because he can't appoint one - unless - and he is supposed incapable of conducting a suit himself.

Co P. 640. Palm. 225. 50. 3 Bac. 148. 50. 5.

2d. If an Infant sue with his Guardian, or prochein ami, y Def may defeat y Suit by pleading to his disability - 3 P M 301.  
Co Litt 135. B. Carth 128. 2. Faud. 212.

Inequity an Infant Pl'd appear by Guardian only, and not by his next friend in any case - but y St of Westminster, 132.

Err P. 640. enables Infants to sue by their real friends in certain cases  
 Palm. 12 in cases of necessity -

205-  
 For 708

3 Bac. 148.

Hutton  
 32.

The cases in which an Infant may sue by next friend are 4  
 II. Where he sues his Guardian Err P. 640. 3 Bac. 148.

III. When y suit is vs a Stranger and y Guardian wont  
 appear for him. Ibid Str 363.

III When y Infant has no Guardian -

Co Litt 135. b.

IIII. When he is charged R out of y care of y Guardian -

Err P. 640. Palm. 205. 6. 3 Bac. 148.

In all y above cases, he is obliged to sue by an next friend.

In all other cases, he must still sue by his Guardian.

5. Bac.  
 148.

According to some opinions, an infant may sue in any case,  
 by Guardian or next Friend - Hutton 32. Err Ch. 86. Co Litt 135. b.

And this taking away y Guardians control and authority, it  
 seems.

5. If husband and wife sue, y wife being an Infant, she  
 need not appear by Guardian, but both may appear by  
 Att'y, named by y husband, he being adult.

2. Sam 213.

Where an Infant sues by Guardian, y latter is liable for y  
 costs, and is compellable to give security for ym, so when y  
 suit is by his next friend, y latter is liable to costs, and  
 both are liable to an attachment for nonpayment - 12. Guardian  
 and next Friend - 1. Ely Es. 72. Str 506. 1026. 1. P. R. 481.

1. Title. Err. 114. 1. Phil 48.

1. No. Hally 60.

1. Wils. 30.

2. P. M.  
 288.

According to some opinions, y Infant is ass liable for costs,  
 and y Def may proceed vs either at his election - Gibb Es 87.

5.

This rule is laid down in 3. Wms  
 was denied on a rehearing by Ed Henric, who said, there

Err 708. was no decision of an Infant Def was liable for costs in  
 Err Ch. 33 Law or Equity, and ergo he need not find pledges at Law -  
 2. Ely Es 238. 1. Wils. 130.

Withford, Pl. 26. 3 Bac. 147.

It is usual to be a better person, for a Court will not make a bargain, a suit, will not, it will not be in his name, by his Guardian &c. and a question, an Infant Estate shall be ultimately charged, what be reserved to a settlement of a Guardianship accounts.

If costs shall be given, will be error, 12. vs an Infant Pff.

2. For 127. Barnes. 105. 128.

If Infant Def is clearly liable for costs, for whenever he is subjected, he is deemed to be in fault, in withholding a Pff. 58.

Rights For 127. Dyer 14. 1. Eul. 39. 7. 225. 100. 164

That a Guardian on record of an Infant Def, is liable for costs. There and so he is liable in present instance for when Judgment goes as one as Def, he is always in fault. <sup>164</sup> 164  
This ant law and there is no authority to support it.

In England, both a Guardian and Guardian's wife, must be admitted to appear by a Ct, as by writ out of Chy, yb 3. Infant may not be injured, by acts of an imposter &c.

Carth 256. 3. Alk 603. 1. For 304. 709. La Rymond. 232. Palmer. 225. 287. 211

Comm.

When a Suit is by Guardian, a Party to, (I believe) never enquire into his qualifications, but if by next friend, he is admitted by a Ct., that a tacit admission, it has been said is sufficient. There at present. <sup>164</sup> 410. 412. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

Any one may bring an action by <sup>as</sup> next friend, for an Infant, and even without latter consent, for he does it at his own hazard. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

106 Com 464

But tho he commence a Suit, he may be dismissed by a Ct. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

2. Tunn 212. 213. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

La Rymond 232. 600. 14. 40.



3. Mod. 236. *Treas.* If they are sued as executors, in y<sup>e</sup> case of proceeding  
 318. as to y<sup>e</sup> m, "in invitis" They don't voluntarily join  
 308a. as Co-parties and y<sup>e</sup> bringing a suit, don't imply any  
 187. admission by either of y<sup>e</sup> m, y<sup>t</sup> they are actually Co-executors.  
 472. Besides y<sup>e</sup> Infant def<sup>y</sup> might be otherwise subjected,  
 130. to costs, "de bonis propriis" by misleading - Post 54.  
 48. 48.

So it is said, (Cro Eliz 542) if an Infant sole executor  
 sue alone, he is liable for costs, This rule is denied and  
 seems not Law - he may appear by Atty. 1. Roll 287.

Costs 23. | Sent 102. 3.

Even y<sup>e</sup> original judgment was for y<sup>e</sup> Infant, as y<sup>e</sup> C Law  
 is. 2. Saund 113. n. Contra Cro B. 4. 441. arguendo, it wd be wrong -

### 50. How Infants are to be Sued Second

An Infant must always appear by Guardian, and not by  
 "Prochein amy." for y<sup>e</sup> Ho 132. Westminster, don't extend to  
 actions vs Infants. Cro B. 540. Hutton 92. Co Litt 131. H. 255.

2. Bac. 680.

If an Infant appears by atty or by himself, when he ought  
 to appear by Guardian, it's erroneous. His plea is signed  
 by y<sup>e</sup> Guardian and y<sup>e</sup> is what is meant, by pleading  
 by Guardian.

Note by y<sup>e</sup> Guardian. in y<sup>e</sup> Gen Rule is meant, not y<sup>e</sup> Guardian  
 for Infants person or estate, but one appointed for his acts,  
 in General by letters patent out of Chy or one appointed  
 by y<sup>e</sup> Ct in rule y<sup>e</sup> Court is best - Co Litt 135. B. n.

2. Bac 878. Pickers. 27.

And in an action vs husband and wife, (y<sup>e</sup> wife being an  
 Infant) she must appear by Guardian.

His being next friend don't enable him to act for her  
 as self. The husband can't appoint an Atty for her,





And by Jo 4. Ann - ch. 16. 3 rule is y same with y last. if judgmt is for y Infant by confession, "nil dicet", "a non sum informatus" 2. Laund. 21.3.2. - On these Jo's, nothing is said of Demurer. - tis as at B. Law. Jo. but taken these Jo's, his infirmity is still pleaded in abatement in these cases. Carth 123. 2. Connt Ro. 357.

If an Infant is sued with others, who are adults, and appears by Atty, and entire or Jo damages are given vs him, y whole judgmt is erroneous, for y Ct cannot apportion damages. 3 Jo. 435. Carth 367. E. Co 58. For 188-808. 4. Burr. 2022.

Alter. If damages are severally assessed, judgmt is then reversed, quoad y Infant, only. for y is substantially y same, as if there had been several distinct judgmts

64. On Connt, it has been determined, yt when Adults and Infants are sued together, as Treasurers (y Guardian not being cited and all appearing by Atty) The Judgmt vs ym is erroneous quoad y Infants only. And y damages were entire or Jo. Rob 125. 115.

Quere. For tho' each is liable for y whole and there is no consideration, yet if y adult had sued alone, a different assessmt. of damages might have been made. The Infant may have been y singlester Jo.

If an Adult and Infant are sued alone, as Executors, y Infant must appear by Guardian -

If an Infant and adult join in a Tine, it may be reversed, quoad y Infant only. Because their interests are distinct and it is in y nature of a Common appearance or conveyance. Rob. 278. Cr. Eliz 115. 124. 2. Leon. 118.





Is under a bond in favour of such children, at Super-  
 struction is waste lies in behalf of an Infant,  
 in ventre se, is an estate limited to a for life, remainder  
 to y unborn child of B, an injunction lies in favour of  
 such unborn child. *Sum. 711.11. Price 3s. 2d. 2. abet 17.*

Murder It 12. Ch. 2. an Infant in ventre se, may have  
 a Testamentary Guardian, or one appointed by y father by will  
 or deed. *1. Pb. 162-*

An Infant in ventre se, may be an executor but can't  
 act till 17. and if 2. are born, they shall be co-executors,

But <sup>26.</sup> by It Geo 3<sup>d</sup>. not till full age, ante 7.

So if one devise or bequeath to y unborn child of A,  
 and 2 or more are born, they take jointly -

*17. Geo. 3<sup>d</sup>. 8 Geo. 2<sup>d</sup>. 5. Co. 29.*

68.

### The Relative Rights and Duties of Parents and Children

The enquiry under y head, renders it necessary to consider  
 y distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children  
 for y rights and duties are different, when referred to these two  
 classes of children

First, Then Who are legitimate or who bastards children?  
 A legitimate, one child is defined to be one, born in lawful  
 wedlock, or within a competent time afterwards -  
*1036. 445. Co Litt 244. Cro P. 541. 12. no other y n a child  
 thus born can be legitimate. But it ain't universally  
 E converso, that every child thus born is legitimate, tho'  
 prima facie he certainly is - 1. p. D. 483. 5. Co 38. 3. 1. 36. 455.  
 It 300.*

69.

An illegitimate child is defined to be one, born or begotten  
 out of lawful wedlock. In other words, not not begotten  
 or born during lawful wedlock. *1. Pb. 454.*

This definition, I conceive, is incomplete, for sub, rose -



or after a cohabitation, & parents infamous, and yet if father die before birth, child is legitimate, according to above definition of a legitimate child.

The true definition is, yet an illegitimate child is one begotten out of lawful wedlock and not born during either lawful wedlock, or within a competent time post or one neither begotten nor born in lawful wedlock, nor within a competent time afterwards.

70. The above definition of a legitimate child, aint only to go, yet if a child is born during lawful wedlock, & presumption is, yet he is legitimate. He is *prima facie* so.

The presumption is very strong, Hence anciently no other proof of illegitimacy was allowed, in such a case, than such as rendered legitimacy impossible, and a fact of illegitimacy can be proved only in two ways. First. by showing impossibility of access, to a wife of a husband, Second by showing his impotency.

Co Litt 244. a. D. B. 98. Fo. 176. 340. Falk 122. v. 1. 10.

Improbability however strong, was <sup>not</sup> states to prove a fact.

Falk 2. 483.

First. no other proof of nonaccess was admitted formerly, & not yet of a husband's absence, "extra Quartus Maria" from time of conception to birth. Co Litt 244. 1. Rot 358. Falk 120. 122. 3.

488-

Absence within a realm want legally provable.

vide Falk. 1686 457. Falk 122.

These are all  
absences.

Hence if a husband had been absent any length of time, and his wife should have a child, however soon after his return, a child wd have been legitimate, unless a husband was proved impotent.

so & after an absence beyond seas, for 20. yrs, he should return, and marry a woman, who should be delivered next day, & child wd have been legitimate, unless (but I suppose) Falk 122. 2. Rot 358. 484.

72. 2<sup>d</sup>. As to Husband's impotency - Formerly y fact cd not be proved otherwise yn by want of age -

According to some, y age of Impotency is any age - under 14.  
According to others, y age of 8 is y limit.

The evi admissible under these rules, is supposed to prove y impossibility of Legitimacy -

The Rules similar to y above have been adopted in Comt,  
and these old rules are now abolished in Comt. England

First. Nonaccess, may now be proved by other Evi, yn y of absence, extra quatuordecas, The question is left to y Jury under y special circumstances of y case, and they may find nonaccess. tho. y husband has been within y realm -  
1. 11 Mod 414. Sir 220. Ex D. 484.

73. Second. Impotency may also be proved by other Evi, yn want of age, &c. as by y husband's state of health - by any Evi, in short, not conducing to prove y fact.

These Rules, however, also seem to admit no other kind of illegitimacy, yn what assts to an apparent impossibility -  
&c.

- + 5 B 350. It has been lately settled, yt other Evi yn y of nonaccess, and impotency, is admissible to prove illegitimacy, as yt y Mother cohabited with another, and yt y child was reputed a Bastard, yt it was called by y name of another, and yt y mother took his name. &c.  
Cow. 584.  
Ex D. 484.

74. This evi goes to prove, improbability only yt y child, is legitimate. It avit direct proof of nonaccess, or Impotency -

The Issue of y marriage, wch is null "ab initio" is illegitimate.

- ii. 36.  
430. 2.  
+ 40. 5. In case of Total Divorce, for causes existing before marriage and rendering it unlawful -

1. 11 Mod 414. Sir 220. Ex D. 484.

But y legality of a marriage not absolutely null and void, can be called in question, only during y lives of y Parties, pro salute animarum, y is y case with those marriages wh are made void by reason of some canonical impediment and y reason is, divorces are granted and marriages annulled in y Spirituals to, "pro salute animarum" but y cant be when one is dead, This rule is confined to those marriages, wh are unlawful by reason of some canonical impediment i.e. where divorces are necessary to prove y illegitimacy, wh are necessary only in cases of canonical impediments -

In civil disabilities, legitimacy may be denied at any time, Issue born during wedlock, cant be bastardized i.e. by proof of illegality of y marriage, after y death of either y Parties. But a child may be proved actually illegitimate after y death of its parents, tho' born during lawful wedlock, by other causes, as is frequently done.

A child begotten and born after a divorce, "a mensa et thoro" is presumed to be illegitimate, because y parties are presumed to have conformed to y divorce, and was to live separately, and not cohabited ym from cohabiting together. But where there is a voluntary separation by him and wife, under articles of separation, if a child is born, tis presumed to be legitimate because there is no presumption of y conformity to their own voluntary agreement, But in both cases y presumption may be rebutted -

When y question of legitimacy depends upon y non access to y wife or non access of y wife and permitted to have non access - This rule, says Lo Mansfield, is founded in decency, morality and policy - It is, says Mansf. y policy of y Law, because, (Mis 340.) it might offend y husband, if may be proved, however by y testimony of others, But she is admitted and good witness to prove her incontinency with others and y arises from y necessity of y case, for she may be y only person acquainted with y

fact, taken y rule of decency and morality -

But y husband and wife are competent witnesses, to prove y time of y child's birth. So they are competent witnesses to prove y time of marriage - in y fact of marriage

So y declarations of y father and mother as to y child's being born fore y marriage, may be proved after their deaths - This ant bastardizing one born during wedlock nor does it impeach y marriage of Parents.

b. To an by either in Chancery is good evidence y child.

To badition, common representation, an entry in a family Bible, inscription on a tombstone are y evidence of y child's birth. as they are upon questions of Pedigree -

As y Civil and Canon Law, a child born before marriage, is legitimated by y subsequent intermarriage of y Parents - but so by y Civil Law nor by our own -

6. Co. 60. 1. Ro. 454. 58. 1. Ro. 524.

To all children born of a widow, so long after y husband's death, as to y usual course of gestation, they can't be his issue, are Bastards - they ant born within a competent time after marriage -

1. Ro. 58. 2. Ro. 54.

11. That is y competent time mentioned in y definition, y Law dont exactly ascertain, 12. within what time after y husband's death a child must be born, to be legitimate -

Plata some suppose, y sole mts ant ten days, is y usual time of Gestation, 12. allowing 30 mts days for y month, 200. days, or averaging y mts of y year, 280 days, Plata others 40. weeks, 280 days.



Dr Coke says 9 mths or 40 weeks, very farthest limit 78.  
 Co Litt 123. n. B. This subject within a few years since  
 has been examined by eminent Physicians. Its agreed  
 yet usual time may be hastened or prolonged by various  
 causes. 1. Roll 356. n. l. 541. 1. Pl 456. Pl n. 3. Co Litt 123. B.  
 n. 1. 2.

The rule is of a child born within a usual period of  
 gestation, following from a husband's death, is legitimate. <sup>Infra</sup>  
 Presumed to be so, as if born during wedlock.

A child born after a separation of the period is presumed  
 illegitimate. But a presumption may be rebutted in both  
 cases. Co D. 541. 1. Roll 1. 36 456. vide Palm. 2. Co Litt 8.  
 357. Bull. N. P. 114. Eb D. 485.

But one born 9 mths and fifteen days post, has been  
 held legitimate, a mother having suffered much hardship,  
 Co one born 9 mths and 20 days, after, under special circumstances.

If a widow many immediately on a husband's death, and a  
 child is born within such a time, yet according to a usual  
 course of gestation, it may be a child of either husband,  
 he or she, may, when of a age of discretion, choose either  
 to be his or her father. 1. Pl. 456. Co Litt 8. 1. Roll 357.  
 2. n. 1. 2. n. 1. 5. n. 1. 7. n. 1. 2. n. 1.

But he can't I trust, if satisfactory evidence of his true Parentage  
 can be obtained. The rule supposes a absence of any other proof  
 on which is furnished by a facts supposed in a statement.

It is said yet one may not be bastardized (i.e. forced to have  
 been a Bastard) after his own death, as "personal defects  
 die with a Person - 1. Bac. 315. 315. Co Litt 33. a. 245.

But yet holds only as between a Bastard Eigne and Mulier  
 Pomey, i.e. between a son born before a marriage of his Parents,  
 and a lawful Issue of a Marriage - Lalk 120. Co D. 486.  
 n. B. n. 315. 3. Rev. 410.

Bastardizing by imbeauching a void or voidable marriage is a distinct thing. ante 74.

1. Page  
315.

If then a Bastard Eigne, enters upon his fathers estate and dies seized, his issue shall hold to y exclusion of y mulier.

But to exclude y mulier Purson, there must have been an uninterrupted possession by y Eigne, and a descent to his Issue. Hence during his life, y legitimate son or mulier Purson may evict him.

And if y legitimate son die without Issue, y estate goes to y mulier Purson, or legitimate son, even in exclusion of a posthumous child by y Bastard eigne. Because y possession wasnt in y posthumous child.

### Of the Rights and Incapacities of Bastards.

The rights of an illegitimate child, are such only as he may acquire, for being filius nullius or filius "populi" he ant of kin, to none, to any one but his own Issue. as it respects inheritance and ergo can inherit nothing.

81. But y maxim, yt he is filius nullius, dont hold as to all purpases, for it dont hold as to a marriage & within y prohibited degrees. An illegitimate child cant marry his mother, or daughter &c. 5. Mod. 158. Le Ray 158.  
Cromb. 365. Com. B. 2. 1. Bb. 488.

Nor does y Maxim extend to cases, in wch y Law requires y consent of y Father or Mother to a marriage of y child.

82.

Here y Law recognizes y relation of Par and Child. Concerning y consent of the Father of a minor illegitimate child is necessary to his marriage, when he is known, by being emballed to support it. 1. P. B. 96. 100.

It is said y<sup>t</sup> a mother's consent is necessary, but y<sup>e</sup> same  
not said. Her consent has often of late been held void by  
the Vice Ch<sup>o</sup> and other civilians. Judge of y<sup>e</sup> Ct of Ch<sup>o</sup> & Bishop  
of London. 22. Christian Tresser 580. 1. Hagar 327.

1. Bb. Com. 458. n. 11. 11. East 1.

Indeed y<sup>e</sup> maxim of nullius filius, seems to apply to y<sup>e</sup> Law 1 B. 2  
of Inheritance. Justice Bull (1. 2 B. 11.) said by Littleton 1 B. 458. 32.  
y<sup>t</sup> a Bastard is quasi, nullius filius, because he can't inherit

3. 2. 2. 1. 1. 1. 1.

C. Litt 123. Litt Sec. 1. 85.

A Bastard may acquire a Surname by reputation, tho' 82.  
he has none by Inheritance -

A Bastard may purchase by his name thus acquired, as  
by y<sup>e</sup> name of Bently Hazel, he having gained y<sup>e</sup> reputation  
of being Bently Hazel's Son - vide Infra.

stom

By description of "Issue" a Bastard can never take, as it  
seems, (Co Litt 3. B) because y<sup>e</sup> substance "Issue" is generally  
used as synonymous with "heir of y<sup>e</sup> body" and he can't be  
Heir in any sense. 1. alk 410. 6. Co 68. Pow. 2. 319. 333. Park 1. 26.  
Co Litt 3 B) 2. or 2. 2. 2. "Little Device 3"

But a Bastard can't gain a Surname by Reputation, or y<sup>e</sup>  
reputation of being child to B. H. but by continuance of time -

Hence if a contingent remainder is limited to y<sup>e</sup> eldest son, 83.  
of B. H. (he having none at y<sup>e</sup> time) in legitimate or illegitimate,  
and he has afterwards an illegitimate son, he can't take  
for he hasn't y<sup>e</sup> reputation of being y<sup>e</sup> son of B. H. at his  
birth, and his uncertain an he ever will. The contingency  
is therefore too remote.

But it has been said y<sup>t</sup> such a limitation & contingent remainder  
limited to y<sup>e</sup> eldest son of B. H. will enure to him - or her  
Bastard son post born, because he acquires y<sup>e</sup> denomination of  
y<sup>e</sup> son of B. H. by being born of her. so that there can't never

any uncertainty as to person intended

If uncertainty in person is only objection, it seems obviated in yd. good and limitation would be good -

84. Fed here, It isn't limited on her bond a contingency, allowing there isn't any uncertainty as to y husband of y husband, when born: is not y future birth of, y bastard its elf, y "remotissima posteritas"

Stargrave leaves it "in dubio", tho' from his note, y better opinion seems to be vs. y of limitation.

A bastard can have no heirs, but those of his own body - for all other kindred must be traced to a common ancestor and he has none. p. 46 o. p. 18.

1. Bl. 459. Co Litt 3. B

In Eng. a bastards settlement is regularly in y Parish in wh he is born. He can't obtain a derivative settlement - for yd is a species of Inheritance. 1. Bl. 162.3. 459.

Salk 427.

If y child lives with its mother for nurture in another parish, still y former parish must support it.

Doug. 7.

85. There is an exception to y last rule, where a fraud is practiced on the Parish in wh y child is born - as If y mother is sent by order of a Justice, to a Parish to wh she don't belong, and there is delivered, y child is settled in y Parish from wh y mother was illegally removed. Salk

So if y mother goes to such a Parish, and is taken up for vagrancy and has a child born there, tis settled in y Parish to wh she belongs.

In Conn. y mothers settlement is gt of y child -

Post 152.



## Of the Duty of Parents to their Damned Bastards.

The duty of parents to such children consists chiefly in their obligation to maintain them. as to a mode of enforcing y<sup>e</sup> duty in Eng. see 1 R. 1. 40. 1 B. 37.

For a relation of Parents and child is not regarded to possess purely civil, yet as to certain natural duties.

The law on y<sup>e</sup> subject in Eng depends upon y<sup>e</sup> Act of J. Sam. 1. 3 Ch. 1. 13. 14 Ch. 2. 6 Geo. 1.

In Conn as in Eng, a Putative Father and mother are both chargeable for y<sup>e</sup> child's support. 1 B. 458.

## The Mode of Proceeding.

On complaint made to a Magistrate by y<sup>e</sup> mother, tender with, he issues a warrant to apprehend y<sup>e</sup> person charged. He is first before y<sup>e</sup> Magistrate, who enquires as to y<sup>e</sup> truth of y<sup>e</sup> charge, and in his discretion, may bind over y<sup>e</sup> person charged, to y<sup>e</sup> next county Ct. (of y<sup>e</sup> County in wh<sup>ch</sup> y<sup>e</sup> child is born) for trial. The county having Penal jurisdiction of y<sup>e</sup> matter, he ought to bind over, in y<sup>e</sup> prosecution seems wholly groundless. 1. 1 R. 1. 267. 2. 1 R. 1. 267.

In y<sup>e</sup> enquiry as on y<sup>e</sup> Penal Trial, y<sup>e</sup> mother is allowed to testify as "necessitate rei".

a Copy

The Process issued by a magistrate, is a forthwith, y<sup>e</sup> form of y<sup>e</sup> prosecution is criminal, tho' y<sup>e</sup> object is civil.

88. It was once generally supposed, yt y<sup>e</sup> complaint must be made before y<sup>e</sup> birth, or y<sup>e</sup> mother has no remedy. It has been decided Contra.

The mother's oath ant conclusive, but his prima facie evi and of course throws y<sup>e</sup> burden of proof on y<sup>e</sup> Def. The Def's denial y<sup>e</sup> plea, unt of any avail vs her oath, but he may rebut or invalidate by the Def, as in other cases.

1. Root  
2. 27

She must also be put to y discovery of y truth in y time of her Trial. 12. avail.

89. The omission of y last requisite can be supplied by no other tri.

Thus when y select men of y town Prosecute, or y town and be at y mercy of y mother and y consequence wd be a collusion between y Father and mother.

In y state y select men have y same power as execute, as y Parish in Eng, but tis more usual for y mother herself to prosecute.

The 1<sup>st</sup> requisite of the antient constant in her accusation, she must not change one before y magistrate and another before y County Ct. 'Antient constant has been decided to be a prerequisite' is necessary to be pledged in y complaint, & ant mere tri, tis absolutely necessary, and even y confession of y Father out of Ct, ant satis, because there is a presumption of law wh cant be rebutted. P. Pease Contra.

90. If y Def is found to be y culprit & her, y Plaintiff i. e. he must sue for y payment of y damages assessed and also, if it be required to save y town free from y charge for its maintenance<sup>st</sup> and if he refuse to obey y order, he is then stands committed to Countt Sq. when y mother sues when y town sues, he only indemnifies y town. This writ is called Bn Eng, an order of Filiation - 1 Com. B 417.

As such security is ever require of y mother, because she would be obliged (in all probability) to sue to Trial.

But y order to stand committed has often been omitted in Countt. It is somewhat hard been judgd. no error. But in these Executions are issued quarterly.

The damages given before Court proceedings, are usually for  
 support of 3 children, till the 4. per child, together with  
 2 children's expenses - Stat. 262. Law as to these Expenses  
Commonwealth vs. Free. Case. 5. March 3. 2. 30. 185.

But 3 periods when damages are to cover, are not  
 uniform. If a child dies before a separation of a term time,  
 & subsequent executions are stayed.

On other hand, if a wife exceeds a damages, & further is  
 compelled to pay more, and a necessary additions will be  
 inserted in a remaining execution. on application to a  
 County Ct.

If a child isn't born before a riling of a County Ct, & with  
 a Def is born, & it will order a continuance and renewal  
 of bond.

If a woman die, or marry before delivery, or suffers an  
 abortion, & Def is discharged - 1866-58.  
 before a recovery, & husband can't join in a prosecution  
 - See Quere 2.

The bond or recognizance taken by a magistrate is conditional  
 to be paid on Def's appearing to the next assizes or Court of Sessions.  
Stat. 217.

On a case a warrant isn't discharged unless a court is  
 of limitation - i.e. 20 days, till a year has elapsed from  
 the time fixed for a next quarterly payment.

If a mother don't prosecute, & select men in County interest  
 in subverts of a child may indict for a Tourn and pledge  
 a Tourn to give security to save a Tourn from being  
 he voluntarily does it for them, prosecution need be  
 unnecessary. The select men may make a formal  
 agreement with him

In Court if she prosecute and fail to pursue it,  
 & select men may pursue & some prosecution—

33. If a putative father, after Judgment is given, don't find security to maintain a child if so required, and to save a town harmless, and free from charge, he is committed also as a criminal in Court. The poor business court not allowed him—

What a mother has sworn on her examination, before a magistrate, is good Evidence, after her death in support of an order of Discretion. 5 C.C. 578.

But in Court where a Court, (she being dead), admitted her deposition, taken before process issued, and also a Court of a magistrate, as to what she testified before him—a Judgment was reversed—Quere. was not a Court of a Magistrate Regal? 12 B. 253.

There an in a prosecution by a select men, a mother is compellable to testify who a father? Why not? The Court is to disclose a crime on her part, not who be Jews unknown, but to ascertain who was concerned with her in it. Decided by 12 B. 253 and Ct of Errors in Court, she is compellable. 12 B. 253. 1 Bb. 458.

She is not bound by a Com Law, but by our Court. In Eng. she is not compellable to testify till a month after her delivery—1 Bb. 458.

In Court, Supreme Ct, reversed a decision of a County Ct, wh was yt a mother was not compellable on her own prosecution to answer relative to her intimacy with other men—1852.

35. Trial of these prosecutions was originally by the only one & is still a practice—

Depositions are in such cases in Court, are admitted



as Eri, And they are inadmissible in Co, purely criminal,  
This is of a mixed character -

But in Court, & Rule as to Criminal Prosecutions,  
shows with regard to & right of Appeal. There is no  
appeal from & County Ct to & Supreme Ct, in criminal  
cases. So in prosecuting on & St. This was & old.  
Rule, post appeals were allowed, - But they are  
allowed now -

of The Rights and Duties of Parents in relation to:  
to their Legitimate Children, and Vice Versa -  
The duties of Parents towards such children, consist  
principally in three particulars. viz Maintenance - Protection  
and Education - 1 Bl. 446.

The Duty - maintenance in parental law, those  
who have given life, ought to preserve it as far as they are able -  
Maintenance consists in providing necessities. This duty is  
reciprocal. 1. He. 403. Day. 570. 1 Bl. 446.?

The obligation of Parents to support their infant children  
is absolute and unconditional, in so far as they may be  
entitled to assistance from & Parish in Eng, or in & town  
in Court. by St. Infants in judgment of Law can't support  
themselves - He. 100 but only when & Parents are unable. 1 Bl. 443.

1. Br. Ch. 238. 387. 3 Atk. 339. 3 Day 37.

1). The duty is enforced in Eng, by St 43. Elvi, and in  
In Court by a similar St. 1 Bl. 443. etc.

This obligation under these Sts, extends as well to Grand  
Parents, as to Parents, and it don't cease with & Infancy of  
& children &c. for by these Sts, all persons who are poor,  
impotent and unable, & who want of understanding, age or  
Infirmity to support themselves, shd be supported by  
their Parents or Grand Parents, if able - 1 Bl. 440

The law always deems Infants unable to support themselves  
(at Littera) He. 448.9. See 30.

Stale  
388  
3.

In England, children are under a same obligation, but  
these as to y Grand children, it seems y obligation doesn't  
extend to y latter. 2. Pauls. 345. 1. S. 45. 454. For 183.

The obligations in Town here and Parish in Eng, to support  
Paupers, is only secondary, y<sup>t</sup> of y Parents &c, and y<sup>t</sup> of  
y children being Primary.

29. Grand Parents ant liable, if y Paupers has Parents, who  
are able to support him. So y Grand children ant liable  
if y children are able.

Suppose y Parents able, to afford only a partial support  
are not y Grand children <sup>Parents</sup> bound to contribute. I think they  
are, for kata y spirit of y Law, y town ant liable, in  
in cases where there neither Parents nor Grand Parents,  
y sufficient ability.

30. In Eng a man ant bound to support his wives children,  
by a former marriage, even during coverture, and no question  
is made as to y wives ability at y time of marriage,  
the R of 43. of Elis extending only to natural relations.

18. relations of consanguinity. Post 148. 53. 2. La Ray 1454.  
and not relations by affinity. 3 Est R 1. 4 P.R. 119. For 190.

For 955. 2. Ben 353. 1. Selw. 296. 1. Per Ry 268.

and maintenance of y ~~children~~ <sup>children</sup> ~~is a~~ <sup>is a</sup> ~~primary~~ <sup>primary</sup>  
O y children, when they attain full age is no duty y extended,  
4. East 76. 1. Selw. 297.

The Eng. construction of y Stat on y subject, appears to me the  
correct one. But an y rule (founded upon y construction)  
in relation to y particular case in question is as I do  
not y true principle is this: If y husband is bound  
(being of ability) if y wife was of ability, as he takes  
her "own ones" otherwise not. 1. Rb. 448. For 283  
This is y rule as laid down by Rb. For says the  
husband takes y lands with wh she was bound to  
support y on - I think y natural, but surely  
not Law.

The St. indeed, don't as I suppose, subject, subsequent W. husband, as extending to him, nor does it immediately affect him at all - But if subjected, by mother being (ability) absolutely and upon her principles, & obligation seems by consequence to devolve upon him -

Clearly a man and woman either in Eng or Unit, to support his wife's Parents, & Wife & have looked it, later on die, etc. it is not certain - For N.D. & C. 1840. 320  
 There ought not her property to be liable, if she was bound,?

So one and woman to support his son's wife, after a "Divorce a Mensa et Thoro"  
 In case of no Divorce, I don't find it expressed, how far Parents are bound to support a Son's wife & child. They are bound to support a Son and his child, and I think, his wife also - I think, supporting him, is supporting her -

Suppose a Pauper has children and Parents able to support him, who are liable. Parents or children or both?  
 Ant. & burden divided in such case -

But y<sup>e</sup> duty to support children don't disable any one 102.  
 from disinherit his children - by will, either in Eng or here. and they can't resort to his devise -

as to y<sup>e</sup> mode of enforcing y<sup>e</sup> relational duty in Eng see  
 1. 46. 448.

1. 46. 449. 450.

In Court y<sup>e</sup> obligation is enforced as y<sup>e</sup> children, and  
 Parents of adult children, by application in y<sup>e</sup> form of  
 a memorial to y<sup>e</sup> ~~the~~ County Ct in y<sup>e</sup> county in wh  
 y<sup>e</sup> Pauper lives.

1 Root 60  
 2 Bro. 168.

6 11. 62 11. 07 2. 00 11. 07 7. 08 11. 09









in many, by the same name. But, as a general rule, in a parent's measure discretionary, he is not liable for slight correction & limit prescribed in law, nor for any mere error of judgment to a proper degree of correction. It seems these must be unreasonable correction and make a subject of Parent -

108. This power of correction may be delegated by a father to a Master, or later than, in his rights and rule, "in loco parentis" 1. Bb. 433.

2. The consent of a Parent to a marriage of his child under age, is also required for a Big and Small case - 1. Bb. 451.

With such consent a marriage is void in Big - And by a Small Law, a marriage is void, but a clergyman who marries g.m. is punishable with Fine - Court L. 286.

A Father has no power over his infant child's estate, so as to make a Trustee or Guardian, he is liable to account when a child is free, or a wife may be, before -

11. A minor is entitled to all a property, he may acquire, from a service, as by Gift, Grant &c. But a father is entitled to whatever his child acquires by service - for he is Servant to his Father - 1. Bb. 452.3 -

Hence a Parent is entitled to a wife and to any one who has injured or beaten his child, so as to cause a loss of service, as in a case of a Servant -

3 Co. 113. 1. Bb. 453. Ed. 545.

So a Parent is entitled to an action "per quod" for entangling away his Minor child -

11. If an Infant has been beaten, or otherwise injured, he himself is entitled to damages, for a immediate personal injury -

Ex Ch. 55. Ed. D. 545.

Aug 289.  
3 Mils  
15.

And if a Parent has incurred any actual expense, in consequence of injury done the child, as in a case of a wound, he may recover, and also in his action, if specially





11. in Eng. - Letter to Mr. [illegible] & [illegible] the [illegible] & [illegible]  
 married man - visit the [illegible] Pea No. 240. 39.

Bull MS. 27.

But still it has been hidden, both in old and modern days,  
yet y<sup>e</sup> action don't lie, no y<sup>e</sup> daughter is in some way rescued  
to have been a reward to y<sup>e</sup> Pitt. 3 Burr 1579. La Ray 1672.

Bulwer. 373. Cro Elw. 749. 2 & R 188. 6 Mod-127.  
770.

14. The age of y daughter and material, if she acted, as servant to y Parent when y Injury was done or lived with him.

(at Club) There is one example of age of 94, nor is a contract of Service necessary in such a case, for the ant considered

3 Miles 18. 2. 50. 100.

1. East  
526.

2. Do. 276. 2. Selw. 1084. 6. T. 252.

2. Polw. 1084-

But if under age, she is a servant of a Parent, or master  
as I conceive, in she serves another without wages, or receives  
them herself. 5 East 45. Selw. 184. 9 John 387

5 East 45. Selw. 1084. g John 387

Eq. thinks, The Parent may have an action, always, in some one who is entitled to it, as Master -

90.

is said by Est. 645. y<sup>e</sup> daughter sh<sup>d</sup> be resident in y<sup>e</sup> town

3 Burr noise, at time of, inquiry done, he sits in a boat of his  
18/5 <sup>therein</sup>, 3 Burr 100% or 8. There in all cases.5

18, 5

net

1857-

Support her infant at a boarding school, or serving in  
another family for y benefit of y Parent. The, mee, say y  
is responsible for y same.

It is dangerous to be an adult, & it is perhaps what is, tantamount, to it, in serving another for & further benefit might be said to entitle & Luther to vacation. If an adult, & may perhaps be necessary, because she not otherwise be a certainty to have & ease 3 Burr. 18<sup>th</sup> 8.



It is said in <sup>645</sup>W.S. 645. to have been thus noticed by the  
Mons. de la <sup>10</sup>6.3 Sum. 1758. It must be a Minii -  
he is not here so, nor is, I am sure, and -

No. 10 in a Masses.

2. SR 4.

11. East 22. Poa 55.

where my parent can't interfere when my daughter is under a mother-in-law's  
retainers of love and control of a parent? No, it must not be an  
interference of parents.

in these actions, & every other necessity, is a competent witness, for she will  
interest & enjoy them, <sup>3</sup> Hills 18.1 Nov 472. I think, she can be compared to  
the <sup>4</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>5</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>6</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>7</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>8</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>9</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>10</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>11</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>12</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>13</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>14</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>15</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>16</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>17</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>18</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>19</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>20</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>21</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>22</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>23</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>24</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>25</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>26</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>27</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>28</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>29</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>30</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>31</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>32</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>33</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>34</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>35</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>36</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>37</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>38</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>39</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>40</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>41</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>42</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>43</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>44</sup> ~~total~~ <sup>45</sup> 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Alle Cui 106.

An action merely for procuring the substantial in action on a note - these

1 3 Milson 18. 3 Burr.

vide Infra -

2 Pp. 4. 2 Ar. Po a R 233<sup>187</sup><sub>476</sub> 2 Selwin 1084

But in Eng. y action is in Form, & respects the et armis. But 116. These  
do seem incorrect on principle. No supported by practice and precedents. belong  
vide Sub. (1. Polw. 913. La Ray 111. 1032. 2. T. R. 167. 2. A. R. 482. Polw.

It seems incorrect on principle, tho supported by practice and precedent.  
vide Sub. (1. Sch. 913. La Ray 1117. 1032. 2 T R. 167. 2. A R. 482.

6 East 388. 55R  $\frac{1}{2}$  61. or 126.

When, Def. un lawfully enters, & wounds, & Def. is may sue for beating and entering his house, and law & deduction in affirmation, is a ground of consequential damage. 3 VR. 292. Ld Ray 1032. 2 VR 187.8. LdH 206.

2. Wils 313. 3 Do. 20. 1. H Bb. var.

Here, action not as in form and substance. Here, yes, y gift of it being  
unlawful breaking of y house, here, y room is doubtless right in principle.

But a "license in et omnia" is not, a license to enter, & leave & depart it, is  
a license to enter. Entering a house being a ground of action, and a rest  
being only negation. In Eng. it must be broader, being a broad relation  
not so in Court, under a Stat of Pleadings - 2. E. 2. 16.

State Swift. 2. (p. 64) a licensee is no definite, so a subseqt entry makes one a trespasser ab initio. This is incorrect - a licensee not given by Law. & given by law, & rule not be right, as in y case of th. entering to take distress, licensee to enter a town -



## Master and Servant.

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### Servant

A subject is one who is subject to a Personal authority & another. Not to a public officer authority & another. This is meant to reach 2<sup>d</sup> Sp. Slaves.

A master is one who exercises a authority. The authority is personal. Subjection to Civil authority and territory.

The authority exercised by a master, is generally by virtue of compact with a servant or his guardian. But not always. This is case of slaves, it isn't. such as exists at a South.

The kinds of Servants in Court are 5. Some Slavery and known there are but four.

1. Slaves. 2. Apprentices. 3. Menial Servants. 4<sup>th</sup> Day Labourers.
5. agents of any kind, as Factors, Proctors, Servants, Leases, Sub-masters - Morrey, Left 1. 1. Pol. C 423.7. 1 Mod. 464. 408.

2 Salk 680.

The first three kinds are unknown to a Slave & England.

First. Slaves. It is doubted by many an Slave is regarded as a man. He is a Slave, it isn't, but it has been so. And if legitimate Slavery exists, it must be sent to Natural Law. Common Law or our own local Law.

First. According to Natural Law - Slavery must be authorized at all by a state of captivity in war. By contract or by what. He. cause a negative kind of Birthright - 18. by being born a Slave - 1 Barlamm 211.3. 1 Pol 424.3. unv.

I. By Captivity. It has been said, a master has a right to kill his captive and therefore to enslave him. But by Law & nature, as explained by a just authority and as recognized by a practice of a Mod. civilized world, no right to kill don't exist, ni in case of necessity for self defence,

and in y case of instant capture, y necessity cant exist  
in favour of y Captor -

II. By Contract - This cant be y foundation of Slave  
Slavery, wh implies an absolute right over y life, property  
and liberty of y Slave -

et man has no right to dispose of his own life -  
Ergo he can confer no such right on another -

So he cant make an absolute Sale of his Liberty, for y no  
imposes an obligation to obey unlawful commands and during his  
Treasonery, and so after such a contract, he can have no right  
of property, there can be no consideration for such a Sale, its  
"Sine Bre Sue" Therefore y contract don't bind in principle  
of Law -

But a contract to serve another is good, y is nothing but a  
Sale of ones labour.

III. By Birth This supposes y slavery of ones parents created  
in of y other last mentioned ways, and ergo y foundation of y  
claim fails -

Second - the Law dont recognize any species of private  
slavery, nor can y Local Laws of any Country be enforced in  
Eng. in favour of Slavery -

C. Litt 29. 23. m. Indeed a Foreign Slave becomes Free on landing in Eng. land -  
18. he is protected in y rights of Personal Liberty, Personal  
Security, and Private Property. Talb 424. 666. 10. 1

Litt 5. 189. 104. 204. 234. There were in England, under y Feudal System, what were  
called villeins, but they were never absolute Slaves -  
The Lord could not maim or kill ym - This species of  
Slavery arose from y Feudal Tenure of Villenage -



But there are no feudal barons in England now -  
 As a tenure in fee was virtually abolished by  
 St 12. Ch. 2<sup>d</sup> and at that time, it is said, there  
 were but 2. barons in England - 2. P. B. 96. Lofft 8.

Indeed a character was hardly known in Eng. in  
 Reign of Elvi. 3. Hum. 347.

Third. By our Local Law a qualified Slavery, however,  
 is legalised - We have no St expressly authorizing, or holding  
 of Slaves, but we have St counting upon existence  
 of Slavery and making provision exclusively for Slaves -  
 As to irregular conduct of Slaves - providing particular  
 punishments for crimes committed by them, obliging Masters  
 to maintain emancipated Slaves - providing a mode  
 of Emancipation, to exonerate a Master -

Long acquiescence of Legislature in a known practice  
 of holding Slaves, furnishes also a strong argument in support  
 of your opinion -

Besides this, however, it has several times manifested an  
 opinion that Slavery is legalised here, and is looked on as such  
 by Indian Legislatures - 2. Post 364. 57.

That it has been decided by a Law that a Master can't  
 maintain Trover, for a Servant - it has also been determined  
 that a Slave may be sold or taken on Execution - 2. La Ray 1274.  
 3 Feb 1801. 2. Lar. 201. Salk 600.

The reason in the last case, is, that a Slave is not a subject  
 in respect an absolute property can exist, any more than in a  
 child or apprentice, since a person or body of a Slave is  
 not a Master's property, tho' his services are, Hence, it  
 follows, that an action for taking away a slave, must  
 be the same as for taking away a apprentice - (of wh. Post)  
 Salk 600.

But where absolute slavery never existed in Conn -  
 For y Master has clearly never had any power over y  
 Slave's life - And it has been settled yt a Slave may  
 hold property and sue for it by his next Friend -  
 He may sue his master -

It has also been decided by y Superior Ct, yt y marriage of y  
 Slave with consent of y Master, is an emancipation - Because  
 he thus contracts with y Master's consent, a relation thought  
 to be inconsistent with a state of slavery -

3 Bac 547.

3 PR 356. 2 H Bl 511

Upon y some principle yt Minors are emancipated - see  
 y last part of Parent and Child - I doubt, an yd wd be conside<sup>ered</sup>  
 Law - It was a rule of y C Law, yt a Female Villain  
 or male wasn't emancipated by marrying another -

"See Supra"

as wife however is not emancipated by marrying a villain -  
 But perhaps no consent of y Lord is supposed -

Litt 51. 87. 2 Bl 33. 4.

On y other hand a wife is emancipated during cohabitation, if  
 she marries a Free man - and forsoes y she marries her Lord -

Co. Litt 123. a. n. 136. B. # 137. 5. Inst. 314

Can an illegitimate child be a slave by birth? By y Civil  
 Law, he may, for *status sequitur parentem*. In y Eng Law  
 of villenage, y condition of y child follows yt of y Father -

2 Bl  
33. 4  
Litt 5.  
187. 3.

In y Law an illegitimate child has no Father. So yt under  
 y Saxon Law an illegitimate child wd not be a villain by birth -  
 But a legitimate child born of a Slave or Villain, is a  
 villain -

y rub of y

In Conn, according to y universal usage, y Civil Law has  
 prevailed and through y U States.

The owner of y Mother is y owner of y child in our  
 Country - Slavery now is almost abolished in Conn -

Importation of Slaves is prohibited: So under 25-6, State 8.  
 children born of slaves after March 1. 1784, & before 1. Aug. 1797, are free at y age of 25 - Those born after Aug 1. 1797. are free at 21.

Importation is now forbid by U. S. St, as it previously was by y Laws of all y Several States -

It has been agreed generally, yt offenders may be judicially condemned to Slavery for Crimes - as confinement to labour in St Gates and other penitentiary houses - This is a qualified Civil Slavery - a Slavery to y Public -

## II. Apprentices -

These are so called from apprender (to learn) being gen bound for a term of yrs, to serve their master, & they may receive instruction - 1. Bac 426.

Usually bound to y Professors of some mechanical art, but sometime to husbandmen and others - as Surgeon, Lawyers, Counselor.

They must be bound by deed\*. A Parol contract of apprenticeship is not binding - 1. H. 58. 5 Mod 132. 2. Ray 117. 1. Day. 187. 2. Barn. 64. 402. 3. Keble 302.

\* Quere by y C Law or only by St 5 of Eliz. C. 4. S. 208.

By y Com Law. it might have been by Parol -

Nor can a defective contract of apprenticeship be continued into a hiring of another kind - as from 10 to 12 - 8. T. 6. 377. 9. (Bayford vs Riggs. Sub Ct of Comm<sup>ns</sup> 1808) We have no such St as y of Eliz, but our Cts have adopted y same rule - and y contract must be by deed.

It has also been said, yt y relation of Master and apprentice can't be created, ni y latter is expressly retained in y deed by y name of apprentice

3 Bac 450. 4 Barn. 57.

But y is denied to be Law. 8. T. 6. 379. 1. East 553. 4 but



It is a safe way to insert the word "Apprentice"

When Servants may be retained by Parol -

36 Bac 546.

10.

In Eng. & children of poor persons (paupers & paupers) may be apprenticed out by a Overseer, with the consent of two Justices, till full age, This is by virtue of several Stat. (1. B.C. 424) and those to whom they are offered are compelled to take ym -

1. B.C. 426.

In Court also, it is provided, yt children of paupers, living idly, murthering their time &c, poor children living idly, & as it be want, & any children grown stubborn, rude, and unruly may be bound out as apprentices - by a Select men, with the advice of a seat assistant or Justice. Males 21. Females till 18.

All servants, or apprentices, are entitled to wages, for their services. The wages of Menial Servants in Court of all other also, are settled by contract - Those of Servants in husbandry by a Scheriff of Sessions in Eng - B.C. 423.

Apprentices are regularly entitled to no wages, &c. & Law implies no contract for a payment of ym - They may have wages by express contract - 8 T.R. 373. 9. I suppose, quia wages are customary and apprentices are gen supported, with food &c. but not with medicine.

B.C. & 5. of Eliz, tis enacted yt Minors may bind themselves by Indenture, of apprenticeship. But any privilege of Infancy, is not expressly taken away by a St. 12. not expressly enacted, yt a Infant shall be liable on any Covenants, it has been uniformly holden, yt an Infant is not liable on a Covenant, and yt the only effect of a St. is, yt while the relation actually continues, under a contract, the Parties respectively enjoy a right, and incur a duty, resulting from the relation, &c.



If a minor serve a full time, he shall be free of his trade - free to use his trade, but <sup>not</sup> in England -

5 T.R. 716. 8. mod<sup>18</sup> Doug. 501. 5T 518. 1. Bl. 420. Cro Elr 179. 448

We have no such Stat. in Conn.

But if a father or Guardian join in aIndenture, he is bound by his contract and so is a common nodder by a C.L. Guardian <sup>how far</sup>

He is liable for nonperformance of what is to be performed, by a apprentice - Doug. 500. 5T 518. Prosser vs Carrington 8. mod 180.  
See 2. Mass. No. 228. It where aIndenture is in Common form, a Guardian ant bound by a Covenant, y<sup>t</sup> a apprentice shall faithfully serve, and not absent himself.

In Parish Indentures, (or town Indentures here) a Parish officers don't event, as they act for a Public, they ant required to subject themselves to any Personal liability -  
1. Burr 85. 90. Doug 501. 518. n.

Misuser is a good cause for apprentice leaving his Master - Misuser is any abuse 1. W.R. 57. 1. Bl. 420.

13. An apprentice can't be discharged other wise than by deed \* - it is said - 3. Dou. 546. Tol Ray. 117. 5. Mod 182.  
The obligation must be dissolved. "Eo ligamini quo legatur"  
The amount of a rule appears to be merely y<sup>t</sup> he ant to be by an agreement not executed. in it be by deed - not of course by a verbal license retracted. But he may be discharged by Misuser -

But y<sup>t</sup> a relation may be dissolved by mutual consent - see 8. T.R. 163. 10.

This must suppose an actual abandonment of a relation, in pursuance of a contract. For as an agreement not executed, it don't discharge aIndenture. (Supra)

R.P.P. Cancelling or delivering up y<sup>e</sup> Indentures, must  
however discharge y<sup>e</sup> apprentice. For y<sup>e</sup> deed no longer  
exists. (582. Str)

And our Sup Ct has holden, y<sup>e</sup> Master having discharged  
y<sup>e</sup> apprentice & bond contract, must not maintain an action  
w<sup>th</sup> y<sup>e</sup> apprentice's father. The Master waived and authorized y<sup>e</sup> departure  
and was guilty of a wrong in making y<sup>e</sup> agreement with y<sup>e</sup>  
Apprentice. See many notes under -

Eng. 59. 1. Day 133. 3. Do 125. Mandeville Burr Lett. 13 542.  
1. J.R. 638. 1. East 619. 39. 2. Her 336. 37.

14. Cancelling or delivering up y<sup>e</sup> Indentures, with abs<sup>o</sup> discharge  
y<sup>e</sup> apprentice - For y<sup>e</sup> deed, no longer <sup>exists</sup> as a deed -  
Str 582. 2. B.C. 303. Burr Lett. 511. 274.

\* Bankruptcy of y<sup>e</sup> Master has been said to discharge y<sup>e</sup>  
Apprentice; but y<sup>e</sup> of itself, don't discharge, tho' y<sup>e</sup> binding,  
with, it is said, discharge in such a case. - Post 18.

Bankruptcy by y<sup>e</sup> Eng-laws, (not Insolvency here) -

Str 582. 1. R. 140. 2. Bac 550. Master's Servant.

"Com. Vires" He may be discharged in Court by County Ct for "Default"  
y<sup>e</sup> Master (at Court 234) and y<sup>e</sup> apprentice may be punished  
in County Ct, if guilty of misconduct. - Idem.

The same thing is done in Eng by y<sup>e</sup> Quarter Sessions, and  
in some cases, by two Justices or by one he appeals to y<sup>e</sup> Justices  
"for default of Master or apprentice". But no Justices in  
Eng only in cases, in which y<sup>e</sup> binding was by y<sup>e</sup> authority  
of y<sup>e</sup> Justices - 1. Str. 426. 3. Bac 550.

If an apprentice marry without y<sup>e</sup> Master's consent, y<sup>e</sup> latter  
may not for y<sup>e</sup> cause, turn him away, he must take his  
remedy, on y<sup>e</sup> Covenant. - 2. Vern 392. 3. Bac 550.

of Master cannot at Law assign his apprenticeship  
contract being fiduciary. His rights are founded on a  
Personal Trust, not transferable - Given by Custom  
of London - This assignment is like a ~~deed~~ <sup>deed</sup> of a ~~deed~~ <sup>deed</sup>  
in action 1. Rep 250. 12. Mod 553. 134. 134.

2. Rep 513.

3. Rep 513. Talk 68.

If on submission to arbitrament, there shall be an award,  
y<sup>e</sup> apprentices shall be assigned, to wit, in it is  
good by Custom or consent of y<sup>e</sup> apprentices (126. Str)  
Given by Custom of London - This assignment is like y<sup>e</sup>  
assignment of a chose in action -

But tho' at Law, y<sup>e</sup> assignment of an apprenticeship, don't pass  
y<sup>e</sup> Master's right or interest in him; it is good as a Covenant  
or agreement to bind y<sup>e</sup> assignor - So tho' y<sup>e</sup> words are only  
"Grant and assign" y<sup>e</sup> are words of Grant merely,  
no express Covenant. If y<sup>e</sup> apprentice serves under y<sup>e</sup>  
assignment, he may gain settlement by it in Eng. But  
he can't be compelled to serve, nor can y<sup>e</sup> assignee maintain  
any action on y<sup>e</sup> original Indenture - 1. Rep 250. 12. Mod 553.

Talk 68. Doug 68. 1. Rep 513. even if y<sup>e</sup> apprentice agree  
to serve him and then leave him 1. Rep 513. 513.

If he don't serve he's a y<sup>e</sup> assignment, y<sup>e</sup> Master is liable  
on Contract broken to assignee - Ibid.

16 -

As y<sup>e</sup> Master can't assign his right in y<sup>e</sup> apprentice, so he is  
bound to keep him under his own care - He may not send  
him abroad even for improvement, ni by agreement and y<sup>e</sup>  
nature of y<sup>e</sup> agreement or business requires it - 8 Mod 236. 12. Do 446.

134. 5.

The Executor of y<sup>e</sup> Master can't hold y<sup>e</sup> apprentice, The Master's  
right not transmissible - The contract to serve and to  
teach, being fiduciary - 2. Rep 30. Talk 68. Str 126.

1. Rep 513.



Abolished But it has been holden, y<sup>e</sup> Executor is liable on y<sup>e</sup> Covenant, when y<sup>e</sup> Covenant to teach is absolute. It is bound to procure him instruction\*. This has been done and I think justly. 1. In 177. T.C. 1. Gid 215. Contra 2 Gid 126. Salk 666- Mats Part, 285.

An Master's executor is bound by y<sup>e</sup> contract, to furnish board, cloathing &c. in y<sup>e</sup> apprentice during y<sup>e</sup> Term, has been a question - What y<sup>e</sup> current of authority, he is liable when y<sup>e</sup> covenant is absolute to board, cloathing, &c during y<sup>e</sup> Term - 3 Salk 41. 1. H. 26. 761. 820. 1. Selw 215.

Pro Cliv 553. 1. Bay. 50.

Suppose y<sup>e</sup> Executor not named in y<sup>e</sup> Covenant, & Condieve, y<sup>e</sup> will make no difference, he is bound if at all, with naming

17. The question depends upon y<sup>e</sup> structure and Terms of y<sup>e</sup> Master's Covenant

These authorities, it has been said by y<sup>e</sup>me, are hardly agreeable to principle? For as y<sup>e</sup> necessities are to be furnished generally in consideration of Service, and as y<sup>e</sup> Executor has no right to y<sup>e</sup> Service, he ought not perhaps in Justice, be liable for y<sup>e</sup> necessities - But if y<sup>e</sup> Master covenant unconditionally, to furnish y<sup>e</sup>m for a fixed period, how can such liability be evaded witht impairing y<sup>e</sup> Contract - It is like a contract to pay rent for a Term, and y<sup>e</sup> building leased is burnt during y<sup>e</sup> term, in y<sup>e</sup> case, he must pay y<sup>e</sup> rent unconditionally - unquestionably -

If a Premium is given, y<sup>e</sup> Exec as all agree, ought to provide maintenance or restore a reasonable part or a proportional part of y<sup>e</sup> Premium -

In Eng, Eng has in some cases, has ordered a part to be restored, as if master die soon after apprenticeship commenced - It has even decreed a large proportion to be restored, where



where a smaller one had been agreed upon between the parties. This is going very far!!! The master's death had been anticipated & provided for - 1. Vern. 400. 1. Wms 148.

So a master, in turning away an apprentice, has been decreed in Chy to refund a part - 2. Vern 64. The father is a creditor for a part of y amount & y <sup>to</sup> remain - 2. Vern 64. 1. Wms 148. 3. Bac. 504.

So on a masters becoming a bankrupt and abandoning his apprentices -

And when Justices in Eng discharge an apprentice, they may order y master to refund a part of y <sup>to</sup> remain - The not expressly authorized by y Law or any St - 3 Burr 550 - 1. 3 Bb 426. Talk 54. 11. Mod 114.

1. Saund 314. 3. Bac 550. (404)

Whatever an apprentice earns by his labour, during y apprenticeship, belongs to y master, for all his services <sup>are</sup> y master's - 12. Mod 415. 6. Do. 60. 1. Wms 582. Co Litt 11. n. 51.

An apprenticeship "de facto" will support y claim -

Talk 68. 6. Mod. 69 - As when y contract of apprenticeship, is void or not by deed, but both parties treat it as valid.

10. Property of any kind, thus earned by y apprentice, may be recovered by y master as his own in any proper action, <sup>And</sup> - As if y apprentice work at different times for a week - it vests in y master - And so, tho' y labour is done without y master's consent, and not in y time of y master's occupations - 1. Wms 583. 1. Wms 582.

Talk 68. Co Litt 11. a. 12. Mod. 415. 6. Do. 60.

The last rule, (semble) don't hold in y case of other servants - \* in Slaves - In y case of other servants, y master can't recover y servants wages, His proper remedy is by an action on y case - for loss of y service, if y Employer knew of y former Retainer - or an action vs y servant himself for a breach of contract - Co Litt 11. a. 1. Wms 583.

\* 18 apprentices and Slaves -

2. Lev. 63. 3. Bac. 504. 505.

If an apprentice, or any other servant is enticed from y master's service, \* an action lies vs y Enticer - 3 Bac 517. Comp 56. Post 63. an action on y case with "a per Quod," and a Journeyman is a servant within y rule - 1 Hod. 400. n.

For taking away of a servant with force, a Trespass lies. For enticing him away, "case" on principles, is y only remedy - 1. Lilly Entic. 72. 105. 2 Ld Ray 1117. Talk 380-3. Burr 567. 2 F.R. 157. Ld Ray mo 1432. Post 63-  
In Lilly's <sup>Entic</sup> form of action is "case".  
72.

But in Comp 55 or 6 - y wrong was 'enticing' but y action (and it was supported) is called Trespass by y Reporter - But see 1 Talk. Entic 72. where y precedent is in Case -  
Bar. Fem. 65. Bar. Child 110. 116

I G. imputes vs mistakes to y Reporter -

In Eng. apprentices gain settlement in y Parish, in wh they were y last 40 days - by Stat

In Court, being under age, they gain none For an apprentice don't maintain himself (as our St requires to gain a residence by Settlement) For he ant emancipated -

By our St. apprentices and other minor servants absconding wither sates cause, are liable at Full age, for all y damage thus occasioned - This considers y contract binding -

### 3<sup>d</sup> Menial Servants

These are Servants employed Intra Mœnia, Domestic -

1 Bac  
428  
Hobart  
181.

If y term of Service ant fixed by contract, y hiring is in Eng considered to be for a <sup>year</sup> 37, upon y equitable principles, yt one shall serve and y other maintain thro y Seasons - 3. Bac 546:

No such rule in Court -

In Eng. by y<sup>e</sup> St. S. Eliz., a servant in certain cases  
can't leave his Master nor can Master's desmiss their  
Servants, either before or at y<sup>e</sup> end of y<sup>e</sup> Term, without  
a Quarters, notice, is allowed by a Justice

the Such St. in Court.

But y<sup>e</sup> Servant may be turned away for incontinency  
or any Moral Turpitude. 1. Bl. 425. ch. n.

## IV. Daylabourers - Daylabourers

There are no General Rules applicable exclusively to these  
except in Eng. by St. S. Eliz. and 4. Geo. 1<sup>st</sup>. 1. Bl. 428. 7.

They may be retained for any period. We have no similar  
St.

These Sts provide, y<sup>t</sup> all persons, having no visible effects,  
may be compelled to labour. The Justices at y<sup>e</sup> Sessions  
are to settle their wages. Penalties are inflicted upon  
those who give or exact more y<sup>n</sup> a certain sum.

In Court We have no Stat of y<sup>e</sup> kind.

## V. Agents

As Factors. Brokers. Stevedores. Bailiffs. Ship masters,  
also &c, These are servants in relation to such acts  
only as affect y<sup>e</sup> interests of their Employers. 1. Bl. 427.

Amb. 202. 297. 8.

1. Mod. 464.

As is y<sup>e</sup> class of Persons falling under y<sup>e</sup> denomination  
see ante 1.

The Principal has not y<sup>e</sup> same general control over  
these, as a Master has over a Common Servant.

They are subject to his domestic government like other  
servants. Tho' they are bound by Law to act for  
y<sup>e</sup> or according to their contracts.



As to y rights and duties of y kind of Servant, & their employers, is difficult lay down Gen Rules -

A factor is a commercial agent in a foreign country,  
A broker one residing in y same country with y owner.

Every factor, broker, &c ought strictly to pursue his commission (or Instructions) for his own security - as he ant then regularly liable for casual losses, seems he is -

1. Modes 469. Com D. Title. Merchant. 23 & 2.

A Factor may retain y goods of his Principal in his hands, to satisfy a General Balance & account - in his favour - (\*Aliter as to goods specialiter deposited with him for a particular purpose -) This Lien, ant confined to goods, wh he may then hold, but extend to any he may hold - But by giving up possession to y Principal, y Lien is lost, for y Lien being founded on possession is thus abandoned - \* Anal 254 - 2 B6  
1 East 335. 1 Burr 403 - 1 East 335. 1 B6 Rep  
104. 1154 - Esp 108. 584. 1 East 4. 2 Dr 227. 523) 104.

‡ Because he is Factor only to goods, wh he is to merchandise.  
Esp 108. 206.

Marsh.  
Pr 121.

He has y same Lien upon a policy of Insurance effected by him on y goods of his Principal - 1. Burr 494.

He has y same Lien "on y price of y goods" in y hands of any pers. to whom he has sold ym - and may compel vendee to pay him - Com. 25. 255

But y Factor has no Lien on y Principal's goods, in they come to his actual possession - Construction - possessorii, i.e. a right to demand possession, ant satis -  
2 Gen 17. 1. 2. 34. 3 i. 2. 115.

They don't become a Pledge 'till actual delivery, possession being essential to a Lien - (Baillmt 57)



The rules relating to a Factor's Lien, are part of  
Law Merchant or are derived from it Law Com. 2. Merchant.

A Carpenter has no lien upon a house, wh he may  
have built - &c.

If y Factor gives more or buys less than commission  
warrants, the principal may disclaim y discharge - If  
he sells at less price, he himself must bear y loss 1. 2. 3. 10-  
Com. 2. Merchant. B. 2. Mod 100 - If he purchases more  
he himself must retain y surplus & there is no ground  
of disclaimer -

The thd y goods are perishable - 2. Mod 100 - Contra 1. Com. 6. 23.  
3. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

So if, he sells on credit, he authorizes to do so - by his  
commission - 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

There an y sale isn't still lawful in consequence of  
change, at y place of consignment. Com. 6. 235. 6. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

A Factor has no right to pawn y goods of his Principal,  
as his own, for his own debts, and if he does, y Principal  
may have Trover vs Pawnee (on tendering to y factor  
balance due to him, witht any tender to y Pawnee) The 2. 4. 10  
factor's lien being a personal right wh cant be trans-  
ferred - 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

And it seems, now settled, yt no tender at all is  
necessary - 7. East 5. For y pawning is Larceny - It's a breach  
of Trust.

Quere, might he not pawn y goods for his Principal? I  
see no reason, why he may not -







can he bind himself -

9. *Can he bind himself?* 1. But no particular form is essential 2. East 142.  
 "Held in" 3. 40. 2. 20 Ray 418. 3. 2 & 17. 4. 50. 18. 50. 500.

27. An Agent can't bind his Principal by deed, without an authority for *de* purpose by deed - *Temple* -  
 2. 20 & 5. 1. 2 & 20, 200. 2. 20. 312. 3. 20. 2. 20. 2. 20.

For as no one can be estopped by any act of his own less solemn in deed, he can't by any means, less solemn, subject himself to an estoppel by *de* act of another -

Public Agents. An agent for a Public, contracting as such, and personally liable for his contracts - Part 42. 40. *For Dexter Case* -  
 Section. Pub. Ct of 20. 1. 20 172. 6/7. 1. 20 502.

1. 20 83.

29. The remedy of a other party, is an application to a Government. The principle is the same as in Private Agencies -  
 When he makes a written contract, it should appear on it, that he is acting as Public Agent -

Altho' no action can be brought vs Government, its Justice is satisfied - Where can action be brought vs government? & C. answer none can.

Rules applying to Masters and Servants Generally -  
 When a Master is bound and can take advantage of a act of a Servant -

General Principle Those acts of a servant, which are done by a Master's commands express or implied, are in legal contemplation of acts of a Master, & regularly all acts done by a Master's Servant, in a performance of his duty, in which he is employed by a Master, are deemed to be done by a Master's command - "Qui facit per alium, facit per se" 1. 20 420. 2. 7 30 442.

30. Whatever a Servant, says done by a superior's command



A Master, whatever a Master permits him to do in the course of his business, whether he does within the scope of the authority given him by a Master, or out of a Master. For these acts are all done in the performance of business, in which a servant is employed by a Master.

20

A contract made by a servant as servant, (he being authorized to make it, by his master) is made in legal contemplation by a Master himself - as a Promise by a Master on servant's account. 1 Roac 509. 2 New 244

If a servant is cheated of his master's property or goods, a master may recover it back, by action as a money due - 1 Roac 38. 2 Mod 223. 3 Doac 509.

If a servant is robbed of a Master's goods, in a robbery, or by a latter, either Master or servant may have action as a money due - in Eng - "Baillmt III" 2. 2 Lark 513. 3 Mod 283. 4 Do. 572. 11 Do. 8. 12. 20 54.

The master may sue because goods are his - The servant may sue by reason of his own liability to a Master. There is no reason, for he is not liable, "perma bail", in case of robbery. Post 50.

The real reason is, goods are considered as a servant's as all persons in a Master - Baillmt 106. 10. 12. - I am an action he sues as tho' goods were his own. 2. Tunn. 370. 3. Mod 283. Gal. 613. Policy may require it - as the Master at a distance - And a recovery by either bars of other's action - and a commencement of an action by one, bars of other from prosecuting - Lark 127.

Where a servant sues he declares on a possession as of his own as of his own goods for they are his as all in a Master - 3 Mod 283. Lark 613.

But if y servant is robbed in presence of y master, of y master's goods, y master only can sue.

32.

Carth  
145.

See 33.

For in such case, y taking is deemed to be from y person of y master. 1. Hawk 148. Public Moneys 63. n. Besides there is no necessity for attorning y servant to prosecute - on y ground of Coverture.

3 Bac.  
559.

If y master's money is gained from y servant by illegal contract, y master may recover it back - Quia if y servant squanders it, there being no fraud in y other party, and no illegal contract - as if he embezzles it by paying it for his own use, to a Bona Fide Receiver. 3 Bac. 559. Then y party receiving it, being guilty of no fraud, or crime, y servant only is in fault - of which more on ~.

If an Innkeeper's servant robs y Guests, y master is bound to make restitution - See Inns and Keepers - 1. Hob. 430. 1. Roll 2. 8. C. 32. Dyer 266.

33.

So if y servant of an Inn sells bad wine, so as to injure y health of y Guests, y master is liable to an action -

But y servant in y case ant liable, tho he knew y wine to be hurtful, he acts as servant merely -

See Duer. for y act is unlawful and wilful in y servant, and tis a general rule, yt where a person has no right to do a given act, whoever does it at his command is a wrongdoer, as well as y person commanding -

If y servant does an unlawful act at y command of y master both are liable.

For y servant is bound only such commands as are honest and lawful - 1. Roll 430 - 1. Roll 328.

See 2. 550. 551.

For y ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

But if a servant in obedience to his master's commands, becomes instrumental in a wrong, of which he himself is ignorant, he is not liable, for he is but an involuntary instrument. As Master locks one in a room and gives a key to a servant, & latter being ignorant of the fact is not liable. 3 Bac. 563.

But the rules can only apply to such acts, as are in themselves harmless, as in case just supposed. It cannot hold in general, if an act is in itself unlawful or it constitutes a forcible injury. For in the latter case, the law does not regard assent, when a civil remedy is sought. 2. BB.

892, "ultra"

action of trespass for battery, and in former a person committing an act, is liable for all its consequences, as a servant fells a tree by Master's command, he is still liable for damage, he has a remedy vs Master.

The act of a servant done without Master's command, express or implied, is not regularly considered as an act of Master. As where a servant acts without Master's direction and not in discharge of any authority or business, with which he was generally or specially intrusted by Master. The Master is not liable for injuries thus committed to third persons, or upon contracts made.

A servant leaves his work in a field and commits a battery, ~~and~~ makes a contract for Master which he had no authority to make. 3 Talc, 262. 5 B. & C. 593.

1. BB 431.

as to effect of a subsequent assent by Master. Post 46.

Upon the principle it has lately been decided, that if a servant, while performing his Master's business, commits a wilful injury to another, Master is not liable. \*

As driving Master's carriage wilfully vs another, East 100,



for is not in furtherance or obedience of Master's business, ergo no command implied. 1. East 105. 1. Ret P. 472. 3 R. 562. 2. Do. 156. Bac. 562. Little 441. Comr 1. Wood. 460. It is the same thing as if a servant has wantonly broken another's carriage, by casting a stone on it, by aid of a Club.

But the rules are universal. I think, a principle near, upon a principle post, where a servant left a field.

36.

But if a servant in performance of his master's business, commits the negligence or want of skill, an act injurious to a third person, a master is liable. He must at his peril employ careful and skilful servants. But he is not an insurer of their unlawful passions, or those of those of their acts foreign to his business. In a first case, a act is his, in a second not, as servant drives negligently vs another's carriage, master is liable, tho he didn't in fact command. it. \* I fear if he wilfully drives thus or commits any other wanton wrong. 1. CB. 431. Trespass in a Case v. 1. CB. 120. 2. Do 548. 2. 7 CB 542. 1. East 106. \* Servant is also liable in this case in Trespass, Post 52.

37.

A careless servant drove negligently vs another's cart, and bilged a rib of mine and a master was held liable, so where he drove by neglect over a boy. Lalk 551. La Ray, 739. 1. Wood. 565.

2. Rule 653. So if a surgeon's apprentice injure a wound tho negligence or want of skill, a master is liable. Post 40. 52. 3. 1. CB 430. 3 Bac 562.

† - \. of a by of. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

The distinction as to masters liability between negligence and wilful wrong committed by servants, has been but lately settled or fully understood and a history of the



modern decisions on y<sup>e</sup> subject, is as follows-

I. 1794. c. 54. 125. Case was b't vs y<sup>e</sup> Master, for y<sup>e</sup> servant wilfully driving his carriage vs Plffs. Held, y<sup>e</sup> case would not lie, because Trespass is y<sup>e</sup> proper action - but no doubt was expressed y<sup>e</sup> Master liable.

II. 1795. 2. St. Tr. 442. Trespass vs Master for servant negligently driving his carriage vs Plffs. Held y<sup>e</sup> case was y<sup>e</sup> proper action - see N. R. 446. "Trespass on y<sup>e</sup> case. 5. 5."

III 1800. 1. East 115. Trespass vs Master for servant wilfully driving his carriage vs Plffs carriage - Holden. y<sup>e</sup> no action wd lie vs Master - 1. B. et P. 475.

These are y<sup>e</sup> established rules -

These decisions, however are all correct - On y<sup>e</sup> first and Third cases, no action wd lie vs y<sup>e</sup> Master - & y<sup>e</sup> Plff did not in fact recover - The reason, assigned in y<sup>e</sup> first, y<sup>e</sup> trespass was y<sup>e</sup> proper action, was wrong -

In y<sup>e</sup> second, both y<sup>e</sup> decision and y<sup>e</sup> reason assigned for it, are correct - For without doubt, when y<sup>e</sup> Master is liable, for even a forcible injury committed by y<sup>e</sup> Servant with y<sup>e</sup> Master's actual direction, "case" is y<sup>e</sup> proper action - For y<sup>e</sup> Master is liable on y<sup>e</sup> ground of negligence - The y<sup>e</sup> proper action vs y<sup>e</sup> Servant in y<sup>e</sup> case, is Trespass -

See Trespass on y<sup>e</sup> Case 5.

It theref<sup>r</sup> however is liable in Trespass for forcible wrongs or his Deputy - Post 41 - For he and his Deputy, in Law constitute but one officer and y<sup>e</sup> return of Service is always in his name, as every official act by either of them is -

- 1 Botul Pl a servant employs in his master's business another  
 404. servant, who by his negligence in performing it, injures  
 6 Y.R. a stranger, y Master is liable & is also y last servant  
 604. in many cases.

Post. To render y master liable, suit abbeas esset -

To if y injury were done by one employed by y last servant -  
 y Master is liable -

40. But in y last case, y action lies only vs y immediate  
 Agent, & y Master. The intermediate servant is <sup>not</sup> liable,  
 for he don't commit an injury - nor is he y Master  
 of him who does. 6 T.R. 411.

In general, (as already stated ante 35) y Master ant  
 liable for y wilful torts of his servant - Post 33.4.7. ante.

But it is otherwise, I conceive, when y wilful wrong  
 amounts to a violation of y contract between y Master  
 & y party injured - As a servant to a B Smith wilfully  
 lames a horse in shoeing him - a Sailor's servant  
 wilfully spoils a garment in y making &c. For in  
 these cases, there is an implied promise, by y Master,  
 yt all necessary skill, care and fidelity shall be used  
 in performing y work - 1. Hen Bl. 3 Bl. 158. Do 165.6. Id  
 Ray 310 Jones on bailment 43.4. 3 Bl. 165.6.

I don't however consider ys an exception to y Rule, that  
 "a Master ant liable for y wilful torts of y servant - for  
 in these cases, y Master ant liable for y torts as such,  
 but only a breach of y implied contract -

The master in such a case is liable on his contract,  
 but he cannot, I conceive, even in cases of ys kind -  
 be charged in Trespass, ante 35. If so, he ant liable  
 for servant's wilful torts, considered as torts, but for  
 a breach of his own contract, Suppose abandoning  
 y Contract, owner brings Trespass in common form -

, he can't recover, Stroud, so if he bring Case 'ex delicto'  
not alleging y contract -

A Sheriff is liable civiliter for y torts and defaults  
of his undersheriff, in y execution of their office - as  
neglecting to execute legal process, So by arresting a  
by mistake under a warrant no D -

In y last case Trespass lies vs Sheriff, for he and  
all his officers make but one officer in Law -

And for mere neglect of duty, y Sheriff is only liable  
at C Law - The undersheriff ant<sup>e</sup> liable i<sup>e</sup>. to y party  
aggrieved - For in such cases, y action is b<sup>id</sup> for  
a breach of official duty only & y Sheriff, not being  
a known public officer, ant<sup>e</sup> liable in his official  
character, and don't act in his own name -

For, private torts, y Sheriff is liable - as embarking 42 -  
in execution - for voluntary Escape - for arresting a wrong  
person - &c.

In these cases, he's sued not as an officer, but as wrong doer -

The Sheriff is also liable for every wilful tort of his  
Deputy, if they include breach of official duty - as  
embarking an execution for a voluntary Escape -

In Court, in all y above cases, both are liable, for  
y Deputy here is a known public officer and act in his  
own name -

A Postmaster ant<sup>e</sup> liable for y default of his Subordinate  
Officers - He is himself, a public officer - ante 2<sup>d</sup>. Galp  
202. 244 Responds on y Case. Bailment 67. 66 - and as such  
liable for an injudicious selection of Servants, only to  
y Public - Cow 754. 754. La Ray 546. East 487 Comyn B. 100.



40. But a Postmaster is liable for his own actual defaults  
to a debilty Postmaster for his -

3 Md. 443. Cow 765. 2 Bl R 306. Esp Dig. 623.

In such cases, he is liable as any other individual not be  
for his own Tort - see Bailmt - and Indebtedness Aff/pts  
will lie vs him for money illegally received to his own  
use. Post 40. Cowp 180.2.

Contracts

8 Bl R 331. 3. 300. 337.

2. Com

5. 3.

643.

Comben

452.

The master is bound for contracts made for him,  
by y servant, whenever y latter in making y contract,  
acts within y scope of an authority delegated to him  
by y Master - Ante 29. 30 - Id Ray 224. 3 T R 234.  
The authority may be Gen or Special, Express or  
implied - 1 Bl R 457. 10. Mod 398.

A General authority in contract, is one wh ant confined,  
to any individual contract, but extends to all contracts -  
generally - or to all of a certain kind - as A employs  
a servant to purchase necessaries generally (for contract)  
for his family,

A Special authority is confined to one or more individual  
specified transactions - as. A employs B to buy a horse  
for him on credit.

A general authority may be implied from y Master's  
usual or frequent practice - 1. Bl R. 430 - as if he  
usually permit y servant to purchase necessaries on  
credit -

A Special authority may also be implied as if Master  
stands by and hears y servant contract for him -  
1. Pow. 131. 2. 1. Bl R 430. 1. Pow. 2. 131. 2.

45. If y Master has made it a practice to send his servant  
for necessaries, <sup>with</sup> money, & has permitted y servant to  
trade for him in no other way, he ant liable for



what y Servant may buy upon Trust. There is then  
no implied order to y Seller to trust y Servant, and  
no implied authority to y servant to purchase on Trust.

Contracts 16 or 14- 3 Talk 234. 1. Show. 95.  
118-

Seems if y Master has usually and frequently permitted him  
(y Servant) to trade on Trust. Here he has given y Servant  
credit with y Seller, or as y case might be with y  
Publican. 1. Bb. 430.

And if y Master has once paid for what y Servant  
has bot for him on credit, notwithstanding his disapprobation  
he will be answerable for y subsequent purchases made  
by y same Servant, from y the same Trades man, or vendor  
till he gives y Trades man an express order to y contrary.  
For y payment will be equivalent to a direction to trust  
y Servant in future. 1 Bb 430. Ch n

And if a servant without any prior authority, general or special, 46.  
buys for his master goods, not come to y Master's use, he  
is liable, for he is bound by his assent subsequent - ante 35.

Comb 480. 3 Feb 625. ~~1 Bb 430 Ch n~~ 3 Talk 234. Ch. Boc. 20.

Suppose in y last case, y master had sent y Servant  
with money and yt y latter had kept it, & bot on Trust.  
There being no prior authority in y Servant to trade on Trust,  
& y master being ignorant yt y purchase was made on l. Com. C.  
credit, wd y Master be liable, quia y goods had come 221.  
to his use? Doubtful - Chd Ray. 224. 3 Talk. 234.

Pea R 48. 5. Cb R 214.

3 T. B. 760. 10. Mod 110. 3 Feb 625.

There is no assent implied subsequent, in y case, & if so,  
y master, I conclude, cannot be liable, for there is no  
proximate authority. In y case y vendor trusts y Servant  
at his peril -

But if y credit is obtained by y Master's authority, and  
y Servant embosels y money given him to pay y debt,  
y master must bear y loss. 5 Cb 70. 1. Com. Con 221. Ray, 224.

For in y<sup>e</sup> case, y<sup>e</sup> master is indebted on a contract, made by his authority and y<sup>e</sup> vendor is no party to y<sup>e</sup> act of embezzlement. The master, therefore, takes y<sup>e</sup> risk of y<sup>e</sup> embezzlement.

But tho' y<sup>e</sup> master has permitted his servant to trade for him, in trust, he may discharge himself in future, by forbidding y<sup>e</sup> Tradesman to trust y<sup>e</sup> servant again, on his account, but not by orders known to himself.

- 4<sup>th</sup>. Y<sup>e</sup> servant only: sto<sup>r</sup> for a time, by a private dissolution of y<sup>e</sup> relation; and all cases of y<sup>e</sup> kind, y<sup>e</sup> prohibition or dissolution sh<sup>d</sup> be as public, as y<sup>e</sup> credit before given by y<sup>e</sup> master to y<sup>e</sup> servant. 3 JR 760. 61. 10 mod. 129.  
Ch<sup>th</sup> Biles 27. 6. Pea R<sup>o</sup> 42. 184. 12. Do 346.

And if a servant in selling property, wh<sup>ch</sup> he is authorised to sell by y<sup>e</sup> master, make a warranty, y<sup>e</sup> master is bound by it, on y<sup>e</sup> authority was expressly restrained—  
C<sup>o</sup> B<sup>o</sup> 111. Ep<sup>o</sup> D. 630. 10 mod. 109. 4 To<sup>r</sup> 177. 3. Do. 757. For 505. 653. Talk<sup>e</sup>. 288.

And even when y<sup>e</sup> servant acts within y<sup>e</sup> scope of general authority, even an express restriction not made public, and not known to y<sup>e</sup> Purchaser, will not exonerate y<sup>e</sup> master. Sale by a servant at a Leasing Stable of a horse, with warranty, when a general authority and credit are given to y<sup>e</sup> servant. Secus if y<sup>e</sup> servant were only especial agent: there wd be no general credit given him with y<sup>e</sup> Public, and therefore to rely on y<sup>e</sup> warranty wd be y<sup>e</sup> folly of y<sup>e</sup> Purchaser—  
3 JR. 60. 701. 10 mod. 109.

3 JR 760. 62. The above distinction between a General authority's effect and a Special one, applies in general to contracts made by servants.

Plan.  
See Quere as to y<sup>e</sup> case of Loutham vs Howe 5 D. 469 or 6. Popham 3. Burr 350—3 Bac. 560—2 Roll<sup>e</sup> R 57. 26. or 20. 143. (3 Bac. Exp<sup>o</sup> 629. 32. 2. Roll<sup>e</sup> 5: For y<sup>e</sup> servant want expressly restrained from

warranty, & he wilfully concealed y defects, wh is in Law,  
is a breach of Warranty- 2. Roll 57 2. E.P.D. 629.32.

Quest. as to y fraudulent sale of an unsound horse,  
by y servant at a fair, y master not having directed  
him to sell to any particular individual. In such  
case it has been held, yt no action lies vs y Master.

1 Roll 95. Popl. 143. 3 Bac. 550. 2. Do. 555.

It seems however agreed, yt if y Master directed y  
Servant to sell to a and y sale was to be him,  
y Master wd be liable - See cases cited in y Text -  
How can y s vary y case, & whether he directs y  
Servant to cheat a or any one whom he may meet &

According to y General rule, ante 17. If a merchant's clerk  
sells goods to his Master, and warrants them to be sound,  
y Master is bound by y Warranty. So in other similar cases.

4 Trk 177.

3 Trk. 157. 3 Bac. 553. Salt. 292.9 For 553.

The Servant ant regularly liable, on y contract which  
he makes for y Master. But he may subject himself  
personally, even in transacting y Master's business, by an  
express agreement or warranty in his ~~own~~ own name.  
as if he make a warranty on his own credit -

1. Roll 95. 3. Bac 553.

And undoubtedly if y Servant make in y Master's name  
a contract, wh he has no authority to make, and by wh  
his master ant bound, he must be personally liable -  
Contracts 12.

2. Dem 127

might he not be subjected, as y case may be, in  
an action of Deceit or in Trover, or any other  
action adapted to y case - in Tort &

Od he be subjected at Law; upon y Contract, or as  
upon a contract implied & by reason of variance



This wife, child, relation or friend acting or living under a general or special authority, as his servant within the limits of realty acts of servant is & not of Master.

1. Bb. 430.

3/8 The master is liable for expenses incurred by servants & house  
2/2 Lett C. Seens as to Slaves. 2. 2/2 B. 730. 3. B. 511 247.

4/6 But y master may be bound by habits control - This rule don't hold in Court, as to Slaves, as in law, & rule where slavery is regulated -

And y judge issue in Court, in y case of apprenticeship &  
On such cases, y Master, covenants to bear such expenses

Now as the Servant is liable for his acts, &  
y fault to Strangers & to his Master

General Rule. Those acts of the Servant wh are not done by y masters command, express or implied, ant in Law y acts of y Master - ante 34.5. For these, ergo, the Servant, and not y Master is liable -

On these cases, he don't act as Servant -

And y last rule applies regularly, to all cases, in wh y acts of y Servant are not in y discharge of any business or authority, with wh y Master has intrusted him, as in y case of wilful torts of y Servant. ante 34.5.

On some cases strangers injured by y acts of y Servant may have their remedy either vs y Servant or y Master. The general rule seems to be, yb if y Servant in y performance of y Master's business, does an injury to another, thd negligence, ignorance or want of skill, y Servant himself as well as y Master is liable for, thd partly injured - ante 36. See 1083. 1. Mils 328. 6. 5th 411. 25 arg -

Ray. 224. Co. D. 380. 86.



Master of a ship, in which a servant was engaged as a master, was sued on contract between a master and servant, ante 367. A servant negligently drove master's carriage over a foot and broke it & overthrew persons. A servant as well as master is liable; a party injured has a right to consider a servant as a only an agent of a master and not bound to enquire into a private relation -

In such case, action vs. master, "case," vs. servant "Indep't"

Seems, I conceive, if a transaction is founded on contract, ante 367. In such case a master only is liable to a party injured - he is liable on a condition expressed or implied for a act of a servant, being here, a act of a master, in performance of his business & in execution of his contract. As B Smith's servant lamed a horse, in shoeing him - this negligence - A Taylor's servant makes a garment unskillfully. In both cases a contract of bailment is violated in both cases, in legal contemplation; by a master. Indeed a master only can violate, in legal "judgmt" his own contracts. ante 4-40-375. Corp 406. G. B. 580.

Salk. 603. 1. Bl. 481.

There is an exception however to a last rule, for a master of a ship, (as well as a owners) is liable to a freighters for damage, caused by his negligence, tho' a contract of freight is made between a owners and freighter; and because a master, it is said, is considered an agent. But what then? Salk 440. Parke 88. 1. Bents 130. 232. Ray 220. 6. P. 125. The rule, I conceive, is founded on convenience and forms only an exception to a general rule. The owners are often unknown - Besides ant a bill of lading always signed by a master.

And if any servant commit a wilful tort, he is liable, I conceive, in all cases to a party injured, even tho' a

transaction was founded on contract (ul ante) as in y case of Smith's Servant negligently laming a horse; for y act ant in performance of y thing contracted to be done - it ant in pursuance of y Servants authority, but a distinct wrong. If y Master himself had done it, y owner, I think, might waive y contract and sue him in trespass -  
ante 40- 1. Post 106.

A public agent contracting or acting as such, ant personally liable - as it is said ante 27.

Upon y principle, Indebitas expst. for money had &c lies not as an officer of y Revenue, for an overpayment made y mistake, for he acts for y public in y exercise of his of his office. Application must be made to Government  
Cow. 69.

But an action will lie as a public officer, for money extorted or illegally received to his own use. Cowp 182. as to that he acts for himself and as a private wrongdoer -  
ante 43. 35. expst 6.

If an atty knowing and being witness of a release from a to B, brings an action for it vs B, he ant liable to B. He acts as a Servant and ant obliged to Judge over his own client. This is y act of Chert. Esp. B. 618. Hutton 125.

But where y Atty for y Plt, after a nonsuit, entered judgment as y Def, he was holden liable to y Def -  
This is a wilful wrong of y Atty.

The Servant is liable to his master, for all wilful wrongs, & all negligence by ych y master is inquired. as a Servant intrusted with y care of Master's cattle, suffers them for want of care, to be injured, &c. &c. 1 Notes 466. 3 Bac 564.

If a merchants Servant lends y Masters goods, before y duties are paid and they become forfeited in consequence of y act y Servant is liable— Cro J. 265. 10. Mod 169. 3 Bac. 554.

No action lies vs a Servant for a mere breach of y Masters order, if no damage is sustained— Correction is satis remedy— So for ill manners.

1. Selwin 298. 3. Bac. 554.

But if y Servant disobeys or neglects to perform any of y Lawful commands of y Master, and y latter in consequence of y disobedience and neglect, sustains any damage, an action lies vs y Servant.

To when there is a neglect of duty, tho no express command an action lies vs y Servant, if y master sustains any damage in consequence thereof. as, the neglecting a fire cause—

Trespass on y case— Exp Dig 57. 1 Sel 285. 2 Feb 88. 2 Dum 2000.  
2 Mils 325.

The Servant undertakes regularly, only for diligence and fidelity and not for strength or skill— He is liable therefore, generally for such loss only as is occasioned by want of diligence & fidelity—

Since he is generally not liable for a loss of y Masters goods by robbers, for ordinary care and diligence can't guard vs it— ante 31. "Bulmer 47." 10 Mod 169. 4 Co 54.

3. Bac. 554.

And in general y Servant isn't liable for losses, caused by fire accidents, vs w<sup>th</sup> ordinary diligence & fidelity isn't a satis guard— guard— 10 Mod 169. § 3 Bac 554.

But y Servant is liable even to Master, whenever y Master has been subjected to damages or injuries done to him by y misconduct or culpable negligence of y Servant—

2 Str 1083. 10 Mod 169.



8 J. B.  
180.  
Harden  
164  
Riley  
116.

The last rule however supposes, y<sup>e</sup> master not to have been actually a party to y<sup>e</sup> wrong committed by y<sup>e</sup> servant. If he was, he has no claim on y<sup>e</sup> servant. for between 2 wrongdoers, there is no contribution and no remedy of any kind. As master commands servant commit trespass and is subjected for it.

How far servants are punishable for embezzling their Master's goods. See Larceny in Criminal Law.

Master's authority over servants.

The master has y<sup>e</sup> general right to chastise his servant, for any breach or neglect of duty. As for disobedience, insolence, negligence &c. 1. Selw. 170. 177. 1. BB. 428. Cro. Ch. 173.

2. Feib. 623. 1. Bents. 70. 1 Hawkins 94 Cro 111. 30.

But y<sup>e</sup> rule ant universal.

60. But y<sup>e</sup> correction must be reasonable, sc<sup>ilicet</sup> master ant justified. He may be liable to y<sup>e</sup> servant and as y<sup>e</sup> case may be y<sup>e</sup> public prosecution. The first rule however don't apply to all servants. Those of y<sup>e</sup> fifth class ant generally liable to correction. as Factors. Brokers Attys. Shopmasters &c. Ibid. 2. Mod 167. 8. Do 120.

And it seems to me y<sup>t</sup> y<sup>e</sup> right of correction extends to no other servitude than such as belong as servants to y<sup>e</sup> Master's family. For y<sup>e</sup> right substantially y<sup>e</sup> same as correcting one's children, and as I conceive, supposes y<sup>e</sup> servant to be under y<sup>e</sup> Personal, domestic government of y<sup>e</sup> Master.

61. The master undoubtedly has a right to chastise his slave for a reasonable cause - and also his apprentices, and minor menials or servants.

The master may correct a slave or apprentice of any age. But if he beat any other servant of full age, he ant



justified and y servant may be discharged by y proper authorities -

In y last case y rule is y same, if y beating is by Master's wife -

A master cannot justify a wounding of y servant, &c. he can't justify it by virtue of his right of correction, as Master, for he must chastise moderately or reasonably, if at all. If then servant sue y Master for assault and battery and wounding, he can't justify as Master, as to y assault and battery only and shd plead not guilty as to y wounding or show some other satis cause, as necessary self defence -

Lieberb. 168. 2. Mod 184. 8. Do. 128. 218. 330.

The master must state in his justification, y relation 18. y contract, y place where and y business in wh<sup>ch</sup> these being essential matters -

The master cannot delegate his right of correction, for y authority is personal. If indeed y master put his servant to school, y schoolmaster may correct him for a reasonable cause. But his (i.e. y schoolmaster's) authority isn't strictly delegated by y Master - The schoolmaster's right arises from reason of duty to himself and not to y Master and is confirmed by Law. 3. Co 76. a. 2 Mod. 167.

⊕ 1d Ray. 62. 310. Str. 553. Cro. J. 360.

If y master in correcting y servant, kill him - he is guilty of excusable homicide, manslaughter or murder - kata y circumstances of y case - See Homicide -

1. Hawkins. 101. 111. Foster Cr L 262. Keeling 65.

5 Mod 287. 1. Hale, P Crown 454. 473. 4.

3 Bac. 507.



The master of a ship, must declare with "His power  
 \* certificate annexed" and will recover if he has been  
 no loss of service. Cro J. 618. 2. Rolle 632.

\* This is a very good action. Rolle 429. 3. Co. 113.

or minor child is a servant within these Rules and  
 an adult child may be. Par. 6 Child 132 so when  
 a child of full age has not been emancipated. Hence  
 an action for seducing one's daughter with a "Per Lived" P.  
 Par. Child 110.

If one beat another's servant to such a degree, that he  
 dies, a master has in Eng. no remedy. The Private Injury  
 is merged in a Public one. 8<sup>th</sup> ed. 17<sup>th</sup> ed. 18<sup>th</sup> ed. 19<sup>th</sup> ed. - 17<sup>th</sup> ed. 18<sup>th</sup> ed.  
 17<sup>th</sup> ed. 89. Ray 339. 2. Rolle 568. 3. Bac 568.

If a servant's wound be injured by a Surgeon unintentionally,  
 so that the master loses his service, a recovery may  
 in trespass be made, an action lies by a Master vs a Surgeon  
 2 Rolle 332. 1 Rolle 38. 3 Bac 568. 1. Rolle R 154.

Suppose a injury done by negligence or want of skill,  
 what action lies for a master? For a servant it  
 certainly would. Trespass. 8. 2o Ray. 214. 2 Rolle 350.  
 1 Rolle 30. 8 East 348. 3o D. 601.

In a case of servant enticed away or leaving his  
 master with license & retained by another person,  
 knowing of his former retainer. ante 63.4. a recovery  
 had and full satisfaction by a Master vs a servant,  
 is a bar to a Master's action vs a stranger who  
 enticed or retained a servant, for a Master can't  
 have but one satisfaction - 1. Rolle R 387 3 Burn 125.

Quere, an a recovery with a satisfaction is a bar in y last case? I think they are considered as It Tort Does.

What acts the Master or Servant may Justify in each others Defence -

The master may maintain (i.e. abet and assist) y Servant in an action vs a Stranger and it not maintenance.

- 8 2. Roll 115. 1. Pl. 429.

A Servant may justify an assault in defence of his Master. Is a part of his duty. 2. Roll 407. 2. Roll 546. 1. Pl. Com. 429. 3. Bac 568.

This right grows out of y relation of Master and Servant and therefore he can't justify an assault in defence of y Master's son, not being to him a Servant -

3. Bac 568.

Not in Defence of Master's goods.

If they are in y Servant's possession, I think he can justify force -

Whether a Master can justify an assault in defence of y Servant, is questioned, because he may have an action for y loss of Service - 3 Bac 568. 2d Ray 262. 2. Roll 407. 1. Pl. 429. Law. on pleading 124.5.

I think y to be no reason -

But Quere? is it y a satis reason, The opening are contradictory. The Master's interest seems to justify him. Besides it seems to be his duty to protect his Servant -

I think y right reciprocal -



A servant can't avoid a deed obtained from him,  
by duress of his Master\*. The relation ant satis ~~intimate~~  
intimate. 1. Role 68% 3 Bue 558.

But probably only might interpose in his favour.  
as for fraud or unfairness.

\* He can by duress of himself.

Finis.

## Master and Servant

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## Guardian and Ward

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## Guardian and Wards -

## Of the different kinds of guardians and their rights and Duties 20.

A guardian is a temporary Parent i.e. a person in loco parentis, for certain purposes, during a child's minority. A child under a guardian is called a Ward. 1 R. 450.

In eq. a Guardian has a charge of Person and estate of ward -  
 1 R. 450. There are under a care of one Guardian - But a estate may be under a care of one Guardian and a person under it of another -  
 1 R. 460. 72 - 1 R. 450.

They are distinct offices under the Law, and a person exercising them are called Tutor and Curator -

The Law of Guardianship, is in not mistaken, a new institution on any portion of a Law, and is different to be understood - It contains a different kinds, not because they have obtained in common, but quite too important to understand them -

First. The Different kinds at Law. are 4. (21.)

First. Guardian in chivalry. This obtains only, when an estate held by knight service is vested in an Infant by descent - It continues over males till 21. and over Females till 16 - or marriage - It extends to a person and Lands within a Guardian's Feignage - The Guardian want a countable for a profits - It was abolished with a military Tenures in Eng at a time of a Restoration in 1660 & 1662 12. Ch. 2. 1660. Co. Litt 38. n. 11.

It is not known in y. U. S.

vide Langraue Notes on Guardianship.

2 R. 47. 8. 56.

Second Guardian by Nature Some books mention a kind of Guardianship, as if it was annexed to a Father, step as if annexed to Parents. 1 R. 461. 3 Co 38. a. b. Do. 22. B.

122 But a Father, Mother or any ancestor may be Guardian of nature at Law. The Father's claim excludes all others - The mother is 3 Co 38. a. second - and among more distant ancestors, if they have equal claim (as if a Infant is heir apparent to his Paternal or maternal Co. Litt 38. B. note 12.

Grand Father) sometimes in possession of the Person seems to decide y difference or rather preference -

It extends only to y heir apparent only to y heir apparent of y ancestor and not to other children, *Ides, que in in Eng.* a <sup>daughter</sup> subject can be subject of it, as she can be but her presumptive. *Co Litt 84. a. 85. B. n. 12. Carl 395.*

This kind of guardianship extends only to y Person, and not to y estate, and continues till y Ward is 21.

In Court all one's children are heirs apparent and y trust extends to both y person and y estate - Post 135.

- 123 In Eng. y Father may suspend y claim of all y ancestors, by appointing a Testamentary Guardian *Co Litt 12. Pl. 2.*  
Post 128

When y Father was natural Guardian, y Person of y Ward belonged to him in exclusion of y Rights of y Guardian in Chivalry, *Ides* when any other Ancestor was natural Guardian.

In Eng y Parents are styled natural Guardians of all their children. By y<sup>e</sup> is meant, not that they are natural Guardians at C Law, but such as y Law of nature designates as proper Guardians, and when there is none provided by positive Law y Chancellor in his discretion settles y Guardianship on y Father and on his death, on y mother -

124. 3. Guardian in Socage - This species springs like y<sup>t</sup> in Chivalry from nature, and takes place only when an Infant under C Litt 87. s. 14. is seised of Land, derived by descent and holden by 88. n. 13.  
2. mod. 176. Socage Tenure -

It belongs to y nearest of y Infant kindred, to whom y Land can't possibly descend, y<sup>t</sup> there may be no temptation to abuse y Trust. 1. Bl. 461. 2.



Among claimants, there is no distinction between a whole and half blood. If two or more kindred claimants, are in equal degree, 125.  
 & priority of possession decides between them - not among Sisters  
 and Sisters, half blood & sisters, & eldest is preferred, and  
 among lineal ancestors, males are preferred -

The Guardian in Socage, may lease & wards estate, till he's 14. and  
 maintain Gestint in his own name -

Guardian Thru in Socage, extends to, Person & Socage Estate Co Litt  
 to Incorporated Creditors, and, (it seems) to personal property 87. a. m.  
 & custody of Person drawing after it, every species of Property. 1 Roll 40.  
 3.

Hutton 17.

26. The Trust ant abrogable like y<sup>s</sup> in Chivalry, for tis for y<sup>s</sup> Infants  
 benefit, That of Chivalry ant for y<sup>s</sup> Ward's benefit.

At 14. The ward may enter and oust y<sup>e</sup> Guardian and occupy y<sup>e</sup>  
 Lands, y<sup>e</sup> Guardian is accountable for y<sup>e</sup> profit and allowed his  
 Reasonable expenses. Litt L. 23. 1. Bb. 461.2

At 14. Infant may choose a Guardian - ante and Post 129.

Guardians in Socage may be superseded by y<sup>e</sup> appointment  
 of a Testamentary Guardian - Co Litt 38. m. 13. or 14.

These different kinds of Guardians have been established, y<sup>t</sup> all  
 kinds of children might have Guardians, i.e. children under  
 diffnt circumstances, w<sup>h</sup> are qualifications to y<sup>e</sup> different kinds  
 of Guardianship -

4. Guardian<sup>natur</sup>ship for <sup>natur</sup> ~~natur~~ <sup>natur</sup> ~~natur~~ - This takes place only where  
 there is no other Guardian, it seems to be a natural Guardian  
 appointed, and he seems to be only an appointment at y<sup>e</sup> age of 14.

1. Bb. 461. 3 Co C 38. Co Litt 88. & n. 12 89. m. 13.

It seems to be y<sup>e</sup> Father or Mother. But it seems to be  
 made up or rein appointed? it seems not, for if there was  
 a Parent, he or she is natural Guardian in y<sup>e</sup> case. Litt

(2).

After 14. if there is no Guardian in Law, and there being none in Fee, who is Guardian to a younger child, &c. Suppose one appointed by the Court or chosen by the Infant.  
 Post

The three last species of Guardianship, may be subverted. & the appointment of a Testamentary Guardian. Guardianship not in Fee, was abolished by the same Act, & is abolished testamentary Guardianship.

There can there be Guardian for nurture in Court. Post 135.

III. By Act 12. Ch. 12. Sec. a father, or himself of age or not may by will or deed appoint, with two witnesses, a Guardian for any or all of his children, who are Infants and unmarried, and even to Infants in ventre Sa Mere. The appointment may be either in possession or remainder. It may continue, till 21. or terminate before that age. This Guardianship extends to a Person, and all of State. It subverts all others.

2. 2/11/110. 2. Mils 129. 1. 136 452. 1. P/M 702.

A Testamentary Guardianship not assignable, for a Trust is Fiduciary, one may but cannot assign. As to Guardians by Act 4 & 5. Phil and Mary - for females under 16. see 3 Co. 59. a - Co Litt 69. or 59. n. 14. 3 St. 417. 3 Bac. 675. 32. a -

III As to Guardians by Custom. see Co Litt 59. n. 10.

IIII. Guardianship not enumerated by old Law, unless and as we now know by the Law, will be, see Post. By Election of an Infant, a kind not known to ancient Law - but claims in the Country. This takes place only where there is no one appointed either by Law, or by appointment of a Father - Example. no Land holden by Knight Service, nor by Socage Tenure, or if any, & Infant being over 14. nor his husband, he being of age of 14. not Neri apparent. No natural Guardian, and finally no testamentary Guardian -

Co Litt 57. b. n. 16. 59. n. 14.

This kind of Guardianship is of late origin, however it has been in use ever since y restoration 1800. and it seems before, The election is said frequently to be made before a Judge, or a Circuit.

In Eng. there is no particular form of selecting a Guardian. 130.

Ed Balthmore when 18. named his Guardian by deed, There is a Parol Election good? I think y Chancellor has y power to agree or disagree to y Infant's choice, for y Law can't be so inconsistent as to allow y Infant to appoint one absolutely -  
1. Dec 370. Co Litt 57. 89. n. 10.

The age for choosing is said to be 14. in Eng.\* Yet it is said y Choice made be'fore or after y tender ante 26. \* Co Litt 89. n. 1. Bb. 463. 90.

Indeed tis said before y restoration 12. Ch. 2. y practice of choosing Guardians, was almost confined to <sup>Infants</sup> Guardians under 14. The C<sup>L</sup> deeming a Guardian of that age, as a great measure unnecessary -  
Co Litt 89. n. 10. 1. Bb 463. 90-

Second. Guardian by y Appointment of y Chancellor. y kind 131-  
is also of modern date, it seems <sup>in Eng</sup> Gill 247 Co 172. 1. Bro PCs 544  
But y Ct of Chy has exercised y power of appointment, ever since y year 1800. with opposition

The Chancellor never exercises y power, however, when y Infant is otherwise provided with a proper Guardian. When he isn't provided for, y power of Chy is very extensive. Its authority is a great measure discretionary and extends as well as to y appointment of Guardians - as y removal. Vide Ensay La Ray 480. 1800.  
1. P Mms 703.

The Chancellor may remove even a Testamentsary Guardian - 2 Bb 233.  
1. Dec 160. 1. Bb 462

So y Chancellor may appoint a Temporary Guardian, may remove any guardian to give security, and may make him <sup>On Chy</sup> discretionary or absolute as to y support of y Infant, as well as his estate. But Chy has no such power in Court, but it <sup>136</sup> La Bb 480, 1036  
may exist, in neighbouring State, where there are distinct Acts 1. Dec 160  
of Chy. as to y. In 2 Bb. 570. 1. Bb 462 - Co Litt 57. 1. P Mms 703.



3. Guardian of a Department of Ecclesiastical &c.

2. <sup>52.</sup> <sup>343</sup> <sup>354.</sup> <sup>354.</sup> The law as to a power of appointment, and fully settled, as to name & right of appointing for a person still in being, there being no other. This right was as a person was always denied. 3 <sup>40</sup> 531. C. 131. 132. a. 6.

103. This right has lately been denied, as to y<sup>e</sup> personal estate of  
infant, and given yt such sh<sup>d</sup> be cur appoint "ad litem" only.

4<sup>th</sup>. A Guardian ad Litem - is a special Guardian appointed for a particular suit, when an Infant suing, Def has no Guardian until 6.06. He may be appointed in any Ct in wch an Infant is sued. Co 89. n. 10. 3 B 427.

2. Lev. 136. 5. Co 53.

The King may appoint a Guardian ad litem by letters Patent, but no practice has been long disused. Co Litt 29. m. 16.

Scherb. 27.

134. In Comb. A Guaduaia ad Litem is never absorbed for an infant Plt. Sub Ct 1802.

In Eng. can Children having no Legal Guardian, elect one at 14.  
(when qualified for natural cases) living y Father? or how  
are they provided for? at Legal? The Father, if unborn, continues  
natural Guardian. of them all Natural y import of  
in Equity and y Chancery settles y Guardianship upon him  
when necessary.

Now Index y & 12. Ch 2. has given y Guardant in such cases to y Father.

135. Under y Court Law there are no Guardianship in Child, in  
George, by Testamt. by Custom, by assent of the or y  
recognition it.

Those known to Const. Law. are First. Natural Guardian  
2<sup>d</sup> by appointment of Probate. and, ad. liton -

Guardianship for our future, east I think, west or Comt.  
for y<sup>e</sup> future is natural Guardian to all his children, and  
mother is as much Guardian to all as <sup>the</sup> father, indeed all are



are heirs apparent, and 181.

Natural Guardianship of Father continues in Court, till they attain 21. and extends as well to their property as Persons.

On Father's death, y mother usually acts as Guardian but another may be appointed for male children, during his life, as a matter of course witht female disposing her, l. Rod 131.2. when it falls so happen, it then shall be any man, with Father's Guardian in trust, says Corral to 273. no mention being made of Mother, But even in y case y Infant lives generally with y mother, but if absent she act Guardian "de Facto." .. ory ory

Holden, y y mother (y Father being dead) is y natural Guardian, to her female children, till they attain y age for choosing, 273. what law is y distinction created between Males and Females, 2 Nov 320.

But in Court, (during y Father's) another Guardian cannot be appointed, in y former is removed, and y can be done only for special purposes or reasons, and not of course. Corral to 373.

How far Father's rights affected by y appointment of a Guardian - 137. Corral to 374. The mother then don't be Court say seem to be of course or of right, guardian to her male children, (is she guardian any more of female than male?) for of whatever ages, condition may may be, another may be appointed of course, tho' she is regularly y person appointed, y father being dead. l. Rod 131.2.

In Court, if an Infant has no father, Guardian or Master, tho' it is of Probate to appoint one, if y infant is y age of choosing (14. 12. to 42), it is a summons him to appear, and make his election. But his choice tho' to be regarded don't control y Ct. who may appoint a different person - Corral to 373.

If he don't choose, y Ct appoints one kasa it's discretion - 138.

If a male Infant (is not a case as to female) under y age for choosing, has no Father, y Ct of Probate may appoint witht summoning y Infant to attend, for he can't choose. But y's ant usually done,

(y<sup>e</sup> mother &c.) ni application is made to y<sup>e</sup> Ct for y<sup>e</sup> end  
or purpose.

In Court. The Ct of Probate may release y<sup>e</sup> father for sales during  
as y<sup>e</sup> may in England.

It seems, y<sup>e</sup> Ct may appoint, as often as occasion requires,  
The 2. paragraph enables y<sup>e</sup> Ct to appoint, when y<sup>e</sup> father is dead.  
Cont. to 273. 2 Post 323.

130. In Court it has been resolved, y<sup>e</sup> y<sup>e</sup> ward has a right to live with  
his Guardian, and can't be removed by y<sup>e</sup> Court.  
sure y<sup>e</sup> he becomes chargeable, for he gains no settlement. Post 154.

Under y<sup>e</sup> old rule relating to settlements, acquired by  
y<sup>e</sup> one might be removed notwithstanding being chargeable,  
y<sup>e</sup> rule now seems correct. But in case of his being actually  
chargeable, both y<sup>e</sup> towns concerned have an interest in removing  
him, and he forced, but seem opposed to y<sup>e</sup> spirit of Court Law—  
in really an invasion of town right.  
In Court a Guardian appointed to an infant, under y<sup>e</sup> age of  
choosing, continues of course till y<sup>e</sup> age of 21. ni y<sup>e</sup> infant chooses  
another to y<sup>e</sup> acceptance of y<sup>e</sup> Ct. Kirby 284. 86.

- Court Law requires y<sup>e</sup> Ct of Probate to take security of all Guardians  
appointed by him for y<sup>e</sup> faithful discharge of their duty, to oblige  
them to account ym to account with y<sup>e</sup> Ct or Ward, when  
he attains full age & sooner, if y<sup>e</sup> Ct on complaint, shall  
require it, the bond must be with security, if he has estate.  
140. But in Court y<sup>e</sup> Guardian thus appointed, is not liable  
to be sued to account to y<sup>e</sup> Ward, (While a Minor) ni called  
upon by y<sup>e</sup> Judge of y<sup>e</sup> Ct of Probate to account. Wood 512.

By y<sup>e</sup> Eng Law, also, all Guardians y<sup>e</sup> ni in (Keverly)  
are compellible, to account for y<sup>e</sup> Ward's property, in their  
hands, to Litt 89. n. 12. Co Litt 89. n. 3.  
And y<sup>e</sup> species of Guardianship being abolished, (ante 121.)  
y<sup>e</sup> rule extends to every Guardian of his property.

The usual remedy in Eng. is by bill in Ch. the proceeding being now more extensive & remedial, on an account at day in contesting a disbursement under a bill of administration or letters &c the action of account will account. also see. Co Litt 88. m. 2.

1. Blk. 463. 2. Bos. 573. 387.

In Eng. it is not uncommon for a bill to compel a Guardian 141. to account annually, especially if the estate is large. 1. Blk 463. In Court of usual remedy is by action of account, which is nearly as remedial in gd estate as a bill in Equity in England. For a Guardian is bound to produce papers and disclose —

If a ward's estate is in danger from a Guardian, even if the latter (the his Parent) may be compelled to account any time —

1. Eq. Co 137. 260. 2. Mod 170.

In case of misconduct by a Guardian, Chy in Eng. may remove him, so if there is reasonable ground he has mismanaged, Chy 42. may order him to procure security and upon refusal, displace him. 1. Talk 44. 2. Mod. 97. Blk 463. Bos. 1. Eq. Co 261. 2. P. M. 702. 3. 442. Indeed, a Chancellor in such cases acts discretely and makes such orders as he thinks proper.

No Guardian, or Parent, are bound at their own expense 1. Bos. 387. to maintain their ward, but may apply a Child's Estate 387. But a Parent, when Guardian, is obliged to support a Child 3. M. 399. and if he is of ability, Chy won't allow him to apply any of 1. Bos. 255. a Ward's Estate for his education and maintenance —

Persons of not of ability. He may then be taken by Chancellor 143. apply a ward's estate, but it must be a case of clear necessity to warrant such permission of a Chancellor — Alder Hill 328.

3 Bry Chy 60. 4 D. 225. 2 P. M. 21. 1. Bos. 160.

3 Bos. 733. 15 Do 120. Alder 60. 339.

But a widow having means again, and bound to support 1. Bos. 160. n

her children by a former marriage, but she may & do, thus satisfy  
her own & second husband and virtually be pleased with their  
support. She is a true lover and has no doubts.

ante 38. Post. 184.

1. Br. Chy 263. Contra 2 Contra 363

several

It has been said, & for any more ordinary and necessary  
support, in maintaining a child, & Parent may apply & child  
state, if justice is for & child's benefit and & interest, is reasonable  
to money advances for a child's apprenticeship to a useful Trade -

2. Br. 353. 2. Br. 137. 200.

1. Br. 227. 77. 7. 7. 7. 7.

144. The last rule has been denied, by Lord Hardwick, in & case  
of apprenticeship, Clerkship - 3 ante 300. Rumbury 130.

Under permission of & Chancellor he may apply a part to & child's  
education, and I think Lord Hardwick's denial subject to & &  
qualifications -

There must not every case of & kind stand on its own bottom  
to circumstances. The Chancellor gives his permission or not, in his  
discretion -

In Decree when & interest of an Infant there is reason to  
be recognized, on a bill for Redemption, & Guardian is empowered  
by & to make a recognizance, and may be required to do it,  
under a Penalty, and if & Infant has no General Guardian  
& Guardian "ad litem" appointed by & &, is authorized  
to recognize -

to Conno Guardian

145. By & Law, & Guardian of Infant heir, & deceased & Tenant  
or Tenant in Common is empowered with & assistance of such  
persons, as & & of Probate shall appoint, to make partition  
of & Land.

In Eng. too said, & Guardian or Discretion, may bind  
& Ward by equal partition 2. Bac. 684. 2. Hale 255. Luce 3  
Burr 1801. & & Infant may do it. ante 21.



if a ward <sup>creditor</sup> ~~creditor~~, in a compromise, accepts from Guardian less than is due, Guardian is not liable. Guardian has no liability of discount for he acts for ward. 2. Bac. 68<sup>n</sup>. 2. Chy. 240.

The Guardian is considered in Chy, as Trustee to ward. 146. and if a stranger tortiously enters upon ward's land, and takes profits, he is compellible in Chy to account as Trustee or Guardian, or he is liable as a Trespasser at election of ward, but this can happen only in case of infants. 1. Roll 661. 1. Ego 2. 1. Wks 489. 1. Vern. 485. 2. Vern. 295. 2. Chy. 342.

The Guardian must allow interest for ward's money in his hands, in he show it interest can not be obtained for it. 2. Ves 628. 2. Chy 155. 7.

His duty of guardian having personal property of ward, to pay debts, charged on ward's estate, out of his property, and not out of his own. This rule is to prevent interest accruing on debt as ward. 1. Chy 155. 7. 1. Ego 2. 280. 2. Vern. 687.

And if ward's estate is in mortgage, Guardian ought to apply profits of estate, to ward's interest, and if it will more than pay, remainder to discharge of mortgage. 2. Chy 11. 2. Chy 2. 9.

The guardian has no power to vest ward's money in land. 1. Hk 231. But if he does it, (taking a deed in ward's name) ward later may at full age take either at his election, and if he takes money, he is obliged in Chy to reconvey land to Guardian. 1. Vern. 435. 6.

But if such case, ward dies without making his election, his exec. shall have money, for right of election being personal, his heir can't claim land. 1. Vern. 403. 35.

148.

In general Guardian in accounting for ward's money is obliged to pay only principal and interest. But if money was directed to be appropriated in a particular way - as in funds, and Guardian has used it in another, as Trade, ward has at his election, ward's interest or profits. 2. Ves 628.

As to marriage of Wards, a Chancellor of Eng exercises an authority never claimed by any of our Cts. He forbids marriage without consent of a Guardian, and even if a Guardian does consent, to an unequal marriage ~~at~~ at his discretion and punishes as for a contempt, ~~the~~ those who assist in a marriage after a prohibition. This don't regard, as I conclude wards under Guardianship of Parents. Labor 58. 2. P. M. 111. 562. 1. Dec. 160.

140. So if there is only an apprehension of a ward's being married, to his disparagement, the wife Guardian's consent, a Chancellor may prohibit it and seize a person of a Ward, if necessary, and even enjoin a Guardian of a other party, (not to allow it - 2. 2. P. M. 112. Labor 58. 3. after 504,

So, a authority ever exercised, when either of Parents is Guardian? In Court, de facto usage, Guardians may bind wards as apprentices. The Guardian's Power over his Female Ward, is said to abate at an end on her marriage -

Where as to her Postesty, viz he is of full age, in which case he becomes virtually her Guardian - ante 6. 1. Dec. 31. 160, not So of Nails, i.e. quoad their Property, a guardianship continues - 1. Dec. 31. 160 -

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## Settlements of Infants.

For a Court Law respecting a acquisitions of original settlements by Persons, in their own right, see to Court 384.

First under Court 30, no foreigner, i.e. not an Inhabitant of 90 or any of it - can gain a settlement in any town in 90 state, unless admitted by a vote of a Town, or by a consent of a Civil authority, or select men - or unless he is appointed to, and executes some public office. Court 30 - Secus he may be named to leave under penalties prescribed by to Court 32.

2. No inhabitant of any tier of 90, can gain one, unless he has one of a above qualifications, or unless possessed in his own right, ~~and~~ in fee, within a State and during his continuance. 3. of Real Estate of a value of 334. and shall have owned a estate and resided in a town at least one year, before he, otherwise he





The settlement of Legitimate Infant children in emancipation, follows at the Parent, & later acquires a new one, & is immediately communicated to his Infant children.

Edg 488. 831-

3 Talk 114. 116. 8. Do. 4. 2. 4. 2. 118.

3 Edg. 1. Burr Sett 48. 04-

2. 1. 638-

154. After Father's death, it regularly follows of mother.

Given in an Eng. where a widow having children marries a second husband; for he is bound to support them till if under 17. they go with her, for nurture - ante 99. 100-143-

La Ray 1473. 395. Burr Sett 49-54. 372.

3 Talk 258. Eng 8. 11- Talk 470. 528-

The usage of Court is said to be that the Lord's Court ante 99-

In Court a Ward gains <sup>no</sup> settlement by living with his Guardian appointed by Probate, tho he has a right to live with him - ante 139.

1. Root 132. 2. Root 132. 3. Root 132. 4. Root 132.

By acquisition of a new settlement, & old one is lost, but in no other way, i.e. one can't actually hold 2 settlements, at any time, tho he may have & necessary qualifications, in two or more towns or Parishes, as a Freehold in two towns, and may reside in either. 1. 36. 363. Burr Sett 49. 372. Talk 528. 29-

An Infant may under some circumstances, gain a settlement of his own, by concoquency and then his derivative settlement is lost, as an Infant apprentice in Eng.

In gaining a settlement, makes his emancipation is, he is no longer a servant to his Father, and may take his emancipation, if he pleases, and he must be supported by a new settlement as he is severed from & old one -

La Ray 567. 3 Talk 110. 356. 3. 118. 364

In Court, an apprentice don't gain a settlement by living with his master. 1. Root 131. 2.





But it seems now settled, that if y<sup>e</sup> Husband, (having  
no settlement) dont remain in y<sup>e</sup> realm, or being in y<sup>e</sup>  
Realm, dont remain with and support her, her maiden  
settlement continues. Indeed, it held unconditionally,  
that if he had no settlement, her is not suspended,  
Burr Sett Cas 307. 70.23- 122.

And in y<sup>e</sup> last case, her children by y<sup>e</sup> marriage are entitled  
with her, to her maiden settlement.

Finis of Guardian and Ward

1 W 20 10 2 307 & 2 in  
2 W 20 10 2 307 & 2 in  
2 W 20 10 2 307 & 2 in



Such persons, are actually void, says Pors, and a better opinion, is, he says, "non est factum" may be pleaded to ym. 1. Pow. 11. 12. 4 Co 123. 2. Cole 728. Show PC: 152.

Bj. thinks, non est factum, cannot be pleaded, but, if it must be specially pleaded, <sup>3</sup> Led. see 4. Bac. 87. 4. Co. 123.

Post. 4. Infra. They seem void as to some intents; but not as to all.

They are void as to some intents. Thus y surrender of a particular State by a person "non compos" mentis, does destroy a contingent remainder depending, but it is strictly void as to y purpose. 1. Pow. 12. 3 Mod 280. 301. Salk 576. La <sup>Ray</sup> Dic 310. 3 Ter. 254. 2. Bent 138. Cart 211. 250. 435. Comb. 438. 68.

Led there as to such persons acts, cannot "non est factum" be pleaded to them? Salk 575. Sh. 223.

+ Co 123. Ter 1104. 2. 557. Bull A P. 172. 4. Bac 27.

The opinions are contradictory, but if not, acts may still be void.

3.

But persons insane are competent to receive property by a narrative Title, by Gift - Devise. &c, as well as by descent, there being his said a presumed assent, to what is thus in common presumption, beneficial to y party because he cannot assent. Co Litt 2. B. 2. Bent 203.

1. Pow. 15. 14. 3 Bac 84.

And it not be more proper to say, y in such cases y Law dispenses with y consent required in this person? There is no fiction nor obsequity at any rate, he may acquire property by purchase, as well as by descent.

And if insane devise or donee, recovers his understanding, and he agrees to y purchase, his assent becomes render, but if he dies during his insanity or having recovered his understanding, dies without agreeing to y purchase, his heirs may avoid it. 1. Pow 13. Co Litt 2. 2 Bent 203.







of Lunatic is one who has had an understanding, but has lost it from some permanent cause.

4 Co. 120. 1. Pl. 304, Co Litt 24.

7. Drunkenness in operating as a temporary Insanity, is not itself, in Law or Equity, a ground on which one can avoid his contract. For tis his own fault. The Rule is founded in Policy. 2. P.M. 131. 1. Res. 19.  
Contra. Rule 1<sup>st</sup>. \* voluntary drunkenness 1. Fortt. 862. 2. Res 402.  
1 Pow 23, 30.

But if one draws another into a Rule of deep intoxication and then obtains a contract from him, a Ct of Chy will set it aside. Pow 30<sup>2</sup> P.M. 131. For here, contract was obtained by fraud.

\* Person being of a weak intellect, is not per se a satis reason for avoiding his contract. For y Law don't distinguish between subordinate degrees of Idiocy. Weakness in minds of men, but y only distinction the recognoses is between minds, sane and non sane. and y same rule holds in Chy. 1. Pow 304. 3 P.M. 133.  
Fortt. 86. 63. 65. \* unless (ut sup.) in case of Idiocy, Lunacy &c.

Secus in Equity, if any fraud or imposition is practised upon a person, this circumstance, and if when such person is a party, there are such circumstances warranting a suspicion of fraud, the rule generally, relate on y ground of fraud. 3 P.M. 129. 2 Pow 228. 1. Do 31.

. . . . . - v. sh 10 }

8. Infants<sup>22</sup> upon y same general principle, viz want of intellect or capacity of assent, viz in some cases for necessities, &c are regularly not binding. And y exception is founded in necessity only, and aint admitted in any other principle. 1. Pow. 33. 34. 35. For Infants in Pledgmt Law have no discretion 18 no mental power to contract. For distinction, see Part<sup>2</sup> Chedg.  
48y Civil Law. full age was 25. by E Law. 21.



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The contracts of a feme covert are also regularly void for want of a moral capacity in her to effect. - her will being subject in presumption of Law to her husband's silence in general her contracts bind neither him nor her. 1. Pow. 62. 112.

But there also other grounds on wh her disability, neg her want of property or control over it, and her husband's rights. 1. Pow. 93. For a distinction, see Vess and Wife.

Who may by their agent to their contracts, bind others as well as themselves?

If a Tenant in tail agrees to alien lands, he is bound by a contract, tho by disherison of a Peer in Tail - and Chy will order him to pay a Fine and Recovery according to a contract. For a distinction is in his power and Estates Tail and Reversion.

1. Chy. Ct. 171. 2. Pow. 112.

The Trustee of a Trust may by an agreement, to wh ever parties, bind their interest as well as his own. & Trustees may be compelled in Chy, to join in executing a agreement. 1. Pow. 12. 13. 1. Ch. Ct. 173. 208. For a beneficial interest is in a former. & Trustees being mere depositaries of a Legal Title, for his use. as estate to A. in Trust for B. B. may dispose of it to C. and compel a Decree (ut supra)

A Trustee may also bind a Estate of a 'Estate in Trust' 1. 1. 131. 1. 1. 135. 7. 20. 34. 663. 8. 1. 516. 1. 1. 334. 44. Pow. 11. 205. An Estate in Trust to A. for B. and a Trust not appearing on the face of it. If B. purchases for a valuable consideration. For a bona fide purchaser of a Legal Title is to be affected by a right of existence of wh. he had no notice. He has equal Equity and also a Title at Law.



It is an implied contract in the marriage, that each party shall retain his estate, and he has the same independence of disposal of (it) and a better right of disposal than any one else has in consequence of the marriage. This is a principle of the common law, and is not subject to any modification by statute.

2 Bern 213. 1. Pow 115.

4 Brong, P. Co. 435. 1. Pow 116.

It is a principle of the common law, that each party shall retain his estate, and he has the same independence of disposal of (it) and a better right of disposal than any one else has in consequence of the marriage. This is a principle of the common law, and is not subject to any modification by statute.

10. And an agreement to convey an inheritance made by a Tenant for life, may be enforced in the equity courts, when the agreement is a term of making a settlement, or a settlement in fact.

A mother acting as aunt to her husband, may under special circumstances, send her minor children in Equity. 1. Pow 123. 1. Bern 210. The Chancellor in such cases exercises a discretionary power, as being arrived from a king, a permanent guardian of Children, or rather Infants.

So, contracts of a woman before marriage will in general bind her husband, when she afterwards marries. For her liability is suspended in favour of her husband.

For as he takes her property, and she is under his control, and as her marriage suspends her original sole liability, he ought to assume her responsibility. He takes her "earnings" and so. 2. Bern 448. 1. Rolle 307. 10. Mod 100. 6. 243.

1. Pow 123.

All Law, & Real Estate of a feme covert, cannot be aliened, or by fine or common recovery, but a covenant of husband to convey her Real Estate, if consented to by her or her private examination, may be enforced in Equity, but an agreement by her husband alone cannot be. 1. Pow 124. Fins. Wife and 8.



Journal, and his agent will not. "Master Servant 30"

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These can y contract be enforced on him only in Equity? For if y other party had sue y ally upon it at Law, there would be a variance. But might he not be subject at Law, as for fraud or in Trover, as y cause might be upon an agreement implied?

If a Tenant agrees to clear his part, and die before agreement is executed, & survives it has been held, cannot be compelled to perform. It seems to y whole, that y party promising under y agreement to c, dies.

2 Vern 48. 63. 1. Pow. 129. Newland 35.

Terms of y agreement amounts to a Release y Estate in Equity. If the agreement is then destroyed, and survives becomes, binds to y Executor, or his heirs.

2 Ves. 634. Co Litt 59. B. Amb. 277. Newland 35.

But y agreement always amounts to a Release in Equity, if it be such as being made by a Tenant in Severalty, would be enforced in Equity as a Release, notwithstanding qualification by language to y case in the case, 27. see Newland 35.

But if so, first rule cannot operate in any case, i.e. in Equity, but is abrogated. But it holds in Law. Cases there. y condition as first land down, would seem to require a change of poss<sup>n</sup> under y contract, before y death of y deceased Tenant.

How assent may be given to contracts or agreements? 13.

Assent to a contract, may be either Express or Tacit 1. Pow 131.

Express assent is declared by some sign, intended to signify it, as by speaking, Writing, Gesture &c and may be either precedent, concomitant or subsequent, &c



1. Principal act. 1. Pow 131. 2. First, a master sends his servant to buy goods, on credit. 2. Buys them himself and promises to pay for ym. 3. The servant buys goods on his master's credit without any previous authority and a master ratifies it by taking to his own use, y things purchased.

1. Facit or Implied, may arise in several ways, in an action or in issue. 2. If a person be present where a man is contracting with another, to make a second mortgage of y same subject, and knowing y contract, is voluntarily silent. In y case, he takes his silence as y ground of an Implied assent, & his mortgage should be postponed. Mortgages 58.

2. Bem  
151.  
1. 1812.  
393.  
1. Bem  
370.

Pow. 125  
1. Res. 6.

1. Por. Chy 357. 1. Pow 132.5.

Note. y first mortgagee may be in such case postponed, on y ground of fraud, but it seems not necessary to consider his silence as fraudulent. It may be properly construed into an implied assent.

12. If y a lessee being present, when y lessor makes another lease of y same lands, to a stranger and knowing y contract, makes no mention of his own lease, y second lessee being ignorant of y first, will even at Law be preferred.

2. Bem  
158.  
239.  
1. 1814. Co  
355.

Pow M  
183.5.

And y rule enforces such implied assent even in an Infant. For, otherwise, he, y Infant might be guilty of a fraud. As where an Infant Male is present at a contract for a second mortgage on y same property, and is voluntarily silent, he, by his silence, forfeits his right of Priority. 1. Pow 134. Bams. 102.3. Barnad. 102.3.

1. P.  
134.  
Pow M.  
80.

And it has been held, y a first wife being present as a witness to y second deed of mortgage, is taken to be y knowing y contents, unless he prove, y contrary.



But is not it deemed by a Lawyer and Banker,  
1. Res. 6. 1. P. 30. on y ground it would be  
dangerous, as giving opportunities for fraud and collusion

5. But in order to raise such an assent on y part of  
y person to be affected with it, or by it, tis necessary,  
not only yt he should know yt his own claim interferes  
with y subsequent contract, but yt his silence shd  
be voluntary. If coerced or awed into silence his interest  
isnt affected by it. 1. P. 34. Assent, either Express  
or Implied must always be voluntary.

Upon y same general principle if y holder of a note, who  
has been dishonoured, omits to give reasonable notice  
of it to y Indorser, he is considered as agreeing to  
discharge y Indorser, and truly solely on y Note for  
payment.

Where what need is there, of impleading each assent.  
in y case? The holder loses his claim when y Indorser  
by his own neglect.

And in General, y Law will raise a Void agreement  
whenever tis necessary for giving effect to some principal  
express contract. As if one makes a Sale of trees growing  
on his Land, he tacitly agrees y y buyer shall  
have free access and egress to take ym off ym  
Land. Or when one lets a chamber, he tacitly consents  
yt he shall have free access to it.

Co Litt 56. 1. P. 35. 1. P. 136.

And there is one species of Void agreement, annexed to  
all contracts. Which is, yt, if y person y contract  
is made with, is dead, or y contract is made  
with y person y contract is made with, is dead, or y contract  
is made with y person y contract is made with, is dead, or y contract

1. P. 137. 2. Burr. 1011. 3 P. 166.

is not y meaning so much? It would seem a Void  
agreement any such Void agreement? The case  
decided in declaring upon y contract. The Law. itself



If a mistake is made of one party as to his own rights,  
 is caused by a fraud of another, & conscience and rendering  
 in Equity. 1. Pow 141.

But its decided on a ground of fraud: 1. P 11m 229. 1. Do. 19. 20-  
 + ven 534. 1. Do 12. 20. as y heir was induced to believe  
 that y ancestor's will would only executed. when it was.  
 & releases his right for a small consideration, & release  
 will be set aside in Equity. or Chy.

But if on a doubtful point of right, both parties being  
 ignorant, on wh side it lies, a contract is made, & y  
 sign y party really entitled, is a loser, still a contract  
 will be good. So y parties on y ground of y right  
 being doubtful and knowing it one of ym must be loser,  
 each voluntarily submits to y risk of losing. As the  
 compromise between litigant parties, wh is common.

Post 112.

Now Ch 37. 1. P 11m 726. 2. after 587.

1. Pow 142. 2.

18. But if y party really entitled is ignorant of y extent  
 of his right, "says Powell" he must <sup>know</sup> y quantity or value  
 of y subject contracted about, & under a mistake as  
 to matter of fact, & of means of informing himself, he  
 seems not to be bound, as y case may be. As Case  
 of a bequest of 10,000 Doll. to a daughter, in condition that  
 she should release her orphanage, part wh amounts to 40,000  
 she accepted y former, & released y latter - The release  
 was set aside in Equity. - Goulds says y party was  
 guilty of fraudulent concealment,

3 P 11m 316. Pow C 144. 5. 2 Do 200.

In y case of Landown vs Landown, both parties being  
 deceived, by a opinion of a 3<sup>d</sup> person, as to y right in the land,  
 y contract was set aside in Equity. This was y case  
 of y Schoolmaster. There was a dispute between 2. Brothers  
 as to y property in fact belonged to y elder brother. But  
 y Schoolmaster, to whom they referred it, decided it



belongs to y younger. 2. *Howell v. Howell*, 164.

not like y case of *embodiment* & doubtful right, where both parties agree in a course of its being doubtful & each of not voluntarily outwits the y risk of being a loser. There both are deceives, tho' no fraud is intended, yet y deception operated as a fraud & the never intended as such. 2. *on p. 117*

But generally speaking ignorance of y Law is no ground for avoiding a contract. 2 East 455. & *Quere* as to y case.

un. "17."

Wagering contracts are generally binding upon y parties, at y Law. 11. Co 57. 57b. 1. Ter. 33.5. *Burn* 2802. <sup>2802</sup> see *Providence* and it isn't essential to y validity of such contracts, if y event upon which it depends, be in itself contingent.

But his rules, if it is equally uncertain to both parties, in y case ignorance don't invalidate y assent.

As question, in a ship at sea, is who lost?

There are some cases where y assent of an intended purchaser of an estate, is invalidated in Equity. by erroneous representations respecting y circumstances or quantity of y subject. *Th* there is no fraud in y case. If the distinction is y of y mistake respects y circumstance or quantity, which seems to have furnished y principal motive to y purchaser, y purchaser isn't bound. *How* y ground of his assent fails, as in agreement to buy land for a Millseat and there appears to be more. This contract ~~is~~ will not be enforced in Equity. for y reasons of *unconscionable*. *Th* *Quere* if not y "Sine Qua Non" y contract cannot be enforced in Equity.

1605 400  
2000  
1835  
1800 32.  
1 Pow. 147  
43  
2 Do 136.  
201.

*Th* *Quere* if y mistake relate to a particular, which a person isn't to have been boundedly in y contemplation of y purchaser, - he is bound by his assent, and his relief lies in compensation for y difference of value. 1. Pow 428-4. and Equity will enforce y contract. *Th* a mistake



in y amt of rent over for land wh is y subject  
contract. (18 P. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 841. 84

1 Pow. 148.9.

But if in agreement for a purchase, & purchaser makes it an express condition, & subject shall be so certain qualities or Incidents, & absence of & in will exonerate him. and such a contract cannot be enforced on him.

1. Porc. 150. Is a condition of a Farm has such a quantity of hedges. Is it has not.

20. And in some cases, the intention of parties, as to their assent, may be inferred from circumstances, and a want of assent may be inferred in y same way. As Sale of <sup>14</sup>Female Slave in a dress of Male, y<sup>e</sup> Contract is void. For there is fraud. 1 P 112<sup>n</sup> 109.

Sea in Comb. 118. Long 22. 196. Hs. 3 1/2 x 107. 1/2 at ant  
low end side & growth from ex os. Rate -? Cast 14. 12.  
Chemical analysis. 1. Solw. N.P. 687. Sea @ 115. 123. 2. Cast 3/4. 22.

[illegible]

Subjects of Contract.

Subst

Under y<sup>r</sup> hand, we are to engross as to what contract,

may be made, so as to bind y parties, to ym. 11th Nov

On y<sup>e</sup> head a distinction is to be observed between executory and executory contracts, merely executory. 2. 11th. 440.

Executory and executory contracts what? 1. Pow 224. 175.

21.

22.

As to y<sup>e</sup> first, no person can by contract executed, convey any thing w<sup>ch</sup> he hasn't an actual or potential interest at y<sup>e</sup> time of y<sup>e</sup> conveyance. For one cannot transfer to another, what isn't his own. As I grants to B. all y<sup>e</sup> land I w<sup>ch</sup> he shall hereafter buy, y<sup>e</sup> contract is void.

Now. 432. Robert 132. Co Litt 309. B. 1 Pow 152.

As if it make a lease to B. y<sup>e</sup> land of another, to last for rent, y<sup>e</sup> lease may stand, if y<sup>e</sup> lessor hasn't any interest in y<sup>e</sup> land at y<sup>e</sup> time of lease made. or:

1. Pow 153. Co Litt 410. 2. 233. 308. 3. 250. 251. Is not y<sup>e</sup> plea allowed on y<sup>e</sup> Covenant c<sup>on</sup>cessio & Implied, & good title is taken by want of title? and y<sup>e</sup> such Covenant is a condition precedent? P R R. 357. St 817. 1. Pow. 160.

Now. 432.

As to y<sup>e</sup> second, were by Impleading for y<sup>e</sup> lease is then voidable. 2. 233. 306. 2. 7. 11th 537.

If one of 2. or Tenants conveys by deed, or by bargain & sale, y<sup>e</sup> land properly, and his Tenant afterwards dies w<sup>ch</sup> before enrollment: His & moiety of y<sup>e</sup> latter will pass.

As to y<sup>e</sup> third, contains Covenant, y<sup>e</sup> Tenant is seized of y<sup>e</sup> whole, w<sup>ch</sup> would y<sup>e</sup> other moiety pass by way of Estoppel.

Upon y<sup>e</sup> same general principle if a Feoff to R. a lease, w<sup>ch</sup> condition for payment of m<sup>th</sup>ly rent, & it can't sell him to another before y<sup>e</sup> expiration of y<sup>e</sup> term, y<sup>e</sup> y<sup>e</sup> property is changed, and sale to another before y<sup>e</sup> expiration of y<sup>e</sup> term, would not be made good by 2.





Focus if in future act is to be done, to give effect to  
Contract, as it must then take effect if at all, as a  
contract executed. It cannot be by a preceding Rule  
to a covenant to stand Seized by use of S. 7. and  
he shall hereafter purchase. This operates as a  
conveyance executed, and no future act is necessary.

23.

But a contract executed may bind a future interest  
by way of Estoppel?

It has been held in Court, that one  
makes a deed, with Covenant of Seisen &c. of land, of  
which he is not owner. & afterwards purchase of land, he  
is estopped from averring that he had no title at time of  
Grant. 2. Pb 295. Co Litt 265. 1 Root. 222.

Rule is the same in Eng as to Lease or Mortgage of Land  
Salk 276. Pow. M. 285. 6. 2. Feb 304. 1 La Ray 729. o Mod 258. 2 Ld  
Ray 1048. 1550. Ely. &c. 233. 306. 3 TR 370. 71. 2. Bem. 11. Pow M.  
37. 1. PR. 760. 1. Pow. 160. Litt J. 4. 46. "Tille Dead. 6"

Then may not a contingent remainder or executory devise  
be barred by such a deed, by way of Estoppel. Estates  
in Remainder 20. ante 25. 21.

All Contracts, must be first possible of performance.  
2 Laxal in their nature. 3 Certain in its terms, terms.  
1. Pow 75.

Article. 1. Possible. No right can be acquired or any obligation  
by a contract created to perform a <sup>thing</sup> ~~contract~~, naturally impossible.

Such contract is idle and nugatory, & void in its nature &  
24. Things, it cannot be performed. 1. Pow 161. 158. For the  
s. 7. rule, see non cogit neminem ad impossibilia" 1. Roll

Parkin  
Sec 7. 35.

42c. Co Litt 205. As a Covenant to enclose one of lands  
covered by a stream. - a promise to go from here at  
time in 3. days. or to suffer a Mansuet in a person's  
action when in fact there is no action pending.



These contracts are void, because they are morally impossible to be performed. 1. Dow 178. 2. Linn 203. Perkins, 100, 101.

But a law distinguishes between things in themselves impossible, and those not possible in themselves, and impossible as to party contracting. In an agreement to perform, sales is voiding. In a contract to sell an estate not belonging to B., in the case it is liable in damages to C. for non-performance. The Chy. will decree a Specific Execution. 1. Dow. 112. 2. Linn 110.

In a former case, it must be evident to all persons, at a time, if performance is impossible. It could not have been intention of either, if it could be performed. See in the latter case.

Therefore where one agrees to deliver to another 2. quarters of Rye corn, on a following Monday, and so on increasing and doubling the quantity on every successive Monday, during a year, if performance was delayed, and the corn was compromised. 6. Mod 305. 1. Bents. 269. 1. Lev. 111. 1. Wils. 295.

1. Feb. 569. Ld Ray 1164.

So of an agreement to pay for a horse a barley corn for a first nail, &c. Held to pay the price of a horse.

1. G. saw void because impossible.

Upon what principle is your decision founded? If a rule is, if a thing stipulated for, is not delivered, its value is a rule of damages. 2 Burr 1010. 1. 400. 2. East 211.

1. Ton 424. 1. Pors 408. 1. 81. 3. 225. 1. Vern 217. 1. 107. 1. 221. Is not a Express contract treated as void on a ground of fraud and a promisee subjected on an implied promise, contract, to pay what he has received upon it? I think, a Express contract should be considered as fraud. He may be bound to pay the price of a horse, on a implied contract.

A contract, not void on a ground, if its performance

impossible, in his strictly l. Antea 24.

The distinction between a near and remote possibility of performance, and regarded in Executory Contract.

As a covenant by A. that he will die within Pascoe, his lands shall be settled on B., is binding and may be enforced specifically in Chy. Any condition, unprobable or not, is by no means impossible. 1. Pow 153. 4.

And if one covenants expressly and absolutely to do a thing, not impossible in itself, his being prevented from performing it by inevitable accident, does not discharge him. As a covenant to be at such a port at such a time with a Ship to take in Cargo, in <sup>add. Pro</sup> ~~the~~ prevented by tempest, he from performing a Covenant, & Covenantor will be liable. 3 Burr 1639. 4. 11th 16. 300. Long 309. see "action Covenant Broken" It would be otherwise, I conjecture, if a covenant to perform a covenant within a time mentioned, within which, such a voyage could not possibly be performed ante 24. In such a case, he is virtually an answerer to: Risk of Failure.

## Second Contracts must be Lawful.

Things stipulated to be done must be morally possible & lawful, or a contract is void. No one can be bound to do as an act which is ~~not~~ prohibited. So a contract is unlawful, when agreement is to do something "malum in Se" or "malum prohibitum".

1. P. 182. 189.

Of the first kind are all contracts which have for their object, something forbidden by a Divine nature - as a contract to commit murder. Shape 1. 1. Pow 150. 5.

Then a contract to give a certain sum, if he will, or not, or how so. is good. Not to hold such contracts









y action will not be the recovery of ransom money till  
 person be restored. 6 T.R. 23. Marsh. An. 37.

The same is y same m. y hostage. i.e. y capt. and  
 ransom was taken with y hostage, y latter being only a  
 hostage, y m. being independent of y hostage.

"Pro. 304. 94."

And as to concave such contracts in general made  
 with an enemy, as arise out of y state of hostility, and  
 tend to mitigate y horrors of War, are binding.

Don. 625. 5. w Treaty of Peace between belligerent  
 States. Truces. Capitulations, and between military com-  
 manders agreements for exchange of prisoners.

In Eng. however, ransom contracts are now prohibited  
 by y 22. Geo 3<sup>d</sup>. Marsh. 432. There as to y Italy.  
 a bill was introduced in Congress, but now lost  
 and it passed. S. (S. C.) don't know.

Marriage breach bonds are void. 12. bonds given for  
 assistance in promoting marriages, because they are  
 of dangerous consequences and militate w public  
 policy. 1. Burr 474. 5. 1. Conbl. 245. 1. Pow 174. 130.

Colo 8. 184. 3 Lever. 411.

The same principles apply to promises and agreements  
 of y same kind.

2<sup>d</sup> Contracts opposed to any principle or maxim of  
 y Law are void. Pow 110. Hence if a consideration, wh  
 is a cause of a promise or y promise itself is opposed  
 to any such maxim or principle y contract is  
 unlawful and void. 3 T.R. 37. 1. Buls. 38. 1. Pow. 170.

Thus a promise in consid<sup>n</sup> of y promisee would  
 fraudulently discharge a debt due to his master, was  
 holden void. 1. Pow 170. 3 T.R. 37. For y consid<sup>n</sup> is  
 opposed to principle of Law. ergo y whole contract  
 is void. "Post 37."

31. If a *Shff* for a valuable consid<sup>n</sup>, promise not to present an Escalpe - tis void - as tis <sup>also</sup> a promise or obligation to indemnify him for it. Here y promise, or y thing promised is contrary to public good. Post 39. 35.  
 10. Co 76. 182.  
 Cro Elvi 139.  
 1. Pow. 176.

So a promise by a Minister of Justice, to do an unlawful act in his office, is void. For y thing promised is unlawful. or a promise by another to indemnify him for it: as then y consid<sup>n</sup> is unlawful. Cro Elvi 230. 1. Pow. 176.

But where y unlawfulness of y consid<sup>n</sup> or rather y fact wh makes it unlawful. - is unknown to y promisee a contract of indemnity founded on it, may be binding. As it brings B to an Inn under pretence of having lawfully arrested him; and promises to indemnify y host for keeping him as a prisoner. If y host is subjected, it will be liable over to him on his promise.

"action on y Case 17" Pluton 53. 1. Pow. 178. 7.

This is an Exception to y Gen Rule, as between Tortfeasors, For y host is innocent of any crime, and his motive being innocent, of course no illegality in y consid<sup>n</sup> can be imputed to him.

So if a Plff on a *Tr. Fac.* request y *Shff* to take certain goods, as y Deft wh ~~g~~ are not his, and promises to indemnify him, y promise is good and binding on y Promisor & for y same reason - "Tresp. Case 17" "Little by Execution" 10. Cro J. 152. 1. Pow. 178.

All contracts, y objects of wh militate vs y Laws of Morality and decency are void, as being illegal, as a Naper as to y *Sez of Chancelor de org* 1 Pow 139. 183. 233.  
 183. 233. 1. Pow 30. 729. 35. 2 JR 610. 3 Dr 698. Post. 35. 7. 8."

So of contracts made for corrupt purposes, as a bet with one having a vote or influence in appointments, it is held not to be appointed to such an office. *Marshall v. G. 1. P. 182. Corp 39. 3 D. 410.*

So of a wager it is but a cover for bribery. *Pow 184.*  
As bet on a loan by a lender, it is void until repaid at such a time. *1. P. 56. 1. Pow 184.*

So a wager bet to a matter of or playing an illegal game. *2. P. 43. It promotes a knowledge of a game.*

But a wager between Alf and Jeff in a case as to a ultimate decision of it, is good at law. *1. P. 184. Corp 37.* For it does not create their interest in a claim issue of a cause, nor does it tend to influence a decision. *1. Pow 184.*

And Wager in Criminal are binding at law. *2. P. 140. Ant 18.* But a rule has been much disapproved of. *Marshall v. G. 2. P. 410. 3. 493.*

But in Court all wagers are made illegal by 22. C. 361.

So of money knowing lent at a time and place of gaming, and to a party gaming. It

Does it extend to any case of money lent to a party gaming except to of a Wager upon some game - horse racing or other Sport, or parlance? Seems not. *See Post 376.*

34. Contracts in fraud of third persons, are illegal & void.

As an agreement between outlaws and another to cheat y. government in a purchase of supplies for an Army.

*Strong 433. 457. Talk 156. 4 P. 166. 2 D. 763. 1. Bos. Tale. 35. 285. C. 1. Dig. 184. 1. P. 322. 156. 1. Pow. 185. 2. D. 165. 176.*

"Pow Chy 40" 7. 272. 7. 577.

So of a secret agreement of one of a party to a marriage to refuse part of his marriage portion. It is a fraud as to a other party of a marriage. *See 240. C. 184.*

*2. P. 184. 1. Pow 184.*



So of an agreement to pay for attendance at an auction to enhance y price of goods, by influencing bidders. 1. Powel 35. 180.

Contracts are unlawful and void, when y omission  
1. Pow. 198. 182 of ~~some~~ some legal duty is their object. 1. Pen 25.  
As contract by an undertaker not to serve more <sup>2</sup> above a certain amt. or not to execute process on a certain part of y Bailwick. Post 35. 47.  
2. 12. More 856. 1. Pow 135. 6.

So of contracts wh tend to encourage unlawful acts or omissions of any kind. As a bond to indemnify y printer re any indictment or action for Libel. 1. Pow 130. An obligation given for countenancing a felony. is illegal. 2. 3. 6. 643. 1. Pow 130.

So of a contract for <sup>to</sup> indemnify a Thief for embarking a Horse or promoting an Escape. 1. Lev. 209. 11 Co 100. B

Exo Ch 300. 3. 4. Plow. 60. 64 1. Pow 137. 8.

It to save one harmless if he will commit a Felony. Though in other ways. This is a temptation to y commission of an unlawful act.

So of a wager between 2. or one of ym or a 3 person shall do any criminal act. ant 33. 1. Pow. 133. 9.  
This is an incitement to Immorality. Post 45.

3d Contracts prohibited by St Law, are void. 1.  
2. 11. 186. 100. 6. 1. R. 493. 99. Marsh. En 56.

As a contract for more ym. legal interest is void by St. 1. Pow. 138. 188. 166.

So of a secret agreement of a bankrupt or by any person in his behalf to pay money to a Cred<sup>r</sup> for signing his certificate. This void by St J. George 2<sup>d</sup>. 1. Pow. 132. v L 7 - v E & P v 7 - v M 1. 180.



And would have been so at E Law, (semble) as  
fraudulent on other Creditors. 1. Dec. 150. 1.

The money ought to go to y payee of all y Creditors  
of to any of them. So holder in Court in case of  
a compromise between an insolvent & his Creditors,  
upon a bill in Equity by y <sup>creditors</sup> debtors to be relieved  
in such a contract.

Distinction between cases of covenants & bonds for  
performance of covenants. & so when some of y are only  
are lawful, & some are made void by E & Cases  
where some are lawful and some void at E Law.

36. In y former case y whole bond or other instrument  
is void. In y latter tis good as to y Covenants,  
yt in themselves are lawful & void as to y Covenant,  
yt are in themselves unlawful. Unto 35. 1. Pow 199.  
2. Nils 351. 1. Bent 237.

Thus if an undershff covenants not to serve exceeding  
above a certain amount as also to raise y shff himself,  
& all weaker or persons, united by himself, a contract  
as to y former covenant is void & as to y latter, void.

The illegality of y former covenant is created by  
E Law. 1. Pow. 199. 200. 2. Nils 357. But if a shff takes  
a bond bond by E, 24. Hen 6. for ease and favour,  
& for a debt due y whole bond is bond void.

See shff 30. 1. Bent 237. 2. Nils 351. + Bre 138. 9. shff  
1. Pow 200.

This difference arises, as I conceive, not from any difference  
in principle between y effect of a particular illegality,  
created by E, in one instance, & by y E Law in y other,  
but from y knowledge and structure of y E Law. wh  
in such cases declares y bond or security void be-  
cause y construction given to y words of y whole  
bond or security. If a E shd merely declare a  
particular clause, or condition in an obligation to  
be void, y whole obligation would be so.

But tho an illegal contract creates no right wh  
can be enforced, yet after it has been executed  
y Law in some instances, suffers it to prevail, by  
refusing to aid either party in rescinding it. 1 Pow 200.

34

First. When y illegality is of such a kind y both  
parties are deemed criminal: here if y contract is executed  
on y other side. I.E. if y unlawful act is done, he who  
has paid, cannot recover back what he has paid.

In Pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis  
Doug 461. or 468. Bull RP 1342. 1. Patk 22.2. Bun 1012. Casper  
W. p. 116. 578. 1. Bon Vol 9. 298.

Secus while y contract remains executory, as to y act  
stipulated I.E. while y criminal act remains unperformed,  
there y other party may recover back y money, wh. he has  
paid. 1 Pow. 202. 6. J. Bull 132. Doug 47. Post 38. 47.

As money paid to A to hire him to beat B.  
If y beating ant committed, y money may be recovered  
back. Secus if it is committed.

\*. Quere as to y correctness of y distinction in point  
of principle? Wd it not be better to allow a recovery  
in both cases, or in neither? 7. 508 535. "Post 47."

It is decided y money is deposited on an illegal wager,  
and paid over with Loris consent, it ant recoverable.

Manth. In case where y wager is decided by event.

522.3. 1 Bon Vol 3. 298. 'Apostumet' "13."

870 875 But if money thus deposited has not been paid  
over, either party, it has been hidden, may recover from  
y stakeholder, or part deposited for himself, tho y wager  
is decided. As on a boxing match. For y los ant paid  
J. Mansie has no legal claim to recover it, tho  
illegal act is committed. As y Law won't aid in  
enforcing y contract, as it would not in rescinding  
it if y money had been paid over.

Suppose a Stakeholder pays a note to a winner after being prohibited, is he (Stakeholder) then liable? It is not as if it came as a last point in principle?

Seems in principle it is. For as it seems to me, a winner could not in such case recover it of a Stakeholder. The latter could not retain it as a Loser. *Bank Ins.* 43. *East* 222. *Park* 8.

See *vide* *Edw* 819. 25. *Easton* & *Hoffman* Reader. It might seem to be as a right of recovery, on a ground it when a contract is executed, a party paying cannot recover it back.

Under our Statute a Loser may recover back in all cases. *See* *Compt* 311. ante 33.

58. And it has been once decided, that money paid to one of a Party, before hand on an illegal wager, was recoverable back after a Event. *See* *10* *St. J.* and *the* *Event* was in favour of the Defendant (winner). It questioned *1* *East* 10. *8* *Edw* 570. & *John* 426.

Indeed, a case is opposed to a current of authority in *8* *St. J.* to say that a action was not a Stakeholder before payment over. *Edw* 55.

Money advanced for a procurement of an office is recoverable before a office is procured. — Not post.

So of a premium paid on an illegal policy, before and after a risk is over, or run. *1* *Pow* 202.5.7.

*Bong* 471. But a distinction as before observed, seems to me opposed to a policy of Law.

Quere, when a party who has paid money on an illegal contract, and "particeps criminis" he may recover back, if a contract is executed. *1* *Pow* 201.2. *Edw* 13.

This is a case where a Law prohibits a









any time of payment, is good. It is payable statim  
1 Pow 1180. for it creates a present debt and no future  
de time is appointed for payment,

2. Tl 8. 124. 427

Tho if one promise to do a collateral act (more  
properly a specific) and no time is appointed, it's  
said he has his whole life time, it is said to  
perform it in. As to make a lease. To deliver goods,  
1. Pow. 180. Even now it now be considered as  
requiring performance in a reasonable time, or on  
request? *res. l. - no of "u. 27"*

But id certum est, quid reddi potest certum."  
Hence if I promise to pay to A, whatever he  
pays for me, the satis certum. For what he advances  
for me, may be ascertained. Popham. 148. 1. Kel 56. 65.  
Bro C. 134. 1. Selim 270. 1. Pow 180.

#### 41. Of The Nature and Kind of Contracts.

All contracts are Executory or Executed. 1. Pow 234. 2. Bl 443.

A Contract is said to be executed, when y parties  
transfer property to each other, together with im-  
mediate possession or with a present indefeasible  
right of future possession. As goods sold, paid for,  
and delivered. Exchange of horses.

2. Bl 443. 1. Pow 108. 9. 175. 234.

2. One having land under lease, sells it to me in  
possession, when lease determines and receives y price,  
Here y whole agreement is Executed on both sides.

"Executory" are those where no property passes at y time,  
or "in present" but which are introductory or preparatory  
to an actual future transfer, or Exchange of property,  
As agreement to Exchange horses next week, -  
an agreement to sell, grant, pay &c "in future"

A contract then is Executory where one performs immediately and y other <sup>is</sup> trusted. (It wd it & not be more proper to say, yt in y former case, tis Executory on one side and in y latter in both. 5). As. 1. a loan of money on promise of repayment.  
 2. an agreement to make a lease in consideration of an agreement to pay for it. 1. Pow 234.

All contracts according to Powel. are Express.  
Constructive. <sup>and</sup> Implied. 1. Pow 236.  
 The usual distribution is into Express. or Implied.  
 - and B.G. prefer y latter.

42. First an Express contract is one in wh y parties stipulate in Express terms, what is to be done or omitted. 1. Pow 236.

Second Constructive contracts are such as are raised by construction out of Instruments, or Express agreements. They are different from what y instrument "prima facie" imports. & they vary from y framed terms of y Instrument, or Express agreement, from wh they are raised. This however is but a branch of Express contract being raised by construction from y words used. Co. L. 137. 608. Helier. 132. 1. Rev. Lev 24.

Thus a recital in a deed of conveyance respecting y Grantor's Estate, in y subject amts in construction of Law. to a covenant or agreement yt he has a title according to y Recital. As whereas, B. is possess<sup>r</sup> of Black acre for yrs. so he assigns. 1. Pow 237. 1. Leon 123.

Raym. 14.

So a recital in a marriage settlement agreement 't  
 Whereas A is to pay B. 1000. for y marriage portion &c  
 was holden to be a covenant for y payment of yt sum.  
 1. Lev. 122. 2. 174 Co. 652. 1. Pow 238.

So an exception in a deed Indented, may amt



to a Covenant. As Lease by Indenture of a farm excepting a particular close.

This is said to be a Covenant by Lessee. yet close shall not pass by devise.

What need is there of calling it a Covenant? If not, excepted If not a covenant, & part excepted will not pass. It seems to be only matter of description. Cro Elvi 657. Cuthk 232. Salk 136.

11. Mod 170. 11. Co. 50. B. 1. Pow 238. 9.

43.

But tis now holden not to amt to a covenant & Lessee shall not disturb Lessor's possess<sup>n</sup> of it. Drid. For Lessee is a stranger to & part excepted.

But where & Exception is of some thing arising out of, thing devised, it amts to a Covenant & Lessee shall disturb Lessor. # Where in it be an Indenture. Pow 238.

But where an Indenture is necessary. 1 Leon 324. 1. Pow 241. 2. As Lease of land excepting a right of Way over it. Lease of a house excepting a right to pass thro' it. For here & Lessee has an interest in & subject out of wh & right excepted arises and therefore is considered as & right.

So of a reservation of rent in a lease amts to covenant on & part of & Lessee to pay it. "As yielding and paying rent." 1. 100. Salk.

1. Roll 518. Cro Elvi 657. Sta 407. 1. rent 10. Cro 339. 39. Poph. 136. 7. 136. 132. 1. Leon. 246. 1. Pow. 243. 4.

So a lease without impeachment for waste amts or rather gives Lessee & trees growing on & land demised.

Now I. (P. C.) regard as Express Contracts. all & Preceding.





In Equity also. contracts are sometimes Implied. as if purchaser of land having paid only part of purchase money, becomes bankrupt. The land stands charged with y residue. Purchaser is by an Implied agreement a trustee to it amt.

1. Br Chy 423. 4. 3 alk 272. 1. Pow. 257. 8.

Where of Security is taken for a purchase money?

Contracts are absolute or conditional.

1. Pow. 236. 259.

An absolute contract is one by wh a person binds himself or property absolutely. & unconditionally. as if in consideration of a <sup>lease</sup> ~~loan~~, covenants to pay rent, or in consideration of money lends covenants to deliver a horse. or build a house. 1 Pow. 259.

4. A conditional contract is one a obligation of wh is void altogether, or in some respect upon some uncertain event, upon wh it is to take effect, or to be defeated, enlarged, abridged.

2. Br Ch. 152. Co Litt 201.

1 Pow. 259  
2. Br Ch 154  
How PCy 83

as if A agrees to purchase land of B. returns from India by such a day. - y condition suspends y obligation to perform. till y day. If B does not thus return, y obligation to purchase is annulled. 1 Br Ch 117. b. 7 120 1 pc - cy

as a promise to pay 100<sup>£</sup> to A. on condition y he marries B. by such a day. or y he conveys land by such a time.

Perk 1 712. Sec. 1. Pow 260.

If A sells to B on condition y in a certain event, B. shall pay for it. £ 10. in another event but 5. y contract is conditional quoad y amt to be paid. only.

If A agrees to give B for his land as much as B





if people shall do an unlawful act, a condition may be void. The Regmt is good and a estate is absolute. Here, a people may be under no imputation, but (supra) a law seems to him, a estate won't performing a condition. 1. Porv. 262.

45 But a effect of a condition in these two cases, is differently & possible is, same in both. — in a former class of cases, 12. where a Contract is unlawful and a condition unlawful, a Law won't enforce it. In a latter 15. when a Contract is accepted & both parties are criminals, a Law must aid a Judge. & so defeat it. So, in both cases, a Law leaves a parties, as it would be.

But a later rule holds only when a parties are in "pari delicto" or both Criminals. It seems when a person is not "particeps criminis," as if a mortgage is made to secure usury. "Ante 38"

In such cases a contract is void and thus a innocent party is protected.

It's bonds in restraint of marriage are void. The condition being unlawful.

So bonds for withholding Evidence are void. 5. 1 Q. B. 2. bin 119. Esp. D. 184.

38. 2 57. So bonds to secure reward for prostitution, if given beforehand. Esp. 182. 5. Bam N. 8. Case of given post. In a former case they are an inducement to immorality. in a later case not, but "premiis inducitur." it is said. 1. St. R. 57. 3. M. 339. 2. Plowd. 432.

All conditions repugnant to a nature of a contract, are void. No point in free contract, it self shall be alien or shall not take a profit. The condition and Law. and a estate is absolute. 1

Cro. 596. 2. bin 283. 2. Porv. 263, 2.



45. But a bond & Covenant by Toffee, that he will not alien or yet he will not take profits, is good, for ye don't disable him to alien. I but merely subjects him on his bond. If he does. Ibid.  
 As bond by Toffee shall have profits, it makes Toffee trustee to Toffee. Ibid. auth.

Conditions may be possible or impossible.

Possible require no explanation. 1. Pow 263.4.  
 Impossible conditions are first, such as are so at a time of a contract made. Or such as become afterwards. 1. Pow. 264.

First. If a condition possible at a time of making a contract, but has become impossible by an act of God, or of a Law, is annexed to a central Covenant, a contract not avoided "by nonperformance". Rule & same, if a condition becomes impossible by an act of a party granting it. Litt. 205. B. 1. Pow 264.5. II Mod 268. Co Litt 206. B. It seems if it becomes impossible by an act of a party to whom a grant is made. 1. Pow 444.6. 1 Co 98.  
 Co Litt 210. B. 1. Pow 420. (Joy. 35. Laid L. exp)

In ye case, a grant is devoted or becomes void.  
 1. Pow 420. Co Litt 210. C. Post 138. As Toffment, grant, so conditions, yet Toffee shall within 6. mths go to London, on Toffee's business. Toffee dies within a time. The Toffment is absolute. 10 Mod. 208.  
 1. Co 98. Joy 35. 1. Pow 446. "

His estate is executed and cannot be devoted, but by a default of Toffee. Action dei injuriam nemini facit. In other words, a Law won't deprive him of an interest already vested, if he has been guilty of some default.

So of a Toffment in condition yet Toffee shall within 6 months perform a certain voyage for Toffee. a voyage is then forced by it. 1. Pow. 444.6. 2. Plow. 218.

3. R. v. P. M. 389. 5 To 263. Car. 198. 8 Mod 57. 5.  
It becomes impossible by act of Law. Municipal  
Law. 27. Post 57. 141. 2. P. M. 218. La R. 198. 8 Mod 57.

So of a feofmt with condition of doing some  
within a month, marry for, and coo marry  
within a month. *ibid*. There is no manner  
being made impossible by act of God, he can't  
take advantage of "non performance" & he will become  
absolute in fee. *ibid*

But if such a condition is annexed to a contract executory  
it becomes impossible by act of God, or of Law, &  
obligation is saved and obligor discharged.  
or act of party.

Rule is if a condition becomes impossible by  
act of party in whose favour a contract is made,  
as obligor, & then if obligor disable himself  
to perform a condition, for he cannot take advantage  
of his own wrong. 5 Co 21. a. La R. 10. 1. Toth 209. 7. Toth 384.  
It is then true even before a time fixed for performance  
that a contract being executory, no advantage can  
be taken of it by obligor, till there is a default  
in him. The Law won't subject obligor to a Penalty  
if he is culpable in <sup>not</sup> performing a Condition.  
5 Co 21. a. 2.

57. So of a bond conditioned, yet if the obligor dies, at  
such a Ct. and he dies in the meantime. 1. Toth 260.  
If others inherit, obligor is discharged.

5 Co 21. a. 1. Pow 260.

31 P. 890  
7 D. 363  
Dony 264  
659.  
If a obligor either prevents or dispenses with a performance  
of a condition, a obligation is discharged. 1. East 619. 1. Ch R 53. La 123.  
An obligation conditioned to build obligor a house,  
and he prevents obligor from working upon it.  
5 Co 92. 1. Toth 374. 1. Co R. 205. B.

If an act of a stranger is made necessary, by a term of a contract or instrument, no act of a condition being complied and he arbitrarily refuses to act. *Bo v obligation void?* *There* 2. *LC BG 574.* 6. *FR 744.* 5. *Co 23-B.* 1. *Roll 452.* 6. *FR 710.* Note a case of Insurance vs fire. 2. *LC BG 574.* 6. *FR 710.*

But it was a case of a condition precedent. 6. *FR 710.*  
Suppose a consideration to be subsequent.

If a bond be conditioned for a performance of one of 3 things & one becomes impossible, obligor is still bound to perform the other, if it is impossible, has occurred in a foreign. 1. *Bo v 242.* *Contra* 1. *Pow 398.* 5. *Co 32.* 10. *Mod. 207.* He to convey a house or land, and a house is burnt by lightning.  
*Pal 170.*

If a condition becomes partially impossible by act of God or Law, still a obligor is bound to perform as much of it as is possible. "By Pres" is bond for a deed of house and land, and house is destroyed by lightning. Bond for a lease for 60 years, & it afterwards prohibits longer leases for 20 yrs, obligor must make a lease for 20 yrs.

Municipal Municipal Law. 28. *Now 284 Co Litt 352. 212. B.*  
2. *BLR 371.* 1. *Pow 448.* 451. 2. *LC BG 163.* 381.  
2. *FR 254.* 1. *Imb. 209.* 11. 2. *Pow. 31.*

If a contract contains a clause making a party bound by Judge, and a condition is complied with, a clause is void, and a party are to decide and a condition is complied with. 2. *LC BG 408.* Resolved in *Conscience 1888.* It on an agreement to sell goods for approved notes, a vendor cannot refuse arbitrarily such as are clearly good. 171 *pag 100* v. c. 5.

Second. If a condition is impossible at a time of making a contract, its operation depends upon its being Precedent or Subsequent.



A Precedent condition is one which must be performed before a right or estate depending upon it, can vest or accrue.

A Subsequent condition is one by which a right or estate already vested, may be defeated.

Co Litt 206. 2. Bl. Com 156. 7.

Rule. If a precedent condition is impossible at y time, y right or estate, wh is y subject of y Estate Contract can never vest. His word "Ab initio" For no right or Estate passes, till y condition is performed.

Co Litt 206. 2. Bl 157. 1. Pow C. 266.

If y condition being possible at y time, afterwards becomes impossible, y right or estate, I suppose, becomes void. Or it cannot vest. As Lease to A to take effect at and from a certain future day, if before y day, he shall marry B. & B. dies before yt day.

So if a precedent condition is unlawful, for no right can be acquired by performing an <sup>act</sup> unlawful. 2. Bl 157.

As Lease to A. to take effect on a future day, if before y time he shall do a certain illegal act.

*Subsequent*

But if a subsequent condition is impossible at y time, it has no effect, y contract is in law unconditional. As a Feoffmt with condition yt mi Feoffee shall go to Rome in a day, y feoffmt shall be void.

1. Pow. 206. 2. Bl 156. 7. Co Litt 206.

So of a bond with y same condition, it is likewise void.

For in y case of Feoffmt, y estate is vested and in y case of y bond, "Debitum in Presenti" A void condition cannot defeat either. 2. Bl 157.

54.

So if y condition was unlawful. 2. Bl 207, ante 47. 8.

But in y case of Executory Contract, Bonds



Recognizances and, like, if a condition is incorporated with a body of obligation, instead of being underwritten or endorsed, a whole obligation is void, 1. Pow. 257. 1. Sal 172. For then there is no 'debitum in presenti' no distinct penal part creating a debt, 12. present debt. It is rather in the nature of a condition precedent and must be so in effect. I think, in every case of the kind.

The common distinction between Special and Simple contracts, "see Consideration Post"

### Written and Unwritten Contracts.

There is a distinction between these contracts introduced in certain cases, by the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries.

29. Ch. 1.

2. Bl. 159. 1. Bac 72. 1. Pow. 239.

Our Statute on the same subject was enacted in 1771, and is, so far as it extends to the same subjects, substantially a transcript from the Eng. Statute 13 Geo. 3. c. 334. - Similar Statutes in most of the States.

Under the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries, the following contracts or agreements will not support an action at Law or in Equity, in any agreement or some note or memorandum of it, is in writing, signed by a party to be charged. Or by some other person by him authorized.

First. promise by an Executor or Administrator to answer out of his own Estate, for any debt or duty of his Testator or Intestate, such a promise not in writing don't bind him.

Second. A promise by one person to answer for a debt, default or miscarriage of another.

3. a promise in consideration of marriage.



with Convention would have been void before  
a Tr. was made, & if every bond provides upon  
consideration is good. Since a Tr. involves a  
Dead matter. "Est. 23"

at Dorchester, assets will clearly be made an  
implicit promise to charge & incumber personally. 5th 18th  
Toll 464. 5th 18th 690 7. Do 350. 57.

7. The holder Contra by the Tenant cited 18th 18th 690 7.  
Administration submitting a claim to him is  
"Bibbham" was once taken (Bibb) to be an admission <sup>12. to y</sup> of debt.  
assets. 5th 18th 690 2. This opinion is accepted, 8th 18th.  
5th 18th 453. Toll 460. 4 464. 5. "Awards 10"

"For an Admin" may be services of knowing or  
ascertaining & existence of assets, or their amt with  
knowing or he has assets.

But if in such submission, & arbitrator award of  
amt shall pay a certain sum, he can't post deny  
assets, but finding of assets to be amt 7th 18th 453. Toll 460.

Same rule as 18th 18th 453. see post 10.

Once holder of Tr. paymt of Interest by, Est. was  
admission of assets. To y amt of a Principal or  
rather of it then of "Dues prokandi" on Est  
unreasonable and was overruled. 5th 18th 8. Toll 464.

But acceptance of a Tr. by trustee's Est. is an  
admission of assets. Secus 3<sup>d</sup> persons might be  
defrauded. Besides y acts plainly implies y admission.

1. 18th 18th 622. 2. 18th 18th 1260. 2. 18th 18th 1275. Ch. B. 823. 112.  
So is a Transfer by holder, 18th 18th 112. "Post 20." 60.  
18th 18th 1260. 3. 18th 18th 1. Ch. Bile 14. 12.

And tho' y promise of Est. be in writing, he is still  
not bound, in some sales cases is shown. As  
assets in his hands or forbearance of a Tr. or him.

For this is a simple contract only. 7th 18th 300. note.

1. 18th 18th 125. Toll 464. Corp 293. 2 - p 87.



14-2 p.  
 23-2 18-18  
 21-17 18-18  
 24-17

The mere fact of Consideration was established, and enters as a consideration.

It is not the object of the Stat. is not to make the promisee liable at all events, in all cases, when a promise is written, but in those cases only in which he would have been liable in a Parol promise. 7 R.R. 307. n. Rob. 10. 202.

1. Sec. 128.

And to make a promisee personally liable on his promise, the written, there must have been an existing claim which bound him as a promisee. There can be no consideration. 2. Lamm. 130. Cro. 1. 47. Rob. 10. 200. n.

Rob. 2 or 6. 11. v. 17-18 40-41 n.

The consideration must also appear in the writing. After the Stat. 10. 20. 307. Post 14. 41. Rob. 10. 207.

It requires a agreement to be written and the promisee must appear in the writing. 7 R. 82 - 1. 515 v. 18 - 24 187.

There is no doubt as every writing here is said to be a specialty. See Quere. hoc. Post 102.

To take advantage of the Statute, a defendant must have been a promisee and when he made a promise. Rob. 201. 210. Amb. 330. A promise by one in consideration of being made a promisee is not within the Stat.

61. Not necessary to aver assets in an action on a promise. For a defendant is subjected to it all "de bonis non propriis". Rob. 200. 2.

Second to answer for a debt, a promise is a mere promise of another. Hence, the clause of general distinction is to be observed. If a promise made for the benefit of another is enforced, the binding, the benefit. See also of consideration. On a similar case this is a promise to answer for a debt and a promise of another, in a former it is not.

2. La. Ray. 1007. Cro. 227. 1. Nib. 300. Cro. D. 101. 2. 3 Barr.



Note y words "I am a Co-surety"

An original promise is not a promise to pay another's debt, but our own.

Collateral is to pay another's.

A promise is said to be original. First, when I promise for whose benefit it is made, not made at all. (for y same debt or duty) to y Promisee so y there is no debt on his part.

Rob. in So 209. Pea Evi 212. Bull N.P. 281. 3 Burn 1921.

Second. When his liability "the before existing" is <sup>3 Mod 205</sup> extinguished on y promise being made. <sup>2 Wils 94</sup> Rob 223 <sup>1 Do. 305</sup> 4. <sup>2 Day 400</sup> Questions Posed. 3. when there is a new consideration answering out of a new & distinct transaction or "res nova" and moving to y Promisee. Cp S. 101. 2.

So y original debt is only a means of what is to be paid for another's debt. 2 East 320.

For whenever y case answers either of y above descriptions, y promisee and in construction of Law is in effect to answer for y debt of another.

But when y promise is of a subsisting or continuing liability (for y same debt or duty) on y part of such 3 persons or to procure credit for him. E.g. when y promise is to furnish an additional security or remedy) it is collateral and therefore within y Stat. None these distinctions, see

For in all such cases, y promisee is in effect to answer for y debt of another.

First. As a says to a Merchant, "deliver goods to B & charge ym to me, or deliver ym on my account, or deliver ym, and I will pay you." y promise is original, for B is liable at all. I am y original debtor. 2 IR 81. 1. H Bl 120. La Day 107. Rob. 209. 216.

41  
Cp 3 102.

Cow 227  
1-72 182

120

La Ray  
1856

Salk 28.

It is not a promise to answer for a debt of another, but his own.

But if a had said, "deliver to J.P. 'till I pay'" and if he don't pay, I will," to collateral. Cow 227.  
Here a intent is, at a charge that be in a first instance to J.P. or receiver. He is therefore a original debtor and a promise is of course Collateral.  
It is therefore a promise by a to pay J.P. debt in aid of his liability and to procure credit for him.

To supply my mother law with bread, and I'll see you paid. - holder Collateral, or rather according to latter opinions, "promia facit" so because a presumes intent as in a last case. "Salk 58. Contra. Shuter." Cited 8. T.R. 30.1. Rob. 223. La Ray 224.

B et P. 158. Rob 223. Contra 58. Salk. now done away.

24.

La Mansfield said, at such a promise before a delivery of a promisee property, was original there being no liability on a first person. cited Cow 228. 11.

This opinion however has since been overruled 2 T.R. 81. Rob At Truads 203. 10. See there, an La Mansfield construction of a promise not correct? In other words, an a intention is not, at Promisor shall be made a debtor in a first instance. At any rate to now holder at when a promise is in a form, "It is court in collecting a intention are at liberty to consider all a circumstances of a Case. In a situation of a Parties. 1 B et T. 158. Rob. 212.

To supply such a Seaman bound to Canton, with necessities for a voyage & at a end of 3 mths. I'll see you paid. - a Seaman having no funds or means of paying here.

This I consider original, as evincing an understanding that necessities must be charged in a first instance to a Promisor.

"If you don't know me, you know me" and I see  
in your suit, "William Collateral" it is a first  
thing. Each having excellent intent.

Rob. 210-11.

2. T.R. 80. C.B.S. 1012.

To a promise by me in consideration of your  
lending a horse to my son shall deliver, I am Collateral.  
This is plainly undertaking for a default of another.  
I procure him credit. Rob. 32. For it is liable on  
a Bailment. B.C. 10. b. # Rob. 210. C.B.S. 27. 320. 15

v. Mod 258. r 48. de Ray 1085.

60. If he would not be liable. He if I promise  
B. on satis consid. at I shall pay, and if not at  
he ("A") will, B. not being bound to it)  
I promise is substantially original, not in form  
collateral. B. is not liable at all. As I let me a  
horse and B. shall pay you. If he don't, I will.

Rob. 223.

To if an agent buys goods at auction, and with  
name his Principal, I agent is bound with writing.  
for he contracts for himself. 3 Dan 1021. Per Cur 213.

"Seemle" To make a promise collateral to necessary  
it is 3<sup>d</sup> person for whose benefit it is. He is not  
only liable on a same consideration, but it he shall  
become liable at a same time, it is a third promise  
is made.

And upon a same contract, with a promisor makes  
in advances. So a two last cases.

If after goods are delivered to D.P. it they shall be  
I charged to me, he shall contract as pay for a me may  
promise is still original. It is not liable, when  
I promise. It. But as a General Rule, a promise  
of a 3<sup>d</sup> person shall do an act, for not doing which  
he not be, liability is Collateral. de Ray. 1085, b. 7.

Rob. 229. 223.

If a promise is by one of several persons already liable  
it is original and not within a Statute for it can't  
be pay of debt of another. A promise is pay costs by 1 of 2. de Ray.

2. Part 320.

Rob. 223

5. Mod 258. Comberb. 305.


213.







Pitt. had a Lien, wh he gave up, in favour  
of Def. on his promise to pay. 3 Burr. 1885. 3 Cb.  
86. 1. 121. n. Pea Cr. 213. 2 East 320. 3 East 320.

The consideration arising in this case out of a new  
of a distinct transaction I moved by y Promisee in y  
abandonment of a Lien (wh was a valuable ~~consideration~~)  
interest) in his favour. 2. Burr 1886. 1880. Pea. 232.  
3 Cb L. 85. 

It was in consequence of y fund being  
disencumbered in y favour. The debt was only  
y measure of y sum to be paid. - like a promise to  
pay another for redeeming y to Promisor.  
Salk 25. 2d Ray. 408. 3 East 80. 3 East 320.

4<sup>th</sup>. When one is under a moral obligation to pay  
for a benefit <sup>received</sup> recovered by another, & a Promisee  
by y former is original I will bind him. as medicine  
furnished a pauper, y overseer afterwards promise  
to pay for it. - y promise is binding - not treated  
as a promise to pay another's debt.

Dale N.P. 281. Pea Cr. 213.

(Thomas Mansfield)

### Miscellaneous Rules.

A promise to pay a certain sum in consideration  
of promisee's withdrawing a certain suit or P.L. for  
assault and Battery. has been held original, for  
there was no debt due from P.L. It didn't uphold  
if there was any default, in him see.

1. M.L. 308 7 T.R. 204 2. Day 487. Pea Cr. 214. Rob 208.<sup>33.4.</sup>

The promise was not for performance of some duty,  
P.L. was never liable to pay y particular sum promised,  
or y particular duty wh y promisee was intended to  
create. "ante 65"

There must exist as a 3<sup>d</sup> person a debt or duty  
ascertained or capable of being ascertained at y time  
of y promise. (Rob. ut Salk) It being y present  
case within y Stat. "ante 65"

1 a n B 50 dle

Rob 208. 33.4.

But a promise to pay in consideration of Promisee's staying a Suit brot. vs P.P. for a debt is collateral. The debt subsists vs P.P. & no interest or Lien assigned or abandoned as in y<sup>e</sup> other case. by Promisor

2. Day 405.

And a promise in consid<sup>n</sup> of Promisee's abandoning an action of Trover, vs P.P. & Promisor, would pay y<sup>e</sup> damages, is collateral. & within y<sup>e</sup> 2. Day 450. Same duty. It is to pay y<sup>e</sup> same & sum wh. P.P. is liable to pay. It. y<sup>e</sup> value of y<sup>e</sup> property.

Suppose y<sup>e</sup> promise to be in consid<sup>n</sup> of Promisee withdrawing y<sup>e</sup> Suit, wd it not be good in Eng<sup>l</sup> as Retraict - as retraits disables P.P. ever to bring another Suit. 2. Bb. 295. So y<sup>t</sup> P.P. liability is extinguished. In Court not good, y<sup>e</sup> Retraict has no such operation.

Promise to pay P.P. debt. If P.P. would release P.P. taken in treas<sup>r</sup> process is collateral. Suppose for y<sup>e</sup> debt continues, P.P. may be arrested again. See R.P. Secus I conclude if he had been taken in final process, & was released. For releasing him wd discharge y<sup>e</sup> debt.

69. Some have supposed y<sup>t</sup> where there arises a new consid<sup>n</sup>, a bond promise to answer for y<sup>e</sup> debt of another is good. & whether y<sup>e</sup> consid<sup>n</sup> moves to promise out of a distinct transaction or not.

Is an y<sup>e</sup> debt is discharged or not. 3. Burr 1887.

Amb. 830. as for bearing of a Suit. 1d Ray. 120.

R. B. G. ) but y<sup>e</sup> out Law. See y<sup>e</sup> last page and P. 58.

2. Wils 94. Rob 233.2. Bull N.P. 281.2.

2. Day 407.

7. 7. Re 201 For 873.

The stat wd be negative and y<sup>e</sup> rule under it y<sup>e</sup> same as at 10 Law. Rob 239.

For a Parol promise not to be good at all. I am not  
considering if it were new good. whenever there is  
consideration & Seal would have no effect. and the  
promise is in writing to be not within consideration.

76. A written promise to pay & debt of another, if he does  
not, is discharged by promisor, granting forbearance  
to & debtor. - There is a tacit understanding of  
& creditor is to collect of & debtor, if he can.

A judicial confession by & of accepting &  
surrender of property, will prevent & application. He  
under plea and money paid into it.

Rob 238. P. & D. P. & E. 10. P. & B. 10.

For a parol promise is not made void,  
as a promise - it must exclude Parol to  
abolish it.

When according to above rule, a promise must be  
written, to be binding, it is not necessary in pleading  
to aver it is now written. Sufficient if it appear  
in evidence. For it introduces a new rule  
of Evidence not a new rule of pleading. 1. P. & D. 10.

3 Bun 189. Rob. 202. Raym. 450. Bull. & P. 279. 3 H. B. 106.

2. Ch. P. 214. n. o.

77. This rule holds as to all contracts, contemplated  
by Rob. 2. Post 146. Cowp 280. 12. Mod 540. 4. Bac 655. "P"

Demure to & declaration confuses a promise in  
writing. 1. Post 7, 37. 2. 300. n. o. rather respects  
it cannot be written under a Demure. & a promise  
not in writing. 7. 2. 2. 1.

Secondly such a contract is treated in bar of Bull. & P. 279  
under action. Rob 202. n. 2. Hill 42. Pals. 277. Pay. 400.

Greater strictness is required in a bar & in a declaration.

But tis necessary in declaring as well as in pleas  
in bar, to show a consideration. 7. H. B. 350. Rob. 202.



A contract by Parol to pay y<sup>e</sup> debt of another, and also to some other thing, is within y<sup>e</sup> Stat. in toto. For if one entire part of a contract is void, y<sup>e</sup> whole is so. No Severance. Both parts must be declared upon.

### 3<sup>d</sup> Agreement in consideration of Marriage.

72. This clause relates not to promises to marry. - These are good by Parol. Contra 1. Lev. 65. 411. overruled.

It relates only to agreements in consid<sup>n</sup> of marriage &c. such as are made by way of marriage settlement or Family Settlement, or provision. Bull N.P. 280. 1. Inst. 179.

1. Pow 277. 8. 1d Ray. 386. 1d 32. Rob. 135. 1. P.M. 618. Pre Chy. 520.

These to be binding must be written and signed. There is no exception to y<sup>e</sup> Rule in case of Part performance. 1. Pow 297. 81. "Part" Formerly avoided an a Parol agreement of y<sup>e</sup> kind would not be good, if it was stipulated y<sup>t</sup> it sh<sup>d</sup> be reduced to a Writing. P.M. 279. 1. Eq. C. 13. 1. Ch. Ca. 135. 3 Atk 574.

But such stipulation makes no difference, sensible and don't take y<sup>e</sup> case out of y<sup>e</sup> Stat.

73. If however such stipulation is made and y<sup>e</sup> Execution of it is prevented by y<sup>e</sup> fraud of either party y<sup>e</sup> marriage takes effect. Equity will enforce y<sup>e</sup> agreement. 1. Eq. C. 13. 13. Rob. 135. 1. Pre Chy. 520. 1. P.M. 618.

But y<sup>e</sup> is done by way of relief or fraud. Conclude. executing y<sup>e</sup> agreement being y<sup>e</sup> means of relieving y<sup>e</sup> fraud.

And a Parol promise promise made on one side in consideration of marriage is a satis exp<sup>d</sup> to support a Settlement made in pursuance of it on y<sup>e</sup> other side after marriage, or to support a promise in writing after marriage. 1. Lev. 230. 2. Lev. 140. 1. Lev. 139. Rob. 137. 200.

For y<sup>e</sup> Stat<sup>ute</sup> don't make y<sup>e</sup> contract by Parol void



but merely prevents a proof of it by parol testimony  
in support of a Suit.

A Letter signed by one Party is a Writing within  
y Stat. 2 Bar Chy 32. 3 Do 318. 1. Toulb 179. 1. Res In 330.

Pre Chy 560. 3. altho ~~573~~ 573 Rob 190. 1. 105. 1. Pow 287. 8.

But it must appear yt the other Party accepted y  
terms contained in y letter, and acted in contemb<sup>d</sup>  
of y in proceeding to marry. Otherwise it aint  
binding. Thus where y Party to whom y letter was  
sent was ignorant of y terms contained in it  
at y time of y marriage, it wasnt decreed.

As where a wrote a letter to his daughter, wh was  
not shewn to his intended Wife. 3 Mod 3.

1. Toulb. 179. 2. P. N. 50. 1. Pow. 287. 290. 9. 1. Toulb 193.

Rob. 192. 3. 107. 8. C 1 Toulb. 193. There was no  
agreement. 3 Mod 3.

A Letter written to ones own Agent stating y terms 74.  
of an agreamt already made by Parol has been  
held... valid. 3 altho 573. Rob 121. This is not a  
written agreamt is a written Memorandum of it  
Post 52. 3. 33. 33. Pre Ch. 560.

It must furnish distinctly y terms of y Agreamt.  
Secus tis uncertain. Pre Chy 560. 1. Toulb 179. Pa 426.

1 altho 12. 1. Pow 290. Rob. 106. 191.

§ or  
+. Contracts for y Sale of Lands, & or any  
Interest in them. Post 59.

Lands &c. A thing annexed to Lands, if sold,  
in contemplation of severance, aint within y Statutes

As Trees growing. Crispo. 6 East 662. 2. Selb 862. 11. East 362.  
1. Bar Lil. La Ray 182. 1. Com. C. 74. to 80. Paler 214. 3. Lev. 60.  
337.

3 Day 476.

And a Parol agreamt between y agreeon owner  
and Occupier of Lands, yt each shall have a  
certain part of y Crop - is good. Semble. 1. B et P. 297.

For a crop and considered as land. By a Eng  
to Carol Leases for 3 yrs are good. Such agreements  
however appears to be good independent of it

Somewhat doubtful as under a last lease, an a Carol  
contract no binia or not. If it was part of a  
agreement, it it shd be written 1. Pow 279. 83.

Mem 157. 1. Eng 116. 13. Now settled at 100 now  
makes no difference. 1. Pow 281. 3. 1. P 112. 476.  
1. Mem. 221. 6. Rob. 147. Pr. Cl. 402. 2. Br. Chy 200.

365. 2455 6. 48 98 45.

It has been holden in Court yt Carol promise  
to pay for land bot, is good. But our Ct of Error  
have decided yt a law dont imply a promise  
to pay the value. 1804. They decided in Court  
yt a Carol agreement by Grantor at a time of Grant  
to pay for any deficiency in a supposed Covenant  
was within a Stat. 1 Root 77. 8. Contra since 1. Day 23.  
3. John. 555. 1. Chd 418. 1 Root 479.

Suppose no obligation given for purchase money, might  
not amount to be had. It would contradict no writing.  
and a subject matter of a promise is only money. But  
Carol agreements for lands are binding in some cases &  
not at no time binding.

76.

Such agreements are good if under a Stat of private  
consistency with a spirit of a act, and a mass of Evidence.  
There is an inherent probability in a contract. The difficulty  
is in proving it. The Stat merely introduces a new rule  
of Civ to prevent Fraud & Perjuries. C. B. G. 80. a Stat  
ought to be liberally expounded. 1. B. 601. 1. B. 87. 88.

Just

When there is no danger of fraud or perjury, in enforcing  
a agreement, a case is said not to be within a spirit of a  
act. As if on a bill filed for a Specific Performance  
& Def in his answer confessed a agreement, no danger

of fraud or perjury in acting on such proof.

2. Br Chy. Dec 221. 441. Pre Chy 208. 374. 3 Alts 3. 2 Do. 100. 55. 1. P. R. 600.

588.

amb 585.

Re Brounne  
Besides, says Poro, y contract is in writing & y  
am near. 1 Poro 297. But y want a sound reason -  
On y's sides if y don't insist upon y Stat, he is  
clearly bound. It.

So if he expressly submits to a decree of performance,  
Rob. 100. And if Alf alleges a written agreement  
Ct of a bond one, will be good. If Def does not  
insist on y Stat, Rob 100. There as he y first Example  
if Def (admitting y agreement) insists on y Stat he  
plea can't be sustained, enforced.

Rea Cr  
216.  
4 Bes R  
23.

That Chy would decree it, tho y Def had not insisted  
on not performing it. 2. Alts 207. Def want insist 2 Alts 155.  
on y Stat, by pleading. Yet he having confessed y  
agreement in his answer, y plea was overruled. 100. 55  
of y agreement decreed. 2. Br Chy. 508. Pre Chy 208. 374.

In 1. Hen 30. 600. rule laid down generally, if  
an agreement confessed is out of y Stat - Decided  
Contra at Law, 10. y Def having confessed y agreement  
by answer in Chy, insists on y Stat, he can't insist  
on y agreement. 1. Alts 53. 5. Bes 548. Rob 228.  
Rob. 107. So in the Rosalyn. 4 bes 23. see the Ray.  
37. Rob. 107. So by Baron Dore 2 Br Chy. 503. 4.

2. Br Chy  
558. overruled

In 2. Br Chy. 1256. 60 y plea of y Stat was allowed  
by Ed Churton. Tho y agreement wasn't denied but y  
decision was on y special circumstances of y case.  
Ibid 569. The agreement was incomplete - only general  
heads by way of instructing to Atty - particular  
terms not settled. Locus penitentiae was taken.  
See Ray 160. 10. 588. 9. 6. P. R. 40. 3. 100. 55. 8.  
Here y agreement wasn't confessed. It remains



79.

"*Amelis bairdii*" *Proc. Acad. Nat. Sci. Phila.* 1891. p. 100. *Amelis* 211  
see also *Bull.* 238. Here it is said it seems to be  
nearly settled, at the moment, agreement and  
near a final. The title is in 2<sup>nd</sup> 548. 4<sup>th</sup> n. *Proc.* 211  
210. It is insisted on that there is a remedy, in  
agreement, in rule itself, in confession with another  
tates & agreement out of the state, some arbitrary and  
Grinnell, 2. *Proc.* 54. 53.

And if <sup>the</sup> knowing & agreement to be by Parol can enforce in one case, why not in another? no little danger of beguery in one order as in another.

It is also a question unsettled, and a difficult one, on a bill for a specific performance, of a Parol agreement for a sale of land, is bound to confess or deny it in his answer? 1. Vent. 168, 70. Decided by Sir Mansfield & Threlkeld, as he is. Case cited by Sir Thurlow 2. Bos. & P. 566. Mittera 211. 2. Robt 150. p. 2. attes

80. 155. 4 bes  $\frac{1}{2}$  24.

La Thurdow is of the same opinion and it is only effect of a Stat. as to proof of agreement is to prevent a Pitt from proving it Abundant. 2 B. Chy 567. 1. 3m 16. 170. Prob. 157. 1. Lord 170.

La maculosa. Mansfield, Karswick and  
Thurlow. hold & held it as confessor lake, it out  
\* new of, Hale. \* \* \* La, Luffborough. Egre. ut Luton  
La Rossiter and Eldon of, contrary opinion. 2. H. B. 68.

Because compelling a Def to answer, a parol agreement lays him under a temptation to commit perjury. What then? Don't yr objection hold in every case equally, in wh Def in Chy is bound to answer? Perjury by Def. is not what is intended to prevent. Besides yr objection might be urged vs compelling an answer, if a agreement is written in such cases, a Def is clearly compellible to answer.



If he is bound nevertheless, it seems to follow  
 that his consent takes a significant part of the Statute  
 out of its meaning in a State which has made him.  
 Hob. 100. For if it did not "Cui bene, compelle  
 him to confess is duty. 1. Ten 11. 171.

In Eng. It has been held that a party who has  
 a Part agreement for sale of Land & who he denies it  
 to answer, shall be bound by it, if there is a previous  
 conveyance out of it. 3. M. 10. 1. M. 200. This cannot  
 be Law.

Upon the same principle viz. If there is no danger  
 of fraud or perjury, in a party a part contract  
 for purchase of Land at a tender sale before a  
 Master in Chy. under order of Ct. is binding. 81.

Br Chy 334. 1. Pow 271. 74. Rob. 110.

Now ed. you be has a Sal made, sure consider him?

So a part contract between 2. Solicitors in Chy  
 in a suit between Mr & Mrs was decreed.

3 Br Chy 331. Rob. 110. m.

again take several opinions part agreement <sup>2-27</sup>  
 respecting an interest in Land, if inseparable from  
 circumstantial facts in possession, but there is no  
 danger of perjury, is binding. As Sale of Land  
 by absolute need, but vendor at y. Ed. gives an  
 obligation to vendee, & amt of y. consid<sup>r</sup> remains  
 in possession, pay & care, don't account for  
 profits - pays no rent, and pays Interest on y  
 obligation.

From these facts tis said a Trust is implied  
 for vendee, i.e. he is considered as 100% by virtue  
 of a Part agreement implied or inferred. Pow. 47. M. 65.  
 3. M. 429. 2. M. 376. 2. M. 11. Br Chy 525.

Salk 60. 21. M. 424. 1. D. M. 381. 2. M. 549. 1. M. 108.  
 Langford vs Hartum. Sup Ct. reversed by  
 Ct of Ensl. Fed Quere. No such Provincial  
 decision.

2. Other Expenditures and General Integ. Insurance Co.

2. It are admitted on a point as yet an act made  
to prevent fraud. ought not to receive such a construction  
as would protect and encourage it. 1. B. & C. v. D. 2. 3. 4.  
1. B. & C. v. D. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

So it when a party is not performing a  
part agreement with practice a greater fraud on the other  
you will result from a mere breach of agreement itself,  
he is generally inclined to it in the Rob. K. 2. 8.

83. Therefore a bond agreement performed or partly performed  
on one side, at y request and with y consent of  
the Party, will bind y latter. As it leaves to <sup>be</sup> ~~be~~ same  
for 20 yrs. It enters under y lease and begins to  
Prob 130.2. fulfill or incurs expenses in Improvement, y contract  
138. is entered in the 10 Lesson, or less

1 Jon<sup>n</sup>. 172. 1. 36. 600. In 783. 3<sup>d</sup> alth. 189. 1 Dec. 83. 297.  
1 Mem. 189. 363. 2. Dr. 373. 1. Pow. 286. 3 Dec<sup>r</sup> 378. 7. To. 341.  
Thommas a might take advantage of his own fraud,  
for his accepting or performing bad performance (as I'm not  
intending to perform himself) is in itself a fraud.  
3. Mod. 37. Dr. 41. Vol. 1. Dr. Ch. 40. 1. D. et P. 377.

Twice, & acts done after administrative evidence  
of agreement and thus a danger of Belgium is diminished.  
1. Pow 203. There are no circumstances has any operation.  
206 13. 2. 5. 13. 2. 8.

Where such case, no agreement has been entered,  
the term, of it were not previously settled by parties.

Delivery possession of land, in remembrance of a bond  
agreement, is a satisfactory performance by the donor.

2 Vern 363. 435. Bre Chy 10. 519. 1 Vern 365. 2. Ery C. 48.  
Pow. 299. 300. Lr 783. 3 Br Chy. 7. ves Br 747.

2. Nov  
37

A. Horner to, so, purchases being let onto to person  
but builds or makes improvements. 14 Nov 303.4, 17483, 17484, 17485.

And taking possession under a deed in the name of the  
notice to a purchaser. Under a deed in the name of a  
purchaser under a deed in the name of a purchaser.

To pay mt. of money as part of a consideration of a purchase  
by Parol Agreement has been held to be such a part  
performance by vendee to take & carry out of a Stat. &  
if money may be recovered back.

1. Pow 384. 5. Rob. 133. 155. Pre Chy 580. 4. Bes 720.

3 Alkes. 2. 1. Bes. 83. 222. 1. Lenth. 175.

Contra 9. Bes. An 234. Laiden 74. 81. 2. Com. C. 82. 2. C. 45. 1. Colles  
and Laffay 240.  
The General opinion seems to be, that payment even of  
whole purchase money don't take & carry out of a Stat.

1. Maid Chy 302. 4. 3. Bes. 712. 382. 1. Ds. 221. 6. Bes. 32. 37.

But payment of earnest. Pre Chy. 580. 1. Bes. 720. 1. Bes. 720.  
1. Bes. 53. 54. 4. by all opinions not a part performance.

This is not in any sense in part performance, not  
subsequent to & in pursuit of a agreement but a mere  
solvency in making a contract a form in stipulating.

In y. s. says Pow. damages may be recovered, at  
Law for nonperformance. 1. Pow 308. Where for payment  
of Earnest does not take & carry out of a Statute.  
Pre Chy 580. Rob. 154. 5.

The Earnest money itself may doubtless be recovered back  
where an receipt of a money in part performance,  
may be proved by Parol. 1. Pow 397. 8. If not a takes  
itself, it such part takes & carry out of a Statute  
as in y. s. Rob 153. 4. An 3. Alkes 4. It was proved  
by Parol.

And a Parol agreement in Part performance by vendee, which  
be deemed as a part of vendee. 1. Pow 395. 2. Alkes 2.

Lenth 302. But to take a Parol agreement out of a  
Stat. in y. s. & act done must be such as  
would be regarded by party claiming, unless a agreement  
were enforced. Hence part performance by one of y.  
Rob. 138  
152.  
6. Bes. 32.  
45.  
7. Bes. 32.  
341.



parties, want entitled & then to a decree. Post 87.

26.

And y<sup>e</sup> act seemed to have been done in best performance  
must be taken y<sup>e</sup> agreement out of y<sup>e</sup> Stat. be such as in  
a person of y<sup>e</sup> It would not have been done but with  
a view to perform y<sup>e</sup> agreement. Leases is not now  
considered as lease performed. As Leases continued  
to take a new Lease and continued in possession.  
I continued in possession. This was not such a part  
Est<sup>d</sup> as to take y<sup>e</sup> case out of y<sup>e</sup> Stat. Leases only  
remains only as he was before. 1. Pow 309. 2. Br Chy 561.  
3. Res. 378. Roberts 139. inwards 161. 102. 3. alms 4.

Ambley. 585. Tonbl. 175. 1. Br Chy 412. 1. alms 12.

Giving poss<sup>d</sup> is sales. (ante 84) seems giving directions  
for conveyance. going to view y<sup>e</sup> Estate &c. These are merely  
introductory or ancillary to a conveyance. Ibid 3 bes.  
36. 379. 1. Madon 30. 3. 4. 1. Tonbl 175. 1. Br Chy 412.  
3. bes 379. o. 30. 41.  
34. 379. 379.

87. Marriage of itself not considered as a best performance  
a Part agreement &c. is consid<sup>d</sup> as marriage. For to  
Pre Chy 551. and a such contract. They are not to have effect  
in y<sup>e</sup> marriage taking place. So considers marriage  
as a lease performance, dispensing with written  
E<sup>t</sup> i would take every case out of y<sup>e</sup> Stat and Lease  
1. Pow. 309. 1. Br Chy 551. 1. Br Chy 551.  
1. Br Chy 551. 1. Br Chy 551. 1. Br Chy 551.  
74. Total agreement.

But tis said y<sup>t</sup> a part contract, is consid<sup>d</sup> as  
marriage, by a 3<sup>d</sup> person, as a Statute to one of y<sup>e</sup> parties.  
is taken out of y<sup>e</sup> Stat by marriage. if it takes place  
with his consent.

Seems a Fraud would be affected only Parties is  
Marriage 1. Pow 288. v. 2. born 373. 1. Pow 287. 8. 305.

So when y<sup>e</sup> wife was allowed by y<sup>e</sup> Husband to receive  
y<sup>e</sup> Interest of a certain sum during coverture, wh<sup>o</sup> he had  
before marriage agreed to sell to her to separate her



agreement was adjudged binding, to wit, on ground of part performance. 1. Pow 304. 1. Dev. 287.

Where a husband is bound by his own performance of a promise to his wife, & the wife has been in good faith and the agreement decided on special circumstances, ante 85.

To cutting down timber in pursuance of a marriage agreement was held a satisfaction part performance, to bind the other party. 1. Pow 304. 2. Egly 123.

Our Ct of Equity have holden yt. part performance in pay of money, don't take a bond agreement out of Stat. Once holden by Sup Ct yt. a complete performance on one side by payment of money did. 1. 389. and as Ct have since holden part payment. see 2. Day 225. yt. payment of part and making repairs, takes out of Statute.

Upon the same principle, to prevent fraud, even a written agreement or contract respecting an interest in land, or any other subject, may be contradicted by proving a part agreement <sup>to the contrary</sup>. There was a fine 2 Altes 203. in the Ct of Chancery, the grantee having obtained 1. Pow 294. a deed, refused to execute a Deed according to the agreement, 3 Altes. 389. Rob 130. 131. 1. P 11th 620. 1. Pont 188.

There case of a Marksman 3 Altes 389. decided as to contents of a deed, & of part agreement being a necessary means of proving a fraud.

To a bond contract of any kind may be proved when it is only incident to an action for fraud. For, action is on a contract. 2. Day 531.

And, agreement is but an instrument or means by which fraud is effected.

To a bond agreement is only showing a memorandum by which fraud is practiced and thus in effect proving



binding & conclude. 1. Root & 9.

When y performance is to take effect on a contingent event, wh may or may not happen within a year, y contract ant within 12 months.

is on <sup>the</sup> return of a Ship. Late 280. Bull N P. 280.

Gr 500. 3 Burr. 1278. La Ray. 316. 17 673. 3 Salt & J. Pea Ori 214.

3 Burr 1281. Pea 214.

So to pay in A's name.

Schin 383.

La Ray 316. Rob. 187.

31.

to a promise to leave him free a sum of money  
by mile. Bull 280. 3 Barr 1278.

And to make a contract binding there is no need  
of a contingency actually happening within a year, for  
a contract is good or not "ab initio" La Ry. 37/3 Burr 1281.

This clause then extends only to contracts ~~not~~ according to their express terms are not to be performed within a year. 3 Burr 1281. Pea Eri 214.

and even as to them to be held in Const. y<sup>t</sup> when  
provision is made upon a contingency <sup>being</sup> and arriving  
condition, to good M<sup>d</sup> be Parole, if to be performed  
within a Year from y<sup>e</sup> time when a Const<sup>o</sup> is complete

As Pinal promise to pay for boarding me, child.

2. y. ss. Golden Good. 1. Root 89. Lea Duere.

Sixth class of contract, contemplated by, Stat. seems not to require a distinct consideration, in it y<sup>e</sup> consid<sup>n</sup> need not appear in Writing - y<sup>e</sup> promise only being required to be in Writing. 6 Ed. 387

92

Rules applying to all or several of y<sup>e</sup> diff<sup>t</sup> Contracts,  
contemplated by y<sup>e</sup> Stat. The construction is y<sup>e</sup> same  
in Chy. as at Law. The remedy or relief may be diff<sup>t</sup>.  
1. B. 6. 000. 3 B. 6. 430. 1. 1. V. 11. 22. Intention of y<sup>e</sup>  
Legislature governs both. Construction is merely  
y<sup>e</sup> means of discovering y<sup>e</sup> Intent. 1. Pow 370.



# Agreement or Note or Memorandum in Writing? What?

Any writing I suppose wh is intended to furnish  
Etc, is an agreement or note or Memorandum, written  
y Stat. Therefore a letter written to one Party is a note or  
1. Rem 201. 2. D. 3221. 3. 287. 8. 1. Tenb. 179. Rob. 105. 5. 2 Br Chy 32. 3 D. 318.

93. A Letter to ones own Agent y stating y Terms of an  
Agreement made, holden Ectes. 3 M. 174. 503. 1 Rob 121.  
But it must distinctly furnish y terms of y agreement.  
Secus not binding.

But y terms may be made certain by reference to  
y written agreement, to other documents or extrinsic  
facts. As agreement to convey for y same price yt 2d  
gave. Or an agreement to convey the same quantity of land wh  
was y 1<sup>st</sup> by a certain deed. 3 Br Chy 315. Rob. 10.  
It must also appear yt y other party accepted y Terms  
and acted upon y offer. 1. Tenb. 179. 2. Row. 65. 1. Row 28.  
8. 9. Med. 3. Secus here is no agreement.

When y writing refers to something extrinsic wh is to  
make it certain, if y thing is not made into certain  
by y thing referred to itself, no hard Etc is admissible  
to make it more so. Rob 108. n. 1. 1. 326.

As referred to a deed wh don't ascertain y subject  
or thing, agreement too uncertain. An advertisement  
printed. Post 98. by one of y parties and containing y  
terms is a sufficient note. 1. 30. E. 578. 3 Burr 121.

- 94 And y consid<sup>n</sup> as well as y promise must appear  
in writing. "ante 60" This agreement is required to  
be in writing. 5 East 10. Rob 116. 207. & 6 East  
307. Secus as to Contracts for y Sale of goods of  
value (under y Eng Stat) note or memorandum



of a bargain only is mentioned. 6 East 307. 3. Rob. 17.  
Agreement is not mentioned - Bargain construed  
as a promise. (Temble)

The instrument intended as a deed and having to operate  
as such, from a suspicion of some irregularity or by a change  
in the relative situation of the parties, may be considered in  
equity as an agreement, as well as an agreement.

As to the one intended to be a conveyance, see  
2. 3. 11<sup>m</sup> 42. Rob. 168. or 23.

Being a "debtum in presenti" is a bond avoided  
by a marriage, etc. of an instrument, in form of a deed,  
but not intended as such, is not void by law.

An Agreement imports a privity of assent of both  
parties. Hence a mere writing in a Steward's book,  
is no evidence of an agreement between Land Lord and  
Tenant. 1. Atk. 497. Rob. 169.

50.

### Signing. What?

Not only a subscription in usual form but a name  
of a party to be bound written by himself or an  
authorized Agent, in any part of a Instrument, if  
intended to give authenticity to it, is a satis signum.

As A & B agree with C & D. to sell him 50 Acres of

not subscribed - his date. "Devises 17" Per 300. 1. Wils. 118.

2. Atk. 31. 32. 1. Wils. 6. 3. Atk. 578. 1. Pow. 283. 4. 1. Combl. 167.

3. Lev. 1. 80. 9. Rep. 249. 2. QB. 238. 1. Ch. 56. 195.

It seems when a name written in a body of a Instrument  
is not intended to give authenticity to it. As A having  
agreed to lease to B by Parol, wrote instructions for  
drawing a lease in these words. A lease to be ~~renewed~~  
renewed. A to pay taxes. This is no signing  
by A. His name was inserted merely to explain a  
supplication - that to authenticate a Agreement.

1. 3. 11<sup>m</sup> 771. 1. Combl. 165. 7. 1. Pow. 285. Rob. 121.

It was not in form an instrument, thus not intended  
as such.

It was formerly supposed, (it seems) yet one party  
making alterations with his own hand in y<sup>e</sup> draught  
of y<sup>e</sup> Agreement was a late signing. I. ven 221. v. 1. month  
1664. But y<sup>e</sup> opinion is reversed. I. P. 11. 770.

10. 1. Jan 6. 166. 1. Peru 284.

1. Min. 218.  
1. Ver. 6.

But on signature as a subscribing witness, he knowing, & content, is a satis signing. to bind him to any stipulation, recited in the writing on his part. As when managers articles, reciting yt a mother of one of a barter, had agreed to advance 1000 £. as a portion. and subscribed by her as a witness, she was holden bound, tho. in not in form a witness.

The subscribing witness in such case, may be considered as having adopted in agreement with his Rob 123.4. or at any rate it may be considered as a Note or Memorandum.

Who must sign?

Later if y party wish<sup>y</sup> make a signed, if there is  
any appearance of y shes. do A draw in agreement  
and receive, B do sign it. tho he usually does not.  
B is bound. 1. Madia Cg 334. S. Newland C. 171. 155. 1. Ely C 20.  
2. Bern. 373. 1. Pow. 286. 1. Bro Chy 564 & Bes 52 337.

Rob. 115. n. 124.

Nov. 10. M. 124.  
In a last case he said yet I also a bound, for  
procuring B to sign, made B's subscription a signing  
authentic by A. and a signing by a procurent of  
one party is equivalent to a signing by his agent.  
1. Pow 28. 1. Eq. C. 21. 10. 2. Ch. 1. 04.  
There. Was it not a signing in A's name, and  
does not import to be a signing for him.

at any rate, if a party not signing brings a





terms of an agreement already made. This, in a memorandum in writing of y Agent.

19 M<sup>m</sup> 77d.  
Rob. 121.

The bare writing an agreement with y party's own hand, does not dispense with y necessity of signing.

(3 Br Chy 318. Rob. 121. 3 Atk. 518. these belong above) \*

100.

Of the Consider<sup>n</sup> necessary to support a Contract.  
A contract is an agreement upon sufficient consideration to do or not to do a particular thing. 2 BB 442.  
According to y<sup>s</sup> consid<sup>n</sup> is of y essence of y contract

Consider<sup>n</sup> is y material cause of a contract<sup>ual</sup>, y<sup>t</sup> in Consider<sup>n</sup> is on account of wh. each party is induced to give his assent 1 Pow 330. 2. BB 443.4.

There are 2 kinds. Good and valuable. "Seed 10"

1. a good consideration is y<sup>t</sup> of kindred or natural affection between near relations. 2. BB 237. 444.  
3 Co 83. 1 Pow 361. 1 Bern 427. 1. Toul. 337.

Such a consid<sup>n</sup> in contract executed, is valid as between y parties. As grant by deed from father to son.  
in consid<sup>n</sup> of natural affection.

But as vs Creditor and Purchaser generally deemed Fraudulent, and set aside 2. BB 327. 297.

101.

An executory contract on such consid<sup>n</sup> may be enforced in Chy. in many cases. 1. Pow 361. 5. 1 Bern 427.  
2 H P 176. 2. Id. 176.

2. Valuable - this consists in something of a pecuniary value, as money, goods, labour, marriage, lands.

2. BB. 237. 3 Co 83.

Indemnity to promisor for becoming surety &c.  
1 Burn 482, 482.

Contracts on valuable consid<sup>n</sup> may be made in either of 4 ways. 1. Pow 335. 5. 2. BB. 444. 5.



I By stipulating (Mun. "do ut des" as in Latin,  
or Bond in promise. Sale on contract - implied  
or implied to pay, &c.

2. Facis ut Facias. as where labour or service is to be  
performed on both sides. as forbearance on one side and  
some act on the other. or mutual forbearance.

3. Facis ut Des<sup>t</sup> as an act to be performed for  
reward.

2. <sup>1<sup>st</sup></sup> Do ut Facias. a counterpart of 1<sup>st</sup> last, or 1<sup>st</sup>  
last inverted, as giving or agreeing to give something  
for an act to be done. 2. Bb. 444. d. 1. Pars 235. 6.

Contracts under present view are divided into  
2. kinds. 1. Special. 2. Simple. 1. Bb. 351. n.

A Special contract is one which is entered into  
and evidenced by Specialty, i.e. by deed or writing  
sealed. 2. Bb. 465. 295. Co Litt 171.

A Simple contract is one by word or one reduced  
to writing but not sealed.

i.e. contract in writing, but not sealed, and a Special  
Contract are upon a same footing in point of formality.  
Hob. J. C. 9. 1. Bb. 351. n. 2. Bb. 465. d.

On Simple, indeed in writing not sealed,  
is a mere Eve of a word contract.

On Point written instruments, containing a promise or  
contract, an sealed or not are generally treated  
as Specialties. And a long law relating to Specialties, applies  
generally, to said, here a written contract - not sealed  
as well as those sealed - if they contain an Express  
promise or covenant. 1. Rev. 373. ante 60. L. C.

(inf<sup>d</sup> Co 1812) See there as to the intent of the  
parties.

See clear of an executory agreement by Parol and

tending to the consideration.

1. P. 335. n. 2. Hb. 445. 3. Burr 129. 4. P. 302. 5. By 30. 6. 336. 7. See Hb. 443. 8. 1. 326. 328. 333.

This is a "modern doctrine and is made part of our nature action" As a promise to give me 100 Doll or to deliver certain reward.

But if owner of goods delivers them to another or takes promise to carry or bestow labor upon them delivery is a satis consid<sup>r</sup> & promise is binding. "Baill 82. 81."

But by Helmet C. a contract in writing is good, without consid<sup>r</sup> at C. Law. 3. Burr 1070. 2. Hb. 446. This proposition is too broad. 1. P. 333. 42. 2. Hb. 242. as to a case put by Hb. of a promissory note. 2. Hb. 446" it is to be observed yt as between original parties, an actual consid<sup>r</sup> is necessary and must be proved. 1. P. 341. Ch. Bills 51. 2. D. 1. 7. 3. 351. n. Doug 514. 7. Hb. 121. Hb. 155. 3. Hb. 421. 757. 1. 1. 335. 4. Mod 242. See 674. Bull 254. Rob. f. c. 39. 100. And after a negotiable note is negotiated, promissor cannot in Gen aver want of consid<sup>r</sup> because a 3<sup>d</sup> person becomes a holder and a Law Merchant governs. 1. P. 341. 2. Hb. 7. 1. 1. 335.

104

There is a fraud on 3<sup>d</sup> persons.

But at C. Law merely reducing a contract to writing will supersede a necessity of consid<sup>r</sup> and as I conceive, yt in strictness and in the judgment of Law, a consid<sup>r</sup> is necessary to validity of a sealed Instrument. Specially. And 1<sup>st</sup> P. 1<sup>st</sup> P. need not prove a consid<sup>r</sup> and 2<sup>d</sup> P. cannot at Law. aver want of it. For 1<sup>st</sup> from solemnity of a Instrument, a consid<sup>r</sup> is presumed. Every man is estopped to deny his own deed. 1. P. 333. P. 308. 3. Burr 163. 1. 1. 334. 2. Hb. 446. 209. and therefore P. 1<sup>st</sup> isn't bound to prove one — 2<sup>d</sup>

2d. & consider being insolvent or presumed

if not negat. within it, it might be considered in such  
it cannot be. 1. Do 342. 2. Do 265. Do 382. 1. Do 334.

"Dad 2." \* It is supposed to say it.

ad Ray 722.

Consideration of contract appears in fact & effect  
to be same. Do 342. Do 382. Do 334. 1. Do 334. 1. Do 334. 1. Do 334.

3d. Result of on same, a contract being necessary  
to validity of a specialty when contract is specialty.  
but it is binding unless a want of consideration  
in instrument. On in some other instrument a course  
of solemnity. It is possible of a contract. see 1. Do 334.

Do. G. Do. consider now taken necessary on all hand  
in Court. in Petition in Duem. It is 1. Do 334. 1. Do 334.  
action on note & a Contract Specialty. bond given  
at same time requiring consideration. Action brought to  
be because there was later consideration. 1. Do 334.

That in voluntary contract, unless full nominal  
damages are received at law. This is a contract  
specialty. But it is a want of consideration to appear  
in instrument. What is a measure? (see in Petition  
as to relief on voluntary bond in Court) 3. Do 334. 1. Do 334.  
54. 2. Do 334. Do 334. 3. Do 334. 1. Do 334.

Do. G. Probably it is not of inquiry a want of consideration  
may be shown. to mitigate damages. not to affect  
right of action. If a part of consideration is not  
shown. how can it be proved? If it does appear  
and a contract, valid or void in fact. 1. Do 334.  
\* It cannot be proved in fact. 1. Do 334.

The rule of a contract is necessary to keep contract  
applies broadly in its full extent to specialty contract  
only. A contract whether by specialty or by subject  
of some other contract, as between parties - as a gift.  
1. Do 334. Do 334. Do 334. Do 334. Do 334.







from y same Gran Se. 5 MB. 3, 3.

second. from something disadvantageous to him in where  
favour &c. as having a bond vs B. returns it up  
to be cancelled &c. in C's promising to pay & content

Pro A 342. Pro Clv 74.5. 745. 849. 881. Cowh 128. 1. Cow 344.8.

As a consequence of a General Rule, as to y<sup>e</sup> 2<sup>d</sup> mode,  
in wh<sup>ch</sup> a conscience may arise, tis also a general rule  
yt a contract w<sup>th</sup> supported by a consideration altogether  
past and accepted. We consider of one's having  
bail'd my Servant, or discharged me of a trespass  
or built me a house, Grates, & so on in a way.

This ant. binding. There is no subsisting consid<sup>r</sup>  
disadvantageous according to either in consequence  
of Promise. For a promise ant. in procuring cause  
of consid<sup>r</sup>. Plow 5. 302. Pow 345. Cro Chr 885. 442.

1. Roll 11. Esp D. 87. 95.

whose

But ~~the~~ a part of y consid<sup>n</sup> be past and executed 149.  
yet if a part is subsisting, y contract may be good.  
do Lessor in consid<sup>n</sup> yt Lessee had occupied and  
paid a rent, promise<sup>d</sup> to save y latter harmless in  
future. This is good. For y occupation and rent paid  
were past, yet y Lessee was to continue in possession  
and pay future rent. \* 18. promise to Guarantee  
his title in future. 2. Rule 73. Pro Chri 9a. Pro Ch 409. 3 Part 9b.

The general rule in page 161, is too narrow unless, 1894 v.  
and y rule of a last consid<sup>d</sup>, will not support a  
contract, is now somewhat relaxed. For 933. 3 Burr 1<sup>st</sup> 101

Thus a contract on consideration part and executed, is good.

if there was a bourgeois legal duty in Germany.

As if one in consid<sup>n</sup> of previous indebtedness, who  
bared by the Law promises to pay - the good.

To return me in evidence of Ally having buried his

1 Pow 350.1.  
1 Leon 198.  
Kay 260.  
Cro Elvi  
132.  
3 Burr  
167.2.

child. \* <sup>to</sup> B. n 43. Cuius to make a duty of parents to  
bury their children.

So where there was a moral obligation on Promisor,  
This is a valid consid<sup>r</sup>. Promise by owners to pay  
May 252. for medicine before furnished to a pauper.  
Bull. 251. Pea Eci 213. ante 47. ) 1 Com. 336. J. No. 259.  
2 B.C. 445. 1. Pow 351. cow 296. 4. Esp 85. Bull 147.

So a consid<sup>r</sup> past will support a contract if  
East 506. y consid<sup>r</sup> accrue at y request of y Promisor. for y  
contract tho' subsequent couples itself with y previous  
request. by relation and ergo operates as if made  
at y time of y request. As promisee to pay in  
consider<sup>r</sup> y P.P. at my request has bailed my  
Servant. 2. vent 208. 3 Lark 96. Rib. 105. Cro Ch. 409.  
Cro B. 18. Cro Elr 42. 252. Cro B. 15. 1. Pow. C. 35 352.

It has been holden, y a mere stranger to a mentioned  
act, done by another cannot support an action in  
his own name on a contract founded upon it, for  
he does nothing advantageous to himself. He is a  
stranger to y consid<sup>r</sup>. As a in consid<sup>r</sup> y B.  
will account him of a Trepass. promise B to pay  
\* 5 100 £ B. to said, cannot sue upon y promise.  
8 JR 330. Cro B. 687. 1. Pow B. 343. 1. vent. 6 Chitty B 220.  
2. Roll 441.

\* This rule seems now to be confined to deed.  
"in partes" J. B. et F. 148. n. 3 In. 139. Carth 77.  
Cro Ci. 729. Gelr. 23. 1. Lev. 235. 3 Lev 139.  
But in y case of Parol agreements, it seems settled  
by y <sup>later</sup> authority. y 3<sup>d</sup> persons may maintain y  
action. J. B. et P. 148. n. 3 In 139. 1. Do. 101. 2.  
1. John. 145. 2. ) For 290. Cum. b. 249. 3. Mod 17.  
he is to be considered as adopting and ratifying

contract by his subsequent assent.

- III. In such cases a promise shd be laid as having been made to a P<sup>ty</sup> and proof of a promise to another for his benefit will support a declaration —  
Lewble. 1 B. et P. 101.

It has always been agreed, & it is consid<sup>r</sup> moving from one rule support a promise in favour of another who is nearly related to him. A promise to A in equiv<sup>l</sup> to he would perform a contract, to pay his daughter. 1 Bent 318. 32. 2. Lev. 210. Raym<sup>d</sup> 302.

1. Pom. 353.

But it appears from the foregoing Rules, & no such relation is now necessary, and if a promise is good in favour of a stranger.

When performance of a suit is a cove<sup>d</sup>, there are 2. R. in law.

First. It must be either general, i.e. repetition, or for a certain precise period.

2<sup>d</sup>. It must be an act in which a promisee is person bound to be liable is chargeable, & at least, in the case of a cove<sup>d</sup> liability on his part. 1. Pom 354. 3. 2. C. 200. Ep<sup>d</sup> 4. 55. 1. Ep<sup>d</sup> promise to pay a debt in cove<sup>d</sup> to P<sup>ty</sup> wd abstain from suing, & no time being limited and a forbearance not supposed to be perpetual is not good. 1. Pom 353. 4. Ep<sup>d</sup> Cl<sup>r</sup> 16. 45. promisee might die & next day. But a promise to forbear a year or a reasonable time is a good cove<sup>d</sup>. It are to Judge what is a reasonable time. Phil<sup>l</sup> 106. 107. Hutton 108. 109. Ep<sup>d</sup> D. 35.

Sec<sup>o</sup>da. Promise by another to pay a debt due from her son, if P<sup>ty</sup> wd forbear to sue her, not obligatory. There is no cove<sup>d</sup>. The son was not liable. There is no favour to her. The no disadvantage to promisee. 1. Pom 354. 5. Hutton 108. 3 Talk 76. and there is no moral obligation on her to pay —



So if one is misled in such a way and cannot in  
 conscience or law, promise to pay, a suit cannot  
 there is no consideration. 1. Pow. 358. p. 100 & 104  
 358. p. 104  
 Kara 73. The promise is only from false representation.

So a promise to a large B<sup>l</sup> debt if a creditor  
 will accept, it is his duty master I will forebear to sue  
 it for it. for 6 mths. is not good even at C<sup>l</sup> Law.  
 for he might sue B<sup>l</sup> immediately. Ego no obligation  
 to Greater. 1. Pow. 356. Kara 73.

But a promise in consid<sup>n</sup> of forbearing a suit  
 is good, if there is a colourable ground for a suit.  
 As Infant having <sup>not</sup> with and beaver, etc. - This is good  
 in consid<sup>n</sup> of forbearance, promised to pay. - This  
 is good at C<sup>l</sup> Law. for here was a colour, or a suit.  
 The being lost 1. Pow. 356. Lach 142. & 272.

Where a promise is in consid<sup>n</sup> of forbearance of a suit  
 originally accruing to a promisor, himself, a moral  
 cause of action will be enforced, etc. if it is acknowledged  
 by a promise. 1. Pow. 357. But cannot hold I trust, if  
 it had appeared in a declar<sup>n</sup> of a suit for one was  
 promised. Pow. 356. \* The rule I think, must be  
 confined to cases, in which for ought there appears  
 on a terms of a contract, there may have been a good  
 cause of action.

Id. Ray The mere act of entrusting property with another, in  
 910. 13. 20. in undertaking to do something respecting it, is a  
 57. 687. valid consid<sup>n</sup>. As delivery of money to be delivered over  
 143. to another without reward. 'Bulmer 15'  
 1. Pow. 364.  
 Lach. 26. 3 Do 11. Com. R. 133.

The preservation of a honour and peace of a family have  
 been held to be a valid consid<sup>n</sup>. As agreement between father  
 son and natural child to prevent disputes. 1. Pow. 302. 1. 143.

So a compromise of a doubtful right has been held



Sufficient in Ex. 1. Pow 383. 1. aff 16. Rem. 4. 2. Vent 353.  
2. Dec. 284. "ante 17"

not necessary in contracts, & is consid<sup>d</sup> that he  
is bound in direct term, as a consid<sup>d</sup>. Later if one  
can be collected out of y<sup>e</sup> whole agreement. 1. Pow 383.  
1. Dec 450. In agreement for setting boundaries.

But if an Express consid<sup>d</sup> appears on y<sup>e</sup> face of y<sup>e</sup> contract,  
y<sup>e</sup> latter opinion is, y<sup>t</sup> no other can be imputed.

"Deed 21" 7. Co 40. 1. Pow 388.

Contracts when distinguished with respect to y<sup>e</sup> form  
of then consid<sup>d</sup> may be divided into 3. kinds. Doug. 600.

First when y<sup>t</sup> wh<sup>ch</sup> is stipulated on one side, is in  
consideration of performance of what is stipulated on y<sup>e</sup>  
other. These y<sup>e</sup> consid<sup>d</sup> are termed Mutual.

When A agrees to pay B. for doing a certain act.  
Here y<sup>e</sup> doing of y<sup>e</sup> act by B. is a condition precedent  
to his right to y<sup>e</sup> payment. 3 Taite 95 7. Co 10. 12 Mod 460.

1. Toulb. 380. 1. Polb. 106. 1. N P 240 m. 1. Hen Bl 274. &

If he sues for y<sup>e</sup> price he must aver performance,  
7 T R 130. or what is equivalent to it, a tender or  
y<sup>t</sup> he has been prevented by Def. "Reed 20" Tender  
1. Polb. 638. 640. Doug. 259. 1. d Ray. 686.

Or as y<sup>e</sup> case may be y<sup>t</sup> he was at y<sup>e</sup> place ready  
to perform and y<sup>t</sup> Def was absent, and y<sup>t</sup> he was  
thus prevented from performing. "Post 137"

114.

concurrent.

2.<sup>d</sup> When performance on both sides is to be concurrent.  
Here neither can compel y<sup>e</sup> other to perform till he  
has, till he has performed his part, or done what  
is deemed equivalent, as offered, or is at y<sup>e</sup> place appointed  
ready, y<sup>e</sup> other party being absent.

When promise to deliver B. a load of wheat, on such  
day for such a price

2. N P 240. C. 7. 1. Saund 320. C. 1. East 203.  
610. 20.

6. 7 R. 366. 7. D. 125. 4. D. 751. 1. R. B. 303.

If a place is appointed for performance, the sales  
of both now here and Def absent. No tender is  
necessary, to entitle Plt to recover.

Doug. 688. Salk 113. 1. 7 R. 125. L. 548.

If Def was to perform on request, the sales, etc.  
Plt now ready and requested and Def refused.

1. East 203.

115.

If then a covenant is so one shall do an act, for  
doing wh. y other shall pay, y doing is precedent.

But if according to terms of contract, y money  
is to be paid on a day, wh. is to arrive, or  
before y act can be performed, y doing of y act  
is not a condition precedent. As promise to pay  
such a sum for (yrs labour or for building) a sh's-  
y money to be paid in 10. days. (here indeed  
y paymt may be a condition precedent.

1. Loun. 320. a. 1. Loun. 381. 8. Mod 42. 1. Pow. 358.

2. R. B. 387. 7. R. 130. 6. D. 752. 752.

So it is in y last case, 12. when a day is fixed  
for paymt., no time is fixed for paymt. on y  
other side. 1. Louna 320. a. 2. R. 233. In both  
cases if y amt. not paid at y time appointed  
for paymt. y party promising is liable on the  
other has performed or not.

But if y day appointed for paymt. is to arrive  
after y time fixed for doing y act. Performance  
of y act is a condition precedent, and must be averred  
in an action for y money.

### Mutual Promises Independent.

But when y promises are mutual and independent,  
12. when y promise on each side is y condition.

110.

If y promise on y other, performance ant. a condition

precedent on either side. Either may sue without  
 awaiting performance. Doug 665. 1. Bos 369. 50. 1. Bent 177. 214  
 1 Rob. 88. 1 Ler 293. 1 Falk. 24. 5 Mod 84 11.

Seems in Equity here Pltff must await performance,  
 or readiness to perform & the contract are mutual  
 Seems Equity won't interpose. 1. Foul 383. 2 Freeman 30.  
 2 B & P 84.

Its interposition being discretionary, he who seeks Equity  
 must do Equity. The Ct will interpose in a cond<sup>n</sup>  
 Dependent. Promises.

If a grant is in performance. I promise to pay 100 Dols.  
 you transferring stock to me. & converso. & promises  
 are not mutual and neither of you can compel  
 performance, till he has performed. 2 B & P 1312.  
 12 Mod 573 Falk 112. Holt 663. 1. Foul 382. 4 T R 701. 8 Do 372.5

Where a contract goes to only part & is conditional  
 on both sides. If a breach of it may be sued for in damages,  
 tho' independent. 1. Lann 320. Sure will be, in Pltff  
 has performed in part.

### Independent

The question on promises are mutual or Independent  
 is to be ascertained by a meaning and understanding of a  
 parties. to be collected from a spirit of a grant, and a  
 nature of a contract i.e. from a order from which  
 intent requires performance. 1. T R 645. 7. Do 130. 6 Do 570. 668.  
 2. N R 240. a. Doug 665. 1 Pound 320. a. n. 8 Do 573.

Where a promises are mutual i.e. tho' no bar to a action  
 tho' pltff hasn't performed, his part. Doug 665.  
 2. B & P 1312. 1. Foul 382. 3 Ler. 41. 1. B. 10. Coups 575.  
 Each may have a cause of action vs y other at y  
 same times

The Eng Cts have banished of late & considering  
 been diminished.



of promises Ind. pendente 8 AL 37. 4 Do 761. Will, 400.  
1. Cast 618.

118

Mutual promises must both be binding or neither will be so. I.e., contracts must be of such a nature and in such terms as will bind both sides.

\* Note are not a form of Mutual promises for wrong? for a voidable undertaking or agreement by an infant while this a void one. will not bind.

# and both must be made at same time - see cases, are "Simultaneous" 1. Do 300. Cast 24. 100. 88.

And one of such a nature as may bind both. is not illegal or void. on other side, supported by a promise made to him by a deed will not.

119

47. 8 Law. fraud in a consideration of a contract, for especially does not in General release it, as in quantity or value of a consid<sup>d</sup> - as bona for a piece of an unground horse, the fraud in execution does.

Advent wanted in a second case, not in a first.

2 BR 304.

11 Co 27. 2. Lr 422. 2 Do 3.2.

3. 9. and yet to said, it frame avoids every kind of act. 1. Do 300. 4 Lr 233. 5 Lr 200. 11 Co 290. 3. Co 77. How is this to be understood?

As deed falsely read. Wrong instrument substituted by artifice. Case of *Metheun* b. 88. *Ibid*.

120

But Chy will relieve in contract of every kind for fraud in a consid<sup>d</sup> 2 Do 140. 2 Do 112 303. 3 Lr 200.

At Law a party defrauded must resort to his Special action for a fraud. And such actions to have been a General rule in relation to <sup>Part</sup> contracts executed, where deed is in sales of goods under false representation, of counting,

Pea. Lr  
233.  
4 Co 2  
98

But so rule is in a last case much relaxed by late decisions - see briefs in a case "P." 1. Lr 140.

38: 14. 8. 107 John 453. Does it not hold at all



in y case of simple Contract.

C. 9 D. In one case however, y Ct of B. E. seems to have considered fraud in y consid<sup>r</sup> of a contract, a good defence. The circumstances of y case were peculiar. Perhaps other points influenced y decision. 3 T. R. 488.

But our Cts have holden, y a total fraud in y consid<sup>r</sup> of a note or bond, i. e. when y promisor has received, is to receive nothing, is a good defence at Law. 1. Post 58. 355. w Georgia Land frauds. Therefore in such cases, relief cannot be had in Equity, if y Defendant is in suit at Law.

Secus when y fraud is partial - here y relief is in Equity. for Cts of Law must give Judgment for y whole amt or for Def. they cannot apportion. 121.

But keep our rule. tho y fraud is total, yet if y obligation ant in suit, y or if all y obligations ant in suit, relief may be had in Equity. even if promisee not remain in jeopardy till promisee not bring a suit at Law.

### Interpretation of Contracts.

122.

y Object of construing contracts is to ascertain y intent of y parties. 1. Post 370.

And y contract however expressed cannot be carried beyond y Intention. 1. Post 370. 1.

Thus if A. ut mi he pays 10 Doll per annum, B may distress for it on B's manor - a writ of annuity would lie for it. because there is no grant of an annuity or rent. 1. Post 371. Co Litt 140. 7.

But tis a good rent charge for wh B may distress for, manor is charged w. th y distress.

Contracts are to be carried th y full evident intention.

if y word can be so construed - as to affect it.  
 As Host. contract to raise money out of y profits of  
 an Estate, comes in Equity a right to sell if y  
 sum cannot otherwise be raised within y term.  
 1. Pow 372.

123. Words are to be understood kalam their ordinary and  
 most known signification, in these are decisive reasons to  
 y contrary. (Municipal Law) Popham 55. Cro. Ch. 385.  
 2 N.B. 213. 1. Pow 373. to 76. Plo 109.

Thus if A agrees for 20. bar. of ale. he ant to hold  
 y barrels after y ale is out. 1. Pow 374. Plo 85.

Seems of ~~this~~ an agreement for a hhd of wine, vendee  
 has y hhd. (Plea) Such y understanding of y parties in  
 such cases. arch y usage.

So a Lease for 12. mths is for 48. weeks.  
 only. 12. 12 Lunar mths. but a lease for a twelve mth  
 is for an entire year. So understood by y Parties.

2 Bx of Ex. 85. 1. Pow 375. 2. H.C. 141. § 61.

124. Words expressive of quantity are construed at y place  
 as they are then understood. - where spoken or used -  
 as Pounds. bushels. 1. Pow 376. Shak Epit. 172. Quere?  
 If to be delivered at another place?

But if money is made payable by contract, at a place  
 named its denominations are to be understood kalam their  
 import, where it is made payable. As contract in  
 London to pay 100. lds in Dublin. The sum to be  
 paid is 100 hundred. Irish Currency. 2 P.M. 88. 690. 1 Bro 307.

If a Language is ambiguous, y intent may be inferred  
 from y subject. - y fact. & y circumstances.

1. Pow 376. 7.

the  
 Subject. First. From y subject. As Covenant for quiet enjoyment  
 extends not to Tortious Entries. For y intention as inoperable

non & subject is merely warrant to high title.

Co. Cliz 212. 13. Co. S. 425. Is 400. 4 M. 619. 3 do. 584.  
Co. S. 273. 301. 4 Co. 80. 8 do. 21 B.

Grant of Common out of all my manors. Grantee has 120  
Common only in commonable parts. or places, not in  
Grantor's garden. 1. Pow 377.

To grant of all trees growing on my farm.  
don't include Fruit trees growing in my garden.  
or orchard. if there are other trees growing on the Land  
1. Pow 378.

To from necessity, ut res magis valeat 30. an <sup>from</sup> Necessity  
instrument may be construed and take effect, as if it  
were in form and structure, an Instrument of a different  
nature, or Species. A Tenant in grant by Tenant  
to his companion operates as a release. A Covenant  
never to sue a debtor, as an acquaintance.

3 Calm 298. 1 M. 446. 2 Lawd 26. Co. Cliz 352. Tak 374. Ray 187.

Second Form & effects. Thus if construing a contract  
kata to ordinary meaning of a word, will render  
it ineffectual or frivolous, a diffnt sense may be put  
upon ym. de Res 1000. I wh I never promise to say.

Co. Cliz 205. Bent 202. 3 Leon 211. 1. Pow 382. 2 386. 55. Roy 14. Pow  
383.

As where words of condition are used in Limit of  
Estates. see Cited. 2 Bl 155.

To if an annuity is granted for instructing and 120.  
son. or other service to be done, & grant is conditional.  
tho' not so expressed, for Secus. Grantor will be  
with remedy. 1. Pow 383. Roy. 14.

From. Circumstances 3d The circumstances attending & 8  
transaction may be considered to explain a contract.  
wh might then be doubtful or be construed as  
Intention of parties. 1. Pow 385.

Then if a grant an annuity to B. "pro circulis impendendis"



it shall be intended to mean B's professional council,  
Council in Law, if a Lawyer. In ? Kine, if a doctor.

1. Pow 385.

If one having goods in his own right and as B's  
grants all his goods, a grant is construed to include  
his own only. 3 Mod 285. 278. 1. Pow 388. Co Chr 705.

Edw L. 535. 37.

127.

So when there is a recital of a particular claim in a  
release followed by General words of release, & later  
are qualified, are restrained by, former. 4<sup>th</sup> Dec. 289.  
1<sup>st</sup> Ed. 74. 3 Mod 277. Edw Ray 683. Co B. 170. Op 243.  
Edw Ray 235 1. Lev 29.

As it had a judgment in a bond vs B. for 1000 L.  
B gave a. a legacy of 5 pounds and died.

It on receiving 5 pounds, executed to B's Ex<sup>r</sup>  
a release acknowledging & receipt of the Legacy, and  
concluding with y General words, & release We demand  
or as Ex<sup>r</sup> The debt ant is changed. 1. Pow 321.

2. 1 Ely Co. n. 170. 4 Bar 290. 3 Mod 277. 2 Lev 268.  
Carth 119.

Robert 74. Edw Ray 683.

Secus (Sombie) when y receipt of a particular Loan,  
is acknowledged. If no particular claim recited.

As # 5. in full. 1 Show. 155. Carth 119.

128.

But if after y application of these rules, y intention  
remains dubious, y contract is generally to be construed  
as y party bound. w Grantor. Covenantor. The words  
are his. he had have explained himself.

Exception when there is an ambiguity in y constr<sup>ct</sup> of  
a penal bond, constrution is in favour of other.  
As y condition is intended for his benefit, & to discharge  
him from a penalty, he ant favoured.

Hence if one is bound in a penal bond conditioned  
to pay money at such a feast and there are 2 feasts



in y year of y name. y money is payable at y Last  
not at y first. i. Por 397. & 401. a. Secus of a Covenant  
I conclude.

So it is holden, if one is bound in a heral bond  
to make a sates and Lawful Estate in Land by  
advise of a b. and he makes an estate kata. #B's  
advise. Can sates and Lawful or not, y Penalty is  
saved. 1. Por 398. 5 Co 23. C. Pea 175. Where not not  
Equity decree a sates apurance. 1. Por 450. 1. C. 129.  
a. 18. 8.

Exception also, when y abbauction of y Gen. (last page)  
will occasion an injury to a 3. person. Thus if  
Tenant in Tail makes a loan for life, not expressing  
for whose life, y life of y Lessor shall be intended -  
Secus y Bone or Reversioner might be injured.  
1. Por 400. Co Litt 42.

Tho if made by Tenant in Fee, y lease wd be for  
lessor's life. 1. Por 400. Co Litt 42.

Subjects to these rules y words are to be construed  
in y most comprehensive sense, in wh they are  
generally understood. As Covenant of Warranty to  
claims of all men" is a Warranty to y claims of all  
persons. 1. Por 400.

And an indefinite expression is construed as an  
universal one in relation to y subjects to wh it  
extends, in there is some manifest reason for restricting  
it. 1. Por 401.

As Two St Tenants make a title of Sale of all  
their goods, as well their Several goods as those holden  
jointly.

So if one reciting yt he owns "diverse" houses or horses  
makes a title of Sale of ym all, his horses inap.  
1 Por 450. 1. D 57

When legal language is used, it is regularly to be understood according to its legal acceptation 1 Pow 402. A limitation to one's heir, as long as he pays such an annual value or sum, extends to all his heirs successively.

Quere aut y word "heir" in y case manifestly used as a Term of description - "Real Estate"

So an covenant to <sup>satisfy</sup> after request and due proof, all embroilements by Covenants, apprentices Inducial proof is intended 10. proof made in an action re apprentices 1. Pow 405. 2 Rob. 217.

131. Contracts are to be construed according to y General intent appearing in the whole context, tho' opposed to particular words or clauses\* in y Instrument or agreement  
1. Pow 403. See \* "Devises" A Covenant by Lessor y he has made no further grant by wh y lease may be defeated but y Lessee may enjoy w<sup>th</sup> himisance to him, or any other person. Disturbance by any other person y n Lessor's Prantee is no breach. "Count Broken" 42"

If y thing stipulated for, is not delivered or done in y contract requires, its value at y time fixed for performance is y rule of damages. 1 Pow 408. 2. 1 Bern 217.  
1 City C. 221. 2. Burr 1010.

But when y thing has afterwards risen in value, then y value at y time of Trial is y rule. Thus y party claiming wd suffer by y other's neglect.  
2 East 211. 2 Bern 394. 1. Pow. 403.

But if afterwards falling in y value, would diminish y damages, and any fluctuation in y value before y time appointed, but wh is then lost makes no difference. *Idid*

If several deeds or instruments are made at the same time between the same parties, respecting the same subject, they are also considered as parcel of the same contract, and are to be taken together, for the purpose of construction. 1. Pow 410. 2. Com 518.

To absolute deed with defeasance separate, these make a mortgage.

### Annulment, discharging, & Varying Contracts.

Premise. till the terms of a contemplated contract are accepted on both sides, the contract is not consummated, and either party may retract the offer.

"Table Deed. 47"

So if a bidder at auction before the goods are knocked down to him. 3. Bl 148. he may take Locus pen 553.

1. Pow 334. C/D. 27.

But an offer on one side accepted by the other, becomes a contract. so if either by tendering performance according to terms of contract, or agreement, may bind the other. 2. Bl 447. 3. Bl 41.

Thus if A offers to B. 20 £ for a horse and B. says, y<sup>t</sup> he will take it. A by tendering the money or B. by tendering the horse, may close the contract or rather bind the other. 2. Pow 63. 4. Bl 41.

So if on such an offer acceptance earnest is paid, or if a future time is fixed to perform, the contract is complete and properly bound. 2. Bl 447. 8. Roy 42. 64.

1. Bl 363. 1. Pow 330. 31.

But if on the offer being made and accepted nothing more is done, i.e. if there is no payment or delivery nor earnest - nor future time appointed and the parties separate, there is no contract, & variance is waived by 1. Pow 231. both parties. 2. Bl 447. 1. Pow 302. 3. 1. Bl 363. 2. D. 316.



So if A agrees to sell goods to B if B within a certain time. should choose to buy y.m. and B within y<sup>e</sup> time gives notice to A. yet he will take y.m. according to A's agreement A ant bound. The agreement must bind both or neither. But by y<sup>e</sup> terms of y<sup>e</sup> first offer. B was at Liberty to accept or refuse, so y<sup>t</sup> there was then no contract, and if A refuse afterwards, there is no new new contract. 3 P.C. 653.

Contra 1 Bos 261. not Law.

But before a right of action has accrued on a simple contract, y<sup>e</sup> parties may rescind by barely expressing their mutual dissent. For there is no consummated right destroyed by it. "assumpsit 39"

Mutual assent is withdrawn, before either can make a claim or other. Com D T. Pleas 2. G. 13. Co Ch 533.

2. Lev 144. Polw. N.P. 136. 1. Pow 412. 1 Mod 259. 12. Do 538.

But after breach it cannot be discharged by agreement without a release by deed, nor there is a new agreement substituted and executed. 18. accord and satisfaction.

1 Polw  
130.2

Here there is a right of consummation and y<sup>e</sup> question of assent is at an end. 12. Mod 538. 1. Bos 412. 16.

On Ch. 384. 2. Mod 44. 1. Do. 259.

130.

As to y<sup>e</sup> acceptance of a Bx., acceptor may be discharged by Parol after Bille is payable. Chite 83.4. (Bx. 5 48) Exp D. 47. Jony. 238. 47. Co D. 47.

"Bx. 48."  
(Cille)

This seems to be a positive rule of y<sup>e</sup> Law Merchant.

But an agreement may in Equity be waived by long omission on both sides to execute or claim under it.

As an agreement between Land Lord and Tenant to enclose a part of y<sup>e</sup> Common. delayed for 20 yrs.

There is a presumed abandonment. 2 Bos P.C. 16. 2 Ely 20.

9 Mod 2. 2. 3. 1 Bos 420. 21. (2 P.M. 82 1 Bos 441.



So where there was an agreement between intended husband and wife, yet she shd have her property, to her separate use, and she permitted y husband during y whole coverture, to take y avails to himself, she was presumed to have abandoned y agreement.

But y presumption may be rebutted by proof 130.  
yet she was satisfied during coverture and y husband took y avails under an engagement to fulfill y agreement. 1. Atk 269. 1. Pow 22.3

And a contract consummated & executed, may be rescinded even by one of y parties only. When there is a provision to y effect, in y original contract itself. As A sells a horse to B. but on an agreement, yet B may on a certain event return him or y happening of y event B may receive and recover y money paid. as had and received. This is a Defensible Contract. 1. KB. 135. 1. Do. 201. Cowp. 818. Doug 23.

2 East 145. 3 Co 82. 1 N.B. 357.

But *hata Bowel*, if a contract with B. for property at such a price, as I shall name y parties cannot annul it, because they have embowered a 3<sup>d</sup> person to perfect it. 1. Pow 410. 16. cites *Bac Max. 91*. Where what right has B? This ant Law.

But a contract can be released after as well 137.  
as before action accrued.

A Release may Express. or Tacit. The former is by regular acquittance by Deed. - y latter by destroying or cancelling y Instrument.

1 Pow 410.

If he who is to be benefitted by a performance of an instrument or contract, prevents it from being executed or dissolved. 1. Pow 416. 420. & Co 91. 2. Co Litt 206.

1. Pow 265.

Or rather a other party is discharged, but a party preventing is still bound to perform his part.

It is incorrect, to say tis dissolved.

And in such case a party who was to perform in the same condition as if he had already performed.

As a covenant to build a house, for B. for 100 £.

B prevents him from building, it may recover a 100 £

& Co 91. 92. Co Litt 206. On Est 374. 1 Pow 265. 416. 420.

So if A makes a Feoffment to B. with condition, yet it shall be void on it, paying 100 £ to B. on a certain day, 10 years day. B's hope is out of a realm, so yt it cannot tender. it may tender as if a money had been paid. 1. Pow 420. Co Litt 210. 3.

There will not equity consider it as Trustee of a money for B.

A contract may be annulled by a new contract of a higher nature for a same thing - merger.

As a simple contract merges in a bond. So in a Judgment. "apud 33"

It is intention of a party is not to furnish a twofold remedy, but to substitute a higher one.

1. Pow 3. 3. 25<sup>th</sup> Bull 153.

5 Co 40. Co Dig 134.

Secus tis said if a bond is given by a stranger.

1. Pow 423. <sup>margin</sup> merger. Eger. 230. 13.

It is only an additional security "apud 34".

Not a substitute.

So a bond may be merged by a Judgment recovered upon it. A Judgment debt being higher than a Bond debt.

"*Assumpsit* 60" And a contract of a given degree cannot be extinguished by a new one of a same degree. *12.* & latter as a new contract is no bar to an action on the former. 1. Pow 424. 1. Bun 9. Cro P. 549.

Cro Eliz 57. 57. Ek. Biles 62. The latter cannot merge a former. But when blended by way of accord and satisfaction. See y distinction.  
1. Vel 126. In 426. 3 East 436. 2 J.R 25. 3 East 251.

"*Assumpsit* 60"

5 Co 17.

In y way may be discharged the original contract.

accord  
12.  
10.

But where a contract of a lower nature, is inserted in one of a higher nature, merely by way of Recital or to corroborate it and enlarge y remedy, is not merged. As one baits goods by deed, *12.* takes a deed as Rec of y contract of Bailment, Detinue lies.

One by deed acknowledges y receipt of money to account. — account lies on action without deed.  
2 Buls 256. Cro Eliz 544. 1 Pow 425. 218. 223. 1 Gold 118.

Here y simple contract ant intended to be turned into a Specialty. The latter is designed only as an additional Security — not as a substituted one and may be used in an action on y former.

But y party is subjected, but once.  
account.

Contract by deed cannot be annulled or discharged 140.  
by Parol. 20 Lygamie

nor by writing ni sealed. 544. Cro P. 252. 1 Lamm 291. n. 1.  
2 Mil 86. 576. Yels 132.

Nor by mere delivering up y Instrument to Obligor. if Obligor regain y possession of it.



Even payment or accord and satisfaction "of a bond" is not a discharge. Tho payment of y money due upon it, is sufficient. Co L. 254. Yelv 192. 1 Pow 457. 57. Jo. 426. 5 Mod 144.

This distinction appears to relate only to y form of Pleadings.

To accord &c of y "damages" accorded on a Covenant is a good discharge for y damages.

D. Co 43. 44. Cro L. 99. 650 Yelv 125. 1 Pow 447. Cro Elv 46.

141. When y right and obligation created by a contract unite in y same person, y contract is discharged at Law. 1. Pow 438.

As obligor becomes Est or adm<sup>2</sup> to obligee.

8 Co 130. 1 Salk 300 2. Pow 254. v. 9. 1 Mod 82. 10 Jo. 573

Contra 1 Jay 220. afterwards denied by the S.C. of Conn.

So if obligor marries obligee, y contract is generally annulled by y Legality of y parties.

See Hus and Wife.

1 Pow 438. 9. 444.

Seems of a bond made in contemplation of marriage and is executed or performed after y consummation of y covenant.

Hob 216. Cro L. 571. Salk 230. 1. Ld Ray 510.

5 M.R. 381.

Contracts may also be discharged by act of y Legislature. 1. Pow 444. 5. Hob 138. 8 Mod 57.

2. 2 P 112. 218. (Municipal Law &c) As a Covenant to do an act affirmatively prohibited by Statute (40. 51. Municipal Law)

142. So by act of God. as Lessee covenants to leave all y timber trees, growing and a tempest blows y on down. 10 Mod 268. 1. Co 98. Ray. 30.



If A sells a horse to B. & he returns &c  
and a horse dies of a disease sent B. fault -  
Bailee is excused. 1. Pow 447. 8. Palm. 548.

If A contracts to serve B a year, for a sum  
to be paid in half yearly instalments, and B dies  
after y first instalment & before y last. B's exors  
liable for y last inst. 1. Pow 448.

But a contract becoming partially impossible, must  
be performed by the best of the "Numerical Law"  
1. Pow. 448. 2. Pow 137.

If A is bound in a bond conditioned to  
convey land by a certain day, and dies before y  
day, y penalty is saved. His Equity will decree  
a conveyance to y heir. 1. Eq. Cas. 18. 8. ante 38.

But y act of a 3<sup>d</sup> person cannot regularly vary  
a contract. Ex. Bond by A to B. conditions  
y B shall appear in an action on 8 days notice,  
& that if y judgment is vs him, A will satisfy  
it. B appears on 9 days notice, and y judgment  
is vs him. A quite bound to satisfy it.  
1. Pow 451. 17 Jones. 441. 143.

Tho' when a contract is by y terms of it, to take  
effect or be varied or annulled. by y act of  
a 3<sup>d</sup> person, his act will operate upon it, as  
provided for in y agreement. As contracts to buy  
property at such a price as J. P. shall name.  
The parties be are bound by his decision & if  
he refuses to set a price, y contract becomes  
void. void. 1. Pow. 451. 6.

## Contract 193-

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## Bailments

A bailment is defined to be a delivery of goods by one person to another, upon a contract express or implied, by which they shall be returned to a Bailor, or disposed of according to his direction, when a purpose for which they <sup>are</sup> bailed, is answered.

#

Every Bailment vests a qualified property in a Bailee.  
7 T 2 377. See also 129. Jones 112. 1. Goltz. 172.

The party delivering goods is called a Bailor.  
The persons to whom goods are delivered, denominated a Bailee. If a transaction is called a bailment. See  
as in de Litt or in Touchet's case takes a wrong  
distinction (Jones 3. 48. 2. Bl 457. Cro Eliz 622. 12. (Mod 482. #  
10em. 268.

On delivery of goods by one party to another in the  
manner, a Law presumes a contract for a bailment  
shall restore them to a Bailor, whereas he shall  
demand them, or if he shall answer with goods  
of Express terms of a contract. 2. Mod 458. Jones 348.

Bailment tho' a species of contract, has from a great  
variety of peculiarities not attended by Law respecting it,  
been considered as a distinct head in most of our writers  
on Law. It has been said, & a Bailee, as he differs  
differs from a Bailor since he has a special property  
in a thing bailed: but there is no distinction in truth.  
+ de Litt & de Litt & de Litt. Indeed upon de Litt, there  
has been more diversity of opinion, than upon any  
other of the Law of its limited extent.

There is a universal rule, that every bailment vests a qualified

property in y Bailee: for a mere lawful possessor  
 holds a special property and implies a right of possession.  
 Annot. 112. J. 112.

4. That  
 In both cases, 4 to 63. or 63. To wit 63. a. and 3.  
 with 70. There was a distinction made between Bailee  
 and Bailor. but since then, it holds there is no  
 difference. The nature of y interest vested, w in most cases  
 is the same. The only shade of difference is in y degree  
 of property vested. The bailor having a higher interest  
 and a stronger lien in y goods ym y Bailee.

It must appear from general principles & analogies, as  
 well as from authorities, y y Bailor vests a special  
 property in y Bailee. For every lawful poss<sup>r</sup> vests a  
 qualified property in y possessor; even y finding of  
 property will vest a special property in y finder.  
 So y he may maintain trespass or trover, or any  
 one, who unlawfully deprives him of y possession.  
 7. to 37. c. 1. to 505.

The bailor has an undoubted right of possession, so as to  
 remove the goods & take them to him in certain cases.  
 If then so authorized by y contract. If y Bailee, then,  
 has y right, he must also have a right of enforcing  
 it also. Secus, right shd be a mere nullity. 10. 515.

It is generally held, y y Bailee, in his obligation to return,  
 must keep y property according to y terms of y contract, and  
 be answerable to Bailor for any loss or damage, wh it may  
 sustain while in his possession.

It shd be y foregoing rule there are some exceptions, as  
 where y loss or damage has been sustained without any  
 neglect or misconduct in y part of Bailee.

The determining an y Bailee has been fully y any



incommensurable in quality of the goods sold & nature of the contract, & characters of the case in which it arises. The rule in conduct must be taken into consideration, and the degree of determination & regulation is so varied, & rather difficult in a title. Jones 8. Gale requires more care than scattered.

In general a dealer is bound to use a degree of care proportionate to the nature of the bailment. In some cases ordinary care is required, in other less, & in other cases more. 1. Bac. 230. Jones 8.

A dealer can be held to a higher standard of care in general use in conducting their own affairs. Jones 9. 10

The degrees of care on either side of the standard have not a distinct appellation. In either case, it is called more or ordinary care, and whatever falls short is ordinary care. Jones 10. 11. 13. *Exponsum facit se posse locum*

In every degree of care, there is a corresponding degree of neglect. The degree of neglect opposed to ordinary care, is called ordinary neglect. The omission of greater than ordinary care, is styled less than ordinary neglect, and so on in an inverse ratio. Jones 12. 31

Neglect greater than ordinary is styled gross neglect, and is *proxi facie* evidence of fraud. This is not in all cases conclusive. For if a Dealer is negligent of his own affairs, of a same nature, and at the same time, is negligent and considered fraudulent. Jones preface to Eng edition.

11. 13. 31. 64. 5.

2d Ray 315. 316.

## General Acceptance

A general acceptance is where there is no special agreement

as to a degree of care or diligence to be used by a Bailor.  
But where there is an agreement to "deliver and receive in good order and condition".

It has been laid down as a general rule, yet every bailor under a general acceptance, is bound to use a degree of care proportional to the value of the bailment. Jones 8.

There are therefore different species of bailments, requiring different degrees of care, in a part of a Bailor. These are taken principally from a celebrated distinction of Lord Holt. in a case of *Legg v. Bernard*.

These distinctions are more generally followed by a disapprobation by Jones in his treatise on Bailments. 2d Ed. 316.

### Rules

1<sup>st</sup>

First. where a bailment is for a benefit to a bailor only, nothing more is necessary for a bailor to be in good faith, and he is liable only for gross neglect. If goods are lost or destroyed. 2d Ed. 316. Jones 15. 16. 21. 22. 32. 51. 64. 100. 112. 4 Co 89. B. 1. Pow 2. 245. 7. (4 Co 83 Contra not Law)

This rule is founded on a supposed equity of a state, & perhaps a more equitable rule could be established as a bailor receives no benefit from a contract, and a bailment is advantageous to a bailor alone, and it ought to be in a position of him, is to be the end of the good faith and not practice any fraud upon a party who is doing goods being. & c. 23. where two holden of a bailor must keep a good man bailed, only at his peril, and not at law. But a bailor may in these cases by express demand dilate his liability beyond a certain time, and in short he may be bound to answer all damages, at all events. Jones 21. 3. 5. 2. 66. 2d Ed. 316.

Second. Where a bailee alone is benefited by a bailment, he is liable for slight neglect. This rule is founded on a Maxim. Qui vult commodum sentiat debet curam.  
Jones. B. 10. 23. 33. 82. 91.

Third. Where a bailment is for a mutual benefit of both parties, a bailee is liable for ordinary neglect, being bound to use ordinary care. Jones. 14. 22. 3. 32. 3. 101. 5.

These rules are intended to apply only to cases where a contract is implied or a acceptance is general. There may be express contracts between parties, by which a bailee won't be liable in any case, or he may make himself liable at all events.

When there only an implied contract, a bailment is a General acceptance: but where there is a Special agreement it is ~~denominated~~ a Special acceptance.

It should be remembered, yet these three several rules are down apply only to General Acceptances.

## Different Kinds,

According to the Law, where distinctions we shall adopt 8.

Bailments are divided into 6 several kinds.

For Mr Jones. divides Bailments into 3 kinds.

I. Depositum or Deposit. Depositum is a delivery of goods by Bailor to Bailee, to be kept by Bailee without reward, or hire. This species of bailment is sometimes called a naked bailment & a Bailee or naked Bailee is also depositary. Hence as the bailment is for a sole benefit of a bailor, a bailee has nothing required of him but good faith. & is liable only for gross neglect. Id. 12. 13. Jones. 50. 1. Bail 72. 1. Pow 247. Eke 618. 1 Pow 247.

## II Commodatum or Lending.

Commodatum is a gratuitous loan of goods, or utensils



which are to be used by Bailor for his benefit and not vice versa  
must be specifically returned to Bailor. This is usually  
a reverse of former case, This becomes so for a loan specific  
of a Bailment and he is liable for slight neglect. The bailor  
is called Lender, of Bailor & borrower. This kind of  
Bailment is often expressed by y words "loaned for use"  
Sa Ray. 913. 10. Jones 50. & 89. Rule 72. or Bac 672.  
1 Bac. 243. 2. 245. 3. 246. 4.

There is a material distinction in loan for use, & a "mutuum"  
a loan of money or a loan for consumption. The latter  
1 Bac 241. is not to be specifically returned, but to be returned  
Dee Far in kind as a bushel of wheat for a bushel of wheat  
129. Here, bailor hasn't a special but an absolute property  
in y thing loaned. If it is destroyed immediately after y  
Bailment, y Bailor must suffer y whole loss.  
Pres. 89. 90 A Mutuum there is no bailment.

## III

Locatio et Conductio 12. Letting and hiring—  
Letting and hiring is y delivery of goods, to be used, by y  
Bailor for hire or reward, to be paid y bailor. Sa Ray  
913. 1. Pow B. 257. Jones 50. 119. Rule 72. 1. 2 Bac. 243. In this  
species of Bailment, bailor & conductor or Locator & conductor  
are synonymous with Bailor and Bailee. Sir Wm Jones  
classes y species of bailment under his 5th division, not he  
calls Locatum, not I think his classification of it very  
improper. for in y fifth class, y goods are to be used  
in a measure for y Bailor or his benefit.

## IV

Raduum 13. Pawn. Pawn or pledge is y delivery  
of goods, by y bailor to y Bailee, as security for y payment  
of y debt due from y former, to y latter. Here y Bailor  
is called y Pawnor, and Bailee. Pawnee. Sa Ray. 913.  
Jones 50. 114. Rule 72. 1. Pow B. 257. Nels. 172. Co Litt 205.

V

The fifth class of Bailments is where goods are delivered,  
to y Bailee to be carried or to have some other act done



to y<sup>e</sup> m<sup>r</sup> by y<sup>e</sup> Bailie for a reward to be paid by y<sup>e</sup> Bailor.

This class of bailments includes y<sup>e</sup> delivery of goods, as well to public as private carriers. Still there is a material difference between the 2. or live us to their Liability. A public or common carrier being liable to a much greater degree, y<sup>e</sup> n a private carrier. See Ray 3.3. 1. 18. Bull 72.3. Jones. 57. 144. 150. 128. 1. Pors 253. 1. Bac. 243. 128.

This Species of bailment includes also a delivery of goods to factors, Brokers, Stewards, & Bailiffs. In short to Agents generally &c. to a common or Specie carrier.

## VI.

A delivery of goods as in y<sup>e</sup> last case with only y<sup>e</sup> difference, y<sup>e</sup> Bailie receives no reward for his services, and is liable only for gross neglect. This is called a Mandatum, and y<sup>e</sup> Bailor a mandatarius. See Ray 3.3. 1. 18. Jones 3.4. 1. Pors 254. or Bull 73. The Bailie is called a Mandatarius.

I. & Depositum or delivery of goods to y<sup>e</sup> Bailie to keep for y<sup>e</sup> use of y<sup>e</sup> Bailor with any reward. Here no deposit is made entirely for y<sup>e</sup> benefit of y<sup>e</sup> Bailor, nothing more is required of y<sup>e</sup> Bailie than good faith. Pors C. 247. and he is liable only for gross neglect. See Bull 129. Bull 72. See Ray 3.3. 1. 18. 1. Pors 232. 45. See 1099. 581. 2. Bb. 446. 482. Jones. 645.

2. E. Hunkers Pors. incurred when he states y<sup>e</sup> Bailie is liable for less y<sup>e</sup> n gross neglect. He is indeed liable for gross neglect, but not on y<sup>e</sup> ground of neglect, as such, but on y<sup>e</sup> ground of fraud, of wh<sup>ch</sup> gross neglect is prima facie tri. This presumption may be rebutted by proving y<sup>e</sup> Bailie is equally negligent of his own property. 2. Pors 452. See 581. 1099. See Ray 3.3. 1. 18. 4. 36 430. 1. Pors C. 247. 8. Jones 64. 5. See Bb. 158. See 351. See Ray 3.12. 14. Jones. 13.30.



This doctrine is denied by *Id. Holt* in a case of *Long v. Barnard*, for 2. reasons. 1<sup>st</sup> Because if *Bailees* had a key, it wd be of no use to him 2<sup>d</sup> And w<sup>th</sup> it he is no less able to defend y. goods from rapine or Theft. *Id. Ray 314.*

*J. G. Munkes.* y<sup>e</sup> rather opinion is on y ground, wh ought materially, if not entirely, to govern in this case, viz the knowledge or ignorance of y *Bailees* with regard to y contents of y chest: for y *Bailees* responsibility or rather his care ought to be proportioned to y value of y goods, or y temptation wh they offer to rapine or Theft. Money or Jewels ought to be kept with greater care, than coarse clothes or Hares. Yet if y *Bailees* was ignorant of y contents of a box containing money, might he not place it without culpable neglect, where he would a box containing things of an inferior value?

*Id. Ray 9/4. 3. or 5/4. 51. 442.* A depository may at all events, make himself liable, if he may insure vs all risks. But even here he would not make himself liable for y loss, or damage occasioned by acts of Providence, acts of violence nor constitutional force *Ines. 62. 3. 1 Rob 34. Pow 73. Id. Ray 310. 18. 202 and Ten 130. 1. Pow C. 248. 3. 4 Co 83.* But in such cases he would be liable for loss by mere theft. This is analogous to y case of a Warranty in a Lease, by w<sup>ch</sup> y Lessor contracts for y undisturbed enjoyment of y premises: but y warranty is not considered as extending to wrongdoers. 1. *Pow 148.* The term "Wrongdoers" is used in a loose sense in most of y books.

A depository may however by such special agreement make himself liable for loss by theft, for this is what he could have guarded against by care and providence. But vs physical force no contracts of y *Bailees* can be security, for a man cannot bind



himself to do it, not in a nature of things he cannot perform.

.- i.e. contract with the owner of a depositary liable for theft, or what is easily guarded vs.  
+ Co. 58. 33. Id. Reg. 110. Jones 75.

If a depositary remains goods after they are demanded by a Bailor, he is liable in an action of Detinue, Trover or assumpsit. 1. Roll 128. Cro. E. 81. Jones 114.

## II Commodatum or Gratuitous Loan.

There as a bailor is alone benefited by a Loan, he is according to a 3<sup>d</sup> general Rule, to be liable for a slight neglect, whereby a loss incurs: for a *Modum qui sentit commodum debet sentire onus* Rule 72. Id. Reg. 110. Jones 11. 1. Pow 248. 50. 1. Que 244.

A moderate degree of care must be borne, in different cases, then care must be determined by its own particular circumstances, as Example has been given. viz. If a borrower, a horse and cart is in a stable with nothing & door, he is liable if a horse is stolen, But he would not be, if a door was shut or locked. Id. Reg. 110. o. 1. Pow E. 248. 50. 1. Roll 121. Que 244. Jones 31. 2. 51.

This example might be given in some cases, but not in all. In no case of open violence, wh. he could not resist. Sure if he had as much care as usual wd he be liable? Of thinks not. But in a contrary Borrower is not generally liable for <sup>loss</sup> occasioned by force wh. he can't resist. Hence a borrower and *bona fide* liable for robbery. To make a bailor liable in such case, Bailor must have property was wantonly exposed. 1. Pow E. 207. Id. Reg. 110. Jones 61. 32. n. Is if Bailor had house in a night in a road frequented by robbers, and wh. was generally considered as unsafe.



It is not in general liable to fire, and is  
 is inevitable. In lightning, Earth quakes.  
 But even in those cases he would be liable, if he  
 had wantonly exposed a property to such dangers. As by  
 putting a horse on board of a boat in time of a Tempest.  
 2d Ray 110. 1. P. 253. Co 242. 50. Jones 61.

A borrower may render himself liable for a loss occasioned  
 in whatever way, by breach of Trust. From the moment he  
 becomes a Bailee, and is entitled to none of the  
 immunities of a bailor. Thus a borrower who takes a horse of B to  
 ride to New York, & directs his way towards Boston,  
 if the horse should be killed by lightning, he will be liable.  
 Jones 109.

So if any one borrows a horse or chattel for a limited  
 time as for 24 hours, and does not return it within  
 within a time limited, he is liable for any loss which  
 may happen after a time. Raw transiories, and he may  
 be sued for a property. 2d Ray 110. 1. P. 253.  
 Cro P. 244. 1. Bac. 244. And this rule as to breaches of  
 Trust, holds as to every species of Bailment, in General.  
 2d Ray 110. 1. Bac 237. & Cro P. 244. 1. P. 253.

### III. Location or Conduct, or Letting and Lending.

This is a loan of property, to be used by a Bailor,  
 for his benefit or uses, in consideration of reward or hire  
 paid to a Bailor. *Infra*

By the contract gains a qualified property in a thing  
 bailed and the Bailor an absolute right to hire or  
 thing to be paid. 2d Ray 113. 1. P. 253. Jones 119. 20.

Here as a contract is essentially advantageous to both  
 parties, a net ought on principle to be equally divided  
 between you. The Bailor is bound to use ordinary Jones 119. 120.  
 care and no more, & is liable for ordinary neglect and no loss

Ed Holt, says, *et* Bailor is here liable, to y. utmost diligence, and consequently liable with a Borrower.

But this is contrary both to precedent and analogy. Ed Holt used loose language on this occasion, and taken his notions, y. principle is settled, *et* a Bailor is bound to use only ordinary care. Ed Holt. 910. Jones 31. 21. 23. 120. 1. Pore 207. Jones makes no mistake in y. mis-translation of y. Latin Substantives. Bale 272. Braden 1010 32. Jones. 34. 122. 3.

— 27 of 170.

There is no decided case, where more than ordinary care has been required. There is no analogous case, requiring more, y. sure is of course wounded in case of Robbery. Tho' it would alter y. decision, if he had knowingly exposed y. goods. Jones 126. 120. 3.

It was once a question: was Bailor bound to repair an Instrument, or other article lent him. But this is now settled, *et* if Bailor means not, the thing bailed he must repair it himself. Jones & Davis 321. 1 Bac. 531. 21.

### IV. Pignus. Pign is Pledge.

Is y. delivery of property by y. Bailor to y. Bailor, as security for a debt due from y. Bailor to y. Bailor. Jones. 50. 104. Ed Holt. 913. Ed Holt 230. 1. Bac 237. This definition will satisfy commentators: for property may be pledged, to indemnify, where there is no existing debt.

On this subject it may be material to observe, *et* an analogy to y. Law of y. Mortgage, if goods are delivered to secure a <sup>debt</sup> from y. lender to y. Bailor, accompanied with a right of Redemption, whatever may be y. form of y. contract or its terms - tis still a Pignus. 1. H. 114. 2. Ed Holt. 913.

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This kind of Bailment being advantageous to both parties  
i.e. by securing a Pawnee's debt & procuring for bearance  
to a Pawnor. Pawnee is to use ordinary care, & he  
is liable for less or ordinary neglect. Id. Ray  
17. Jones. 130. 1. Cow. 282. Talk. 323. 4. 4 Com D. 258.

But in Foulmotes case, La C case, y<sup>t</sup> a Pawnee is  
bound to keep goods as his own, and is liable only  
for gross neglect, as a depository and a reason assigned  
is y<sup>t</sup> a Bailor has a property in y<sup>e</sup> goods.

But every Bailor has a property in y<sup>e</sup> things bailed, so  
that there is no ground for y<sup>e</sup> distinction, and y<sup>e</sup> Plaintiff  
founded on it, ante. Lang. Carter Jac and Sta  
129. 4. & 33. B. Ryburnton 172. 1. Bac 211. Jones 105. 12.  
15. 1 Post 82. a. & 34. 82. a.

It follows that when a loss is occasioned by robbery, y<sup>e</sup>  
Pawnee and Pawnor face liable that he may subject  
himself to any loss by a breach of trust or wanton  
abuse of y<sup>e</sup> property and when a degree of care required  
of Bailor, dont exceed ordinary care, he is released  
from liability in a loss from robbery as contradicting what  
from Theft. Talk 322. La Ray 110. 17. Jones 105. Bracton 84.  
Jones. 106. 107. 111. & 112. 232.

In Foulmotes case its also laid down y<sup>t</sup> Pawnee and  
Pawor for losses occasioned by bare theft and a reason  
assigned is y<sup>e</sup> same as y<sup>e</sup> assigned above to show that  
he is liable only for gross neglect i.e. his having a  
property in the goods and his being bound to keep  
them as he keeps his own.

Jones holds unconditionally y<sup>t</sup> the Pawnee is liable  
for a loss occasioned by theft & his reason is y<sup>e</sup> same  
as y<sup>e</sup> assigned by Id. Coke. in Foulmotes case. he  
says y<sup>t</sup> a Pawnee cannot be supposed to have used



ordinary case, if he steals, goods to be stolen from him.  
Jones 106. 7. Esp 524. 5. Palm 507. 4 Co 53. B. Prec 59. u.  
1. Bac 27. Jones 60. u. 61.

But Jones clearly contradicts himself as well as the  
analogy of Law. For now Jones in ordinary case gives  
afford protection - as a Theft. or a loss by Theft. But  
contrary to General appearance to assert, if men of  
common sense don't suffer by Theft. It is a question  
of Fact, an ordinary case was used or lived and this  
must determine of Pawnee's liability. Jones 92. 61. 109. 16. 138.

See Ray 37. 18. 1. Kent 522. 1. Ventris 121. 1. Pow 252.  
Lord Holt places of liability for a loss by Theft on the same  
footing with of a factor who is excused, if he used  
reasonable and ordinary care. See Ray 37. 18.

Indeed Jones himself says of in commoatium  
a borrower is liable for loss occasioned by Theft, and  
he used extraordinary care. See Ray 37. 8. 1. Vent 121.  
1. Pow 252. Jones 92. 61. 109. 16. 138. 126.  
61. u.

The Pawnee like other Bailees gains a qualified property  
in the thing bailed. But his interest is defeasible  
as by payment on a day (wh rests his Title at Law)  
so of Mortgage his interest is determined. Also by  
a proper tender, wh for any purpose of averting a forfeiture  
of a Pawnee is equivalent to a Payment. 1. Bac 237.

Bulk 72. Cro 244. 4 Co 53. 6. Belveston 576. Jones 111.  
2. Bul 27. Hoo. 208.

If after tender and demand of a property, if after payment  
on a day appointed, Pawnee refuses to restore it,  
he is guilty of a breach of Trust, and is of course liable  
for any loss or damage, wh may be sustained by the  
property, while in his hands or possession however  
it may be occasioned as by Lightning &c.  
1. Bul 522. 3. See Ray 37. 18. 1. Pow 252. 2. H. 27. 4 Co 53. 6.  
1. Pow 253. 1. Bac 237. 8. Bulk 72. ..



And on y Pawnee's refusal to redeliver y goods after paymt. y Pawner may immediately commence an action of Trover, Detinue, or assumpsit, as him.\* The pawnee in case of a breach, is not only liable for all damage afterward, occasioned to y property, but is immediately liable for y breach of trust.

\* Bull N.P. 72. 1 Bosc 237 s. Cro P. 244. Talk 441 Jones III. "Till Trover 64."

Rule is y same if y refusal is made by y Pawnee's clerk, agent, &c. acting regularly in the ordinary course of his business, for y is equivalent to a refusal of y Pawnee himself on y maxim. Qui facit per alium facit per se. But if y refusal of y Pawnee be was out of y course of his regular business, Pawnee not not be liable. Cro P. 224. Jones. III. 1225. Talk 441. Moor 842. Cro D. 613. 1. Pow. 253. Pol Ray 97.

In this case however, y Pawner may have his election of 2. actions, Trover or assumpsit. The breach of trust is y foundation of y action of Trover, and y breach of an express or implied contract, y foundation of y action of assumpsit. For in Bailments y pawnee impliedly or expressly agrees in relation to y property pawned, to return it on y day appointed, provide y debt is satisfied by paymt or tender. or Rule 72.\* Bosc. 237. s. Com. D. 220. 2 to 238. Cro P. 244. Jones. 114.

But y Pawnee can have neither of these actions, till he has paid or tendered paymt of all y is due. Both principal and legal interest, even where y property was pawned as security: for these actions on y case are founded on Equitable principles, and he who seeks Equity, must do it. 1. P R 103 This rule would not apply, if detinue, a C Law action were b't.

"Wary 30"

A refusal to deliver up property pawned, after paymt or tender, of paymt of y sum due, is an indictable offence at C Law. This rule ant general as to mere

2 Hawkins  
210. or  
110

breaches of Trust. They being considered only as Civil  
injuries &c. not offences. On this subject, there was a  
diversity of opinion, but it seems now to be settled.  
Falk 222. 222. 3. Contra Duck 277. 2. Hen 210.  
1. Bac 240. 2. 4 Com. 258. Falk 322. 3. 3 ibid 307

This is a mere rule of policy, for the loss of a pawn  
or trust, in y<sup>e</sup> case is no more culpable for in any  
other. The object of y<sup>e</sup> rule is to protect y<sup>e</sup> pawnor, from  
oppression. The danger of not is greater <sup>in this</sup> in almost  
any other species of Bailments, as y<sup>e</sup> transaction is generally  
secret. In y<sup>e</sup> Pawn is enacted to conceal a fact & further  
is usually made by persons discreet and embarrassed.

The pawnor has in some instances a right to use y<sup>e</sup>  
property pawned. This right, when it exists, is said to  
be founded on y<sup>e</sup> consent of y<sup>e</sup> pawnor, either express or  
implied. This presumed right is said to exist or not,  
in regard as y<sup>e</sup> property is likely to be improved or  
impaired, or not affected at all (Falk 12. 3 Falk  
322. 2. 1. Roll 338. 8. 3. 1. But 12.

4. Case in which property can be made better by use.  
Some violence occurs. Does suppose y<sup>e</sup> case of a dog  
not is trained or conformed in useful habits, by certain  
employment. Does 112. 3.

and it seems when the things pawned are of such a  
nature as not be injured by the use, y<sup>e</sup> Pawnee has a  
right to use y<sup>e</sup> m. but it is at his peril, for y<sup>e</sup> loss  
is for his own benefit & he is liable at all events  
as if he had be robbed. The examples given are Bawls &c.  
But tho' these things will wear out, still y<sup>e</sup> injury  
done to y<sup>e</sup> m. by careful usage, is so small y<sup>e</sup> the  
law won't regard it. Falk 322. 2. Bac 230. Roll  
72. 1. Roll 338. 8. 3. See Ray. 27. Does 113. Co Litt 53.

11. When a Pawnee is at expense in keeping a property pawned, he may reimburse himself by using it, as when living animals are pawned. This D.C. thinks don't arise from any consent of a Pawnee, but is allowed by Law as a recompence and a principle of justice demand. La Ray. 110.7. Eos 9 608. Talk 522.

Bull 72. Jones 114.

I have not D.C. discovered from the books, that a Pawnee is liable for a loss of profits. He was by the Roman Law. Jones 110.

But when the pledge will be injured in the use, a keeping of it incurs no expense, a Pawnee has no right to use the property, because no such thing is no consent implied on a part of a Pawnee. But D.C. thinks a Law don't refer to a reason. For the duty of a Pawnee is to keep and restore a goods safely, when a debt is paid, & as there is no expense incurred in keeping the property, there isn't any principle of justice which will warrant a Pawnee in using it. La Ray. 11. Bull 72. Jones 113.

And as a Pawnee has no right to use the property if he does use it, D.C. thinks, he is "ipso facto" guilty of conversion & liable in an action of trover. For in a action unlawful use is per se a conversion.

5 Bac. 287. 26 B. Bird Trover.

The Law is the same per La Holt with respect to a finder of goods. The liability is continually a same. The finder of goods is surely not liable in affirmat. for there is no contract between a parties. a action must therefore be "Ex delicto"

The Finder has no Lien upon a goods, as the pawnee has. And a same degree of care is required of him. Pow says the finder is bound to use ordinary care







is well settled at at B. Law. if a finder has in  
 him upon goods for his trouble and expense, but upon  
 demand made by the true owner, with proof of ownership,  
 he is bound to deliver the property, and should he refuse  
 to deliver it, he is guilty of a conversion and is  
 liable in trover. 2. 11 B. & C. 204. 105-106. 2. 286. B. 111.

"Trover 324" 34"

But if such a finder is negligent as where goods are  
 wrecked, abandoned at sea, a finder is entitled to a reward.  
 This is a principle of public law & nations, not of B. Law.  
 12 B. & C. 2. 286. 287. 3 B. & C. 270. "Trover is title of"

But tho' it has been agreed by us that a finder has no  
 lien upon goods, it has been a mooted question, and  
 at B. Law he can in any case recover a reward. If he  
 can recover at all, it must be by "Inevitable Accident"  
 for <sup>work</sup> done, & founded on an imputation of request and  
 promise. The act of a finder is a mere act of custody,  
 & a solitary courtesy will not support an action at  
 B. Law. 104. 5. I don't see therefore any ground  
 of recovery. 2. 50 B. & C. 208. 210 5. 10. 101. 102.  
 Robert

But a refusal by the finder to deliver goods to a  
 party claiming ownership on demand, is not necessarily  
 a conversion, in the party claiming them, offers proof of  
 ownership. The finder is then made the judge, and the  
 ownership is satis and the correctness of his decision is  
 to be determined by a Judge, in an action of Trover. And  
 if a finder refuse to deliver them, after proof offered, that  
 be a conversion. 2. Bull 312. 1010 590.

But there is not one case decided in the books to  
 my knowledge. A finder Goods which actually belong to B.  
 demands them, and on refusal to deliver them,  
 he brings an action and by false testimony recovers the  
 full value. How can B. find owner bring another action  
 or a to recover the value, again? Even decided in Combs

it is more than a 1. Sec 440. But if a  
 contract of this kind in the person that borrower  
 of Law combats, a person to pay a sum of money for a  
 given cause, or consideration. While not combated  
 it may be again. Thus, where a debtor has been compelled  
 by an action to pay a debt a wrongful debt, the  
 law will not compel him to pay the debt again to  
 a rightful debt. See in support of General Principles  
 35 Pa 123.5. 2. Bac 11. Song 141. 101. 1. Heide 440. 000. 2. ibid 408.  
 Song. 681. A record between 2. parties A and B. and  
 C is between the parties B and C. 12 of a principal writ  
 determined. As here it was not be C's debt of right  
 of property, was in B. But his C's that a judgment  
 has been had by B as in Cook Bank Law. 3<sup>rd</sup>.

But a subject of Pawns. if after a tender of payment  
 by the pawnor, & a refusal to deliver goods, the pawnor  
 of pawnor recovers in an action of Debt, & pawnor may  
 then recover his debt, taken his breach of Trust.  
 It must however, make demand of money tendered.  
 1. Wils. 29. 3. 1. 331. 4. "Tender" Title

If pawnable goods are pawned and decay in the hands of  
 pawnor, he must for his reason lose his debt, & he may  
 one and recover for a debt and duty remains, the pledge  
 is lost. Indeed there are many instances sometimes to make  
 one answer, for a pawn is not more than half the  
 value of a debt, but generally of double debt and of Law  
 gives a debtor a mutual remedy. Again a pawn is never  
 considered a forfeiture but only a security for a payment  
 of a debt. 1. Bac 235. 2. 175. 1. 200. 2. 173.  
 3. 173. 1. 176. 173.

While a pawn remains unimpaired in the pawnor's hand,  
 he may sue for a debt and recover, in there was an agreement  
 to the contrary i.e. that he should only on the pledge only,  
 175. 175. 175. 175. 175. 175. 175. 175.

Howe must must be conduct of Pinner he is still entitled to his debt. Pinner however may recover for loss of his goods, and this Justice will be done.  
 .. Inst 209, Pack 328. ... Bac 233.

and while a pledge remains unexpired in the hands of Pinner, he may sue for his debt, and he has discharged his right by an agreement yet he will rely on his pledge alone for a pledge and a satisfaction of a debt. Inst 210, Pack 178, L. Lev 10.

If a debt for which the goods are pledged, and paid by a third person, a property in the pledge becomes absolute in the Pinner by Law, and is forever gone from Pinner, the principle is the same as in the Law of mortgages, a condition of which being broken, a title becomes absolute in Mortgages, and in analogy to the Law of mortgages, a Pinner has an Equity of Redemption. *Overton 120, or 188. Inst 200. 3 Inst 388. 2. after 388, or 3. 188. Co Litt 200.*

It appears to me however, that a right of redemption can be exercised only where a property remains specifically in the hands of Pinner, or has been assigned to him as a pledge. For as the debt not being paid by the day, a property in the pledge is absolutely vested in the Pinner at Law, and he may lawfully sell it. See 22 vol Christian, Honor Abri. 175. where it is said Pinner is obliged to pay back a surplus to Pinner, - and also in the case, that if not paid within 12. months, and 1. day, a Pinner may sell and if he receives any surplus over debt and expenses, they must be returned to Pinner. *Id.* thinks that where no time is appointed, the Law absconds this time. It does not appear from the Report. he saw.

A distinction is to be observed between a pawn, and a mortgage of personal property. Here the lender has a general ownership in the thing mortgaged and there is no Equity



of redemption after a day of payment has elapsed. This mortgage  
don't create a mere Lien as a pledge does. Jones. 8. 28. 8.  
1. Des B<sup>2</sup> 278. 2. Cairn, 200. 3. Gohn. 288. 323.

But in the case of pawning property, properly so called,  
this right of redemption exists after forfeiture, even tho' it  
was agreed at a time of making a contract, yet if a property  
was not redeemed at a time appointed it shall be considered  
as sold. This is in analogy to mortgages, "once a mortgage,  
always a mortgage" This maxim applies equally well  
to Pawns. But this maxim don't ~~not~~ precisely express its  
meaning, wh is, that if property is once conveyed as a  
security with a right of Redemption, no collateral agreement  
made at the time, shall destroy the right of Redemption.  
This rule is intended to protect defenceless debtors from  
abandonment and extortion. 3. Des 608. Bac 38. or 208. 1. B<sup>2</sup>  
or 4 B<sup>2</sup> 114. 3. Des or Dem. 688. 1. Bac 239. 8.

A Factor cannot pawn the goods of his principal so as  
to give the Pawnee, a lien upon them as to his principal.  
7. East 5. 3 B<sup>2</sup> 604. 2 B<sup>2</sup> 301. "Master and Servant,  
24 onward" For 1178.

The reason appears to be, yet the Factor has only a Lien  
himself & that as a personal right wh cannot be transferred.  
The contract producing it, being personal: a Lien & Property  
cannot be transferred in any case, and certainly not in this.  
The principal is willing to Trust the Factor, and to give  
him a Lien on the property, till their accounts are settled,  
but he don't give him power to appoint a new keeper.  
For 1178. & Com. 227.

It is now settled yet if a Factor pledges goods of his  
Principal, to secure a debt due from himself, the principal  
may maintain Trover, after demand, and without tender  
of the amt due to the Factor. The act of pledging is  
a breach of trust, by wh he forfeits his Lien. For 1178.  
3. B<sup>2</sup> 404. 1. 4 B<sup>2</sup> 382. 7. East 5.



The Failure of payment by the day appointed, & Pawnee  
is at liberty to sell the Pledge, for the time is absolutely  
vested in him by Law. 1. An. 208.

According to some opinions, he may sell or assign the pledge,  
before a day of payment. 1. Bull 29. 31. Twen 124. 1. Bull  
202. 1. Ber 350. 4. An. 208.

But these opinions for various reasons cannot be correct.  
Every Bailment implies a contract, strictly Inducement, and  
Bull observes that a Lien is a personal right, which cannot  
be transferred. Id. Glenbois witnesses the same opinion.  
and a similar doctrine is deducible plainly from the  
former cases. Cro. P. 244. Yelv 178. 5 TR. 606. 7. East 0.

The decision of this point one way or the other, is  
very important, for if an assignment before the day  
is not Legal, it follows that the Pawnee need not  
tender payment, to the pawnor, but may immediately  
claim of a Pawnee, and if he refuses, he is "ipso facto"  
guilty of a conversion.

It appears contrary to the analogy of the law, that an assignment  
of a pledge should be assigned or assignable.

It is clear that a pledge cannot be forfeited to the King,  
or act of a Pawnee, as by his Treason. Tenny Pl. 1. Bac 138.

But a person may thus forfeit, what he is capable  
of conveying in his own right, i.e. what he can convey  
by contract. 1. Just 8. 12. 12. Co 12. Cro Eliz 50. 1. Bac 238.  
276. 7. 1 Ber 238. Moor 100. 1. Ber 350. Co Litt 8. 2 Bac 376.

It is also settled that a pledge cannot be taken on  
Credit of a Pawnee, because the interest of Pawnee is of such  
a nature, as to render it dangerous to the right of  
Pawnee, to allow it to be thus taken. 1. Bac. 258. 352.  
Sayer of. 13. 76. B. 1. Twen 124.

Is laid down in Brooks abridgment, yet a Lien cannot be "aliened" evidently meaning that it cannot be assigned. 1. bes 509. 1. Pac 238.

I think it appears from the authorities, analogy and principle, that a pledge cannot be assigned before a day of payment. A pledge is in the nature of a personal trust, and if it could be assigned, the Pawnor would be in a dangerous situation, for if the Pawnee should become a bankrupt, and the Pawn lost through fraud or mismanagement, the Pawnor could not resort to the assignee.

This is the principle which governs fiduciary acts relating to Real Property as Lands. They cannot be converted or embezzled. Nor can the Mischief or knavery prevent a redemption. But a Chattel may be run away with, embezzled or destroyed.

There is a case in 2. bes. 691. It now seems to show that a pledge may be assigned before the day of payment. As a pawned goods to B. who directly afterwards and before a day of payment, pawned them to C. I got a bill to redeem of C. and was decided that I should pay the sum due from B to C. as well as that due from himself to C.

But it is to be observed, the bill was brought after Trepiture. (Otherwise he would have brought his action at Law and not in Equity) when the equitable interest of the assignee was precisely what it would have been had the assignment been made after the Trepiture. To now have raised the question for discussion, it should have appeared, that there had been a tender of payment to the Pawnee, or the action should have been Trepit and brought at Law. Point not yet settled. 2. besm 691.8. & Cox 583. Pre Cy 419.20.

But the Pawnor may forfeit his interest in the pledge, by Treason, Felony. But the King or Duke cannot take a pledge without paying the debt due from the Pawnor, for the interest forfeited by the Pawnor, is only an Equity of Redem. 1. Pac 238.

1. besm  
23.  
July. 178.

According to S.C. The law construction is, that a Pawner cannot  
 apportion before forfeiture, and if the Pawner were to apportion  
 he would be immediately subject to an action in Treason.  
 The apportioner would also be liable, he must deliver up.

It was then held essential to a Pawn, that it shall be delivered  
 at a time when it was agreed, and it was intended to  
 secure, and that if it was afterwards delivered, it was  
 not a pledge, but a licence to excuse a trespass, in  
 taking it, to be retained during the Pawner's pleasure. 43

But this was now so, and to settle yet the pledge may  
 be delivered as well after, as at the time of contracting  
 y. sub. 1. Co. 57. 2. Leon 30. 1. Bac 238. 1. G. 1. 104. 1. Bull 35.  
 1. Bull. 35. 1. des 308. 3.

It was formerly doubted, and if no day of payment was  
 fixed, payment or tender would reinstate the property  
 in the Pawner, and made during the life of the  
 parties.

It is now settled yet in such case, y. Pawner may  
 redeem at any time during his own life - tho' this is  
 deemed too. 1. Bac. 238. Cro. 2. 244. 3. 2. Bull 29. 2. Co. 1.  
 1. G. 1. 178. 1. d. Ray 434. 1. des 78. Provided however  
 that the bailee can't call on him sooner, to redeem.  
 This proviso has been added, so since the rule was  
 laid down, see 2. Case 206. But where no day of payment  
 is fixed, y. Pawner must be redeemed, i.e. tender, or payment  
 made, if at all, y. during the life of the Pawner. For payment  
 or tender by his Ex<sup>or</sup> will not avail at Law. The reason  
 of this is that there ought at Law, to be some limitation, i.e. <sup>1. G. 1. 178.</sup>  
 to y. right to redeem, for seems the bailee might suffer.  
 For tho' he may sue in the meantime, y. Pawner  
 may be worth nothing, or may be out of the reach of Process,  
 and thus the only remedy, not be the Lien on the Pawn.  
 Dord. and 4. Com. 208. 2. Co. 1. 400. Cro. 2. 244. Jan. 178.  
 There still remains no right of redemption after his  
 death.



Bac. supposed that there was still be a right of Redem-  
ption in Equity after the death of a pawnor,  
because he has a right to sell the pledge after a  
foreclosure at Law. 1. Bac 239. 1. Ans. 205.

If a day of payment is fixed by the contract, & pawnor  
interest not perfected by his death, & it occur before  
day of payment. But after his death, his representatives  
may redeem by pay<sup>t</sup> or tendering, just as the Pawnor  
might, if he had lived. 1. Bull 28. Bac. 239.  
4. Com. & Corp 209.

3<sup>th</sup>  
Clasp of Bailment of the 5<sup>th</sup> kind is a delivery of goods, to be  
"Bailment" carried on to have some act done, to them by the Bailee  
for a reward paid him. Jones 50. 127. 8. 32. 4. 44. 2d Ray  
913. 14. 1. Bac. 343.

This class includes a delivery, to a common carrier, a  
private carrier, an Innkeeper, Mechanic, &c. and the 2.  
different classes of Bailees, viz. Common Carriers, and Private  
persons, require a distinct consid<sup>r</sup>. 1. Jones. 133. 4.

A delivery to a private person, includes a delivery to a  
private professional character, as to Tailor, Barber, Broker,  
or any private agent in General. Includes a delivery of  
Beasts to pasture to an agisting Farmer. 2d Ray 916.  
Jones 50. 128. 9.

This bailment being advantageous to both  
parties, Bailee is bound to use his own care,  
and is liable for only ordinary neglect, and this is done  
both on principle and authority. 1. Bull 4. 2d Ray 917.  
1. Com. & Corp. 204. 12. Mod 485. Jones 14. 20. 32. 38. 48.

A Bailee of this class is prima facie excusable, (this varies  
as in 3<sup>d</sup> class) in the case of robbery, as the other  
Bailees before mentioned Jones 129. 130. 5. 1. Ans. 55.  
2d Ray 918. 1. Bull 131. 4. Co 54. n. 1. Mod 402.



In case of more loss by Theft, & Bailor is liable or not, as it appears that he owed ordinary care or not. Jones 139, Vent 121. Ed Reg. 118. 2. Lev. 51

If the thing bailed is distrained by Bailor's Landlord, for rent, as it may be, the Bailor is liable, it seems, for permitting it to be distrained upon, instead of his own goods. He must be liable at least for ordinary neglect. Jones. 141. 2. 3 Bo. 5. 3 Burr. 148. 1398.

It wd seem that he is liable independently of all neglect, for as the Bailor's property has been sold to pay his debt, he shd be liable as for money laid out, and compensated for his own loss. Here he is no Loser, for he pays only for benefit received.

According to Jones, if metal is delivered to a Smith, to be wrought into an identical Smith and case, as Bailor. Such delivery he maintains, vests the property absolutely in the Smith as a medium, and if a loss happens, he must be liable at all events. Jones. 83. or 9. 149. 143. The reason is, the metals when wrought, cannot be identified. 2. Bo. 404.

This seems to be incorrect, tho it is true that the owner cannot identically know the metal, yet if the fact can be proved that it is the same, it can be identified in point of fact, and therefore can be specifically restored. The hardship of y case is another material objection to y doctrine. If the metal were destroyed even by the act of God, before any alteration made, the Smith wd be liable. In case of a Medium the Bailor purchases the property delivered, to return an Equivalent. There tho no injury wd arise from the Smith's using the metals for another purpose. Yet he has strictly no right to do so. It is considered by Jones as a Medium in wh case the Smith wd be a purchaser. But

it is not strictly a Mutuum. In the case of a Mutuum  
the rule is undoubtedly hold, as where wheat is  
loaned to A. and is consumed or destroyed, there it  
is virtually a hire-hire. It is liable at all events.  
2. Bb Co. a 404. Popham 38. Moor ex. The Ct of  
N York have rejected this Rule 19. 3d 44

When property is delivered to a Bailor, who is to perform  
some act, of which upon it is about done in his professional  
character, or in the line of his occupation for hire, the law  
imposes a hire-hire contract, on his part. It not only  
implies a contract that he will redeliver it, when the  
purpose of the Bailment is answered. But also that the  
work shall be performed skilfully or in a workmanlike  
manner. 11 Co 54. a. 3 Bb. 165. 6. 1. Tams 374 Esp 601.  
Jones 128. 9. 3/4 40. 1. Hb Bb. 158.

'50"

But if an act to be performed is not in the line of the  
Bailor's profession or common avocation, the law implies  
no contract on his part that the act shall be skilfully  
done and therefore Bailor cannot be liable in the making  
an express agreement that it should be done skilfully. 3 Bb. 166  
Esp 601. Jones 138. 40. 1. Hb Bb. 158. See "action on the case".

As to Insurance B. G. thinks it should depend on the  
usage of the place.

If goods of any kind are delivered to a Bailor and are  
lost or destroyed for want of that care, which is required  
of him by law, he is not entitled to wages for the labour  
previously bestowed upon them. This on principle seems  
to be the rule. And there is little said on the subject  
in the books. 3 Bac. or Burr. 1592. 2. 3. Esp Dig 96.

But if the property should be lost after the labour had been  
bestowed & without the Bailor's fault, it would seem he would  
be entitled to wages. 3 Bac or Burr. 1592. 3. Esp 55.  
Jones says B. G. if lost by the Bailor's neglect, or fault.

Common Carriers have become so frequent now. that the Law considers them as very important.

A common carrier is any one, in general, who makes it his business to carry the goods of another for hire as a Wagoner, Porter, Drayman, and also a master of a Ship employed, in carrying freight. *Id* Ray 918. Jones 149. 107. 4 Co 54. Ray 220. 1. T. R. 27. 2 So 617. 1. Bac 345. 343. Allen 73. or 93. Cro J. 330. Rescues Law of carriers.

It seems formerly to have been doubted an any other than a carrier by land, came within the description of a Common Carrier. The Law on the subject was first extended to common Wagoner, in the reign of Sam. I. and to Shipmasters in Ch. 2<sup>d</sup>. Jones 149. *Ibid* 132. T. R. 178. Cro J. 330. *Id* Raymo 918. 1. Vent 190. 238. 12 Mod 487. 2 Lev 69. There is now no doubt of the liability of carriers on the water. 1. Selw. 313. 4. Lamm. 718.

The masters of ships carrying goods for other persons, are then common Carriers. In case of a loss, and in case of a loss of action may be lost either to the owner, or the Master. In shortland at Law. the owner alone will be liable, as the Master is his Servant. But there are many reasons which render it just and necessary that the Master *Ind*. The Freighters often know nothing of the owners. Talk 440. Park 62. 3 Lev. 259. 1. T. R. 178. 2 So 623.

By the Eng. Trials 7<sup>th</sup> Geo 2<sup>d</sup> and 26. Geo 3<sup>d</sup> is provided that when the loss has happened by the misconduct of the Master, or Mariners, y owners shall be y subjected to the value of the Ship and Freight, tho' the master wd be liable for the whole. 1. T. R. 18. 178. Marsh. 100. 1. Selw. 342. 10. 2. Com. 288. Abbot 231. This <sup>is not</sup> prevail here. & in the *Ind*

If a common carrier having contracted to carry the goods of another, & having his hire tendered to him, refuses to carry them, he is liable to an action on the case.



For by assuming this public character, he impliedly holds out an offer to carry for any one applying to him. So that there is an implied contract to carry them. Bull 70. 1. Bac 180.2. 339. 3 Pl. 100. 2 How 327. Jerey. 6.59. Joy 92. Card. 103.

But this a common carrier is bound to receive property as mentioned in the last Rule, yet he is at liberty to make a conditional or special acceptance. The Law allows him to say that he will not be answerable, or a Discharge in he is told what value it contains and is promised that a reward proportionate to the risk is given him, or shall be given him and he may demand it before hand.  
4 Burr 2208. W. 622.

The bailment here being advantageous to both Parties, it wd follow, if there were no circumstances to impeach the application of the Gen Principle, that the common carrier wd be liable for nothing less than ordinary neglect, and this was the case as late as 17th<sup>th</sup>. In the reign of Eli, it was settled that robbery was no excuse. But the Rule at that time extended no further. Inst 39. a. Jones 144. 5: 4 Pl. 84. a.

+ The bailment, here, being advantageous to both Parties, it wd follow, if there were no circumstances to impeach the application of the Gen Principle, yet the common carrier wd be liable for nothing less than ordinary neglect. *vide supra*.

The rule now is that the common carrier is liable for any loss, occasioned in any manner, except by act of God, of public enemies or of Bailor. Bull. 50. 1. 4. Id. Ray 98. 3. Burr 593. For 128. 1. Pl. 127. Little 15. 1. Hyl. 281. 1. East 203. Pl. 610. Jones 144. 5. 6. 3 Day or Steps 376. 1. Pow C. 253.

It will be seen then that the liability of a common carrier is extended far beyond yet of other Bailies, where the bailment is advantageous to both, and the distinction is



founded on Public Policy. A great part of the Commerce of the world, is carried on by Common Carriers. If their liability were exactly the same, as that of common Bailies, they will have it in their power to commit great frauds by collusion among themselves. Shipmen are under the necessity of insuring them, therefore there ought to be the strictest regulation for the protection of Commerce. It does not suggest a different reason well because of the reward which they receive, but the same holds as to private carriers and that he who receives a reward, is necessary to constitute a common carrier. 4 Co 84. n. 1. R. 148. 1. Bac 346. 1. Y. B. 34. See Ray. 918. 1. Den 148. 1. n. D. 318. 1. Cat 604.

A common carrier is liable to goods sent in he is bound or is to be paid, because if he carries gratuitously, he does not act as an Common Carrier: but as a Mandatary. 1. Cat 486. 1. Co 621. 1. Cat 604.

A com. Car. is in y nature of an insurer at all events, in acts of God, or public enemies, & of Bailies. If then the goods are lost by any cause, above human control, he is excused. But for a loss by fire occasioned otherwise than by lightning, he is <sup>not</sup> liable. If it be by accident or occasioned by an incendiar, he is not excused. 1. Y. B. 33. 4. 144. 1. Den 125. 2. H. B. 113. 1. Y. B. 16. a. 1. Co 620. 1. Selw. 363. 2. Com. 254. 1. R. 401. 1. Y. B. 34.

Where goods are spoiled in consequence of a hole gnawed through the side of a vessel by a rat, the carrier is not helden liable. 1. Den 147. 5. 1. Bull. 70. 1. Selw. 363. 1. Hils 281. Rule the same for running on Sheds.

He is liable for losses occasioned by y acts of Rebels or Insurgents, for they are not such public enemies as come within the Rule. 1. Den 239.

Pirates are public enemies within y Rule. But it has been decided that a shipmaster is not excused for losses

occasioned by Freshwater Pirates. 15. rotters in Harbours.  
1. J.R. 18. Cb 620. 1 Bent 160. 230. 1. Wm d 80. Jones 105.  
at 200. 37. 1. Con R. 487.

If a tempest should make it necessary to throw the goods overboard, & carrier is excused: for this the immediate act of throwing the goods overboard, is not the act of God, & necessity was occasioned by the act of God.

Jones 107. Roll R. 70. 2. Bull. 280. Cb 620. 12. Cb 63. 1. Selw. 303.  
1. Carrier 43.

There is a case where a box of Jewels, was thrown overboard in a Tempest. & the master was held liable for the Loss. Probably the box was light and there was no necessity for throwing it over. This decision must have turned on the point, that it was unnecessary, or it cannot be Law. Allen 93. Jones 107.

In the case of loss by throwing the goods overboard, in a tempest, owners, master, freighters, & passengers, must apportion the Loss among them by the Law Merchant, or Maritime Law, for twain for the benefit of all. 3 Bac 584. 2. Lea More 148. 2. J.R. 404. Deaves 148.

This is a rule of the Lex Mercatoria which is a branch of the C Law. 1. Cart 220. On this subject there is a St in Connt. 1. Connt R. 428. 487.

As to passengers contributing in such case, Bay Thurtes Piney mistaken, for nothing is bit into the average but what can be deemed a part of the Cargo. Manh. 456.

A Con Car. is excused when the loss is occasioned by an act or fraud of the Sailor. Thus where a delivers a cask of wine to B in a state of fermentation, to be carried and the cask bursts in consequence thereof, B was held not to be liable. Bull 57. Cb 621. Full at P. 74. 59. 69.

So where a carrier wagon is full and the owner

insists on the goods being carried. It is willing to take his chance, as his own fault, if the goods are lost. 2. Show 127. 1. Bac 344. 3. Comm. Re. 18.

So in the case of Inkeepers, when they insist.

As a purpose of subjecting the carrier, the goods must have been lost while in his immediate possession and under his immediate care and controls.

If the owner sends his servant in the stage or ship, to take care of y goods and he takes charge of them, y carrier isn't liable for y loss wh may happen. The meaning of the Rule must be, yet the master isn't liable as a common carrier. He doubtless wd be liable if the goods were lost by his fault or neglect, as if y goods shd be spoiled in consequence of the ship's being unseaworthy. Bull 70. 2. 612. 1. 682. 2. Show 307. 3. 308. 170. Bac 344. 1. Show. 325. 1. 681.

The ant of the Rule, then, seems to be, yet in such case y master isn't liable for want of care, in y custody of y goods, as com. car. but he wd be as private carrier, i.e. for misconduct or want of ordinary care.

But where goods are delivered to a Master and a passenger, is merely requested to take the oversight of them. The master's liability is not impaired. 1. Bull 2. 2. 344. 1. 17.

It seems yb a com. car. is liable for y loss of a box, tho ignorant of the contents, wh he discharges himself by an qualified or Special acceptance. Focus in case of y Substantary. Bull 70. 2. East 128. 1. 148. Jones 148. 1. 116 480. 1. 622. 4. Burr 2238. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

And according to two decisions, tho y carrier is misinformed of y contents, by the owner, he is still liable, wh he accept specially. In one of these cases. The owner told the



carrier, "it y box contained articles of small value," when in fact it contained money. But still y carrier was holden liable. Allen 93. 1. bents. 238. 1. Bac 340. Bull 70. Jones 140.

In y other cases y owner said, y box contained a book and some tobacco, when it contained 100 £. Ibid. Doe and Sta 130. 3 H. 6. 435. Allen 93.

Both of these cases appear to be opposed to every principle of justice. The books say he may discharge himself by a special acceptance. 12. in the present case, by saying, "I will not take your word y box contains only books &c. La. Transpica has expressed his disapprobation of y Rule. & the latter opinions of La. King and La. Henrich are also opposed to it. 4. Burr 2300. Sta 145. 1. Cast 510. a letter decessor. Selw. 500. 8. Jy. thinks these cases ant Law. Jones 145.

If A delivers to B. a box containing £ 1000. telling him it contains 100 £. there is a fraud practiced upon the carrier. The amt is concealed in order to diminish the price. The carrier has no opportunity of knowing the amt. and certainly cannot be considered a bailee of the 1000 £. He is bailee only of y 100 £. So far as he is informed, so far, he ought to be liable. It is in the nature of Insurer, against risk. Jones 145. Esp. D. 621. Bull 70.1.

Much has been said with regard to a qualified or Special Acceptance. 12. an acceptance intended to qualify the Liability of the Bailor. To make such an acceptance, it any necessary, that there shd be a personal communication between the Bailor and Carrier. An advertisement in a public newspaper, may be sufficient to constitute a qualified acceptance. But as it is so, or not, depends upon an y owner had notice of this advertisement, and this must be left with the Jury. Bull 71. 4. Burr 2298. Carth 488. 1. H. 36. 208. 300. m. C. 622. Selw. 308. 8. 4. Cam. 40,



Under a general acceptance, in no case of fraud, the carrier is liable for what he receives, but under a Special acceptance, he is liable for so much only, as he agrees to carry. In this case the carrier's reward extends to no more & is embraced in the Special acceptance as to any thing to which his reward don't extend. he isn't a com. car. and consequently isn't answerable as such. Esp 621. 2. Carth 480. Bull 70-1. 1. 1st De 288. 2 East 134.

In the case in H B. a owner having concealed the value, y carrier was held not to be liable at all, but in that case there was a Special acceptance, by the terms of which he was not liable. Carth 480. Esp 621. 4 East 371. & East. 554. Esp 622, 620.

A master of a stage coach who receives paymt for passengers only. & not for goods, is not liable as a Com. Car. And if they are lost by his fault, he is liable. Com. R. 25. 1. Bac 343. 4. 2. Shaw 128. Talk 282.

This a com car isn't liable for more than his reward extends to. Yet he is liable w/out actual paymt made beforehand, or w/out any Express promise of paymt.

Because he may recover his hire upon a Quantum Meruit. he isn't bound however to receive the goods w/out paymt. 1 Bac 343. 1. Shaw 302. 2. Shaw 8. 129. Cro J. 262.

A notice of the Bailee limiting his liability put up in conspicuous place, in his office, dispenses with the necessity of a Personal communication with the Bailor and will give a strong reason to presume that the Bailor understood his terms.

To charge the Carrier it isn't necessary that the goods be lost in transit, for if they are lost at the place and before the delivery, he is clearly liable & if the goods are not delivered and are lost, he is liable, and he

When ~~one~~ the consigned custom is to deliver  
but to report at the time. The ~~new~~ rule is that he is  
liable of course till delivery, but it is an error that he  
shall not be liable to deliver. 2 B. & C. 3. M. 425.  
L. 523. Bac 350. 1 B. & C. 34. 3 B. 304. 3 Com. B. 13  
If the goods are directed to B. they are to be delivered.  
The carrier is liable till such delivery.

When the custom is for a carrier not to deliver the goods  
to a consignee but to keep them in store for him,  
the carrier is liable as a common carrier, after they are deposited  
in the store. 4 B. & C. 48. B. 523. 2 B. 27.

But if he keeps them as a Depositary without a reward  
for the Storage, he will be liable as such. If he keeps  
them for a reward for the Storage, he will be liable  
as a hirer, and liable for want of ordinary care.

Does not the price of carrying include a custody?  
And if so he will be liable as Bailee of the third  
class.

If delivering goods on a dock, see 1 Selw. 302. 1 B. 200.  
3 B. 115. 1 Selw. 304. Bac 350. Owen 57. Bac 39. Geo 34  
2 B. & C. 37. 5 B. 390. 2 Com. Contract. 272.

If a consignee of goods directs by what carrier they shall  
be sent, he and not the consignee will be entitled to the  
action, for he is the Bailee. 8 B. & C. 333. Co. 57. B. 50.  
3 Com. 254.

Whenever the consignee makes himself liable for the  
price of conveyance, it takes upon himself a risk, he  
is entitled to the action even though the consignee selects  
the carrier. 8 B. & C. 333. 1 Co. 2. 43. 52. B. 50. 5 B. 390  
or 2 B. 2680. 1 B. & C. 600. 1 Selw. 313. n. 2.

† naming none in particular

If one sends an order for goods without naming a carrier &  
the vendor delivers them to the carrier, they are at the

note of the sender, 5 W. 330. 248. 3 300.  
582. 2 Camb 35. 2 L. 312. 2 L. 232. 2 L. 212. 2 L. 212.  
42. not in the Eng Edition. m. r. c. v. 17 v.

When an action is brought on the owner it must be brought  
on the owner. when it is against the carrier, 440. 2 L. 523.  
5 Burr 261. 14. 5 W. 65. 2 L. 312. 3 L. 525. 5 W. 65.  
65. 2 L. 312. It is "ex quasi contractu" Secus if it  
sounds in tort.

As to the Non-owners of the owner, 5 Burr 261. 14. 2 L. 312.  
2 L. 312. 1. L. 261. 6. see Pledings.

By the 17th C. Law, a Postmaster was liable as a common  
carrier, for letters, money &c. intrusted to him by mail, for  
by 17th C. Law, he was acting in a private capacity. But  
since the establishment of a general Post Office by Law,  
and the suppression of Private Posts, by 2 L. 2. Cr. 2.  
the Postmaster has ceased to be considered a Com Carrier.  
He enters into no private contract with private individuals.  
2 L. 17. 2 L. 17. 645. 2 L. 17. 64. Jones 103. See  
Master and Servant Paction on the case.

It is unreasonable to give the character of a Com Carrier, that  
he should receive hire from the individual who employs  
him. But a Postmaster receives payment as an agent  
for the government, & for their use. No one can incur  
so great a responsibility as Postmaster, if they  
were liable as Common Carriers. From the nature  
of his character, he is not liable to an individual for  
default of his deputies. They are agents of the Law.  
It is liable as an individual injured for his own neglect  
& so are his subordinate officers liable for theirs.  
But no farther. 3 W. 443. Cow or Com. 760. Jones 8.

Common carriers are liable in the books. It is liable in  
the books of the Law. But this is totally unnecessary, for the Law







Enclosed is such. It always a private Bailiff.  
Ex 225.6.

It is. Classes this Bailiff under the 6<sup>th</sup> division  
i.e. a Mandatary.

A mandatary as such, is always a private Bailiff.  
he receives the goods to take care of them. *Quia* did  
an Innkeeper is always recompensed for his care.

It. he receives directly a price for keeping them. Even  
for inanimate things he is rewarded by another gainful  
contract: by wh. he is bound to entertain his guests.  
The pay for a room, or chamber, has reference to  
to the Storage. Bull 73. Jones 130.2.4.

The Bailiff in this case being advantageous to both  
parties, the Innkeeper, not according to the Gen Principle  
be liable for ordinary neglect, only. But the policy  
of the Law has extended his liability somewhat farther.  
It seems to be a prevailing opinion, that an Inn-  
keeper's liability is coextensive with that of a Com Car.  
But I know of no express authority to that effect.  
He is clearly liable for loss occasioned by Servants  
in any way. The Law on this subject is intended  
for the benefit of Travellers. They being in general  
strangers to him, & therefore, exposed to danger in losing  
their goods, unless he were liable to them. 8 Co 32.3.  
Bull 73. 1. Bl 430. Jones 133. 4. D. a. b. 232.0.0.

According to the General Rule, he is also liable, if  
g. goods have been stolen by a stranger, and there  
has been neglect or not. He isn't excused here by  
Ordinary care, so he not be by the v. General Principle.  
Jones 134. Cro J. 184. 224. & Co 33. a. 87 R. 276. I J  
thinks that the policy of Law requires, y<sup>t</sup> he shd  
be liable as Com Carrier. Tho he finds nothing is  
this point.

This rule don't hold if the goods have been stolen

by the guest's own Servant, or by his travelling companion  
or by any other who lodges in the room with him.  
by his own request. Cro Elr 885. or 255. & Co 33. a.  
3 Bac. 183. Cro 8. 825.

It wd seem Innkeepers are liable for  
losts. occasioned by common robbery. And on this subject  
there don't seem to be any authorities that are  
conclusive. In Plowd. 3. tis said that if the Inn be  
broken. and the goods. taken by the King's enemy.  
& Innkeeper is excused. Now this seems to imply  
that he wd be liable for any other robbery.

On assigning a reason for this rule. it is said to be.  
yt such force is subjoined insupportable. The conclusion  
from the authorities it wd seem. must be. that for  
a robbery committed by a small party. he wd be liable.  
But if it were by a large party. as by a Mob.  
or by Insurgents. he wd be excused. Hence it  
appears he aint liable to the extent of a corn carrier.  
Dowd 155. a. And the authorities aint conclusive. & Co 32. a. b.  
3 Bac. 182. Co 626. 7. Quere J. C. Jones 350.

By the Roman Law nothing less than inevitable  
accident excused him & our Law is very much like it  
being deduced from it, almost word for word.

It wd seem that the Innkeeper aint Liable, if there  
is some default in himself, or his Servant. but tis  
ant Law and tis expressly denied by J. Buller.  
8. Co 33. Co 526. 7. 4 W. 6. 270.

The Innkeeper is liable only for such goods as are  
"Infra Portam". But this includes his outhouse, and  
Stables. & Co 33. b. Co 626. 7. 4 Marsh and Selw. 310.

If the goods of a guest are removed from an Inn.  
and lost. by his own neglect, & Innkeeper is regularly  
not liable. As if a guest orders his horse to be sent

the a position which open I he is certain, he is liable for  
his own fault, that I have not "infra dictionem"  
Bull. 3. l. 1. c. 4. p. 52. 8. l. 2. 3

It may be observed that if a guest enters his horse, to be  
put into a cart and he escapes, and is lost for want  
of an adequate fence, the Keeper will be liable on the ground  
of ordinary neglect, but not on the rule founded on policy.

If damage is done by the bagger's neglect, a bagger may  
sue him in assumpsit, on the agreement either express or  
implied, or in tort for the neglect. 3 East 62. 1. Mils 282.  
2 Sess 36.

But in this case, neither debt nor trover will lie, for  
there is no unlawful detainer or actual misfeasance.

#### 4<sup>th</sup> Class of Bailments. Mandatum.

A mandate, which is a delivery of goods to be carried on  
some other act to be done to them without a reward.  
This species of Bailment is sometimes called "acting on  
commission" but the expression is grossly improper and the  
proper name is mandate, as the carrying is gratuitous.  
One difference between this and a deposit, is, the one  
is to do some act, and the other to keep some article.

Bull. 3. l. 1. c. 4. p. 203. 2d Ray 88. Bull. 1. c. 15.

A Bailment of this kind being very advantageous to the bailor,  
only, the Bailor is liable according to the General principle,  
for nothing less, than gross neglect, and such is the Law.

2d Ray. 300. 1. W. l. 1. c. 15. p. 103. 4. 2d Ray 203. 4. These are some  
qualifications.

But where there is an express agreement by the bailor  
to use more care, care required in principle, and the  
loss happens by the neglect of the bailor, who he agreed to  
use, he is clearly liable. But this is account of







impliedly engages to use all necessary care and skill.  
Jones, 183.4. An unfounded distinction D.C. 15. B.C. 258.  
true second.

But where there is no engagement, express or implied,  
to use all care and skill, the bailee is liable for  
gross neglect only. Jones 74. 1. Pow 255.

1. a merchant engages to enter at the Custom House, a good  
of B.C. with his own, and to do it gradually, he did it,  
but made a wrong denomination, in consequence of which  
they were forfeited. & was held not liable, but his own  
goods were lost to the same amt. and therefore there was  
essentially no gain. 1. J.C. B.C. 158. 1. Pow 255. 3 B.C. 155  
5. Jones 149. 58. B.C. 601.

Jones agrees that a bailment to convey goods,  
is not imply a contract to use all necessary care and  
skill. Jones 172. 87.

It has been observed, that the Law implies an engagement,  
to use all necessary care and skill, on the part of the  
bailee, when the act to be done is in the line of  
his professional business; but this implied agreement extends  
only to the avoidance of the doing of the act, and no further.  
There is no implied agreement to use all care and skill  
in keeping it, for if the goods should be lost, by the bailee,  
he is liable only for gross neglect. Thus a tailor  
engages to make a garment to order, the Law implies  
an agreement to do the work skillfully, but not to keep it.  
1. J.C. B.C. 158. 1. Pow 255. 3 B.C. 155.

Even an express agreement to the bailee to use all  
necessary care and skill, will not subject him for losses  
occasioned by the acts of God, or public enemies,  
or the Bailee. 1. J.C. B.C. 158. 1. Pow 255. 3 B.C. 155.

But it is not same in principle that a Bailee, cannot  
even by express agreement, exempt himself from losses occasioned

as he can find a bill. The contra Bono's then, ago  
is Jan. Bono 00.75.

It has been observed that according to some authorities,  
in cases of stipulated care, it grows negligent.

It was suggested to. But can it be true or not,  
on the delivery of the bag, if delivery binds him as a  
contract. So that after the goods are delivered & a

Mandatum, & engagement in his said Bono's is implied,  
binds him, as a contract. But he can't bound before

delivery. If I promise to build a house for a man,  
and at the same time refuse to do it, he cannot compel

me, for he's a nudum pactum & if I promise to carry  
46. goods for a B. and at the same time refuse to take them,  
I am not liable, but after having taken them, I shall

47. Action on the case. certainly be bound to carry them. 2d Ray 22. 5th B. 143.

7. Cro. P. 607. 200 and 210. 120. 100. 200. 2d Ray 22. 11.

12. mod 48. 49. 4. 120. 100. 200. 100. 200.

The opinions are not all coincident on this point.

But beside the above authorities, there is a judicial decision  
directly in point. A. & B. deliver money to C. and C.  
promises to deliver it over to D. If he receives of B. in  
assent. 49. 120. Cro. P. 607. 4. 12. mod 48.

Bono says the liability of the Bailie is founded on his  
neglect, and not on the promise. 2d Ray 22.  
5th B. 143. 100. 200. 100. 200.

4 John 84. Dons says (1758) that where Special damage, arising  
on account of the party's not taking the goods according  
to the agreement, an action will lie, tho' the contract is  
gratuitous, and this, he says, is because of the Special damage.  
The damage must accrue, & at all in the breach of the  
contract, but this will be "damnum absque injuria".  
The question of damage cannot arise, till the question of  
contract has been settled, and he begins at the  
tail end, for how he can be said to be wronged, till the  
damages, before he ascertains, on the action will lie.

Besides, the case with Jones subrogates will not support damage, even if the action. Atot Law: 4 Jones 84.

On the other hand when the goods have been delivered, special damages are not necessary to support the action. The Law presumes damage, where there has been a breach of contract. Id Ray R.R. 10. 6. 20.

It is said, that if action is a mandatory, his undertaking being gratuitous, it is founded upon his request, and not upon his promise Express or Implied. If this is the case, how can an Express promise extend his liability?

Jones 86. 1. Rule 10. He may surely make himself an insurer, vs all risks; but if his express promise wd not bind him as such, how can he become more liable by any promise, than without one? There is no foundation for this opinion. Jones cites, Rule, but is doubtful as he supports his position. It seems to be the intent of all the authorities, that he is liable on the promise. Jones 86. or 86. Contra. Id Ray. 300. 10. 3. 10. 140. 3. 50. East 52.

## General Rules of L. in.

A Lien is understood to be a direct claim or Incumbrance upon some specific property of another, as security for some debt or duty, and accompanied with a portion of the definition is correct, it wd seem of a Lien wd be only in favour of Bailies of the 3<sup>rd</sup> class and also fourth class. It wd not all of the 3<sup>rd</sup>. It is true that a King. has a right to detain the goods, but this wd not a Lien. It is a direct property, not an incumbrance to secure a debt.

Lat 522. Co. 8. 585. De Chy 418. Cro 5. 245.

In the case of a debitorary mandatory, there can obviously be no Lien. The Bailor may countermand the delivery, whenever he pleases. Id 588.

A Bailor of the 4<sup>th</sup> kind always has a Lien on the goods



of a pawn, a Lien is created by the delivery, for that is a kind of act of the owner. 3 Bac 244. 5. 2d Ed 178. Talk 522. 3d Ed 418.

Most bailies of the 5<sup>th</sup> kind, have also Lien, i.e. a right to hold the goods entrusted to them as security for their hire or reward. But this act of case of an Bailie of the 5<sup>th</sup> kind. 3 Bac 135. 1 Ed 42. This Lien is created by a contract in Law.

A person who obtains possession of the goods from the owner wrongfully, has no claim to this Lien, 3 Bac 555. 2d Ed 485. Talk 605.

A common carrier has a Lien till his hire is paid. 2d Ray 182. 80<sup>th</sup>. 5 Bac 282. 2d Ed 64. Contra 2d Ray 180<sup>th</sup>. Not Law.

And as laid down by 2d Roll, that if goods are stolen, and delivered to a Com Carrier, y latter may detain them as long as the owner, till his reward for y damage of them, is paid. for as a Com Carrier he is bound to receive them. 2d Ray 5<sup>th</sup> Ed 80<sup>th</sup>.

An Innkeeper may detain the person of his guest for the payment of his bills, viz. for horse, 2d Ed. He has a Lien upon his bedding, for he is bound to receive him. 3 Bac 185. 2d Ed 50. 1. 2d Ed 260.

He may also detain the horse of his guest, till his bedding is paid, for. But the horse cannot be detained for y payment of the guests entertainment. The owner however may be detained till the whole is paid. 3 Bac 265. 2d Ray 508. Bull 10. 5. Co 147. Talk 388. 2d Ed 584.

And an innkeeper may detain y horse, even tho' not by a Lien, not the true owner, and he may detain him, viz



he was owner, till his keeping is paid for. It will  
his business to know the true owner, and to rely that  
the horse has been kept in his possession. *Ido. 5.*  
3. *Bac. 180. 6. Popham 128. 7. 8. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.*

But the Innkeeper loses his Lien by voluntarily permitting  
the horse to go out of his possession. Indeed that is  
a rule with regard to all Liens upon Personal Property.  
Possession is essential to all such Liens. A Lien is  
a right to detain and necessarily refers to that which  
is already in his possession. *Ido. 5. 8. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.*

Most private Bailies, of the 5<sup>th</sup> class, have also a Lien.  
a tailor or other mechanic to whom goods are  
delivered, to be wrought, has a Lien till a bill for so  
much is paid. It is true that he is not bound to receive  
the goods, and his Lien therefore cannot be founded  
on that principle. It is said to exist for a promotion  
of trade. If however the tailor is in the habit of trusting  
the Bailor, he ought not to detain without giving notice  
for he is presumed to have done the work on the Personal  
credit of the Bailor. *8. Co. 14. 1. Bac. 240. n. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.*

On the other hand an agenting Farmer cannot detain  
property committed to him, till paid. First, because  
he will be bound to recover them 2<sup>d</sup> The Interest of  
Trade and Commerce, will be affected by it. *Ido. 5. 8. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.*

Bull 20. *Ido. 5. 8. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.*

The Captain of a ship has no Lien upon her for his wages,  
and Freight, for he is deemed to trust to the personal  
credit of the owners. If he had a Lien, he might make  
a very improper use, to the great injury of the owners.  
He might keep her in a foreign country to enforce his  
Lien, till she became useless. *Ido. 5. 8. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.*

12. March 440. Abbot on Shipping 143. 400. 1. Ball 48. 23. 2p  
 632. 5<sup>th</sup> d.

The mariners, however, have a lien upon her, for they are  
 supposed to contract upon the credit of the ship and  
 there is no damage to the ship to be apprehended from  
 it, they may liber the ship even in a foreign port  
 of Admiralty and have her condemned and sold for their  
 wages. The master has, generally, the power to pay them off.  
 He is the person to whom they are to look for payment.  
 Abbot 400. 2p 238

In all cases in which there is a Special Express of value  
 on the ship, unless he has no Lien, he has no Lien.  
 It has been decided in the case of a Farmer, who claimed  
 a right to detain a horse, until paid for his care.  
 That an Express promise on the part of the owner, to  
 pay a certain sum for the care, would be the right to  
 detain, because, says, said that the Farmer relied on the  
 Express promise. It comes within the maxim "Expressum  
 facit cessare tacitum". 10th ed. 5. Que 17. 2. 10th ed.  
 2p 880. 6. Not Law.

Law Treat 10th ed. 10th ed. 10th ed. 10th ed. 10th ed.  
 3rd ed. 10th ed. 10th ed. 10th ed. 10th ed.

A Factor has a Lien on the goods in his possession.  
 Master and Servant. 3. 3. 10th ed. 10th ed. 10th ed.  
 1. Bac o Barr 324. 404. 2. 36. 10th ed. 404. 2p 108. "Master  
 and Servant. 10th ed. 24"

With regard to other Bailies, than those of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup>  
 classes, tho they all have a Special interest, some higher, and  
 some lower. Yet none of them have a Lien. There is  
 nothing to be secured for them, are entitled to nothing.  
 1. 10th ed. 10th ed. 10th ed. 10th ed. 10th ed.

10. They have a right to detain according to the amount

No 3 Bailments. Omit this side and turn over.

It has been observed, yet if the bailee is insolvent, his creditors will not hold, nor the bailee's property was such as, was him a false credit. And it may also be added, yet property must also be in his order & disposition. And tho' the Bailee is insolvent, with in the appearance of ownership, a creditor cannot look to the Bailor, nor the terms of the Bailment enabled the Bailee to hold and appear as the true owner. This was settled in the following case. A deposited as a pledge with a pawnbroker, a seaed bag o' Savals, and he being insolvent disposed of them to third persons, a sailor was allowed to recover them of the 3<sup>d</sup> persons. The Pawnbroker had no right by the terms of the bailment to treat a goods as his own. The breaking o' a Seal was clearly a violation of his Trust. 1 alk 185.3 ibid 44 1. 3 et 22. 88. 548. Doug 306. 7 T R 57. 23. 1. 22. 244. Cook 33 L. 234. 243.

This case will illustrate the rule yet the bailment must not only have the appearance of ownership but he must with the consent of a owner, have the order and disposition. If then goods are left with a repository and become insolvent and sell them, a purchaser cannot hold them nor can the creditor so Bailee hold them as Bailor 1 alk 44

It is also if goods are left by the purchaser, in the temporary power of the vendor, for a particular, necessary or necessary food &c. and the vendor becomes insolvent, yet the creditor or purchaser can hold as the owner, Brown v. Pennington, Court.

It has also been determined in Court, that where one person sells a cow to another, if the bailee becomes insolvent

# This is mistaken.



of one man say, & another, & another, he said that  
the voice must decide the subject to the sailors, according  
to some of the contracts. Because he said that  
Parker cannot know the ownership of the men on  
his contracts. See 28. 1. Rule 6. b. 1. See 242.

The aim of the rule is, if a bail, the words of B to C. P. is obliged to deliver the goods back, i.e. But it seems, unaccountable that he should be liable to the Bailor, if he delivers the goods to the true owner, in the rule otherwise it means, that the Bailor, will be satisfied in receiving the goods back, to the Bailor. The rule should be reformed then, that he may instead of, he must hold 100%.

See 542. i. e. d. 17.

That such is the rule appears from a rule given a-boreward  
viz. that if the Bailie receives, the goods, to the Bailor  
pending an action on Bailie for the owners, such receiving  
will bar the action. It is evident from this, that he will  
be justified in the delivery to the Bailor, and not that  
he must deliver to him.

"The true owner may claim the goods wherever he finds them, in Market Over."

This explanation seems to be justified in the Rule. That  
if a real owner, goods, is a coin carrier, & takes and found  
to recover them, will be, reward is paid. But he must  
give them up to the true owner, a friend a private one  
to must. See the sup. 1. Bac 227. 1. Gold 27.

It seems then in such case, if a letter dies, and his  
last comes into poss<sup>n</sup> of a poss<sup>r</sup>. he must deliver them  
to the true owner or his agent.

He can't discharge himself by a delivery to the Dealer, who are the slaves. The reason given is, that the latter having come into possession by act of Law, he is bound to deliver them to him, who is by Law entitled to the



supra, the Bailor not being bound to the personal trust of the Vestitor. This reason is very technical and I doubt very much whether he could not be justified, if he delivered them to the Bailor. 1 Roll 607. 1 Bac 237.

In pursuing the subject of how far the rights of Chancery are affected, it is necessary to consider the rights of, Bailors, creditors, who rely upon the property, supposing it to be his, and of purchasers who purchase under the same circumstances. a very important part of the title.

The Law on this subject is in a great measure regulated by the 21. Stat. which is in affirmance of the Com. Law.

By this Statute provided that if where a person becomes a Bankrupt, he has in his possession, order, and disposition, goods of another, with the consent of the owner, then those goods are liable to be taken for his debts and may be applied upon by any of his creditors. Thus if the warehouse of a stock of goods, puts them into the possession of B. to hold them as his own, and B becomes a Bankrupt, these goods are liable for his debts. 1 Atk 100. 1 W 342. Doug 313. 1 W 228. 8 W 82. 3 B 688. 1 B et P 32. It gives the vendor a false credit.

This provision of the Statute is founded on the apprehension of false credit with a public. It is thought more reasonable that a Bailor who has enabled a Bailor to occasion the loss, and suffer, than those who limited to the credit, with conduct of a Bailor had created. 2 W 670.

The Statute however relates only to a case of Bankrupt Bailor. With regard to solvent Bailor, there is no need of any provision, for if they have goods of their own, justice does not require that a Bailor's property should be liable. 2 W 670.

It extends to all cases where the goods of one person are in any manner in the possession or disposition of the Bailor with a view, consent, &c. that it extends to goods, which did not belong to him originally as well as those which did. 1. 3d P. 52. 2d P. 52.

It is well to observe that as to goods originally belonging to the Bailor & by him sold, but permitted by the purchaser to remain in his possession, the law was as strong before, & as it is now. Such a conveyance wd have been fraudulent and consequently void by the St. 13 Eliz. 3 Co 51. Coups 233. 2d P. 587. 3d P. 587. 3d P. 71.

And also a creditor of a Bailor is allowed to come on the goods in his possession not merely on the ground of fraud inter Bailor and Bailor, but on the ground of false credit. 1. ibi 582. 3d P. 586.

And further a rebutting of a presumption of fraud inter Bailor and Bailor will avail nothing to the bailor, as between him and the creditor 1. ibi 300. 1. 5th P. 180.3.

But the St. does not extend to goods possessed by a Bankrupt in the right of another, as if an estate had become a Bankrupt, being in the possession of the property of the deceased. That property ant<sup>l</sup> liable. It ant<sup>l</sup> the fault & Representing of he holds a goods, for he holds them by Law, and they cannot prevent it. 1. ibi 52. 582. 1. ibi 104. 3d P. 172 187. in 3d P. 518.

The St. however, <sup>does not</sup> extend as well to mortgaged Lands, as to absolute Sales, when the vendor remains in possession. And it may be asked why are not mortgaged Lands likewise subjected? The reason is, the Law does not hold a possession of Lands to be proof of ownership, & the ownership of Lands can also be proved by title deeds. But there

can be no such proof of a renunciation of Personal property.  
 Proof of Personal property, especially with the order and  
 disposition of it, is the best Ev<sup>d</sup> of Title. 1. Alk<sup>s</sup> 160.  
 1. Rev 348. 1. Mils 200. 1. Selw 189. 30. 1. Rob. 545. 57. 1. Rev 244.  
 or 348. Cow. 566.

The Lt don't extend to a sale of a ship at sea. by  
 the owner on Land; for here immediate poss<sup>n</sup> cannot  
 be given to the vendee, and therefore it isn't a fault  
 of either party if the property remain, in the poss<sup>n</sup>  
 of the vendor. 1. Alk<sup>s</sup> 160. Rob. 545. 57. 2. Ld. 462. 780.  
 1. 2. 1. Rev 361. 2. 3. Ld. 566. 8.

But in this case a vendee of a ship must take  
 poss<sup>n</sup> of her on her return as soon as may be, otherwise  
 if the vendee seems bankrupt, the ship can be taken  
 to be taken by the creditors. 1. Rev 302. 2. Ld. 460. 402.  
 491. Ld. 566. 8. 1. Alk<sup>s</sup> 160.

But there are cases where a actual delivery of goods  
 isn't necessary, under special circumstances, as where goods  
 are kept in a store, here delivery of the key of the store  
 is a sufficient deliver<sup>y</sup>. 1. Ld. 566. 8. 2. Ld. 566. 8. 3. Ld. 566. 8.  
 This is called a Symbolical deliver<sup>y</sup>, inposposely.

In giving a case within the Lt, a goods must be  
 possessed by the Bankrupt Debtor, as his own goods,  
 and this with a consent of the owner.

They must not only be left in his poss<sup>n</sup> but also in  
 his care, and disposition. More poss<sup>n</sup> and sales.

If a Let B a horse to go a Journey, and B is a bankrupt,  
 a horse isn't liable for his debt. Ld. cannot be taken  
 for his debt. There isn't sale, Ev<sup>d</sup> of ownership according  
 to common experience - as tis common, very much so Ld. 566. 8.  
 for men to ride other than their own horses. Ld. 566. 8.  
 secus, if he kept the horse for one or 2. yrs. Cowp<sup>s</sup> 233. 1. Alk<sup>s</sup> 160.



For the same reason, a temporary post<sup>n</sup> for a particular and necessary purpose. In we answered for, by Bailor, will not make a good title, if the Bailor becomes a bankrupt. Such a case and within either of the 2d. the bankrupt Bailor must appear in all respects to be the true owner. 1 Collo. L. 2d. 1, also see 2d 36, 10. 2d. But say, shall we kill the —

From the nature of his business, & presumption  
of his ownership is concluded, & one owner shall hold  
goods in preference to the creditors. Thus if a Factor  
known to be such, becomes Bankrupt, & goods of  
his principal are liable for his debts, he being known  
to be a Factor, the poss<sup>r</sup> of the goods gives no  
credit to him. 1. B & O. 32. 1. 67. 11 m 318. 3 ibid 130.  
Eis 5<sup>th</sup>. Do of Goldsmiths &c. private Bankers in Eng.

These 2 Acts are intended for the benefit of the bailee, creditors & with purchasers, have no concern, but as it is in affirmance of the C. Law, it will be needless to treat of it.

[illegible]

The rule is the same as to <sup>PR</sup> Bailors as if it properly  
were taken from him wrongfully.

But there is an exception to the rule, when the property, valued is money or bank bills, or any circulating medium, transferable by delivery. Here a bona fide



transfer, being the Bailor, and a bona fide recovery will hold as the owner. It is the rule that the money be taken wrongfully and cannot be identified. This rule is founded on Commercial Policy.

Call 126. 1 Burr 452, 8. 3 And 15. 16. 1. B. R. 485.  
Cob. 32-380. (511-) "Index 52 or 62. & 42.

Under the Statute a creditor of the Bailor who seizes the property as his, cannot hold as the Bailor in any case, in the bailor is bankrupt.

To in Court, however, among the appearance of ownership may have been: for if the bailor is solvent, a creditor may have his remedy. So also of a purchaser, for he may have his remedy as the Bailor on his implied Warranty of Title.

It has been observed that if the bailor is Insolvent his creditor will not hold in the Bailor, if he was such, as gave him a false credit and it may be added yet the property must be in his own disposition and order.

And if the bailor is Insolvent with all appearance of ownership, a creditor cannot hold as the Bailor. 1. 240-  
In terms of a Bailment enabled the Bailor to hold 3. 111.  
and appear as the true owner. This was settled in 1. 23. 80.  
a following case. A Defendant in a plea with Doro. 350.  
a pawnbroker, a sealed bag of jewels, and he 20. 50.  
being Insolvent disposed of them to 3<sup>d</sup> persons, a bailor 350.  
was allowed to recover them of the 3<sup>d</sup> persons. The 82. 88.  
pawnbroker has no right by the terms of the bailment 648.  
to treat these goods as his own. The breaking of the 67. 23.  
seal was clearly a violation of the trust.  
ni.

This case will illustrate a rule that the bailor must not only have the appearance of ownership but it he must with consent of the owner, have a

order and disposition. If then goods are left with a  
 depository and he becomes insolvent and sell them.  
 the purchaser cannot hold them nor can the creditor  
 the Bailee hold them as Bailor. 3 Wms 44.

So also if goods are left by the purchaser in the  
 temporary possession of the vendor for a particular, reasonable  
 or necessary purpose, and the vendor becomes insolvent,  
 neither the creditor nor purchaser, can hold or the  
 owner. Brown vs Henderson. Exmt.

It has also been determined in Exmt. that where one  
 person lets a cow to another, if the bailee becomes  
 insolvent, the creditor or purchaser, cannot hold as  
 Bailor, for it being a very customary thing, the posses-  
 sion and quiet proof of ownership or a rule of policy  
 supposes thus. Otherwise this species of bailment would be  
 disencouraged and is a very useful one.

A purchaser of beef cattle for a State of N.Y. commenced  
 an action against a driver, as driver of the cattle and the  
 driver told him to his own team and sold them and held  
 that the purchaser, could not hold them, because the  
 mere fact of driving them, is a very slight or no proof  
 at all of ownership.

It seems to be a question not precisely settled in the  
 books, as if goods are bailed for hire, to be used  
 by the bailee for a certain time, a creditor, or creditors upon  
 becoming insolvent, can take goods or give for the  
 time of the Bailment. The better opinion seems to be, that  
 a purchaser cannot and that it cannot be taken  
 in law Com D. Co. 8. 3. 4. 1 Wms 210. note 454.

The principle in this is founded upon, it is a personal  
 trust in the Bailee and he can't himself assign it  
 during the term. The general principle, relating to the

assignment of a pawn. apply equally well here.  
 8 D.R. 604. 10 J. Cas. 6. 1 Bac 363. 1 Mod 210. 7 T.R.  
 11.12. said he can. but not the better opinion. 6 Mod 228.

Upon reading the case in 7 T.R. it wd appear that  
 opinion of J. King was in favor of admitting such a bailment  
 to be taken. But when considered notwithstanding to the  
 subject matter, his opinion wd seem to be sound.

Is a General Rule, yet the Bailor, having a General  
 property, may maintain Trespass, Trover, or any other  
 action vs any person who takes away or injures the  
 goods in the possession of a bailor. 5 Bac 104. 260. 1 Salk  
 214. 3 Levee Eng Law. 292. 2 Bull. 268

"Trover 53"

And a rule will hold even tho' a bailor never had a  
 actual possession i.e. a right of possession. The phrases "constructive  
 possession" & "possession in law" are synonymous, and mean a  
 right of present possession. Thus if A makes a bill of sale  
 of goods to B. & B leaves them in the possession of A, and  
 a stranger takes them away. B may recover them from  
 the stranger: for the bill of sale gives him the property.

Is a rule in Law that he who has an interest in  
 things personal, has of course a constructive possession, and  
 it has been transferred to him by his own act, or by operation  
 of Law. This interest may be in the hands of another.  
 Salk 214. 2 Rot 366. 1 P. 438. (Heus if he have  
 a right of immediate <sup>possession</sup> possession.)

But if goods are pawned or bailed for hire, to be  
 used for a certain time by the Bailor: a bailor cannot  
 maintain any action vs a wrongdoer, for taking or  
 injuring them during that time; for he maintains Trover or  
 Trespass. He must have a actual constructive possession  
 at a time where a injury was done. But here he







If a bailee delivers some goods to a stranger, the bailor cannot maintain an action against the stranger, or recover the goods, nor in the first instance, even on a demand by the Bailor and refused. 5 Bailees have been so held. 5 Bac 104. 201. 1. 26 244. 231. 1. 106. 107. 2d Ray 809. See also 117.

Bailees

On the other hand, most bailees and it will seem every bailee, may maintain an action for the full value as any wrongdoer, who takes the goods from him or injures them while in his possession. As to bailees of all classes, in the first place there is no doubt in any of the books respecting this right. 5 Bac 104. 262. Bull 33. 2d Ray 276. Fark 143. 11 Mod 31.

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A Finder may recover as a stranger who takes the goods away wrongfully, or injures them in his possession. For in the true owner, he has a right of possession. 5 Bac 104. Bull 33. 2d Ray 276. 1. 106. 107. 1. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 841. 842. 843. 844. 845. 846. 847. 848. 849. 850. 851. 852. 853. 854. 855. 856. 857. 858. 859. 860. 861. 862. 863. 864. 865. 866. 867. 868. 869. 870. 871. 872. 873. 874. 875. 876. 877. 878. 879. 880. 881. 882. 883. 884. 885. 886. 887. 888. 889. 890. 891. 892. 893. 894. 895. 896. 897. 898. 899. 900. 901. 902. 903. 904. 905. 906. 907. 908. 909. 910. 911. 912. 913. 914. 915. 916. 917. 918. 919. 920. 921. 922. 923. 924. 925. 926. 927. 928. 929. 930. 931. 932. 933. 934. 935. 936. 937. 938. 939. 940. 941. 942. 943. 944. 945. 946. 947. 948. 949. 950. 951. 952. 953. 954. 955. 956. 957. 958. 959. 960. 961. 962. 963. 964. 965. 966. 967. 968. 969. 970. 971. 972. 973. 974. 975. 976. 977. 978. 979. 980. 981. 982. 983. 984. 985. 986. 987. 988. 989. 990. 991. 992. 993. 994. 995. 996. 997. 998. 999. 1000.

The ground of a bailee's right to sue a stranger, is said to be his own liability over to the bailor. It has therefore been doubted, and a depository under a general acceptance, can ever maintain an action on a wrongdoer. Because he said he is liable only for his own fraud to the Bailor. 5 Bac 104. 262. 1. 106. 107. 1. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 841. 842. 843. 844. 845. 846. 847. 848. 849. 850. 851. 852. 853. 854. 855. 856. 857. 858. 859. 860. 861. 862. 863. 864. 865. 866. 867. 868. 869. 870. 871. 872. 873. 874. 875. 876. 877. 878. 879. 880. 881. 882. 883. 884. 885. 886. 887. 888. 889. 890. 891. 892. 893. 894. 895. 896. 897. 898. 899. 900. 901. 902. 903. 904. 905. 906. 907. 908. 909. 910. 911. 912. 913. 914. 915. 916. 917. 918. 919. 920. 921. 922. 923. 924. 925. 926. 927. 928. 929. 930. 931. 932. 933. 934. 935. 936. 937. 938. 939. 940. 941. 942. 943. 944. 945. 946. 947. 948. 949. 950. 951. 952. 953. 954. 955. 956. 957. 958. 959. 960. 961. 962. 963. 964. 965. 966. 967. 968. 969. 970. 971. 972. 973. 974. 975. 976. 977. 978. 979. 980. 981. 982. 983. 984. 985. 986. 987. 988. 989. 990. 991. 992. 993. 994. 995. 996. 997. 998. 999. 1000.

This conclusion seems to be wholly unsubstantiated. First because the Bailor's liability and the grounds of his right of action, and 2<sup>d</sup> if it was, he wd have still his right of action. It wd seem that on the ground of his having a Special Property, he has this right. It admits of no doubt that he has the Special Property. He has a right of possession as all persons but the owner. Barnes 112.

7. C. B. 302. 1. Due 270. 500 Big. 17. 10. 100. Comb. 264.  
 It is absurd to say that he has a right of 1000. 2. 1000  
 admitting a remedy w<sup>th</sup> them & those who injure him  
 in the 1000.

It is established, yet a finder has a right of action as  
 a wrongdoer. If then he is entitled to a action when  
 in 1000. 2. 1000 with the consent of the owner, "a fortune"  
 the depository is, who has 1000. 2. 1000 with the owner's  
 consent. But it never was intended that a ground  
 of a foundation right to the action was his liability  
 over to the owner. 10. 100. 5. Due 302. Comb. 264.

A still stronger case analogous is, yet a servant  
 robbed of his master's goods, may maintain an action  
 w<sup>th</sup> the hundred. in the 10. 100. 5. 100.

But to universally agreed that he is not liable  
 to his master. The ground of his right is clearly  
 the lawful 1000. 2. 1000 w<sup>th</sup> he has. 1. Mod. 404. Comb. 10.  
 627. Com. 103. 12. Mod. 404. 3 Co. 59. 13 Co. 69.  
 2. 1000 300. 3 Co. 59.

An unincorporated Bankrupt after having acquired goods,  
 after his bankruptcy, may have 1000. 2. 1000 as a wrongdoer,  
 none will contend that his right arose from his  
 liability over to his assignees. Yet he is a mere  
 depository of the goods for the assignees. 1. D. 10. 10.  
 44. Doug. 400.

In an action by bailor as a wrongdoer. The bailor's  
 liability over to Bailor can't be tried - no such thing  
 as trying 2. 1000 Policy also demands it.

It seems then to be clearly proved by analogy  
 that the ground of the bailor's right of action  
 as a wrongdoer, is not his liability over to his Bailor.

It is said that a special property alone is sufficient to give a right of action vs a wrongdoer. Bull 33.  
 Co. 170. 110. 500.

But to come to what establishes a doctrine "talem totum vobis" It is said down by B.R. that mere deposit of goods<sup>d</sup>, is sufficient to give a right of action vs a wrongdoer. 1 B.R. 33.

Even if the bailee's liability over to the Bailor is in every instance a sound one, & claims vs a wrongdoer, still a depository has the right of action. If he may be liable, he is accountable for goods, and may be subjected for loss or damage. This proves that on this principle, a depository is entitled to an action. It cannot be known whether he is liable or not, before proof, and as he is liable or not, cannot be tried in an action vs the wrongdoer, by the bailee. There is then no distinction, between a depository and other Bailees, as the right of action vs a wrongdoer. All bailees may therefore maintain an action for the full value vs a wrongdoer.

If a bailee delivers goods to a Stranger, the latter may have an action vs any third person, who violates his possession. For he has a Special property, an actual possession, and therefore a right of possession.  
 5 Bac 260. 1. And 242. 1 Roll 607.

*Note* This rule ought to be observed, both on account of its continued importance and its relevancy to the case discussed.

An auctioneer or Broker may maintain an action, in his own name, on a contract for goods sold, vs the buyer, and this he may do, tho' the goods were known to belong to another. Now he acts only as a



Servant to the owner, but he has a right to a action  
his, said, because he has a beneficial interest in the  
Sale, and because the contract is in his own name.  
The true reason, why he is allowed the action, is not  
that he has an interest arising from his commission,  
but because the contract is in his own name.

1. H. B. 81. 2. H. B. 81. 2. 1. Chit. 5. Bull 130. "A Tortion  
a Factor is entitled to maintain an action in his  
own name. Servant and Master.

So also the master of a ship may maintain an action  
in his own name, for the freight. Reason the contract  
is in his own name. Park 403. 1. H. B. 82. Bull 130.

It will be perceived already laid down that in many  
cases, an action may be brought vs the wrong doer for the  
full value, either by the Bailor or a Bailee. But  
there be only one action for the full value, it recovery  
in favour of either will bar an action brought by the  
other. 5. Bull 100. 263. 13. C. 62.

And tho the Bailor may recover the full  
value, still the Bailee may recover for his Special  
damages. For the recovery of the Bailor is no  
compensation to the bailee for the damages he may  
have sustained.

As laid down in Rolle 36 if the bailor and bailee  
both sue, he who recovers first, shall oust the other  
of his action, i.e. the first recovery may be pleaded in  
bar to the 2<sup>d</sup> action. 2. Rolle 308. 8. ver. 22.

But it will seem that the more commencing an  
action by one of you, ousts the other of his action  
of that same nature and yet the action cannot proceed  
together and the parties share for the first recovery.



He who sues first, entitles himself to recover according to all analogies: as in the case of actions by Master & Servant for the same thing. 3 Jac 309. or 309. Each 12<sup>th</sup>.

So also in cases of an Escape where, P<sup>ty</sup> in the process commences an action. he defeats the right of the Sheriff. This either might have commenced an action. 3 Co 44. C. 2 Str 823. 1. Toll 608. Cro. 6. 00<sup>th</sup>.

If the Bailor sues and recovers of the wrongdoer, he can maintain no action vs the Bailor. for he is entitled to but one satisfaction. Lat Ray 127. Cro. 6. 24. 35. Lev. 124. Fulk 11. Cill 319. Yelv. 68

And it was seen that if the Bailor first commences a Suit vs the wrongdoer, he by that waives his right of action vs the Bailor. He had 2 remedies, but by that he made his election and is bound by it. There is however no direct authority to this effect, but there is the strongest analogy to support it.

If in the case of a Rescue and Escape, P<sup>ty</sup> in process ~~sues~~ <sup>rescues</sup> the ~~rescuer~~ <sup>rescued</sup>. So the Sheriff is pro facto discharged. Co 60. 12. Cro 63. 97. or 100. That is

If the Bailor sues first for the full value, he makes himself liable at all events to the Bailor. To authorize, he supports this Rule, correct on principle, if it be true, yet Bailor commencing an action ousts the Bailor right. Since he will have no opportunity to seek his remedy.

If the Bailor takes the property from the Bailor before his special interest therein is determined, the Bailor

may maintain a Special action in the case, as him,  
for in such case the Bailor is a wrongdoer. 5 Bac 180.  
206. 2 Ld. 68. Bailee may recover for Special injury.

But an the Bailee in this case can maintain Trover,  
or Trespass, is a very difficult question. The Bailee's  
Special property is the ground of his right of action.  
but this it wd seem confer a right of action for the  
full amt only vs Transferrer. The local act between  
Bailor and Bailee ant the bailor. He has only a  
Special property in them. 1. Bac 246. Exp. 411. 3d.  
20. 180. 5 Bac 180. 7. 50.

On this ground it appears that the bailor ant entitled  
to Trover, or Trespass vs the Bailor. But tis said in Coke  
yt the bailor may maintain Trover or Trespass vs the  
Bailor and that bailor's ownership appearing in Cui  
shall go in mitigation of damages. 13. Co 68.

In all cases where damages are merely mitigated  
the P<sup>ty</sup> has "prima facie" a right to recover the whole  
value of the property but the Bailee in this action  
vs the Bailor has not even "prima facie" to the  
whole value. Besides the value of the property is  
no Rule of damages. whatever in this case, and hence  
it wd seem that the Bailee cannot have an  
action vs the Bailor, wh in its structure is for the  
whole value.

If the damage sustained by the Bailee is greater  
than the whole value of the property bailed, can the  
damage be appraised? The damage sustained may  
be much greater or less than the value of the property  
bailed and such damage is the ground of action.  
but it cannot be measured by the value and ergo  
we may conclude that a Special action in the case

is the only proper action in this case.

If the bailee delivers the goods to another contrary to the Bailor's orders, & Bailee is "ipso facto" guilty of a conversion and a Bailor may maintain Trover, with demand. 100 581. 45 R. 268. or 260.

As to a form of action, w<sup>ch</sup> the Bailor may maintain vs the Bailee, a General Rule is that he can maintain no other action than Detinue or some other action on the case Trover for the implied promise to return, or assumpsit, according to the nature. 100 Bae 237 &.  
Cro. J. 244. Cro. Evi 784. Bull 72.

When the Bailor is injured by the neglect of the Bailee, the former may sue either in assumpsit upon the contract express or implied or in tort for the neglect. 3. East 62  
1. Mil. 282. 2 ibid 340.  
219-

The general Rule then is, that Trespass will not lie vs Bailee in favour of the Bailor, because his poss<sup>n</sup> is lawful and has been guilty of no unlawful taking.  
8. Co 140. 52 R. 1. 121. 8 Co 146 or 46.

There is an Exception to the Rule where a bailee willfully destroys the goods. for this act extinguishes the Bailment and destroys his character as Bailee. Co Litt. 57. a.  
1. Inst. 57. a. 5 Co B. v. Moor 241. 2 Roll 553. 25 R. 400.  
3 Atk. 40. Contra 5 Bae. 260. Here Trespass will lie. Perkins.

The destruction to ground the action of Trespass upon it must be voluntary on the part of a Bailee for if goods are lost by accident or neglect. Trespass will not lie.



Inns.  
Inn  
Tiep-  
ers

at Law any person may establish an Inn, as they are so numerous, that in establishing another, it not make a public nuisance of them. 3 Bac 173. 1. Roll 84. 1 Roll 84. Cro B. 24. No Licence necessary by Law.

Avoid by assuming the character any person who did so, was liable for the duties, at Law. 4 BB 108. Cro Elvi 542. or 48. 2 Hale 174. 2 Bac 171.

A disorderly Inn may become a public nuisance, and the keeper of it may be indicted for it.

4 Bl 168. 1. Hawkins 132. 4 BB 108. Cro Ch 542. Inns shd not be confounded with what in Eng are called Alehouses, wh are Licensed. In Eng any person may set up an Inn. Not so in the U. S. Talk 20. Cotton &c.

For disobedience to the Laws regulating Inns, the licences may be taken away or suspended a time in Court.

### Duties of Inn keepers

These consist chiefly in the entertainment of Travellers, as Guests, and the care and custody of their property or effects. 2. Co 87. 3 Bac 186. 1. 5 Co 32. It doth extend to the persons of Guests.

And if an Innkeeper refuses with due cause, to entertain a traveller upon tender of a reasonable sum, he is not only liable in an action on the case, to the traveller but may also be indicted, for his Inn is a public nuisance. 1. Law. 220. 1. 36. 1st.

The care and custody required of an Inn keeper, doth extend to the person of his Guest, & then



a traveller is beaten at an Inn, the keeper is not  
and liable. 8. Co 32.

But he is liable for his own misconduct as  
well as that of his servants. So if he gives travellers  
unwholesome food. 3 Bac 182. Role 58.

Sickness in the family may excuse the Innkeeper  
from taking the guest, but if he receives him into  
the Inn, his absence, Sickness or even Insanity won't  
excuse him from his liability as Innkeeper.

Pro<sup>63</sup> 522. 3 Bac 182.

An Infant in keeper not liable as an Innkeeper.  
1 Role 2. 3 Bac 182. 1 R. & R. v. 202

There is a 3<sup>d</sup> analogy between an Innkeeper and  
a common Carrier. Quere 158. 3 Bac 183.

If a host requires his guests to <sup>lock</sup> ~~leave~~ his apartment,  
and he refuses otherwise to be liable and the Guest  
refuses or neglects to do so, and the Guest loses his  
goods. It has been made a Question an the Innkeeper  
w<sup>d</sup> be liable. I think not. Mo<sup>10</sup> 158. Quere 200.  
3 Bac 183.

It is settled however that merely delivering the key  
to the Guest, will not excuse the Innkeeper for  
the Loss of the goods, but he must actually ask  
his Guest to lock his door. 8 Co 33. a. n. 2. Bac 183.  
5 T. B. 273.

It is not necessary to subject him that the Innkeeper  
sh<sup>d</sup> know what the goods are. But he is liable for  
those duties only to travellers or <sup>ne</sup> ~~the~~ persons who  
board at his house, and whom he charges, as he

as he does Traveller. 15. The same price.  
 Nor does it extend to those persons who board  
 at his house. in General as boarder. 3 Co 32<sup>B</sup>, Role  
 3. 3 Bac 183. Pinn 26.

An Inn keeper is not liable as Inn keeper for the  
 loss of goods, in the absence of the owner, nor he receives  
 a price for keeping. He is liable in such case only  
 as Depositary. Cro. E. 188. 5 D R 253. Noy 126. Co. b. 17<sup>th</sup>.

But for property for the keeping of which he has as-  
 sessed a price, in the owner's absence he is liable. Role 3.  
 Cro. E. 188. Fulk 388. Noy 126. Popk. 1<sup>st</sup>.

There is some difficulty in ascertaining what  
 time will take the character of a Guest from a  
 Traveller. Now it is not necessary that he should be  
 in the Inn every moment. 5 D R. 253. Cro. E. 188.  
 1. Role 3. 338.

If a Servant is robbed of his Master's goods at  
 an Inn. the Innkeeper is liable over to the  
 Master. 5 D R. 253. Cro. E. 224. Gels 162.

Tho an Innkeeper may detain the person of his  
 Guest, till the whole bill is paid, still he can  
 only detain the horse for his keeping - not for the  
 rest of the Bill. Fulk 388. Carth 157. 3 Bac 188  
 2 Role. 85.

If a Guest leave the Inn without paying and without  
 permission to leave & Innkeeper may sue and  
 take him on what is called Fresh Suit.  
 2 Role. 138. 2 Bac 186.

If an Inn keeper detain a horse or any animal  
 he has no right to use him, but he may add  
 the price of his keeping, during the Detainer, to  
 the Original Bill. Moor 877. Str 535. 3 Bac 180.  
 He detain by licence of Law. and cannot use  
 it to his profit.

A promise by a Stranger to pay the Bill, if  
 the Inn keeper will discharge the person of his  
 Guest or his horse, is binding. and act within  
 the 10 of Writs. as some have supposed.  
 3 Burr 1838. 1 Mil 305. Telt 101. 3 Bac 180.

Note. an agreement to carry goods Gratis, while  
 it remains entirely Executory, is not binding.  
 2d Ray. 103. 10. 19. 20.

Finis of <sup>Samuel</sup> this Title,

*[Faint, illegible handwriting, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.]*





Sheriff and Gaoler 360 Sheriff's Liability  
for the acts or default of Undersheriff  
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# Sherrif and Jailer.

Station of office, manner of appointment &c.  
 The word Sheriff is derived from a Saxon word  
 shire & reeve: i.e. Governor or keeper of a shire or  
 County. 4. Bac. 430. 1 B6 334.343.

Nature of  
 office

They are appointed in different modes in different  
 States. - In some by Electors or voters of a County in some  
 by Executive and Senate in others. In some by  
 Legislature for 3 years. Int. to 332

They are appointed in England by King out of a nomination  
 made by a 12. member. formerly by a nomination  
 made by a 12. member. 1 B6 340.1.

In some States, 3. and 3.5. a Sheriff can hold  
 his office for one year. But it is said, he may be  
 removed "during the session"

The Sheriff is appointed for a term, regular, no express limitation out of it, being  
 a County officer. But if it is necessary for completing  
 an official act, begun in his own bailiwick to go out of  
 County, he has the authority out of his  
 own County: as if he is commanded by a Court to  
 carry a prisoner to prison in another County,  
 he may maintain his authority till he delivers him  
 into the custody of the County. Bac. 34. 3.

If a person's estate is taken into another County, the Sheriff may  
 on first call, seize and retain him: for a seizure  
 is only for the purpose and continuance of his local authority.

Plow 3. Bac. 34. 3.

If a Sheriff having begun execution of a process, as by distress  
 goods, is removed before execution is complete, he must  
 proceed to complete it, execution of process being an entire  
 thing: and is a complete consummating act having reference  
 to the thing. Bac. 34. 3. 1 B6 33.4

to its inception. This rule was violated in N. Y. some 20 yrs ago, at an election for Governor, when Jay and Clinton were Candidates. Jay received y greatest number of votes, but y office of Sheriff expiring in some Counties just before y election, votes from these counties were rejected as Informal, thereby giving Clinton y Majority.

Same rule holds as to Constables.

1813

Bae. Sh. H. 1

H. 1

A. S. Law. y Sheriff may appoint Deputies, or under Sheriffs, who as his representatives or Substitutes, may execute all y ordinary ministerial duties of his office. His Judicial they cannot — nor all his Executives.

+ Bae

H. 1. 3.

Sh. H. 30

H. 1. 3.

The only y removable is y Sheriff at pleasure, he being only a substitute y Constable. This y Sheriff may do, without impeachment and without assigning any reason, but while a deputy is allowed to remain in office his General powers cannot be abridged by y Sheriff.

Bae. Sh.

H. 1

In Eng. y deputy acts officially only in y name of y Sheriff, he is not regarded as a known public officer, but merely as a servant. Writs are directed not to him, but to y Sheriff only, and are returned by y Sheriff. The meaning of y rule was so under Sheriff cannot return a writ, if he can't endorse it in his own name, it must be done in y name of y Sheriff.

In Const a deputy acts in his own name, and is treated as a public officer, and writs may and usually are directed to him. A writ executed to y Sheriff only may be executed to his General or Special deputy, in y latter name. H. 1. 3.

A Covenant of a deputy not to execute writs of a certain description is void, as being vs Law, for it's his duty to execute all legal Process delivered him to be executed. Bae. Sh. 4: 2.

H. 1. 4. "Contracts 33"



A deputy cannot activate his authority by a appointment  
 & a Sub Deputy, he himself being but a Servant or  
 Representative, & as a principle of Law, of a representative  
 can act only in his own person and never by Proxy, &c.  
 — upon a principle, <sup>a peer</sup> may vote by Proxy, he acts for himself,  
 no one. but a representative in a house of Commons,  
 must vote in his own person. Tho' any one may legally  
 assist him, & he may empower another as an assistant;  
 in a particular act for him, & not being an  
 assignment of his Power. But an arrest by his assistant,  
 is not good, &c. where a deputy sits in Company.

Page 30.

\* This is a General principle of Political as well as Municipal  
 Law.

If a Sheriff directs a Warrant to 2. persons, either  
 of whom alone may make a arrest, & authority being  
 of a public nature, & when conferred on two or more  
 individuals, is generally General. Secus when a authority  
 is, of a Private nature, — i.e. then Joint, in there is an  
 Express provision, & either may act alone.

Bac Resol<sup>18</sup>. 12. 17. Range 17. Bac Ch. 4. Co 2<sup>11</sup> 18.

If a deputy is guilty of any neglect of duty, (as in a case  
 of an escape) a Sheriff may have cause against him, for a  
 Sheriff is liable over, to a party injured by a act of his  
 Deputy, and he may have an action vs a Deputy immediately, "Pro"  
 even before a recovery in himself by a injured party, for 114.  
 if he was obliged to wait till then, he might incur  
 a responsibility of losing it, as a Deputy might become  
 a Bankrupt, &c.

Page 33, Bac Ch. 4.

In such case a deputy has violated a Implied contract  
 "to discharge his duty faithfully"

It must be very rare, & a Sheriff brings an action on an  
 Implied contract, for there is usually a bond or Covenant,  
 with Security. The usual remedy at y<sup>e</sup> day, is an  
 action on a bond or Covenant.

A Goalor. (or a Common Goal) is a Servant of a Sheriff, appointed and removable by him, & latter being in office Keeper of a Goal in his county - not so of a Jail previous and of which Sheriff isn't Keeper.

1. 12  
428  
3. 12  
171.

A Sheriff has no right (regularly speaking) to confine his prisoners in any other place, than a Common Jail, or being a place appointed by Law. Rob. 202. Lach 16. Of he does, tis a False Imprisonment. 1 Selw 318.

"False Imprisonment."

Therefore a Sheriff shd confine a person in a Private house, or any other place than a common Jail, he wd be liable in an action of False Imprisonment, in which he wd be obliged to do it, as when a Jail was broken open. Brown v. Dunn. &c.

Shirley  
48.

The Sheriff being "in office Keeper of a Common Jail" and as there is in Court, no Common Jail, if he is not Keeper, he can't there be imprisoned, nor of course arrested in his own County, for as he is a Governor or Keeper of it, he can set himself at Liberty. If a deputy shd arrest him he wd instantly discontinue his authority, by removing him from office, or if a Constable shd arrest him, he wd not commit him to Prison, but a Goalor must do it, and he is a mere Servant of a Sheriff, and removable at any moment, & Sheriff's Pleas, as to it, (he can't be confined in any Jail, out of his county, in a Civil case. that wd be outrageous. #

3. 12  
397  
Lach  
10.  
1. 12  
128.

Sure what is to be done in Criminal Cases? Is public justice to be defeated, because he is Keeper of a Common Jail, in his own County? J. G. hasn't found any thing very definite on y<sup>e</sup> subject, he may however be committed to another Prison, as to a different County, J. G. thinks "from y<sup>e</sup> necessity of y<sup>e</sup> Case"

In *S. Johnson* 22. tis held yt a Sheriff arrested on a *Ca Sa* by a Coroner, must be imprisoned in a Coroner's house. This seems to *S. G.* not Law. in it may be said, yt in a new case y<sup>t</sup> it may make a new rule to suit y<sup>e</sup> Exigency of y<sup>e</sup> Case.

The Sheriff for want of a Bail may make his own house one, for he has authority to <sup>keep</sup> a Goal, but no other officer. *S. G.* thinks he has. On *Mesne Process* in in y<sup>e</sup> Eng. Practice, he may, it seems, be arrested, for if not liable to imprisonment, he may be discharged on Common Bail, wh holds him to Trial. (C. John 24) In Court practice, Common bail being unknown. he is not liable (*S. G.* thinks), to be arrested on *Mesne Process*. for as they have no writs, i.e. Common Bail a person not liable to imprisonment on *Mesne Process*, is of course, he thinks, not liable to arrest. If he is so arrested, y<sup>e</sup> suit abates? <sup>2</sup> I

Quere why abate? In Eng, he may be committed to a different prison.

### Sheriff's Liability for y<sup>e</sup> acts or defaults, of his Deputies or Under Sheriffs.

The Deputy being y<sup>e</sup> Servant of y<sup>e</sup> Sheriff, y<sup>e</sup> latter is, in <sup>2</sup> *Co. 18.* many cases liable for y<sup>e</sup> acts & defaults of y<sup>e</sup> Deputies, for <sup>2</sup> *207* <sup>108.</sup> they are in legal Judgment, y<sup>e</sup> acts and defaults of y<sup>e</sup> Sheriff. "Qui Facit per alium, facit per se" - *Mod. 113.* <sup>1</sup> *Co. 80.* <sup>1</sup> *Mod. 113.*

Whenever y<sup>e</sup> act or default of y<sup>e</sup> Deputy, is considered as y<sup>e</sup> act of y<sup>e</sup> Sheriff, y<sup>e</sup> latter is liable.

Hence he is allowed to take security of y<sup>e</sup> deputies, for y<sup>e</sup> faithful discharge of their duty. - were he not liable for y<sup>e</sup> same, he would not be allowed to take Security.



The general Rule is, <sup>1</sup> *ye* official acts of *a* Deputy, are as to all civil purposes, *ye* acts of *a* Sheriff. He is civilly liable for *ye* m., but not liable Criminaliter. He is liable for ommission as well as acts. There is no such thing, as a legal imputation of Crimes from one to another. To subject him Criminaliter, he must have been guilty of an offence, personally. <sup>2</sup> See Raym. 1574. Long. 42. 2. L. R. 154. Luch. 18. Hunt 235. Cro. J. 330. 1. Bac. 442. 2 L. R. 154.

Dep'ty

For *a* private tort of *a* Sheriff, *a* Sheriff is not liable, for these are official. he acts not as Deputy. 4 Bac 442. 1. Roll 94. 1. L. R. 155. Cro. Eliz. 173. Hence *a* Deputy, serves as Execution, as *a*. on *a* Writ of *a* Sheriff, it has been doubted, whether *a* Sheriff not being sworn to *a* act is liable. as *a* Deputy says. I deem *a* Sheriff not act in pursuance of *a* Sheriff's authority. 4 Bac 442.

4 Bac  
412. m  
3 mch  
309

That *a* Sheriff is liable for *a* Deputy's acts officially, and tortiously, see Master and Servt 412. and in *a* case *a* Sheriff is liable in Trespass, for *a* Dep. and all his substitutes are considered but one person. 2 R. L. 832.

2 R. L. 832. Long 42. 2 R. L. 332. Not 27.

Jy. thinks, he ought to be liable in Trespass, in *a* case, as Masters generally are for *a* torts of their Servants. For *a* deputies neglect of duty, *a* Sheriff only is liable to *a* Injured party at *a* Law. - *a* Dep. not.

Cap dig  
603.  
12th  
14. 14

As for negligent execution - ommission to execute *a* process for *a* deputy and *a* known public officer, acting in his own right, or on his own account, nor is *a* process directed to him. Cow 403. 5. L. R. 18. 5 Co 88.

But for *a* positive tort or Misfeasance, committed by *a* Deputy, in his office, both are liable.

The Sheriff is liable because *a* wrong is committed by his Servant. The deputy is liable, because *a* party injured may consider him as *a* mere Tort Feasor.



and are bound to enquire under what supposed authority, he acts, Etc. for a voluntary Escape. Embossing a writ of Habeas Corpus, breaking open doors in civil cases.

An officer when sued for a positive Tort, is not sued in his official character. He is when sued for neglect of duty &c. 20th 18. Co D. 103. Co Litz 157, 103. Co D. 331.

For defaults of a Special deputy appointed at request of a Pltff. or a process, and upon his nomination a Sheriff is liable to a Pltff. The appointment so far as respects his rights, is at his risk.

4th 120. Co D. 107.

In Count a Deputy is liable for neglect of duty, as for positive Torts. for he is a known public officer, process is directed to him and he makes returns, in his own name. Hence he may sue and be sued as Deputy. The Sheriff is liable also, in both cases.

The foregoing rules respecting a Sheriff's liability for acts and defaults of his Deputy, extend to acts and defaults of Deacons, for these are a Species of Deputies.

If after the death of a Sheriff, and before a successor is appointed, a prisoner escape, no one is liable, for the Sheriff being dead, a Deacon's authority ceases.

In your case there is no remedy but betaking to the appointment of a successor. 3 Co 72. Co Litz 300. 1. Mod 14. 4th 300m 440.

Suppose a Deacon in your last case detains a man in your Prisoners. 12. omits to enlarge him - is he guilty of false imprisonment. P. (P. G.) presume not. he has no authority to discharge him, he only keeps him and they remain in "Statute Dues"

# Authority and Duty of a Sheriff & his Representative

In Eng. a Sheriff is a Judicial officer, as well as an Executive & Ministerial officer. 1 R 343. 4 R 448.

In Court an executive and ministerial <sup>officer</sup>. Goulash. treats of him as a ministerial officer only, and as Conservator of Peace, in both latter characters, he is strictly an Executive officer.

Note. A ministerial officer is one who executes by Law, in obedience to a command of some Superior officer: as a Sheriff in executing a Warrant.

An executive officer is one who executes by Law, without such command, as a Governor or Mayor of a City, in performing a duty prescribed by Law, without a command of a Superior. Is in command of a Law itself. Heads of Department are Executive and Ministerial.

First

1. As Recorder or Conservator of Peace, a Sheriff is first Executive officer in a County, or rather of a County. Is a first Executive County officer. 1 R 237. 1 R 343.

As a Law, a Sheriff may apprehend and commit to prison without Warrant, all who break a Peace, &c. is bound by office to take Murderers, Thieves, Robbers and other offenders, and to commit them to safe keeping, and to defend a County de Publico Enemy. And for these purposes, he may command a House or a County, to assist - Is all Thalls. after 10. in Rens. 1 R 343. 1 R 430. 52.  
Co. 108

In Court, he can't bind any to a Peace, for yd is a Judicial act. - he may arrest and commit.

In Court, he is empowered by Jc, to subpoena, note, rents

and all unlawful assemblies, and tumults, to apprehend  
with warrant, all disturbers of the peace, & to bring them  
before Magistrate, and to command assistance of all suitable  
persons, 18. all persons of age and ability in County.

The same powers are given to Constables in their respective  
towns.

Second as a ministerial officer, he is bound to execute  
all legal process, regularly directed to him, and on refusal  
is subject at Law, to Fine and Imprisonment & to a civil  
action, (Case by Party aggrieved).

Now 74.1. 30 344. 4 Bac 449.

He is liable in Case in Court, for not returning a Writ. 1 S. 2.  
In Ex. he is ruled to return it. & in neglect, is proceeded <sup>8. 206</sup> <sup>Ex. d. 616</sup>  
vs by attachment as for Contempt. Doug 446. 2 H Bl 233. 3 B 36 Com

By thinks & proceeding might be same here. In Court  
by So he must give a receipt. The Sheriff or his Deputy  
may command a "Process Comitatus" at Law, when resisted  
in Execution of Lawful Process. 4 Bac 403.

It gives him similar powers, & additional, for he may  
command a Militia of his County, as an organized Body.

A Sheriff or other officer may not break open door or  
Windows of a house, to arrest owner. In a Civil case  
or take his goods for it in his castle, and so yet a  
family may not be exposed to Thieves and Robbers.

5 Co 3. Corp. 1. Bro Pri 32. Bro. 62. Bro. Dig. 84

x. This originated in y Feudal ages. y reason is petitions-  
Of Error in Court decided yet a may.

It is said however in y old books, yet y End of Process  
by breaking open door is good - tho' y officer is a Trust person -

5 Co 32. D. & 3 Man. R. 55.

By. Thanks yet ant Law

ii. Duty modern practice is to discharge y Person arrested. This 2. Bl R  
is however, in some measure, discretionary with y Court. Corp. 1. 23.

ii. This is done in motion

4 Bac 454.



Deciding what is necessary to a Drunking? Does it imply a Lick. or  
 Isms valuing a window necessary to it as in Drunking? Must  
 it not be a removal of some kind of calculation and  
 selection as it is and it is, an act of violence.

The man, perhaps said, a Lick. & S. Mendez.

10. But so privilege is construed strictly, it extends to no  
 other than y outer doors or windows. If then y officer can  
 enter peaceably. (i.e. without breaking) at either of those,  
 he may break any inner door, chest or trunk, but there  
 must be a demand and refusal.

Griff 687. Harst 22. 236. Cumb. 17. 337. Exp. 804. 5.  
 Exp. 804.

4 Jac  
 400.

The privilege of outer doors and windows extends only  
 to y protection of person... family and goods of y owner.  
 or person dwelling in it. 5 Co 93. B. 1. 185.

If then it is in y house of B. y officer after request  
 made, for a refusal, may break y outer doors and  
 windows to execute Civil Process on him.

Is if a' goods are after requesting a delivery & a  
 refusal.

There as to y propriety of y privilege in any case. Is it  
 not a reproach to y Law. thus to defeat private Justice?  
 Yes?

In y case of a Criminal Process, y privilege isn't allowed  
 y officer may break outer doors, &c. if necessary, but  
 he ought first to make known his business and demand  
 admittance. 5 Co 91. 4. Bac 454.

So he may in Process to compel one, to find security  
 for y peace or good behaviour, it being of a Criminal nature.  
 12. Co 131. 4. Bac 454.

So he may in Process of forcible entry, and Detainer, it  
 being of a Criminal nature. 4 Bac 455.

So where one having committed a Felony is warned with  
 or without a Warrant, by an officer or Private Person.



Now I suppose only one no process— no Warrant 4 Bac 455.  
 in y<sup>e</sup> case y<sup>e</sup> arrest is justified is not by y<sup>e</sup> event. 2 Hawk. 138.  
 If he is convicted, y<sup>e</sup> arrest is justified, I see not. He is  
 guilty of False Imprisonment. So to prevent an affray or prevent  
 a breach of y<sup>e</sup> Peace. So if those who made an affray  
 are immediately pursued by an officer. with warrant  
 4 Bac 456. 1 Inst 66.

So on a Writ of Habeas Corpus to a Civil  
 Process, y<sup>e</sup> officer may break y<sup>e</sup> Outer door. If of entrance  
 is denied him. for y<sup>e</sup> very object of y<sup>e</sup> Writ, y<sup>e</sup> command  
 contained in it. is to give peaceable & exclusive possession  
 to y<sup>e</sup> Plff & there is no other way of executing it.

4 Co. 91. B. 4. Bac 455.

This privilege extends only to y<sup>e</sup> Mansion house strictly.

So on a Civil Process, y<sup>e</sup> Plff may break open y<sup>e</sup> door  
 of a barn, not adjoining y<sup>e</sup> house, for y<sup>e</sup> privilege is  
 strictly construed.

So G.D. presumed of a store detached from y<sup>e</sup> Mansion 1 Keb 638.  
 house. I see possibly if y<sup>e</sup> owner lodge in it. 1. Seld. 186.

Stores have often been broken open in Court on G.D.  
 possibly.

If y<sup>e</sup> Sheriff Bailif having entered a house  
 lawfully, is locked in. y<sup>e</sup> Plff may break in to release  
 him. 2 Inst. 555. Palm. 32. 4 Bac 456.

The Def committed a wrong, and y<sup>e</sup> Plff. having entered  
 for y<sup>e</sup> purpose, may not take him or y<sup>e</sup> goods.

So if a person being arrested, escapes into his house, as in  
 all cases of Escape, for a right to y<sup>e</sup> custody of y<sup>e</sup> person,  
 has attached in y<sup>e</sup> officer. Palm 34. 4 Bac 456.

But if a person illegally arrested by y<sup>e</sup> breaking of an Outer  
 door, is charged while in custody with a another Process,  
 In another suit and by another officer, y<sup>e</sup> last arrest is  
 good if there is no collusion between y<sup>e</sup> parties, and y<sup>e</sup>

officer in two cases. 2 Bl. R. 823. Ex 2. 605.

By Stat No civil process may be served on Sunday (12 during  
2d Ch 2<sup>d</sup> season of daylight on y day. Com. R. 541. - if so, service  
is void & y officer guilty of false imprisonment.  
1 Turk 75. 4 Bac 450. 2. Com R 541.

2d Day 1028 If a prisoner escapes, on y case, he may be  
retaken on y Sabbath, for is merely y means of continuing  
y officer's custody. 6 Mod 35. 253. 5 R 25. Ex 2 605  
And is in y nature of fresh pursuit. The law y same  
right to retake him as to keep him in custody,  
or to resist his attempt to escape on y day, day.

In case of illegal arrest on Sunday, y Ct will discharge  
y prisoner on motion. If no Ct is sitting, his specific  
remedy is by writ of "Habeas Corpus"  
4 Bac 450. 5 Mod 35- 6. 35 35.

### Escapes

An escape is an unlawful evasion of legal restraint,  
or custody. 2. Bac. 233 Escape. The terms in law signify  
illegality.

When therefore a person being under lawful arrest, & restrained  
of his liberty, either privately or voluntarily, evades such  
restraint, or is suffered to go at large, before he is  
delivered by due course of Law, he is said to escape.

Still

The party escaping is deemed guilty of a wrong, when Criminal  
of a Criminal wrong. & in both cases, is responsible in  
one. Civiliter, in y other Criminaliter.

It is essential to an Escape, yt there be a previous legal  
arrest. for y evasion of an illegal arrest, is in Law no  
Escape. 6 R D. 51. J. Coult 65

Where y arrest is illegal, there can be no Escape.

37.  
L.  
arrest.

The doctrine of <sup>Escapes</sup> ~~arrests~~ necessarily involves <sup>of</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>Escapes</sup> ~~arrests~~ &c.

First y arrest must be made in pursuance of lawful authority. — Seeu tis void. Tho' y<sup>d</sup> authority may sometimes exist without Writ or Warrant. This is in Criminal and not in Civil cases. 4 Bac 455-

As to Arrest without Warrant. see Title "Imprisonment"

13. When y arrest is made by virtue of a Writ or Warrant. Bac. a y Gen. & Law. Rule is, y<sup>t</sup> if y Ct from whose authority y<sup>d</sup> it issues, has Jurisdiction of y subject matter. D. C. process <sup>or</sup> itself is regular, y arrest is lawful — D suffering y person <sup>to</sup> arrested to go at large, is an Escape, even tho' y process is erroneous. 333. 34. 357. 2 116, 304. 5. Co 141. 3.

Where y arrest is in these process however, y Def<sup>t</sup> going at large is no Escape. if he appears in Ct on y appearance day. & bails in bail above as required by y rules of Practice. 3 BB. 230.

Falk 273. no Car 148. Carth 148.

It in Court. if he is forthcoming during y life of <sup>D</sup> This rule supposes y mode of making y arrest to have been regular, as without y unlawful breaking of doors &c. for however complete y authority may be, an abuse of it may render y arrest unlawful.

By y subject matter is meant, y cause of action or <sup>finis</sup> ~~finis~~.

Where if y Ct has no jurisdiction of y subject matter in such case, y process and arrest are void. and of course, there can be no Escape.

This Rule is universal.

But still in Court, y officer ant liable to y person arrested, in y defect of Jurisdiction appear on y face of y process.



Ch. R.  
 2<sup>d</sup>.  
 3<sup>d</sup> Ch.  
 4<sup>th</sup>.  
 5<sup>th</sup>.  
 4<sup>th</sup>.

In certain cases, also, the J. Ct. has complete jurisdiction & process may be void, as being irregular. As a writ returnable to any other Jm. & just term, to wh. it can by Law, be made returnable. In such cases, & arrest is void. & there can be no escape. - There there is no writ in Law, i. e. no lawful writ,

In Court these process don't usually issue from J. Ct. applied to for relief, tho' it sometimes does. The general rule therefore isn't sufficiently broad, to reach all arrests, made under these process, in practice. Tho' it extends to all cases in wh. & process is issued by J. Ct. to wh. it is returnable.

But as to cases of these Process, where & writ ant. issued by J. Ct. to wh. it is returnable, & rule in Court must be go. If & process is regularly issued by competent authority and returnable to a Ct. having jurisdiction of & subject matter, an arrest under it is lawful. (if & mode of arrest is proper); of course suffering & prisoner to go at large, may be an Escape. As. If not surrendered, before return of Execution.

Process issued with competent authority (as by a private person) is returnable to a Ct. having no jurisdiction (but Sup.) to action for, 10. § before a single Magistrate. Irregularity, renders Process void in Court and England.

Second. Writ

There must be an arrest actually made, or there can be no Escape.

A. to Law an officer, having made an arrest on Legal Process, can't delegate to a stranger a right to hold & Prisoner in his own absence. It is in Law, an Escape, and a stranger if he detain & party, is guilty of false imprisonment. As he has no authority, to detain 1. D. at P. 24. go rule is probably founded on & Regis. with wh. & Law respects and guards & rights of Personal Liberty.



Bare words will not make an arrest, there must be an actual touching of Body, or (what is tantamount) a power of immediate possession of y person and submission to it. *Ex D. 004 Case, P. 536. Bull A 202.*

An officer merely says "I arrest you" & y person runs from him, here is no arrest, and of course no Escape.

13. If y party had submitted, tho' y officer didn't lay hands upon him.

If one is arrested at y vault of A, and while in custody, or a writ in B's power, he runs, is delivered by officer.

y Esc is in construction of Law, "ipso facto" in Custody, on y second Writ, of course if suffered to go at large, y officer is guilty of an Escape in both Cases.

2 Bac 236. 5 Co 89. Bull 237.

Quere, In Court where writ goes as well as y prisoner, as y Person? For y Plff may elect to bring take y former. Tho' if he don't direct prisoner to be taken and none is taken, he would be an Escape (There) Perchance in both Cases. At C Law it don't.

Third. The arrest must be lawful, or generally speaking there can be no Escape. *Cowp. 64. Esc Escape 2. 2. 204. 204.*

An arrest must be made by authority of y officer, *Cowp 64* to whom y Writ or Warrant is directed, i.e. he must make Bac y arrest in Person, or must be in company of y assistant, or follower, actually making it, but y arrest may *Esc. 204.* be by y hand of y follower. But y officer need not be actually present, or in sight, - tis satis, if he is near and in pursuit of y same object. *Cowp 65. 6. Mod. 211.*

*Ex D. 604.*

An process by Shff. in S.P. y Shff reaches at one door and y assistant at another, and y person goes out at assistant's door. An Arrest on Sunday, in Civil

375-

Co. D.  
314.  
Cons. 3

cases being said. (ante 2) y officer is ant chargeable with an Escape. if he let y prisoner arrested on y day go at Large. Bac Corp. a.c. 1 Mod 55. Tit 78

So if Arrest is made by unlawfully breaking an outer door, or window of Def's house.. there can be no Escape.

The Sheriff is guilty of False imprisonment and y sooner he arrests him, y better.

On y point, perhaps, there may be some doubt as to claim of y party to be discharged, on motion, is not "Enote Juris." Still as y arrest is a trespass in y Sheriff, he cannot be bound it wd seem, to continue it. ante 2.

If y officer having an opportunity to arrest a Def, refuses to take him, and y latter eventually evades y arrest, y officer is liable in case, for neglect of duty. But there is no Escape. 2. Mod 23. 4. Bac Ab. Ec. a. 2.

2d Ray 331. 10. Mod 25. 50.

in 9. -  
8-1-2.  
22-1-  
w

An officer exercising a General authority (as Sheriff, General Deputy or Constable) ant bound to show his Writ. or Warrant to y Def before he makes an arrest or seizes goods, tho y latter demands it. J. Co. 4\* 51. Bac Ab. m. l.

But upon y arrest he is bound to make known y contents of y Writ. Co. D. 604. Cro. 488 8. 12. 8.

Bac.  
Ab. m. l.  
J. Co. 62.

But a Special Deputy or Bailiff, must if required show his Warrant, before he makes y arrest. Secus Def may resist him, for he ant a known officer, and shant no General authority - y Def ant bound to submit witht Coi of his authority. But he ant bound first to show his Warrant, in it is demanded.

Escapes are of 2. kinds 1. Voluntary 2. Negligent.

3 Bl.  
415.  
3232.

A Voluntary Escape is one who takes place with y consent of y Goalkeeper, or <sup>their</sup> officer having custody of

of Prisoners.

372.  
Negligent are such as happen without his consent. 3 Bl 415.  
Every person committed to prison is to be kept in safe and close custody. If then a Sheriff suffers him to leave the limits of the Prison, for a moment, he is guilty of an Escape. # 18. till delivered by due course of Law.  
In p.

1. Voluntary If a Sheriff or Gaoler admit to Bail a Prisoner, not bailable, he is guilty of a voluntary Escape. So if he consent to a Prisoner going at Large. From 1000 Prisoner a moment and even with a keeper. 1 Roll 806. 3 Co 44. Bac Be. 131. (Bac Ab Be. 13. 1. 1 Roll 806. 3 Co 44. Supra

17. Go of a person arrested on Execution is not committed. The reason of its strictness will appear Post.  
2. T.R. 176. 1. B. P. 26.

Prisoners committed on Criminal Process, are confined within the walls, Those on Civil Process, may by procuring security - to save the Sheriff harmless, be admitted at his discretion to the liberties of the Prison.  
2. T.R. 126. 131.

It has been decided in Eng. yt if a Prisoner committed on Exec is brought by "habeas Corpus ad testificandum" is a voluntary Escape. But it can't be Law, - it is not where his testimony is required. 1 Roll 72. Bac Be. 13. 2. 3. 1 Selw 72. Bail. N.P. 72.

But if a Sheriff who brings out a Prisoner on "Habeas Corpus" grant him an unnecessary or unwarrantable liberty - tis a voluntary Escape. As taking him 100 miles out of the direct road. He must bring him to Court in convenient time and a most convenient way. 12 reasons 3 Roll 305. 2d Ray 29. Bac Ab Be. 13. 2. 2d Ray. 788. 8 Mod 78. Cro Ch. 74.

So an officer having made an arrest on a civil process, must commit in convenient time, or he is guilty of a voluntary Escape. 1. B. et F 24 25 P. 70.







or before his known to a Gaoler, & Escape is negligent.

1 Root 106. 1288.

If he leaves a limits on Sunday, & Shff may commit him.

The Shff. ant bound to grant a limits of a Bailiard, in any case, even upon bond of Indemnity. His matter of Indulgence and discretion with him. But he may lawfully do it, and a bond of course is legal. (Ed. Comt. It he is bound to do) and he may & recommit to a Walle at pleasure. 2. T. R. 131. In Comt. as he is bound to grant a liberties, & G. thinks, there must be cause for committing.

In Comt. a County Ct. in a respective counties, have authority to order into close imprisonment, all persons committed on Executions, for debt, damages, fine or Costs, Except where a Execution is issued by a Supreme Ct. and in such case a Sup. Ct. has a same power. (ant ys it now repealed?) since a arbitrary and unconstitutional interposition of a Legislature, in a case of Fowler, vs Freshin. 1819.

The Shff is bound to obey, or is liable as for voluntary Escape, in a same manner as if he had permitted a voluntary Escape. — his refusal to obey — is deemed a voluntary Escape. But ys authority of a 2. Ct. extends not to a, in wh a Judgment on wh a person is committed, don't exceed 17. Sol. For a mode of proceeding, see now St 36.

Second Negligent Escapes are such as happen with officers consent.

Thus if a person arrests evades his restraint by fleeing from a officer, or by using violence, a escape is proven negligent. So if committed Escape by breaking Prison or in any other way, to wh a keeper is not consenting, as by the law.

3 Bb 410. Cro P. 419. Tichb. 130.

In an action for an escape, as a officer, his Indorsement of

of "Non inventus" is satis Eri, & y writ may be delivered to him.

### Difference between Escapes on Mesne Final Process.

If a person arrested on Final process, tho' not committed, is allowed to go at large, for a moment, y officer is liable for an Escape. 2 TR 172. Cro El. 605. d. 3 BL 415.

& Wile Execution. 9"

If tho enlarged on security given, & he shall again be summoned into custody, and y security is illegal and void, it being given to affect False Imprisonment. Contra 2. Root 133. See Quere.

Reason. as it operates as a Penal or coercive means to get satisfaction of y De gmt. But at C Law. a person arrested on Mesne Process, but <sup>not</sup> committed, may be permitted to go at large with subjecting y officer, if he is forthcoming at y return of y writ. In Court during y life of y Execution, y may be obtained vs him. Rixby 259. 382. 434. 2 TR 172. 2 BL 2 1849 3 BL 2 415 55 37. 2 Mil 294. 295.

Reason. if he is forthcoming to respond y judgment, & satisfaction of y arrest is answered. Whereas an arrest on Final process is y coercive means of obtaining payment.

If not thus forthcoming, y officer is liable in case for y escape. The escape in y case is negligent.

2. Mil 294. Cro El. 609. Cro El. 623. 52. 863. Bac. Co. d.

But if a person arrested on Mesne Process, is committed, y greater permission him to go at large for a moment, subjects him for an Escape. For upon commitment, every prisoner, is to be kept. "Salva. et arcta custodia"

Salic 27.

By Com Law. y time of obtaining is past on commitment, released by It.

2 Mil  
294.  
1. Root  
507  
Cro El.  
610.

As to the Plaintiff's remedy in such case, and  
 a matter of right & action vs. the Sheriff for his omission  
 Tort, or whether as well as the Sheriff is liable (2. Wils 254)  
 or (if a Escape was voluntary) vs. the Sheriff.

But, if a person committed on Mesne Process,  
 may be enlarged by the Sheriff upon a Bailbond.

20. By the 23. Statute a person committed on Mesne Process,  
 may be enlarged by the Sheriff on Bailbond.

If one arrested on Mesne Process, escapes, & the Plaintiff's action  
 vs. the Sheriff is by action on the Case. 2. Bac. 240.

The damages are Presumptive & the action can't be supported.

nor the Plaintiff prove a legal claim vs. the person escaping.

2. Lev. 80. 3 TR 40. 41. 2 Str 873. 2 Wils 295. 2 TR 129. 4 Do 611

Co D. 609. Exp. R. 109. Harg. 65.

But the prisoner's acknowledgment of the debt is good Evidence.

That the Plaintiff can't recover more than his original demand,  
 see Cui 23. 1 John. 215.

For an Escape on Final Process, the Plaintiff may have Case  
 or injury to Person. 2. D. 1. Plow. 22 Debt vs. the Sheriff. Co D. 203.  
 Str. 153. 2. H. Bl. 110. 113 2. TR 122. 132.

These Acts extend as well to Escapes, before commitment,  
 as afterwards. In the former case, the Jury may give  
 what damages they think proper, for the Sheriff's misconduct.  
 for the action is not really for the loss of the original action.  
 Ibid. Co D. 609.

Since the party escaping is a Comptent Witness, vs. the  
 Sheriff, for he is not discharged by a recovery of damages  
 vs. the latter. See Cui.



B. R. B.  
69. 611.

If special damages only are given, y<sup>e</sup> P<sup>l</sup>ff. may still recover his debt as y<sup>e</sup> original debtor. 2 T.R. 129. 2 M.L. 285.

Suppose full damages are given, and y<sup>e</sup> Rule y<sup>e</sup> same. Remble it is. 3 T.R. 42. 41. Pea. R. 124. Eri. R. 172.

3 Ch. R. 208. 2 T.R. 129.

Q. Think y<sup>e</sup> original debtor liable whatever y<sup>e</sup> P<sup>l</sup>ff. give.

But if y<sup>e</sup> P<sup>l</sup>ff. bring debt as y<sup>e</sup> P<sup>l</sup>ff. y<sup>e</sup> P<sup>l</sup>ff. must give y<sup>e</sup> whole sum. for not y<sup>e</sup> original debt was charged in Execution. — Is original debt and Legal Costs. Price. # I such a recovery is a bar to y<sup>e</sup> P<sup>l</sup>ffs claim. vs y<sup>e</sup> original debtor. I Quere with satisfaction? y<sup>e</sup> debt itself being considered as transferred to y<sup>e</sup> P<sup>l</sup>ff. (2 T.R. 126. 132. 2 B.R. 114.)  
Supra

C. D.  
69.

Count 20. seems require y<sup>e</sup> in case of a voluntary Escape from Prison. whether on Mesne or Final Process. I what ever y<sup>e</sup> form of y<sup>e</sup> action may be y<sup>e</sup> P<sup>l</sup>ff. shall recover of y<sup>e</sup> Keeper. I suppose y<sup>e</sup> whole original debt or damages. Count 22. New 365. This is peculiar to y<sup>e</sup> State probably.

This is then, if y<sup>e</sup> be y<sup>e</sup> true construction, gives y<sup>e</sup> same rule of damages in all cases of voluntary Escape from Prison. as obtains in Eng. only in y<sup>e</sup> action of debt for an Escape on Final Process.

If one arrested on Mesne Process but not committed, is rescued. y<sup>e</sup> officer is Excused, secus if arrested on Final Process. for he ought to have satis force, y<sup>e</sup> power of y<sup>e</sup> County. He is supposed in y<sup>e</sup> latter case. to have time to raise y<sup>e</sup> "Pope Comitatus" Why any more on Final or Mesne Process I cannot tell. I am y<sup>e</sup> he has time to raise y<sup>e</sup> "Pope Comitatus" Why?

Cro. J. 419.  
3. M.L. 416.  
Cro. Cir.  
873.

Cro. L. 610.

"Title  
Prepara"  
on the case  
10. 11

But after a Def. arrested on Mesne Process, is committed, Rescue is no excuse. for y<sup>e</sup> P<sup>l</sup>ff. in made by public Enemies. Rescue. by Robbers or Traitors



in such case is no excuse. No power greater in public Enemy's is presumed greater in his.

1. Co 84. Fitz 482. 1. Roll 808. Co. D. 60.

The same rule as y last obtains where one is arrested on Fines Procp., and not committed & original Plff may maintain an action vs y Rescuer, and y arrest was on Mesne or Fines Process. Cro D. 480. b. Hob. 180.

Cro Ch. 109. Hutton 98.

In these cases, where y Thff is liable, Plff may sue either y Thff or y Rescuer; but by suing y Rescuer, he waives his remedy (it seems) vs y Thff. - or

6 Mod 211. Hutton 98. Cro Ch. 109. 109.

Ch D 657. 59. 610.

It is said, y he may have Trespass or Case vs y Rescuer. Hob. 180. Cro D. 486. 4 Bac 399.

These are not case & only proper remedy? - B.C. can't see why he has a right to Trespass. for y damages are only consequential? -

In an action vs y Rescuer, y Jury may give either 22. y whole or part of Plffs original demand. If part only, y Plff may still proceed vs y Original Debtor.

6 Mod 211. Ch D. 657. 59. Exp D. 611. Bule N.P. 69.

Quere. may he not proceed vs y Debtor; And y Jury shd give y whole debt vs y Rescuer in damages.

In an action vs y officer for an Escape on Mesne Process his return of a Rescuer is conclusive. But Plff may sue him for a false return. for such official acts can't be falsified, except by a proceeding, with in its nature necessarily puts ym directly in Power. 1 Bent 224. 2, 20 175. and who is constituted for y purpose. Cro El. 781. Cum. 6. 29.

4 Bac 404.

In Assent. it may be disputed in y Original action.

The Thff may also have Case vs y Rescuer, but

yo I suppose, is only in cases in wh he liable over  
to y Shff. I not in case of an arrest on Mesne Process  
ante 21. See Trespass. in y Case. 10. l.

4 Bac 390. Cro C 109. 671. Hutt 98. 1 Mod. 180.

If a Shff bring out a prisoner on "Habeas Corpus" release  
is no excuse. Str 482. Cro D. 612.

Except in case of Public enemies

After a person arrested, is actually committed,  
even on Mesne process. nothing but y act of god or  
y public enemies will excuse y Shff in case of an  
Escape. Cro D. 612. 4 Co 84. a. 2. H 62 113. 4. 7 R 789.

Fire causes otherwise yn by lightning, is no excuse.  
La. G. Gorden. <sup>1783</sup> not fire in London. 1666.

Here y prisoners were released, but Parliamt made  
a special St to exempt y Shff. as y fire wasn't  
caused by lightning.

### Difference between y consequences of voluntary and Negligent

I was formerly holden yt in case of voluntary Escape  
y prisoner was absolutely discharged from y debt, or  
liability for wh he was arrested, and yt his liability  
was entirely transferred to y Sheriff. 1 Mod 202. 2 Bac 202.

But y's ant Law. y. Pitt as y nature of y case  
may require, may (if y arrest was on Final Process)  
have a new action of debt vs him. Or by Sci Fa.  
a new execution on y original Judgmt.

Bac 190. 1 Vent 4. 3 Co 415. H 60. 1 Felt 334. 31. 2 Mod 186.  
2 Bro. 240. l. <sup>415</sup>

And now by St 8. J. P. Mile Mary. 3<sup>d</sup> a new Execution  
may issue on y original judgmt. witht a Sci  
Faciens, by a Mere Affidavit.

It it seems. y Pitt may retake him on y original  
Ex<sup>t</sup> at Q Law.

This being a Mod. St. ant our Law.

By y committment 12. in case of voluntary escape)  
was in these process. y Plff may retake by an  
Escape Warrant. Eps D. 611. 3 Co 52. B. 2. Hils 235. Eps D. 611.

But y officer suffering a voluntary escape, cant  
retake or maintain an action vs y Escaper, for  
he's "particeps Criminis". 3 Co 52. 1 Felis 330. 2 TR 176.  
3 Bl 415?

And if y officer suffering a voluntary escape, does retake,  
he is guilty of false imprisonment. The Escaper is entitled  
to a Writ of Habeas Corpus. 2 TR 176. 2 Vent 269.  
2 Bac 246.

And a bond to save Shff harmless, of such an Escape,  
12. voluntary one, is void as vs Law.

But y Plff may retake y escaper, even tho he has  
received vs y Goalor, if y sum recovered was less y n  
y debt. 12. D.G. thinks of y. was not debt, if  
it was debt he recovered y whole.

Bull N.P. 69. Eps L. 511.

Suppose y whole debt and costs recovered may he  
not still retake, vide Pleading 117.

May y Plff not always retake on recovery vs y  
escaper, when he has recovered damages vs y Shff.  
of whatever amt.? 12. always no when y recovery  
vs y Shff. was in debt, on y Pt of Restraint 2. D. ante.

But in case of a negligent escape, y Shff may  
retake or have an action on y case vs him. immediately  
for escaping. for y Shff is liable for y Plff and ant  
"Particeps Criminis"  
Eps D. 612. 13. Bac 45. 6. Cro E. 234. 3 Co 52. B.



Or if a bond has been given <sup>in</sup> vs a negligent Escaper, he may sue upon it. 1 Root 157.

24

But y Sheriff's bailiff (Bailiff is only a Special agent) can't at O. Law. have an action vs y Escaper, tho' y Shff has recovered of him: for he ant liable to y original Pltff at all, nor by law. to y Shff, but by his contract with y Sheriff. Co S 343. Ch S. 613. 7 J.R. 116. 1. 2. Phil. Ev. 218. 19.

For a description of y office of Special Bailiff.

1. Ble. 340. They are empowered to make arrests their Hundred.

Quere. If y Bailiff has been compelled to pay money for y escape, may he not recover it in "indebitatus assumpsit" for money paid and laid out. for y use of y Escaper? Seemle not. Tis like any individual contracting to indemnify another vs y wrongs of a 3<sup>d</sup> person.

The Escaper may be taken by an Escape Warrant in another State. 1 Root 107.

Quere for y<sup>o</sup> ant like y case of Bailie retaking under a bail piece. 1. Root 107.

The right is founded exclusively on y Process, wch cannot run out of y State.

If a person arrested on Criminal process, escape, he is punishable by Fine, and imprisonment, and for prison breach, he is guilty of Felony. 4 R. 122. 35 2 Hawk 122. 8.



Is y latter rule enforced in Mod. practice? I? says not. They at least, seem obsolete now?

An  
Felony-

Officers who after an arrest suffers a negligent Escape, of a Felon, are punishable by Fine.

But for Voluntary Escape, they are punishable as y offender is, being considered as accessories. after y Fact.

But they are punishable as accessories, till sentence passed on y original Delinquent. 1 Hale 590. 2 Hawk 134.

4 BB 130-

But before conviction of y principal, y officer may be fined and imprisoned, as for a Misdemeanor 4 BB 130.  
for in y case y Crime or Misdemeanor is Primary.

If for a negligent escape, y Shff has been compelled to pay y debt, he may doubtless maintain vs y Escaper Indebtedness aft. for money paid &c.

And y same point has been decided at Nisi Prius, when y Escape was Voluntary in y Goaler or Deputy.

Decided Contra by La Kenne. 4 B & 112. Per 1240.

Quere an y 2 first cases at Nisi Prius, are correct on principle, when y Escape the voluntary is permitted by y under officer?

If after negligent escape, y Shff retake y Prisoner, on fresh Suit, before action vs himself, his liability to Plff is discharged, & any taking before action brot vs Shff. is a taking on fresh Suit. or in pursuit.

11 B & 11. 2 Str 518. 3 Co 44. 52. 2 T R 120.

1 Wonts 26. 1. Bb. 1. 011.

Fresh Suit is superfluous if he be taken at any time, before suit vs himself. He must however be pleaded specially in England.

Tecus in Comt.

But if y action vs y Thff. is brot before recaption, a subsequent recaption don't discharge him. for bringing y action y Pltff attaches in himself a right of Recovery.

2 Str 873 Co Litt 657

3 Co 4th 51. 1 Robt 808. 2 S P D 611

A Voluntary Return of y prisoner into custody, before action vs y Thff. is equivalent to Recaption in fresh Suit.

Com. R 557. 2 S P 126. 1 Robt 418

But in case of a voluntary Escape, relating to no Excuse. for y Thff. he has no right to retake for a party permitting a voluntary Escape is "Particeps Crimini" & besides a pledge or right of Custody, once voluntarily abandoned or suspended, is relinquished forever. 2 Wils 247. 3 Co 52. D. Co D. 61. 12. 1 Talk 277.

2 S P D. 612

He not be Guilty of False Imprisonment. ("ante").

And in such case a voluntary return don't save y Thff.

Nor will a subsequent assent by y Pltff in y action, purge a voluntary Escape. He may still sue y Thff or retake y party.

But if y Escaper is negligent, y Shff may for his own security, retake even after action brot vs him.  
1 Rost 33.

25. If after a negligent Escape, y Pltff in y process discharge, y Escaper, y Goalr y Shff cannot retake him, for his fees, tho he might have retained him for his fees, for by Escape, his lien is lost. - as y loss of his actual custody is deemed to have been, by his own fault & neglect. 1 Rost 64.

On a negligent Escape of a prisoner, having y liberty of y prison yard, a retaking on fresh Suit, or a voluntary return, before action brot, saves y Shff.  
1 Rost 106.

Yet may in such case, as y last, recover nominal damages, on y bond of indurment, for y condition is broken. 1 Rost 107. & after such escape neither y Prisoner nor y Bondman, can compel y Shff to receive y former. - he has a right to enforce y bond, y penalty being forfeited at Law. 1 Rost 127.

He recovers only Nominal damages generally, for he ant liable to y Pltff.

But y bondsmen ant liable in y last case, to y Shff, for y debt due from y Escaper after y Pltffs remedy vs y Shff is barred, as by y Act of Limitation. Tho y prisoner ant retaken, 1 Rost 151. And if y Judgment for y Def, vs y bondsmen, before "audita querela" lies, for y object of y bond is to indemnify y Shff, vs y claims of y original Pltff, and in y case

supposed, yet claim is barred 1. Root 187.

Under a count for a voluntary escape, y Plff may give a negligent Escape, in Evr and Def may of course plead to such count, a retaking in fresh pursuit with traversing y avermt, yt y Escape was voluntary. 10 Ventr 211. 2 IR 126.

Then there is y Plff to avail himself of y distinction between a negligent and voluntary Escape. In his replication, by way of new assignment. of the escape 1 be as a voluntary Escape.

It is unpertinent to state it voluntary in y decl<sup>n</sup> — it shd come out in y replication, in answer to any defence yt may be made vs a negligent Escape, 10 Ventr 217. 2 Bac 248.  
2 IR 126.

For a voluntary escape, y under Shff or Gaoler is liable. Corp 403. Co. D. 613.

If then y Plff in y process sue y Under Shff, y Shff seems excused. Ep 2. 610.

If after action writ vs y Shff, for an Escape & before y original judgment vs y Gaoler is reversed, y Shff may defeat y action by pleading to y original Judgment. Nul Tel Record.

But if after Judgment and Co. vs y Shff, y original judgment is reversed, y judgment vs y Shff stands good — it can't be reversed. 2 Bac 40. 248.

3 Mod  
325. Hot. 209

8 Co 122. B



Quere? may he not be released on Execution by  
"audita Querela" So it seems, 5 Co. 143. B.

This is a Mist as a Duagmt discovered an act  
"by Matter de post facto" A voluntary Escape  
works y forfeiture of y Goalers office, or M<sup>or</sup> Sh<sup>er</sup>ff. if he is partly  
Secur<sup>y</sup> of negligent.

### False Returns and Miscellaneous Rules

If a Sh<sup>er</sup>ff make a false return, he is liable to an action  
on y Case, in favour of y Party aggrieved ante 22. In return  
of Service on y Def. when there has been none. There  
Def may sue him. 1 Wils 336. Co. D. 610

In Comt. Plt<sup>f</sup> may sue if Def abscond, return  
as by Comt practice he may in plea in abatement,  
for Plt<sup>f</sup> is then suffering waste.

So of a False return of "non est inventus" y Plt<sup>f</sup>  
in y process may sue.

upon False return & upon Execution, action on case.

11. Co. D. 616. Str 650 Bro Civ 720.

So of Nulla Bona.

### County's liability for Escapes in Comt.

In Comt. if a prisoner escape thin y insufficiency  
of y Goal, y County is by y<sup>e</sup> made Liable for him.  
Tis y duty of y County and not of y Sh<sup>er</sup>ff to keep y  
y Goal in repair. 1 Root 450.

By y O<sup>rd</sup> Lin Sh<sup>er</sup>ff is liable in such case, 1 Co 84. a  
P<sup>er</sup> h 11. 1 R. 6. Str 482.

Et of C Pleas.

The remedy in Court is by Petition to y County Ct,  
 I not by action: I appeal by petition is allowed by y Supr  
 Ct. Court Et 223. 17th Et 3rd. 18th 318. 1 Root 155. 8.  
 275. 8. 3rd. 457. 575. 2 To 3d.

In Conn in General y liability of y County (according)  
 to their decisions, is but nominal: for it is holden yt of  
 debts is responsible, y Creditor must pursue his remedy  
 w him, and if not y Creditor suffers no actual loss  
 by y Escape, and therefore can recover only nominal  
 damages. So yt County is virtually made liable in  
 ordinary cases only, for y Special damage actually  
 sustained. Quod Thunum.

JJ. cannot reconcile y to y rules of Justice.

If however y person escaping is of ability at y time  
 of y Escape, & by means of y Escape is enabled to demand  
 y County, I suppose, wd be subjected to y whole  
 debt. As Escape by means of External assistance,  
 y Goal being otherwise sufficient, y County ant liable.  
 2 Root 135.

In Conn in those cases of Escape thro y insufficiency  
 of y Goal, y Shf wd be also liable, if y escape  
 were facilitated by any actual negligence in him  
 or y Goaler.

### Effects of discharging from Execution-

17R 257.

4 Bun

2482.

8 JR

123.

7 Do 420

6 Do 325.

If a Creditor voluntarily discharges from custody a debtor  
 taken in Execution, or committed or not, he can never  
 afterwards relater him nor in any way. Enforce  
 y Judgment. 1. 17r 652. Ch Bill, 182.

If a discharge of y debt, y body in Execution being  
 deemed for y time being, a satisfaction and y Shf having

taken his highest remedy, must abide by it.

And this discharge mere in consideration of a new promise by a Def. to pay. If a promise is broken, y Rule is y same. He can't be retaken nor sued in debt on, Judgmt, but on y promise he may be.

4 Burr 2482. 1506 557. 6. J.R. 525. 7. Do. 420.

2 East 243.

And y Judgmt is satisfied by thus enlarging y Def, even tho' y new agreement shd be defeated afterwards for Impossibility. 1506 557 5. Do 525.

And a bond conditioned for y rendering <sup>Costs</sup> of a person overtaken, upon it y released by y Pltff, is void as being vs Law. This is a bond for to take Imprisonment.

1. Bat F. 242. 2. East 223. 2 R

But in Court, such a bond has been held good.

2 East 133.

This determination is directly opposed to y rule of y Law.

30. If 2. It Debtors are taken in Court, a release of one from <sup>the King</sup> y custody of y Pltff, is a release of y whole debt. 1 Sm. 16. 93. Lath. 57. If originally joint and Several y debt becomes joint <sup>vs 2.</sup> by Judgmt vs both. 13. 132. 525. 5. Do. 420.

Each one in Law being bound y whole -

Suppose one of 2. It and Several sued alone, taken in Execution & enlarged by y Pltff, is y Def quoad y other discharged, y recovery being as of a Several debt?



- 2 Bl B 1235  
4 F.R. 8252  
Ch B 1310  
115. 124.  
2 Thors 481.
- But under Law Merchant, a holder of a bill &c, after having taking one Endorsee in Ex<sup>te</sup> and discharged him in C<sup>te</sup>dy without actual satisfaction, may sue another. for they are not Jt Debtors - each is bound independently of a Rest.

It was formerly decided, that if a Sole Def imprisoned on Ex<sup>te</sup> died in prison, y debt was forever extinguished on y ground, yt y Plt<sup>f</sup> had elected his highest remedy, I ought to be bound by it. Hob. 52. Cro Eliz 850. Cro J. 136-143

Tho if one of 2. Jt debtors, thus imprisoned, died, y debt as to y other was always not to be discharged. 5Cs 86. Cro Eliz 850. Cro J. 136. 143-

- 2 Bac 354.  
Hibing 183
- And by y St 21. Jams. 1. tis 'declared, explained & enacted' yt when a Sole Def dies in prison, y Plt<sup>f</sup> may sue out a new Ex<sup>te</sup> vs y 'State of y Deceased, as if there had been no prior Ex<sup>te</sup>.

This is a parliamentary declaration yt y former was not Law.

31. A Penal bond <sup>given</sup> by a prisoner to y Sh<sup>ff</sup> conditioned, yt y. (\* a bond for ease and favour) obligor shall remain a true prisoner till y debt fees and Expences of board are paid, is wholly void. - it being as to y Board and Fees vs y St. 1 Vent 23<sup>d</sup>. 1 Pw C. 1<sup>st</sup> 3. 12 Mod 683. Hob. 14. 1. P.M. 155. 12 Mod 155. 10. Co 103. 6.
- 2 Mil 357.
- But y St contemplates only Penal obligations, wh may enable y Sh<sup>ff</sup> to oppress y prisoner, by a forfeiture of y Penalty. "Contract 26."

The Sub. Ct in Com<sup>te</sup> seems to have adopted y idea, yt it is void as to y board only. 1 Root 158.



And it not be consistent with the Principle in Court,  
to consider a bond good in toto, as penalties may then  
be cancelled, in all cases in Cts of Common Law.

All prisoners are by y<sup>e</sup> Law. to support themselves, in  
felons attainted. They are deemed incapable of supporting  
themselves, as their property is forfeited.


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
The Eng<sup>l</sup> Law mitigated y<sup>e</sup> Law in y<sup>e</sup> case of poor  
persons.

In Court, prisoners in Civil Suits obliged to  
bear their own Expenses. in admitted to y<sup>e</sup> "poor man's  
sath" wh<sup>ch</sup> is y<sup>t</sup> he ant worth 17. Dole. after y<sup>e</sup> sath,  
if he ant supplied with a weekly maintenance 18.  
money satis to pay his board and lodging, he may  
be discharged. The creditor is allowed to prove y<sup>t</sup>  
y<sup>e</sup> prisoner is worth 17. Dole. This rule or law is adopted  
by Congress. in y<sup>e</sup> sum is 17. Dole

Fines of Sheriff and Goalers.










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